The Project Gutenberg eBook of Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant — Volume 2, by Ulysses S. Grant

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PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT

VOLUME II.

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER XL. FIRST MEETING WITH SECRETARY STANTON—GENERAL ROSECRANS—COMMANDING MILITARY DIVISION OF MISSISSIPPI—ANDREW JOHNSON'S ADDRESS—ARRIVAL AT CHATTANOOGA.

CHAPTER XLI. ASSUMING THE COMMAND AT CHATTANOOGA—OPENING A LINE OFSUPPLIES—BATTLE OF WAUHATCHIE—ON THE PICKET LINE.

CHAPTER XLII. CONDITION OF THE ARMY—REBUILDING THE RAILROAD—GENERALBURNSIDE'S SITUATION—ORDERS FOR BATTLE—PLANS FOR THE ATTACK—HOOKER'SPOSITION—SHERMAN'S MOVEMENTS.

CHAPTER XLIII. PREPARATIONS FOR BATTLE—THOMAS CARRIES THE FIRST LINE OFTHE ENEMY—SHERMAN CARRIES MISSIONARY RIDGE—BATTLE OF LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN—GENERAL HOOKER'S FIGHT.

CHAPTER XLIV. BATTLE OF CHATTANOOGA—A GALLANT CHARGE—COMPLETE ROUT OFTHE ENEMY—PURSUIT OF THE CONFEDERATES—GENERAL BRAGG—REMARKS ONCHATTANOOGA.

CHAPTER XLV. THE RELIEF OF KNOXVILLE—HEADQUARTERS MOVED TO NASHVILLE—VISITING KNOXVILLE—CIPHER DISPATCHES—WITHHOLDING ORDERS.

CHAPTER XLVI. OPERATIONS IN MISSISSIPPI—LONGSTREET IN EAST TENNESSEE—COMMISSIONED LIEUTENANT-GENERAL—COMMANDING THE ARMIES OF THE UNITEDSTATES—FIRST INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT LINCOLN.

CHAPTER XLVII. THE MILITARY SITUATION—PLANS FOR THE CAMPAIGN—SHERIDANASSIGNED TO COMMAND OF THE CAVALRY—FLANK MOVEMENTS—FORREST AT FORTPILLOW—GENERAL BANKS'S EXPEDITION—COLONEL MOSBY—AN INCIDENT OF THEWILDERNESS CAMPAIGN.

CHAPTER XLVIII. COMMENCEMENT OF THE GRAND CAMPAIGN—GENERAL BUTLER'SPOSITION—SHERIDAN'S FIRST RAID.

CHAPTER XLIX. SHERMAN S CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA—SIEGE OF ATLANTA—DEATH OFGENERAL MCPHERSON—ATTEMPT TO CAPTURE ANDERSONVILLE—CAPTURE OF ATLANTA.

CHAPTER L. GRAND MOVEMENT OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC—CROSSING THERAPIDAN—ENTERING THE WILDERNESS—BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS.

CHAPTER LI. AFTER THE BATTLE—TELEGRAPH AND SIGNAL SERVICE—MOVEMENT BYTHE LEFT FLANK.

CHAPTER LII. BATTLE OF SPOTTSYLVANIA—HANCOCK'S POSITION—ASSAULT OFWARREN'S AND WRIGHT'S CORPS—UPTON PROMOTED ON THE FIELD—GOOD NEWS FROMBUTLER AND SHERIDAN.

CHAPTER LIII. HANCOCK'S ASSAULT—LOSSES OF THE CONFEDERATES—PROMOTIONSRECOMMENDED—DISCOMFITURE OF THE ENEMY—EWELL'S ATTACK—REDUCING THEARTILLERY.

CHAPTER LIV. MOVEMENT BY THE LEFT FLANK—BATTLE OF NORTH ANNA—ANINCIDENT OF THE MARCH—MOVING ON RICHMOND—SOUTH OF THE PAMUNKEY—POSITION OF THE NATIONAL ARMY.

CHAPTER LV. ADVANCE ON COLD HARBOR—AN ANECDOTE OF THE WAR—BATTLE OFCOLD HARBOR—CORRESPONDENCE WITH LEE RETROSPECTIVE.

CHAPTER LVI. LEFT FLANK MOVEMENT ACROSS THE CHICKAHOMINY AND JAMES—GENERAL LEE—VISIT TO BUTLER—THE MOVEMENT ON PETERSBURG—THE INVESTMENT OF PETERSBURG.

CHAPTER LVII. RAID ON THE VIRGINIA CENTRAL RAILROAD—RAID ON THE WELDONRAILROAD—EARLY'S MOVEMENT UPON WASHINGTON—MINING THE WORKS BEFOREPETERSBURG—EXPLOSION OF THE MINE BEFORE PETERSBURG—CAMPAIGN IN THESHENANDOAH VALLEY—CAPTURE OF THE WELDON RAILROAD.

CHAPTER LVIII. SHERIDAN'S ADVANCE—VISIT TO SHERIDAN—SHERIDAN'S VICTORYIN THE SHENANDOAH—SHERIDAN'S RIDE TO WINCHESTER—CLOSE OF THE CAMPAIGNFOR THE WINTER.

CHAPTER LIX. THE CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA—SHERMAN'S MARCH TO THE SEA—WARANECDOTES—THE MARCH ON SAVANNAH—INVESTMENT OF SAVANNAH—CAPTURE OFSAVANNAH.

CHAPTER LX. THE BATTLE OF FRANKLIN—THE BATTLE OF NASHVILLE

CHAPTER LXI. EXPEDITION AGAINST FORT FISHER—ATTACK ON THE FORT—FAILUREOF THE EXPEDITION—SECOND EXPEDITION AGAINST THE FORT—CAPTURE OF FORTFISHER.

CHAPTER LXII. SHERMAN'S MARCH NORTH—SHERIDAN ORDERED TO LYNCHBURG—CANBY ORDERED TO MOVE AGAINST MOBILE—MOVEMENTS OF SCHOFIELD AND THOMAS—CAPTURE OF COLUMBIA,best electronic learning toys for 14 year olds SOUTH CAROLINA—SHERMAN IN THE CAROLINAS.

CHAPTER LXIII. ARRIVAL OF THE PEACE COMMISSIONERS—LINCOLN AND THE PEACECOMMISSIONERS—AN ANECDOTE OF LINCOLN—THE WINTER BEFORE PETERSBURG—SHERIDAN DESTROYS THE RAILROAD—GORDON CARRIES THE PICKET LINE—PARKERECAPTURES THE LINE—THE BATTLE OF WHITE OAK ROAD.

CHAPTER LXIV. INTERVIEW WITH SHERIDAN—GRAND MOVEMENT OF THE ARMY OF THEPOTOMAC—SHERIDAN'S ADVANCE ON FIVE FORKS—BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS—PARKEAND WRIGHT STORM THE ENEMY'S LINE—BATTLES BEFORE PETERSBURG.

CHAPTER LXV. THE CAPTURE OF PETERSBURG—MEETING PRESIDENT LINCOLN INPETERSBURG—THE CAPTURE OF RICHMOND—PURSUING THE ENEMY—VISIT TOSHERIDAN AND MEADE.

CHAPTER LXVI. BATTLE OF SAILOR'S CREEK—ENGAGEMENT AT FARMVILLE—CORRESPONDENCE WITH GENERAL LEE—SHERIDAN INTERCEPTS THE ENEMY.

CHAPTER LXVII. NEGOTIATIONS AT APPOMATTOX—INTERVIEW WITH LEE ATMCLEAN'S HOUSE—THE TERMS OF SURRENDER—LEE'S SURRENDER—INTERVIEW WITHLEE AFTER THE SURRENDER.

CHAPTER LXVIII. MORALE OF THE TWO ARMIES—RELATIVE CONDITIONS OF THENORTH AND SOUTH—PRESIDENT LINCOLN VISITS RICHMOND—ARRIVAL ATWASHINGTON—PRESIDENT LINCOLN'S ASSASSINATION—PRESIDENT JOHNSON'SPOLICY.

CHAPTER LXIX. SHERMAN AND JOHNSTON—JOHNSTON'S SURRENDER TO SHERMAN—CAPTURE OF MOBILE—WILSON'S EXPEDITION—CAPTURE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS—GENERAL THOMAS'S QUALITIES—ESTIMATE OF GENERAL CANBY.

CHAPTER LXX. THE END OF THE WAR—THE MARCH TO WASHINGTON—ONE OFLINCOLN'S ANECDOTES—GRAND REVIEW AT WASHINGTON—CHARACTERISTICS OFLINCOLN AND STANTON—ESTIMATE OF THE DIFFERENT CORPS COMMANDERS.

CONCLUSION

APPENDIX

CHAPTER XL.

FIRST MEETING WITH SECRETARY STANTON—GENERAL ROSECRANS—COMMANDINGMILITARY DIVISION OF MISSISSIPPI—ANDREW JOHNSON'S ADDRESS—ARRIVAL ATCHATTANOOGA.

The reply (to my telegram of October 16, 1863, from Cairo, announcing myarrival at that point) came on the morning of the 17th, directing me toproceed immediately to the Galt House, Louisville, where I would meet anofficer of the War Department with my instructions. I left Cairo withinan hour or two after the receipt of this dispatch, going by rail viaIndianapolis. Just as the train I was on was starting out of the depotat Indianapolis a messenger came running up to stop it, saying theSecretary of War was coming into the station and wanted to see me.

I had never met Mr. Stanton up to that time, though we had held frequentconversations over the wires the year before, when I was in Tennessee.Occasionally at night he would order the wires between the WarDepartment and my headquarters to be connected, and we would hold aconversation for an hour or two. On this occasion the Secretary wasaccompanied by Governor Brough of Ohio, whom I had never met, though heand my father had been old acquaintances. Mr. Stanton dismissed thespecial train that had brought him to Indianapolis, and accompanied meto Louisville.

Up to this time no hint had been given me of what was wanted after Ileft Vicksburg, except the suggestion in one of Halleck's dispatchesthat I had better go to Nashville and superintend the operation oftroops sent to relieve Rosecrans. Soon after we started the Secretaryhanded me two orders, saying that I might take my choice of them. Thetwo were identical in all but one particular. Both created the"Military Division of Mississippi," (giving me the command) composed ofthe Departments of the Ohio, the Cumberland, and the Tennessee, and allthe territory from the Alleghanies to the Mississippi River north ofBanks's command in the south-west. One order left the departmentcommanders as they were, while the other relieved Rosecrans and assignedThomas to his place. I accepted the latter. We reached Louisvilleafter night and, if I remember rightly, in a cold, drizzling rain. TheSecretary of War told me afterwards that he caught a cold on thatoccasion from which he never expected to recover. He never did.

A day was spent in Louisville, the Secretary giving me the military newsat the capital and talking about the disappointment at the results ofsome of the campaigns. By the evening of the day after our arrival allmatters of discussion seemed exhausted, and I left the hotel to spendthe evening away, both Mrs. Grant (who was with me) and myself havingrelatives living in Louisville. In the course of the evening Mr.Stanton received a dispatch from Mr. C. A. Dana, then in Chattanooga,informing him that unless prevented Rosecrans would retreat, andadvising peremptory orders against his doing so.

As stated before, after the fall of Vicksburg I urged strongly upon thegovernment the propriety of a movement against Mobile. GeneralRosecrans had been at Murfreesboro', Tennessee, with a large andwell-equipped army from early in the year 1863, with Bragg confrontinghim with a force quite equal to his own at first, considering it was onthe defensive. But after the investment of Vicksburg Bragg's army waslargely depleted to strengthen Johnston, in Mississippi, who was beingreinforced to raise the siege. I frequently wrote General Hallecksuggesting that Rosecrans should move against Bragg. By so doing hewould either detain the latter's troops where they were or layChattanooga open to capture. General Halleck strongly approved thesuggestion, and finally wrote me that he had repeatedly orderedRosecrans to advance, but that the latter had constantly failed tocomply with the order, and at last, after having held a council of war,had replied in effect that it was a military maxim "not to fight twodecisive battles at the same time." If true, the maxim was notapplicable in this case. It would be bad to be defeated in two decisivebattles fought the same day, but it would not be bad to win them. I,however, was fighting no battle, and the siege of Vicksburg had drawnfrom Rosecrans' front so many of the enemy that his chances of victorywere much greater than they would be if he waited until the siege wasover, when these troops could be returned. Rosecrans was ordered tomove against the army that was detaching troops to raise the siege.Finally he did move, on the 24th of June, but ten days afterwardsVicksburg surrendered, and the troops sent from Bragg were free toreturn.

It was at this time that I recommended to the general-in-chief themovement against Mobile. I knew the peril the Army of the Cumberlandwas in, being depleted continually, not only by ordinary casualties, butalso by having to detach troops to hold its constantly extending lineover which to draw supplies, while the enemy in front was as constantlybeing strengthened. Mobile was important to the enemy, and in theabsence of a threatening force was guarded by little else thanartillery. If threatened by land and from the water at the same timethe prize would fall easily, or troops would have to be sent to itsdefence. Those troops would necessarily come from Bragg. My judgmentwas overruled, and the troops under my command were dissipated overother parts of the country where it was thought they could render themost service.

Soon it was discovered in Washington that Rosecrans was in trouble andrequired assistance. The emergency was now too immediate to allow us togive this assistance by making an attack in rear of Bragg upon Mobile.It was therefore necessary to reinforce directly, and troops were sentfrom every available point.

Rosecrans had very skilfully manoeuvred Bragg south of the TennesseeRiver, and through and beyond Chattanooga. If he had stopped andintrenched, and made himself strong there, all would have been right andthe mistake of not moving earlier partially compensated. But he pushedon, with his forces very much scattered, until Bragg's troops fromMississippi began to join him. Then Bragg took the initiative.Rosecrans had to fall back in turn, and was able to get his armytogether at Chickamauga, some miles south-east of Chattanooga, beforethe main battle was brought on. The battle was fought on the 19th and20th of September, and Rosecrans was badly defeated, with a heavy lossin artillery and some sixteen thousand men killed, wounded and captured.The corps under Major-General George H. Thomas stood its ground, whileRosecrans, with Crittenden and McCook, returned to Chattanooga. Thomasreturned also, but later, and with his troops in good order. Braggfollowed and took possession of Missionary Ridge, overlookingChattanooga. He also occupied Lookout Mountain, west of the town, whichRosecrans had abandoned, and with it his control of the river and theriver road as far back as Bridgeport. The National troops were nowstrongly intrenched in Chattanooga Valley, with the Tennessee Riverbehind them and the enemy occupying commanding heights to the east andwest, with a strong line across the valley from mountain to mountain,and with Chattanooga Creek, for a large part of the way, in front oftheir line.

On the 29th Halleck telegraphed me the above results, and directed allthe forces that could be spared from my department to be sent toRosecrans. Long before this dispatch was received Sherman was on hisway, and McPherson was moving east with most of the garrison ofVicksburg.

A retreat at that time would have been a terrible disaster. It wouldnot only have been the loss of a most important strategic position tous, but it would have been attended with the loss of all the artillerystill left with the Army of the Cumberland and the annihilation of thatarmy itself, either by capture or demoralization.

All supplies for Rosecrans had to be brought from Nashville. Therailroad between this base and the army was in possession of thegovernment up to Bridgeport, the point at which the road crosses to thesouth side of the Tennessee River; but Bragg, holding Lookout andRaccoon mountains west of Chattanooga, commanded the railroad, the riverand the shortest and best wagon-roads, both south and north of theTennessee, between Chattanooga and Bridgeport. The distance betweenthese two places is but twenty-six miles by rail, but owing to theposition of Bragg, all supplies for Rosecrans had to be hauled by acircuitous route north of the river and over a mountainous country,increasing the distance to over sixty miles.

This country afforded but little food for his animals, nearly tenthousand of which had already starved, and not enough were left to drawa single piece of artillery or even the ambulances to convey the sick.The men had been on half rations of hard bread for a considerable time,with but few other supplies except beef driven from Nashville across thecountry. The region along the road became so exhausted of food for thecattle that by the time they reached Chattanooga they were much in thecondition of the few animals left alive there—"on the lift." Indeed,the beef was so poor that the soldiers were in the habit of saying, witha faint facetiousness, that they were living on "half rations of hardbread and BEEF DRIED ON THE HOOF."

Nothing could be transported but food, and the troops were withoutsufficient shoes or other clothing suitable for the advancing season.What they had was well worn. The fuel within the Federal lines wasexhausted, even to the stumps of trees. There were no teams to draw itfrom the opposite bank, where it was abundant. The only way ofsupplying fuel, for some time before my arrival, had been to cut treeson the north bank of the river at a considerable distance up the stream,form rafts of it and float it down with the current, effecting a landingon the south side within our lines by the use of paddles or poles. Itwould then be carried on the shoulders of the men to their camps.

If a retreat had occurred at this time it is not probable that any ofthe army would have reached the railroad as an organized body, iffollowed by the enemy.

On the receipt of Mr. Dana's dispatch Mr. Stanton sent for me. Findingthat I was out he became nervous and excited, inquiring of every personhe met, including guests of the house, whether they knew where I was,and bidding them find me and send me to him at once. About eleveno'clock I returned to the hotel, and on my way, when near the house,every person met was a messenger from the Secretary, apparentlypartaking of his impatience to see me. I hastened to the room of theSecretary and found him pacing the floor rapidly in his dressing-gown.Saying that the retreat must be prevented, he showed me the dispatch. Iimmediately wrote an order assuming command of the Military Division ofthe Mississippi, and telegraphed it to General Rosecrans. I thentelegraphed to him the order from Washington assigning Thomas to thecommand of the Army of the Cumberland; and to Thomas that he must holdChattanooga at all hazards, informing him at the same time that I wouldbe at the front as soon as possible. A prompt reply was received fromThomas, saying, "We will hold the town till we starve." I appreciatedthe force of this dispatch later when I witnessed the condition ofaffairs which prompted it. It looked, indeed, as if but two courseswere open: one to starve, the other to surrender or be captured.

On the morning of the 20th of October I started, with my staff, andproceeded as far as Nashville. At that time it was not prudent totravel beyond that point by night, so I remained in Nashville until thenext morning. Here I met for the first time Andrew Johnson, MilitaryGovernor of Tennessee. He delivered a speech of welcome. His composureshowed that it was by no means his maiden effort. It was long, and Iwas in torture while he was delivering it, fearing something would beexpected from me in response. I was relieved, however, the peopleassembled having apparently heard enough. At all events they commenceda general hand-shaking, which, although trying where there is so much ofit, was a great relief to me in this emergency.

From Nashville I telegraphed to Burnside, who was then at Knoxville,that important points in his department ought to be fortified, so thatthey could be held with the least number of men; to Admiral Porter atCairo, that Sherman's advance had passed Eastport, Mississippi, thatrations were probably on their way from St. Louis by boat for supplyinghis army, and requesting him to send a gunboat to convoy them; and toThomas, suggesting that large parties should be put at work on thewagon-road then in use back to Bridgeport.

On the morning of the 21st we took the train for the front, reachingStevenson Alabama, after dark. Rosecrans was there on his way north.He came into my car and we held a brief interview, in which he describedvery clearly the situation at Chattanooga, and made some excellentsuggestions as to what should be done. My only wonder was that he hadnot carried them out. We then proceeded to Bridgeport, where we stoppedfor the night. From here we took horses and made our way by Jasper andover Waldron's Ridge to Chattanooga. There had been much rain, and theroads were almost impassable from mud, knee-deep in places, and fromwash-outs on the mountain sides. I had been on crutches since the timeof my fall in New Orleans, and had to be carried over places where itwas not safe to cross on horseback. The roads were strewn with thedebris of broken wagons and the carcasses of thousands of starved mulesand horses. At Jasper, some ten or twelve miles from Bridgeport, therewas a halt. General O. O. Howard had his headquarters there. From thispoint I telegraphed Burnside to make every effort to secure five hundredrounds of ammunition for his artillery and small-arms. We stopped forthe night at a little hamlet some ten or twelve miles farther on. Thenext day we reached Chattanooga a little before dark. I went directlyto General Thomas's headquarters, and remaining there a few days, untilI could establish my own.

During the evening most of the general officers called in to pay theirrespects and to talk about the condition of affairs. They pointed outon the map the line, marked with a red or blue pencil, which Rosecranshad contemplated falling back upon. If any of them had approved themove they did not say so to me. I found General W. F. Smith occupyingthe position of chief engineer of the Army of the Cumberland. I hadknown Smith as a cadet at West Point, but had no recollection of havingmet him after my graduation, in 1843, up to this time. He explained thesituation of the two armies and the topography of the country so plainlythat I could see it without an inspection. I found that he hadestablished a saw-mill on the banks of the river, by utilizing an oldengine found in the neighborhood; and, by rafting logs from the northside of the river above, had got out the lumber and completed pontoonsand roadway plank for a second bridge, one flying bridge being therealready. He was also rapidly getting out the materials and constructingthe boats for a third bridge. In addition to this he had far under waya steamer for plying between Chattanooga and Bridgeport whenever wemight get possession of the river. This boat consisted of a scow, madeof the plank sawed out at the mill, housed in, and a stern wheelattached which was propelled by a second engine taken from some shop orfactory.

I telegraphed to Washington this night, notifying General Halleck of myarrival, and asking to have General Sherman assigned to the command ofthe Army of the Tennessee, headquarters in the field. The request wasat once complied with.

CHAPTER XLI.

ASSUMING THE COMMAND AT CHATTANOOGA—OPENING A LINE OF SUPPLIES—BATTLEOF WAUHATCHIE—ON THE PICKET LINE.

The next day, the 24th, I started out to make a personal inspection,taking Thomas and Smith with me, besides most of the members of mypersonal staff. We crossed to the north side of the river, and, movingto the north of detached spurs of hills, reached the Tennessee atBrown's Ferry, some three miles below Lookout Mountain, unobserved bythe enemy. Here we left our horses back from the river and approachedthe water on foot. There was a picket station of the enemy on theopposite side, of about twenty men, in full view, and we were withineasy range. They did not fire upon us nor seem to be disturbed by ourpresence. They must have seen that we were all commissioned officers.But, I suppose, they looked upon the garrison of Chattanooga asprisoners of war, feeding or starving themselves, and thought it wouldbe inhuman to kill any of them except in self-defence.

That night I issued orders for opening the route to Bridgeport—acracker line, as the soldiers appropriately termed it. They had been solong on short rations that my first thought was the establishment of aline over which food might reach them.

Chattanooga is on the south bank of the Tennessee, where that river runsnearly due west. It is at the northern end of a valley five or sixmiles in width, through which Chattanooga Creek runs. To the east ofthe valley is Missionary Ridge, rising from five to eight hundred feetabove the creek and terminating somewhat abruptly a half mile or morebefore reaching the Tennessee. On the west of the valley is LookoutMountain, twenty-two hundred feet above-tide water. Just below the townthe Tennessee makes a turn to the south and runs to the base of LookoutMountain, leaving no level ground between the mountain and river. TheMemphis and Charleston Railroad passes this point, where the mountainstands nearly perpendicular. East of Missionary Ridge flows the SouthChickamauga River; west of Lookout Mountain is Lookout Creek; and westof that, Raccoon Mountains. Lookout Mountain, at its northern end,rises almost perpendicularly for some distance, then breaks off in agentle slope of cultivated fields to near the summit, where it ends in apalisade thirty or more feet in height. On the gently sloping ground,between the upper and lower palisades, there is a single farmhouse,which is reached by a wagon-road from the valley east.

The intrenched line of the enemy commenced on the north end ofMissionary Ridge and extended along the crest for some distance south,thence across Chattanooga valley to Lookout Mountain. Lookout Mountainwas also fortified and held by the enemy, who also kept troops inLookout valley west, and on Raccoon Mountain, with pickets extendingdown the river so as to command the road on the north bank and render ituseless to us. In addition to this there was an intrenched line inChattanooga valley extending from the river east of the town to LookoutMountain, to make the investment complete. Besides the fortificationson Mission Ridge, there was a line at the base of the hill, withoccasional spurs of rifle-pits half-way up the front. The enemy'spickets extended out into the valley towards the town, so far that thepickets of the two armies could converse. At one point they wereseparated only by the narrow creek which gives its name to the valleyand town, and from which both sides drew water. The Union lines wereshorter than those of the enemy.

Thus the enemy, with a vastly superior force, was strongly fortified tothe east, south, and west, and commanded the river below. Practically,the Army of the Cumberland was besieged. The enemy had stopped with hiscavalry north of the river the passing of a train loaded with ammunitionand medical supplies. The Union army was short of both, not havingammunition enough for a day's fighting.

General Halleck had, long before my coming into this new field, orderedparts of the 11th and 12th corps, commanded respectively by GeneralsHoward and Slocum, Hooker in command of the whole, from the Army of thePotomac to reinforce Rosecrans. It would have been folly to send themto Chattanooga to help eat up the few rations left there. They wereconsequently left on the railroad, where supplies could be brought tothem. Before my arrival, Thomas ordered their concentration atBridgeport.

General W. F. Smith had been so instrumental in preparing for the movewhich I was now about to make, and so clear in his judgment about themanner of making it, that I deemed it but just to him that he shouldhave command of the troops detailed to execute the design, although hewas then acting as a staff officer and was not in command of troops.

On the 24th of October, after my return to Chattanooga, the followingdetails were made: General Hooker, who was now at Bridgeport, wasordered to cross to the south side of the Tennessee and march up byWhitesides and Wauhatchie to Brown's Ferry. General Palmer, with adivision of the 14th corps, Army of the Cumberland, was ordered to movedown the river on the north side, by a back road, until oppositeWhitesides, then cross and hold the road in Hooker's rear after he hadpassed. Four thousand men were at the same time detailed to act underGeneral Smith directly from Chattanooga. Eighteen hundred of them, underGeneral Hazen, were to take sixty pontoon boats, and under cover ofnight float by the pickets of the enemy at the north base of Lookout,down to Brown's Ferry, then land on the south side and capture or driveaway the pickets at that point. Smith was to march with the remainderof the detail, also under cover of night, by the north bank of the riverto Brown's Ferry, taking with him all the material for laying the bridgeas soon as the crossing was secured.

On the 26th, Hooker crossed the river at Bridgeport and commenced hiseastward march. At three o'clock on the morning of the 27th, Hazenmoved into the stream with his sixty pontoons and eighteen hundred braveand well-equipped men. Smith started enough in advance to be near theriver when Hazen should arrive. There are a number of detached spurs ofhills north of the river at Chattanooga, back of which is a good roadparallel to the stream, sheltered from the view from the top of Lookout.It was over this road Smith marched. At five o'clock Hazen landed atBrown's Ferry, surprised the picket guard, and captured most of it. Byseven o'clock the whole of Smith's force was ferried over and inpossession of a height commanding the ferry. This was speedilyfortified, while a detail was laying the pontoon bridge. By ten o'clockthe bridge was laid, and our extreme right, now in Lookout valley, wasfortified and connected with the rest of the army. The two bridges overthe Tennessee River—a flying one at Chattanooga and the new one atBrown's Ferry—with the road north of the river, covered from both thefire and the view of the enemy, made the connection complete. Hookerfound but slight obstacles in his way, and on the afternoon of the 28themerged into Lookout valley at Wauhatchie. Howard marched on to Brown'sFerry, while Geary, who commanded a division in the 12th corps, stoppedthree miles south. The pickets of the enemy on the river below were nowcut off, and soon came in and surrendered.

The river was now opened to us from Lookout valley to Bridgeport.Between Brown's Ferry and Kelly's Ferry the Tennessee runs through anarrow gorge in the mountains, which contracts the stream so much as toincrease the current beyond the capacity of an ordinary steamer to stemit. To get up these rapids, steamers must be cordelled; that is, pulledup by ropes from the shore. But there is no difficulty in navigatingthe stream from Bridgeport to Kelly's Ferry. The latter point is onlyeight miles from Chattanooga and connected with it by a good wagon-road,which runs through a low pass in the Raccoon Mountains on the south sideof the river to Brown's Ferry, thence on the north side to the riveropposite Chattanooga. There were several steamers at Bridgeport, andabundance of forage, clothing and provisions.

On the way to Chattanooga I had telegraphed back to Nashville for a goodsupply of vegetables and small rations, which the troops had been solong deprived of. Hooker had brought with him from the east a fullsupply of land transportation. His animals had not been subjected tohard work on bad roads without forage, but were in good condition. Infive days from my arrival in Chattanooga the way was open to Bridgeportand, with the aid of steamers and Hooker's teams, in a week the troopswere receiving full rations. It is hard for any one not an eye-witnessto realize the relief this brought. The men were soon reclothed andalso well fed, an abundance of ammunition was brought up, and acheerfulness prevailed not before enjoyed in many weeks. Neitherofficers nor men looked upon themselves any longer as doomed. The weakand languid appearance of the troops, so visible before, disappeared atonce. I do not know what the effect was on the other side, but assumeit must have been correspondingly depressing. Mr. Davis had visitedBragg but a short time before, and must have perceived our condition tobe about as Bragg described it in his subsequent report. "Thesedispositions," he said, "faithfully sustained, insured the enemy'sspeedy evacuation of Chattanooga for want of food and forage. Possessedof the shortest route to his depot, and the one by which reinforcementsmust reach him, we held him at our mercy, and his destruction was only aquestion of time." But the dispositions were not "faithfullysustained," and I doubt not but thousands of men engaged in trying to"sustain" them now rejoice that they were not. There was no time duringthe rebellion when I did not think, and often say, that the South wasmore to be benefited by its defeat than the North. The latter had thepeople, the institutions, and the territory to make a great andprosperous nation. The former was burdened with an institutionabhorrent to all civilized people not brought up under it, and one whichdegraded labor, kept it in ignorance, and enervated the governing class.With the outside world at war with this institution, they could not haveextended their territory. The labor of the country was not skilled, norallowed to become so. The whites could not toil without becomingdegraded, and those who did were denominated "poor white trash." Thesystem of labor would have soon exhausted the soil and left the peoplepoor. The non-slaveholders would have left the country, and the smallslaveholder must have sold out to his more fortunate neighbor. Soon theslaves would have outnumbered the masters, and, not being in sympathywith them, would have risen in their might and exterminated them. Thewar was expensive to the South as well as to the North, both in bloodand treasure, but it was worth all it cost.

The enemy was surprised by the movements which secured to us a line ofsupplies. He appreciated its importance, and hastened to try to recoverthe line from us. His strength on Lookout Mountain was not equal toHooker's command in the valley below. From Missionary Ridge he had tomarch twice the distance we had from Chattanooga, in order to reachLookout Valley; but on the night of the 28th and 29th an attack was madeon Geary at Wauhatchie by Longstreet's corps. When the battlecommenced, Hooker ordered Howard up from Brown's Ferry. He had threemiles to march to reach Geary. On his way he was fired upon by rebeltroops from a foot-hill to the left of the road and from which the roadwas commanded. Howard turned to the left, charged up the hill andcaptured it before the enemy had time to intrench, taking manyprisoners. Leaving sufficient men to hold this height, he pushed on toreinforce Geary. Before he got up, Geary had been engaged for aboutthree hours against a vastly superior force. The night was so dark thatthe men could not distinguish one from another except by the light ofthe flashes of their muskets. In the darkness and uproar Hooker'steamsters became frightened and deserted their teams. The mules alsobecame frightened, and breaking loose from their fastenings stampededdirectly towards the enemy. The latter, no doubt, took this for acharge, and stampeded in turn. By four o'clock in the morning thebattle had entirely ceased, and our "cracker line" was never afterwarddisturbed.

In securing possession of Lookout Valley, Smith lost one man killed andfour or five wounded. The enemy lost most of his pickets at the ferry,captured. In the night engagement of the 28th-9th Hooker lost 416killed and wounded. I never knew the loss of the enemy, but our troopsburied over one hundred and fifty of his dead and captured more than ahundred.

After we had secured the opening of a line over which to bring oursupplies to the army, I made a personal inspection to see the situationof the pickets of the two armies. As I have stated, Chattanooga Creekcomes down the centre of the valley to within a mile or such a matter ofthe town of Chattanooga, then bears off westerly, then north-westerly,and enters the Tennessee River at the foot of Lookout Mountain. Thiscreek, from its mouth up to where it bears off west, lay between the twolines of pickets, and the guards of both armies drew their water fromthe same stream. As I would be under short-range fire and in an opencountry, I took nobody with me, except, I believe, a bugler, who stayedsome distance to the rear. I rode from our right around to our left.When I came to the camp of the picket guard of our side, I heard thecall, "Turn out the guard for the commanding general." I replied,"Never mind the guard," and they were dismissed and went back to theirtents. Just back of these, and about equally distant from the creek,were the guards of the Confederate pickets. The sentinel on their postcalled out in like manner, "Turn out the guard for the commandinggeneral," and, I believe, added, "General Grant." Their line in amoment front-faced to the north, facing me, and gave a salute, which Ireturned.

The most friendly relations seemed to exist between the pickets of thetwo armies. At one place there was a tree which had fallen across thestream, and which was used by the soldiers of both armies in drawingwater for their camps. General Longstreet's corps was stationed thereat the time, and wore blue of a little different shade from our uniform.Seeing a soldier in blue on this log, I rode up to him, commencedconversing with him, and asked whose corps he belonged to. He was verypolite, and, touching his hat to me, said he belonged to GeneralLongstreet's corps. I asked him a few questions—but not with a view ofgaining any particular information—all of which he answered, and I rodeoff.

CHAPTER XLII.

CONDITION OF THE ARMY—REBUILDING THE RAILROAD—GENERAL BURNSIDE'SSITUATION—ORDERS FOR BATTLE—PLANS FOR THE ATTACK—HOOKER'S POSITION—SHERMAN'S MOVEMENTS.

Having got the Army of the Cumberland in a comfortable position, I nowbegan to look after the remainder of my new command. Burnside was inabout as desperate a condition as the Army of the Cumberland had been,only he was not yet besieged. He was a hundred miles from the nearestpossible base, Big South Fork of the Cumberland River, and much fartherfrom any railroad we had possession of. The roads back were overmountains, and all supplies along the line had long since beenexhausted. His animals, too, had been starved, and their carcasseslined the road from Cumberland Gap, and far back towards Lexington, Ky.East Tennessee still furnished supplies of beef, bread and forage, butit did not supply ammunition, clothing, medical supplies, or smallrations, such as coffee, sugar, salt and rice.

Sherman had started from Memphis for Corinth on the 11th of October.His instructions required him to repair the road in his rear in order tobring up supplies. The distance was about three hundred and thirtymiles through a hostile country. His entire command could not havemaintained the road if it had been completed. The bridges had all beendestroyed by the enemy, and much other damage done. A hostile communitylived along the road; guerilla bands infested the country, and more orless of the cavalry of the enemy was still in the West. Often Sherman'swork was destroyed as soon as completed, and he only a short distanceaway.

The Memphis and Charleston Railroad strikes the Tennessee River atEastport, Mississippi. Knowing the difficulty Sherman would have tosupply himself from Memphis, I had previously ordered supplies sent fromSt. Louis on small steamers, to be convoyed by the navy, to meet him atEastport. These he got. I now ordered him to discontinue his work ofrepairing roads and to move on with his whole force to Stevenson,Alabama, without delay. This order was borne to Sherman by a messenger,who paddled down the Tennessee in a canoe and floated over MuscleShoals; it was delivered at Iuka on the 27th. In this Sherman wasnotified that the rebels were moving a force towards Cleveland, EastTennessee, and might be going to Nashville, in which event his troopswere in the best position to beat them there. Sherman, with hischaracteristic promptness, abandoned the work he was engaged upon andpushed on at once. On the 1st of November he crossed the Tennessee atEastport, and that day was in Florence, Alabama, with the head ofcolumn, while his troops were still crossing at Eastport, with Blairbringing up the rear.

Sherman's force made an additional army, with cavalry, artillery, andtrains, all to be supplied by the single track road from Nashville. Allindications pointed also to the probable necessity of supplyingBurnside's command in East Tennessee, twenty-five thousand more, by thesame route. A single track could not do this. I gave, therefore, anorder to Sherman to halt General G. M. Dodge's command, of about eightthousand men, at Athens, and subsequently directed the latter to arrangehis troops along the railroad from Decatur north towards Nashville, andto rebuild that road. The road from Nashville to Decatur passes over abroken country, cut up with innumerable streams, many of them ofconsiderable width, and with valleys far below the road-bed. All thebridges over these had been destroyed, and the rails taken up andtwisted by the enemy. All the cars and locomotives not carried off hadbeen destroyed as effectually as they knew how to destroy them. Allbridges and culverts had been destroyed between Nashville and Decatur,and thence to Stevenson, where the Memphis and Charleston and theNashville and Chattanooga roads unite. The rebuilding of this roadwould give us two roads as far as Stevenson over which to supply thearmy. From Bridgeport, a short distance farther east, the riversupplements the road.

General Dodge, besides being a most capable soldier, was an experiencedrailroad builder. He had no tools to work with except those of thepioneers—axes, picks, and spades. With these he was able to intrenchhis men and protect them against surprises by small parties of theenemy. As he had no base of supplies until the road could be completedback to Nashville, the first matter to consider after protecting his menwas the getting in of food and forage from the surrounding country. Hehad his men and teams bring in all the grain they could find, or allthey needed, and all the cattle for beef, and such other food as couldbe found. Millers were detailed from the ranks to run the mills alongthe line of the army. When these were not near enough to the troops forprotection they were taken down and moved up to the line of the road.Blacksmith shops, with all the iron and steel found in them, were movedup in like manner. Blacksmiths were detailed and set to work making thetools necessary in railroad and bridge building. Axemen were put towork getting out timber for bridges and cutting fuel for locomotiveswhen the road should be completed. Car-builders were set to workrepairing the locomotives and cars. Thus every branch of railroadbuilding, making tools to work with, and supplying the workmen withfood, was all going on at once, and without the aid of a mechanic orlaborer except what the command itself furnished. But rails and carsthe men could not make without material, and there was not enoughrolling stock to keep the road we already had worked to its fullcapacity. There were no rails except those in use. To supply thesedeficiencies I ordered eight of the ten engines General McPherson had atVicksburg to be sent to Nashville, and all the cars he had except ten.I also ordered the troops in West Tennessee to points on the river andon the Memphis and Charleston road, and ordered the cars, locomotivesand rails from all the railroads except the Memphis and Charleston toNashville. The military manager of railroads also was directed tofurnish more rolling stock and, as far as he could, bridge material.General Dodge had the work assigned him finished within forty days afterreceiving his orders. The number of bridges to rebuild was one hundredand eighty-two, many of them over deep and wide chasms; the length ofroad repaired was one hundred and two miles.

The enemy's troops, which it was thought were either moving againstBurnside or were going to Nashville, went no farther than Cleveland.Their presence there, however, alarmed the authorities at Washington,and, on account of our helpless condition at Chattanooga, caused me muchuneasiness. Dispatches were constantly coming, urging me to dosomething for Burnside's relief; calling attention to the importance ofholding East Tennessee; saying the President was much concerned for theprotection of the loyal people in that section, etc. We had not atChattanooga animals to pull a single piece of artillery, much less asupply train. Reinforcements could not help Burnside, because he hadneither supplies nor ammunition sufficient for them; hardly, indeed,bread and meat for the men he had. There was no relief possible for himexcept by expelling the enemy from Missionary Ridge and aboutChattanooga.

On the 4th of November Longstreet left our front with about fifteenthousand troops, besides Wheeler's cavalry, five thousand more, to goagainst Burnside. The situation seemed desperate, and was moreaggravating because nothing could be done until Sherman should get up.The authorities at Washington were now more than ever anxious for thesafety of Burnside's army, and plied me with dispatches faster thanever, urging that something should be done for his relief. On the 7th,before Longstreet could possibly have reached Knoxville, I orderedThomas peremptorily to attack the enemy's right, so as to force thereturn of the troops that had gone up the valley. I directed him totake mules, officers' horses, or animals wherever he could get them tomove the necessary artillery. But he persisted in the declaration thathe could not move a single piece of artillery, and could not see how hecould possibly comply with the order. Nothing was left to be done butto answer Washington dispatches as best I could; urge Sherman forward,although he was making every effort to get forward, and encourageBurnside to hold on, assuring him that in a short time he should berelieved. All of Burnside's dispatches showed the greatest confidencein his ability to hold his position as long as his ammunition held out.He even suggested the propriety of abandoning the territory he heldsouth and west of Knoxville, so as to draw the enemy farther from hisbase and make it more difficult for him to get back to Chattanooga whenthe battle should begin. Longstreet had a railroad as far as Loudon;but from there to Knoxville he had to rely on wagon trains. Burnside'ssuggestion, therefore, was a good one, and it was adopted. On the 14thI telegraphed him:

"Sherman's advance has reached Bridgeport. His whole force will beready to move from there by Tuesday at farthest. If you can holdLongstreet in check until he gets up, or by skirmishing and falling backcan avoid serious loss to yourself and gain time, I will be able toforce the enemy back from here and place a force between Longstreet andBragg that must inevitably make the former take to the mountain-passesby every available road, to get to his supplies. Sherman would havebeen here before this but for high water in Elk River driving him somethirty miles up that river to cross."

And again later in the day, indicating my plans for his relief, asfollows:

"Your dispatch and Dana's just received. Being there, you can tellbetter how to resist Longstreet's attack than I can direct. With yourshowing you had better give up Kingston at the last moment and save themost productive part of your possessions. Every arrangement is now madeto throw Sherman's force across the river, just at and below the mouthof Chickamauga Creek, as soon as it arrives. Thomas will attack on hisleft at the same time, and together it is expected to carry MissionaryRidge, and from there push a force on to the railroad between Clevelandand Dalton. Hooker will at the same time attack, and, if he can, carryLookout Mountain. The enemy now seems to be looking for an attack onhis left flank. This favors us. To further confirm this, Sherman'sadvance division will march direct from Whiteside to Trenton. Theremainder of his force will pass over a new road just made fromWhiteside to Kelly's Ferry, thus being concealed from the enemy, andleave him to suppose the whole force is going up Lookout Valley.Sherman's advance has only just reached Bridgeport. The rear will onlyreach there on the 16th. This will bring it to the 19th as the earliestday for making the combined movement as desired. Inform me if you thinkyou can sustain yourself until this time. I can hardly conceive of theenemy breaking through at Kingston and pushing for Kentucky. If theyshould, however, a new problem would be left for solution. Thomas hasordered a division of cavalry to the vicinity of Sparta. I willascertain if they have started, and inform you. It will be entirely outof the question to send you ten thousand men, not because they cannot bespared, but how would they be fed after they got even one day east fromhere?"

Longstreet, for some reason or other, stopped at Loudon until the 13th.That being the terminus of his railroad communications, it is probablehe was directed to remain there awaiting orders. He was in a positionthreatening Knoxville, and at the same time where he could be broughtback speedily to Chattanooga. The day after Longstreet left Loudon,Sherman reached Bridgeport in person and proceeded on to see me thatevening, the 14th, and reached Chattanooga the next day.

My orders for battle were all prepared in advance of Sherman's arrival(*15), except the dates, which could not be fixed while troops to beengaged were so far away. The possession of Lookout Mountain was of nospecial advantage to us now. Hooker was instructed to send Howard'scorps to the north side of the Tennessee, thence up behind the hills onthe north side, and to go into camp opposite Chattanooga; with theremainder of the command, Hooker was, at a time to be afterwardsappointed, to ascend the western slope between the upper and lowerpalisades, and so get into Chattanooga valley.

The plan of battle was for Sherman to attack the enemy's right flank,form a line across it, extend our left over South Chickamauga River soas to threaten or hold the railroad in Bragg's rear, and thus force himeither to weaken his lines elsewhere or lose his connection with hisbase at Chickamauga Station. Hooker was to perform like service on ourright. His problem was to get from Lookout Valley to Chattanooga Valleyin the most expeditious way possible; cross the latter valley rapidly toRossville, south of Bragg's line on Missionary Ridge, form line thereacross the ridge facing north, with his right flank extended toChickamauga Valley east of the ridge, thus threatening the enemy's rearon that flank and compelling him to reinforce this also. Thomas, withthe Army of the Cumberland, occupied the centre, and was to assaultwhile the enemy was engaged with most of his forces on his two flanks.

To carry out this plan, Sherman was to cross the Tennessee at Brown'sFerry and move east of Chattanooga to a point opposite the north end ofMission Ridge, and to place his command back of the foot-hills out ofsight of the enemy on the ridge. There are two streams calledChickamauga emptying into the Tennessee River east of Chattanooga—NorthChickamauga, taking its rise in Tennessee, flowing south, and emptyinginto the river some seven or eight miles east; while the SouthChickamauga, which takes its rise in Georgia, flows northward, andempties into the Tennessee some three or four miles above the town.There were now one hundred and sixteen pontoons in the North ChickamaugaRiver, their presence there being unknown to the enemy.

At night a division was to be marched up to that point, and at twoo'clock in the morning moved down with the current, thirty men in eachboat. A few were to land east of the mouth of the South Chickamauga,capture the pickets there, and then lay a bridge connecting the twobanks of the river. The rest were to land on the south side of theTennessee, where Missionary Ridge would strike it if prolonged, and asufficient number of men to man the boats were to push to the north sideto ferry over the main body of Sherman's command while those left on thesouth side intrenched themselves. Thomas was to move out from his linesfacing the ridge, leaving enough of Palmer's corps to guard against anattack down the valley. Lookout Valley being of no present value to us,and being untenable by the enemy if we should secure Missionary Ridge,Hooker's orders were changed. His revised orders brought him toChattanooga by the established route north of the Tennessee. He wasthen to move out to the right to Rossville.

Hooker's position in Lookout Valley was absolutely essential to us solong as Chattanooga was besieged. It was the key to our line forsupplying the army. But it was not essential after the enemy wasdispersed from our front, or even after the battle for this purpose wasbegun. Hooker's orders, therefore, were designed to get his force pastLookout Mountain and Chattanooga Valley, and up to Missionary Ridge. Bycrossing the north face of Lookout the troops would come intoChattanooga Valley in rear of the line held by the enemy across thevalley, and would necessarily force its evacuation. Orders wereaccordingly given to march by this route. But days before the battlebegan the advantages as well as the disadvantages of this plan of actionwere all considered. The passage over the mountain was a difficult oneto make in the face of an enemy. It might consume so much time as tolose us the use of the troops engaged in it at other points where theywere more wanted. After reaching Chattanooga Valley, the creek of thesame name, quite a formidable stream to get an army over, had to becrossed. I was perfectly willing that the enemy should keep LookoutMountain until we got through with the troops on Missionary Ridge. Bymarching Hooker to the north side of the river, thence up the stream,and recrossing at the town, he could be got in position at any namedtime; when in this new position, he would have Chattanooga Creek behindhim, and the attack on Missionary Ridge would unquestionably cause theevacuation by the enemy of his line across the valley and on LookoutMountain. Hooker's order was changed accordingly. As explainedelsewhere, the original order had to be reverted to, because of a floodin the river rendering the bridge at Brown's Ferry unsafe for thepassage of troops at the exact juncture when it was wanted to bring allthe troops together against Missionary Ridge.

The next day after Sherman's arrival I took him, with Generals Thomasand Smith and other officers, to the north side of the river, and showedthem the ground over which Sherman had to march, and pointed outgenerally what he was expected to do. I, as well as the authorities inWashington, was still in a great state of anxiety for Burnside's safety.Burnside himself, I believe, was the only one who did not share in thisanxiety. Nothing could be done for him, however, until Sherman's troopswere up. As soon, therefore, as the inspection was over, Shermanstarted for Bridgeport to hasten matters, rowing a boat himself, Ibelieve, from Kelly's Ferry. Sherman had left Bridgeport the nightof the 14th, reached Chattanooga the evening of the 15th, made theabove-described inspection on the morning of the 16th, and started backthe same evening to hurry up his command, fully appreciating theimportance of time.

His march was conducted with as much expedition as the roads and seasonwould admit of. By the 20th he was himself at Brown's Ferry with thehead of column, but many of his troops were far behind, and one division(Ewing's) was at Trenton, sent that way to create the impression thatLookout was to be taken from the south. Sherman received his orders atthe ferry, and was asked if he could not be ready for the assault thefollowing morning. News had been received that the battle had beencommenced at Knoxville. Burnside had been cut off from telegraphiccommunications. The President, the Secretary of War, and GeneralHalleck, were in an agony of suspense. My suspense was also great, butmore endurable, because I was where I could soon do something to relievethe situation. It was impossible to get Sherman's troops up for thenext day. I then asked him if they could not be got up to make theassault on the morning of the 22d, and ordered Thomas to move on thatdate. But the elements were against us. It rained all the 20th and21st. The river rose so rapidly that it was difficult to keep thepontoons in place.

General Orlando B. Willcox, a division commander under Burnside, was atthis time occupying a position farther up the valley than Knoxville—about Maynardville—and was still in telegraphic communication with theNorth. A dispatch was received from him saying that he was threatenedfrom the east. The following was sent in reply:

"If you can communicate with General Burnside, say to him that ourattack on Bragg will commence in the morning. If successful, such amove will be made as I think will relieve East Tennessee, if he can holdout. Longstreet passing through our lines to Kentucky need not causealarm. He would find the country so bare that he would lose histransportation and artillery before reaching Kentucky, and would meetsuch a force before he got through, that he could not return."

Meantime, Sherman continued his crossing without intermission as fast ashis troops could be got up. The crossing had to be effected in fullview of the enemy on the top of Lookout Mountain. Once over, however,the troops soon disappeared behind the detached hill on the north side,and would not come to view again, either to watchmen on Lookout Mountainor Missionary Ridge, until they emerged between the hills to strike thebank of the river. But when Sherman's advance reached a point oppositethe town of Chattanooga, Howard, who, it will be remembered, had beenconcealed behind the hills on the north side, took up his line of marchto join the troops on the south side. His crossing was in full viewboth from Missionary Ridge and the top of Lookout, and the enemy ofcourse supposed these troops to be Sherman's. This enabled Sherman toget to his assigned position without discovery.

CHAPTER XLIII.

PREPARATIONS FOR BATTLE—THOMAS CARRIES THE FIRST LINE OF THE ENEMY—SHERMAN CARRIES MISSIONARY RIDGE—BATTLE OF LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN—GENERAL HOOKER'S FIGHT.

On the 20th, when so much was occurring to discourage—rains falling soheavily as to delay the passage of troops over the river at Brown'sFerry and threatening the entire breaking of the bridge; news coming ofa battle raging at Knoxville; of Willcox being threatened by a forcefrom the east—a letter was received from Bragg which contained thesewords: "As there may still be some non-combatants in Chattanooga, Ideem it proper to notify you that prudence would dictate their earlywithdrawal." Of course, I understood that this was a device intended todeceive; but I did not know what the intended deception was. On the22d, however, a deserter came in who informed me that Bragg was leavingour front, and on that day Buckner's division was sent to reinforceLongstreet at Knoxville, and another division started to follow but wasrecalled. The object of Bragg's letter, no doubt, was in some way todetain me until Knoxville could be captured, and his troops there bereturned to Chattanooga.

During the night of the 21st the rest of the pontoon boats, completed,one hundred and sixteen in all, were carried up to and placed in NorthChickamauga. The material for the roadway over these was deposited outof view of the enemy within a few hundred yards of the bank of theTennessee, where the north end of the bridge was to rest.

Hearing nothing from Burnside, and hearing much of the distress in
Washington on his account, I could no longer defer operations for his
relief. I determined, therefore, to do on the 23d, with the Army of the
Cumberland, what had been intended to be done on the 24th.

The position occupied by the Army of the Cumberland had been made verystrong for defence during the months it had been besieged. The line wasabout a mile from the town, and extended from Citico Creek, a smallstream running near the base of Missionary Ridge and emptying into theTennessee about two miles below the mouth of the South Chickamauga, onthe left, to Chattanooga Creek on the right. All commanding points onthe line were well fortified and well equipped with artillery. Theimportant elevations within the line had all been carefully fortifiedand supplied with a proper armament. Among the elevations so fortifiedwas one to the east of the town, named Fort Wood. It owed itsimportance chiefly to the fact that it lay between the town andMissionary Ridge, where most of the strength of the enemy was. FortWood had in it twenty-two pieces of artillery, most of which would reachthe nearer points of the enemy's line. On the morning of the 23dThomas, according to instructions, moved Granger's corps of twodivisions, Sheridan and T. J. Wood commanding, to the foot of Fort Wood,and formed them into line as if going on parade, Sheridan on the right,Wood to the left, extending to or near Citico Creek. Palmer, commandingthe 14th corps, held that part of our line facing south and southwest.He supported Sheridan with one division (Baird's), while his otherdivision under Johnson remained in the trenches, under arms, ready to bemoved to any point. Howard's corps was moved in rear of the centre. Thepicket lines were within a few hundred yards of each other. At twoo'clock in the afternoon all were ready to advance. By this time theclouds had lifted so that the enemy could see from his elevated positionall that was going on. The signal for advance was given by a booming ofcannon from Fort Wood and other points on the line. The rebel picketswere soon driven back upon the main guards, which occupied minor anddetached heights between the main ridge and our lines. These too werecarried before halting, and before the enemy had time to reinforce theiradvance guards. But it was not without loss on both sides. Thismovement secured to us a line fully a mile in advance of the one weoccupied in the morning, and the one which the enemy had occupied up tothis time. The fortifications were rapidly turned to face the otherway. During the following night they were made strong. We lost in thispreliminary action about eleven hundred killed and wounded, while theenemy probably lost quite as heavily, including the prisoners that werecaptured. With the exception of the firing of artillery, kept up fromMissionary Ridge and Fort Wood until night closed in, this ended thefighting for the first day.

The advantage was greatly on our side now, and if I could only have beenassured that Burnside could hold out ten days longer I should haverested more easily. But we were doing the best we could for him and thecause.

By the night of the 23d Sherman's command was in a position to move,though one division (Osterhaus's) had not yet crossed the river atBrown's Ferry. The continuous rise in the Tennessee had rendered itimpossible to keep the bridge at that point in condition for troops tocross; but I was determined to move that night even without thisdivision. Orders were sent to Osterhaus accordingly to report toHooker, if he could not cross by eight o'clock on the morning of the24th. Because of the break in the bridge, Hooker's orders were againchanged, but this time only back to those first given to him.

General W. F. Smith had been assigned to duty as Chief Engineer of theMilitary Division. To him were given the general direction of movingtroops by the boats from North Chickamauga, laying the bridge after theyreached their position, and generally all the duties pertaining to hisoffice of chief engineer. During the night General Morgan L. Smith'sdivision was marched to the point where the pontoons were, and thebrigade of Giles A. Smith was selected for the delicate duty of manningthe boats and surprising the enemy's pickets on the south bank of theriver. During this night also General J. M. Brannan, chief ofartillery, moved forty pieces of artillery, belonging to the Army of theCumberland, and placed them on the north side of the river so as tocommand the ground opposite, to aid in protecting the approach to thepoint where the south end of the bridge was to rest. He had to useSherman's artillery horses for this purpose, Thomas having none.

At two o'clock in the morning, November 24th, Giles A. Smith pushed outfrom the North Chickamauga with his one hundred and sixteen boats, eachloaded with thirty brave and well-armed men. The boats with theirprecious freight dropped down quietly with the current to avoidattracting the attention of any one who could convey information to theenemy, until arriving near the mouth of South Chickamauga. Here a fewboats were landed, the troops debarked, and a rush was made upon thepicket guard known to be at that point. The guard were surprised, andtwenty of their number captured. The remainder of the troops effected alanding at the point where the bridge was to start, with equally goodresults. The work of ferrying over Sherman's command from the northside of the Tennessee was at once commenced, using the pontoons for thepurpose. A steamer was also brought up from the town to assist. Therest of M. L. Smith's division came first, then the division of John E.Smith. The troops as they landed were put to work intrenching theirposition. By daylight the two entire divisions were over, and wellcovered by the works they had built.

The work of laying the bridge, on which to cross the artillery andcavalry, was now begun. The ferrying over the infantry was continuedwith the steamer and the pontoons, taking the pontoons, however, as fastas they were wanted to put in their place in the bridge. By a littlepast noon the bridge was completed, as well as one over the SouthChickamauga connecting the troops left on that side with their comradesbelow, and all the infantry and artillery were on the south bank of theTennessee.

Sherman at once formed his troops for assault on Missionary Ridge. Byone o'clock he started with M. L. Smith on his left, keeping nearly thecourse of Chickamauga River; J. E. Smith next to the right and a littleto the rear; and Ewing still farther to the right and also a little tothe rear of J. E. Smith's command, in column, ready to deploy to theright if an enemy should come from that direction. A good skirmish linepreceded each of these columns. Soon the foot of the hill was reached;the skirmishers pushed directly up, followed closely by their supports.By half-past three Sherman was in possession of the height withouthaving sustained much loss. A brigade from each division was nowbrought up, and artillery was dragged to the top of the hill by hand.The enemy did not seem to be aware of this movement until the top of thehill was gained. There had been a drizzling rain during the day, andthe clouds were so low that Lookout Mountain and the top of MissionaryRidge were obscured from the view of persons in the valley. But now theenemy opened fire upon their assailants, and made several attempts withtheir skirmishers to drive them away, but without avail. Later in theday a more determined attack was made, but this, too, failed, andSherman was left to fortify what he had gained.

Sherman's cavalry took up its line of march soon after the bridge wascompleted, and by half-past three the whole of it was over both bridgesand on its way to strike the enemy's communications at ChickamaugaStation. All of Sherman's command was now south of the Tennessee.During the afternoon General Giles A. Smith was severely wounded andcarried from the field.

Thomas having done on the 23d what was expected of him on the 24th,there was nothing for him to do this day except to strengthen hisposition. Howard, however, effected a crossing of Citico Creek and ajunction with Sherman, and was directed to report to him. With two orthree regiments of his command he moved in the morning along the banksof the Tennessee, and reached the point where the bridge was being laid.He went out on the bridge as far as it was completed from the south end,and saw Sherman superintending the work from the north side and movinghimself south as fast as an additional boat was put in and the roadwayput upon it. Howard reported to his new chief across the chasm betweenthem, which was now narrow and in a few minutes closed.

While these operations were going on to the east of Chattanooga, Hookerwas engaged on the west. He had three divisions: Osterhaus's, of the15th corps, Army of the Tennessee; Geary's, 12th corps, Army of thePotomac; and Cruft's, 14th corps, Army of the Cumberland. Geary was onthe right at Wauhatchie, Cruft at the centre, and Osterhaus near Brown'sFerry. These troops were all west of Lookout Creek. The enemy had theeast bank of the creek strongly picketed and intrenched, and threebrigades of troops in the rear to reinforce them if attacked. Thesebrigades occupied the summit of the mountain. General Carter L.Stevenson was in command of the whole. Why any troops, except artillerywith a small infantry guard, were kept on the mountain-top, I do notsee. A hundred men could have held the summit—which is a palisade formore than thirty feet down—against the assault of any number of menfrom the position Hooker occupied.

The side of Lookout Mountain confronting Hooker's command was rugged,heavily timbered, and full of chasms, making it difficult to advancewith troops, even in the absence of an opposing force. Farther up, theground becomes more even and level, and was in cultivation. On the eastside the slope is much more gradual, and a good wagon road, zigzaggingup it, connects the town of Chattanooga with the summit.

Early on the morning of the 24th Hooker moved Geary's division,supported by a brigade of Cruft's, up Lookout Creek, to effect acrossing. The remainder of Cruft's division was to seize the bridgeover the creek, near the crossing of the railroad. Osterhaus was to moveup to the bridge and cross it. The bridge was seized by Gross's brigadeafter a slight skirmish with the pickets guarding it. This attractedthe enemy so that Geary's movement farther up was not observed. A heavymist obscured him from the view of the troops on the top of themountain. He crossed the creek almost unobserved, and captured thepicket of over forty men on guard near by. He then commenced ascendingthe mountain directly in his front. By this time the enemy was seencoming down from their camps on the mountain slope, and filing intotheir rifle-pits to contest the crossing of the bridge. By eleveno'clock the bridge was complete. Osterhaus was up, and after some sharpskirmishing the enemy was driven away with considerable loss in killedand captured.

While the operations at the bridge were progressing, Geary was pushingup the hill over great obstacles, resisted by the enemy directly in hisfront, and in face of the guns on top of the mountain. The enemy,seeing their left flank and rear menaced, gave way, and were followed byCruft and Osterhaus. Soon these were up abreast of Geary, and the wholecommand pushed up the hill, driving the enemy in advance. By noon Gearyhad gained the open ground on the north slope of the mountain, with hisright close up to the base of the upper palisade, but there were strongfortifications in his front. The rest of the command coming up, a linewas formed from the base of the upper palisade to the mouth ofChattanooga Creek.

Thomas and I were on the top of Orchard Knob. Hooker's advance now madeour line a continuous one. It was in full view, extending from theTennessee River, where Sherman had crossed, up Chickamauga River to thebase of Mission Ridge, over the top of the north end of the ridge toChattanooga Valley, then along parallel to the ridge a mile or more,across the valley to the mouth of Chattanooga Creek, thence up the slopeof Lookout Mountain to the foot of the upper palisade. The day washazy, so that Hooker's operations were not visible to us except atmoments when the clouds would rise. But the sound of his artillery andmusketry was heard incessantly. The enemy on his front was partiallyfortified, but was soon driven out of his works. During the afternoonthe clouds, which had so obscured the top of Lookout all day as to hidewhatever was going on from the view of those below, settled down andmade it so dark where Hooker was as to stop operations for the time. Atfour o'clock Hooker reported his position as impregnable. By a littleafter five direct communication was established, and a brigade of troopswas sent from Chattanooga to reinforce him. These troops had to crossChattanooga Creek and met with some opposition, but soon overcame it,and by night the commander, General Carlin, reported to Hooker and wasassigned to his left. I now telegraphed to Washington: "The fightto-day progressed favorably. Sherman carried the end of MissionaryRidge, and his right is now at the tunnel, and his left at ChickamaugaCreek. Troops from Lookout Valley carried the point of the mountain, andnow hold the eastern slope and a point high up. Hooker reports twothousand prisoners taken, besides which a small number have fallen intoour hands from Missionary Ridge." The next day the President replied:"Your dispatches as to fighting on Monday and Tuesday are here. Welldone. Many thanks to all. Remember Burnside." And Halleck alsotelegraphed: "I congratulate you on the success thus far of your plans.I fear that Burnside is hard pushed, and that any further delay mayprove fatal. I know you will do all in your power to relieve him."

The division of Jefferson C. Davis, Army of the Cumberland, had beensent to the North Chickamauga to guard the pontoons as they weredeposited in the river, and to prevent all ingress or egress ofcitizens. On the night of the 24th his division, having crossed withSherman, occupied our extreme left from the upper bridge over the plainto the north base of Missionary Ridge. Firing continued to a late hourin the night, but it was not connected with an assault at any point.

CHAPTER XLIV.

BATTLE OF CHATTANOOGA—A GALLANT CHARGE—COMPLETE ROUT OF THE ENEMY—PURSUIT OF THE CONFEDERATES—GENERAL BRAGG—REMARKS ON CHATTANOOGA.

At twelve o'clock at night, when all was quiet, I began to give ordersfor the next day, and sent a dispatch to Willcox to encourage Burnside.Sherman was directed to attack at daylight. Hooker was ordered to moveat the same hour, and endeavor to intercept the enemy's retreat if hestill remained; if he had gone, then to move directly to Rossville andoperate against the left and rear of the force on Missionary Ridge.Thomas was not to move until Hooker had reached Missionary Ridge. As Iwas with him on Orchard Knob, he would not move without further ordersfrom me.

The morning of the 25th opened clear and bright, and the whole field wasin full view from the top of Orchard Knob. It remained so all day.Bragg's headquarters were in full view, and officers—presumably staffofficers—could be seen coming and going constantly.

The point of ground which Sherman had carried on the 24th was almostdisconnected from the main ridge occupied by the enemy. A low pass, overwhich there is a wagon road crossing the hill, and near which there is arailroad tunnel, intervenes between the two hills. The problem now wasto get to the main ridge. The enemy was fortified on the point; and backfarther, where the ground was still higher, was a second fortificationcommanding the first. Sherman was out as soon as it was light enough tosee, and by sunrise his command was in motion. Three brigades held thehill already gained. Morgan L. Smith moved along the east base ofMissionary Ridge; Loomis along the west base, supported by two brigadesof John E. Smith's division; and Corse with his brigade was between thetwo, moving directly towards the hill to be captured. The ridge issteep and heavily wooded on the east side, where M. L. Smith's troopswere advancing, but cleared and with a more gentle slope on the westside. The troops advanced rapidly and carried the extreme end of therebel works. Morgan L. Smith advanced to a point which cut the enemyoff from the railroad bridge and the means of bringing up supplies byrail from Chickamauga Station, where the main depot was located. Theenemy made brave and strenuous efforts to drive our troops from theposition we had gained, but without success. The contest lasted for twohours. Corse, a brave and efficient commander, was badly wounded inthis assault. Sherman now threatened both Bragg's flank and his stores,and made it necessary for him to weaken other points of his line tostrengthen his right. From the position I occupied I could see columnafter column of Bragg's forces moving against Sherman. EveryConfederate gun that could be brought to bear upon the Union forces wasconcentrated upon him. J. E. Smith, with two brigades, charged up thewest side of the ridge to the support of Corse's command, over openground and in the face of a heavy fire of both artillery and musketry,and reached the very parapet of the enemy. He lay here for a time, butthe enemy coming with a heavy force upon his right flank, he wascompelled to fall back, followed by the foe. A few hundred yardsbrought Smith's troops into a wood, where they were speedily reformed,when they charged and drove the attacking party back to hisintrenchments.

Seeing the advance, repulse, and second advance of J. E. Smith from theposition I occupied, I directed Thomas to send a division to reinforcehim. Baird's division was accordingly sent from the right of OrchardKnob. It had to march a considerable distance directly under the eye ofthe enemy to reach its position. Bragg at once commenced massing in thesame direction. This was what I wanted. But it had now got to be latein the afternoon, and I had expected before this to see Hooker crossingthe ridge in the neighborhood of Rossville and compelling Bragg to massin that direction also.

The enemy had evacuated Lookout Mountain during the night, as I expectedhe would. In crossing the valley he burned the bridge over ChattanoogaCreek, and did all he could to obstruct the roads behind him. Hookerwas off bright and early, with no obstructions in his front but distanceand the destruction above named. He was detained four hours crossingChattanooga Creek, and thus was lost the immediate advantage I expectedfrom his forces. His reaching Bragg's flank and extending across it wasto be the signal for Thomas's assault of the ridge. But Sherman'scondition was getting so critical that the assault for his relief couldnot be delayed any longer.

Sheridan's and Wood's divisions had been lying under arms from earlymorning, ready to move the instant the signal was given. I now directedThomas to order the charge at once (*16). I watched eagerly to see theeffect, and became impatient at last that there was no indication of anycharge being made. The centre of the line which was to make the chargewas near where Thomas and I stood, but concealed from view by anintervening forest. Turning to Thomas to inquire what caused the delay,I was surprised to see Thomas J. Wood, one of the division commanderswho was to make the charge, standing talking to him. I spoke to GeneralWood, asking him why he did not charge as ordered an hour before. Hereplied very promptly that this was the first he had heard of it, butthat he had been ready all day to move at a moment's notice. I told himto make the charge at once. He was off in a moment, and in anincredibly short time loud cheering was heard, and he and Sheridan weredriving the enemy's advance before them towards Missionary Ridge. TheConfederates were strongly intrenched on the crest of the ridge in frontof us, and had a second line half-way down and another at the base. Ourmen drove the troops in front of the lower line of rifle-pits sorapidly, and followed them so closely, that rebel and Union troops wentover the first line of works almost at the same time. Many rebels werecaptured and sent to the rear under the fire of their own friends higherup the hill. Those that were not captured retreated, and were pursued.The retreating hordes being between friends and pursuers caused theenemy to fire high to avoid killing their own men. In fact, on thatoccasion the Union soldier nearest the enemy was in the safest position.Without awaiting further orders or stopping to reform, on our troopswent to the second line of works; over that and on for the crest—thuseffectually carrying out my orders of the 18th for the battle and of the24th (*17) for this charge.

I watched their progress with intense interest. The fire along therebel line was terrific. Cannon and musket balls filled the air: butthe damage done was in small proportion to the ammunition expended. Thepursuit continued until the crest was reached, and soon our men wereseen climbing over the Confederate barriers at different points in frontof both Sheridan's and Wood's divisions. The retreat of the enemy alongmost of his line was precipitate and the panic so great that Bragg andhis officers lost all control over their men. Many were captured, andthousands threw away their arms in their flight.

Sheridan pushed forward until he reached the Chickamauga River at apoint above where the enemy crossed. He met some resistance from troopsoccupying a second hill in rear of Missionary Ridge, probably to coverthe retreat of the main body and of the artillery and trains. It wasnow getting dark, but Sheridan, without halting on that account pushedhis men forward up this second hill slowly and without attracting theattention of the men placed to defend it, while he detached to the rightand left to surround the position. The enemy discovered the movementbefore these dispositions were complete, and beat a hasty retreat,leaving artillery, wagon trains, and many prisoners in our hands. ToSheridan's prompt movement the Army of the Cumberland, and the nation,are indebted for the bulk of the capture of prisoners, artillery, andsmall-arms that day. Except for his prompt pursuit, so much in this waywould not have been accomplished.

While the advance up Mission Ridge was going forward, General Thomaswith staff, General Gordon Granger, commander of the corps making theassault, and myself and staff occupied Orchard Knob, from which theentire field could be observed. The moment the troops were seen goingover the last line of rebel defences, I ordered Granger to join hiscommand, and mounting my horse I rode to the front. General Thomas leftabout the same time. Sheridan on the extreme right was already inpursuit of the enemy east of the ridge. Wood, who commanded thedivision to the left of Sheridan, accompanied his men on horseback inthe charge, but did not join Sheridan in the pursuit. To the left, inBaird's front where Bragg's troops had massed against Sherman, theresistance was more stubborn and the contest lasted longer. I orderedGranger to follow the enemy with Wood's division, but he was so muchexcited, and kept up such a roar of musketry in the direction the enemyhad taken, that by the time I could stop the firing the enemy had gotwell out of the way. The enemy confronting Sherman, now seeingeverything to their left giving way, fled also. Sherman, however, wasnot aware of the extent of our success until after nightfall, when hereceived orders to pursue at daylight in the morning.

As soon as Sherman discovered that the enemy had left his front hedirected his reserves, Davis's division of the Army of the Cumberland,to push over the pontoon-bridge at the mouth of the Chickamauga, and tomove forward to Chickamauga Station. He ordered Howard to move up thestream some two miles to where there was an old bridge, repair it duringthe night, and follow Davis at four o'clock in the morning. Morgan L.Smith was ordered to reconnoitre the tunnel to see if that was stillheld. Nothing was found there but dead bodies of men of both armies.The rest of Sherman's command was directed to follow Howard at daylightin the morning to get on to the railroad towards Graysville.

Hooker, as stated, was detained at Chattanooga Creek by the destructionof the bridge at that point. He got his troops over, with the exceptionof the artillery, by fording the stream at a little after three o'clock.Leaving his artillery to follow when the bridge should be reconstructed,he pushed on with the remainder of his command. At Rossville he cameupon the flank of a division of the enemy, which soon commenced aretreat along the ridge. This threw them on Palmer. They could makebut little resistance in the position they were caught in, and as manyof them as could do so escaped. Many, however, were captured. Hooker'sposition during the night of the 25th was near Rossville, extending eastof the ridge. Palmer was on his left, on the road to Graysville.

During the night I telegraphed to Willcox that Bragg had been defeated,and that immediate relief would be sent to Burnside if he could holdout; to Halleck I sent an announcement of our victory, and informed himthat forces would be sent up the valley to relieve Burnside.

Before the battle of Chattanooga opened I had taken measures for therelief of Burnside the moment the way should be clear. Thomas wasdirected to have the little steamer that had been built at Chattanoogaloaded to its capacity with rations and ammunition. Granger's corps wasto move by the south bank of the Tennessee River to the mouth of theHolston, and up that to Knoxville accompanied by the boat. In additionto the supplies transported by boat, the men were to carry forty roundsof ammunition in their cartridge-boxes, and four days' rations inhaversacks.

In the battle of Chattanooga, troops from the Army of the Potomac, fromthe Army of the Tennessee, and from the Army of the Cumberlandparticipated. In fact, the accidents growing out of the heavy rains andthe sudden rise in the Tennessee River so mingled the troops that theorganizations were not kept together, under their respective commanders,during the battle. Hooker, on the right, had Geary's division of the12th corps, Army of the Potomac; Osterhaus's division of the 15th corps,Army of the Tennessee; and Cruft's division of the Army of theCumberland. Sherman had three divisions of his own army, Howard's corpsfrom the Army of the Potomac, and Jefferson C. Davis's division of theArmy of the Cumberland. There was no jealousy—hardly rivalry. Indeed,I doubt whether officers or men took any note at the time of the fact ofthis intermingling of commands. All saw a defiant foe surrounding them,and took it for granted that every move was intended to dislodge him,and it made no difference where the troops came from so that the end wasaccomplished.

The victory at Chattanooga was won against great odds, considering theadvantage the enemy had of position, and was accomplished more easilythan was expected by reason of Bragg's making several grave mistakes:first, in sending away his ablest corps commander with over twentythousand troops; second, in sending away a division of troops on the eveof battle; third, in placing so much of a force on the plain in front ofhis impregnable position.

It was known that Mr. Jefferson Davis had visited Bragg on MissionaryRidge a short time before my reaching Chattanooga. It was reported andbelieved that he had come out to reconcile a serious difference betweenBragg and Longstreet, and finding this difficult to do, planned thecampaign against Knoxville, to be conducted by the latter general. Ihad known both Bragg and Longstreet before the war, the latter verywell. We had been three years at West Point together, and, after mygraduation, for a time in the same regiment. Then we served together inthe Mexican War. I had known Bragg in Mexico, and met him occasionallysubsequently. I could well understand how there might be anirreconcilable difference between them.

Bragg was a remarkably intelligent and well-informed man, professionallyand otherwise. He was also thoroughly upright. But he was possessed ofan irascible temper, and was naturally disputatious. A man of thehighest moral character and the most correct habits, yet in the old armyhe was in frequent trouble. As a subordinate he was always on thelookout to catch his commanding officer infringing his prerogatives; asa post commander he was equally vigilant to detect the slightestneglect, even of the most trivial order.

I have heard in the old army an anecdote very characteristic of Bragg.On one occasion, when stationed at a post of several companies commandedby a field officer, he was himself commanding one of the companies andat the same time acting as post quartermaster and commissary. He wasfirst lieutenant at the time, but his captain was detached on otherduty. As commander of the company he made a requisition upon thequartermaster—himself—for something he wanted. As quartermaster hedeclined to fill the requisition, and endorsed on the back of it hisreasons for so doing. As company commander he responded to this, urgingthat his requisition called for nothing but what he was entitled to, andthat it was the duty of the quartermaster to fill it. As quartermasterhe still persisted that he was right. In this condition of affairsBragg referred the whole matter to the commanding officer of the post.The latter, when he saw the nature of the matter referred, exclaimed:"My God, Mr. Bragg, you have quarrelled with every officer in the army,and now you are quarrelling with yourself!"

Longstreet was an entirely different man. He was brave, honest,intelligent, a very capable soldier, subordinate to his superiors, justand kind to his subordinates, but jealous of his own rights, which hehad the courage to maintain. He was never on the lookout to detect aslight, but saw one as soon as anybody when intentionally given.

It may be that Longstreet was not sent to Knoxville for the reasonstated, but because Mr. Davis had an exalted opinion of his own militarygenius, and thought he saw a chance of "killing two birds with onestone." On several occasions during the war he came to the relief ofthe Union army by means of his SUPERIOR MILITARY GENIUS.

I speak advisedly when I saw Mr. Davis prided himself on his militarycapacity. He says so himself, virtually, in his answer to the notice ofhis nomination to the Confederate presidency. Some of his generals havesaid so in their writings since the downfall of the Confederacy.

My recollection is that my first orders for the battle of Chattanoogawere as fought. Sherman was to get on Missionary Ridge, as he did;Hooker to cross the north end of Lookout Mountain, as he did, sweepacross Chattanooga Valley and get across the south end of the ridge nearRossville. When Hooker had secured that position the Army of theCumberland was to assault in the centre. Before Sherman arrived,however, the order was so changed as that Hooker was directed to come toChattanooga by the north bank of the Tennessee River. The waters in theriver, owing to heavy rains, rose so fast that the bridge at Brown'sFerry could not be maintained in a condition to be used in crossingtroops upon it. For this reason Hooker's orders were changed bytelegraph back to what they were originally.———

NOTE.—From this point on this volume was written (with the exception ofthe campaign in the Wilderness, which had been previously written) byGeneral Grant, after his great illness in April, and the presentarrangement of the subject-matter was made by him between the 10th and18th of July, 1885.

CHAPTER XLV.

THE RELIEF OF KNOXVILLE—HEADQUARTERS MOVED TO NASHVILLE—VISITINGKNOXVILLE-CIPHER CIPHER DISPATCHES—WITHHOLDING ORDERS.

Chattanooga now being secure to the National troops beyond any doubt, Iimmediately turned my attention to relieving Knoxville, about thesituation of which the President, in particular, was very anxious.Prior to the battles, I had made preparations for sending troops to therelief of Burnside at the very earliest moment after securingChattanooga. We had there two little steamers which had been built andfitted up from the remains of old boats and put in condition to run.General Thomas was directed to have one of these boats loaded withrations and ammunition and move up the Tennessee River to the mouth ofthe Holston, keeping the boat all the time abreast of the troops.General Granger, with the 4th corps reinforced to make twenty thousandmen, was to start the moment Missionary Ridge was carried, and under nocircumstances were the troops to return to their old camps. With theprovisions carried, and the little that could be got in the country, itwas supposed he could hold out until Longstreet was driven away, afterwhich event East Tennessee would furnish abundance of food forBurnside's army and his own also.

While following the enemy on the 26th, and again on the morning of the27th, part of the time by the road to Ringgold, I directed Thomas,verbally, not to start Granger until he received further orders from me;advising him that I was going to the front to more fully see thesituation. I was not right sure but that Bragg's troops might be overtheir stampede by the time they reached Dalton. In that case Braggmight think it well to take the road back to Cleveland, move thencetowards Knoxville, and, uniting with Longstreet, make a sudden dash uponBurnside.

When I arrived at Ringgold, however, on the 27th, I saw that the retreatwas most earnest. The enemy had been throwing away guns, caissons andsmall-arms, abandoning provisions, and, altogether, seemed to be movinglike a disorganized mob, with the exception of Cleburne's division,which was acting as rear-guard to cover the retreat.

When Hooker moved from Rossville toward Ringgold Palmer's division tookthe road to Graysville, and Sherman moved by the way of ChickamaugaStation toward the same point. As soon as I saw the situation atRinggold I sent a staff officer back to Chattanooga to advise Thomas ofthe condition of affairs, and direct him by my orders to start Grangerat once. Feeling now that the troops were already on the march for therelief of Burnside I was in no hurry to get back, but stayed at Ringgoldthrough the day to prepare for the return of our troops.

Ringgold is in a valley in the mountains, situated between EastChickamauga Creek and Taylor's Ridge, and about twenty miles south-eastfrom Chattanooga. I arrived just as the artillery that Hooker had leftbehind at Chattanooga Creek got up. His men were attacking Cleburne'sdivision, which had taken a strong position in the adjacent hills so asto cover the retreat of the Confederate army through a narrow gorgewhich presents itself at that point. Just beyond the gorge the valleyis narrow, and the creek so tortuous that it has to be crossed a greatmany times in the course of the first mile. This attack wasunfortunate, and cost us some men unnecessarily. Hooker captured,however, 3 pieces of artillery and 230 prisoners, and 130 rebel deadwere left upon the field.

I directed General Hooker to collect the flour and wheat in theneighboring mills for the use of the troops, and then to destroy themills and all other property that could be of use to the enemy, but notto make any wanton destruction.

At this point Sherman came up, having reached Graysville with histroops, where he found Palmer had preceded him. Palmer had picked upmany prisoners and much abandoned property on the route. I went back inthe evening to Graysville with Sherman, remained there over night anddid not return to Chattanooga until the following night, the 29th. Ithen found that Thomas had not yet started Granger, thus having lost afull day which I deemed of so much importance in determining the fate ofKnoxville. Thomas and Granger were aware that on the 23d of the monthBurnside had telegraphed that his supplies would last for ten or twelvedays and during that time he could hold out against Longstreet, but ifnot relieved within the time indicated he would be obliged to surrenderor attempt to retreat. To effect a retreat would have been animpossibility. He was already very low in ammunition, and with an armypursuing he would not have been able to gather supplies.

Finding that Granger had not only not started but was very reluctant togo, he having decided for himself that it was a very bad move to make, Isent word to General Sherman of the situation and directed him to marchto the relief of Knoxville. I also gave him the problem that we had tosolve—that Burnside had now but four to six days supplies left, andthat he must be relieved within that time.

Sherman, fortunately, had not started on his return from Graysville,having sent out detachments on the railroad which runs from Dalton toCleveland and Knoxville to thoroughly destroy that road, and thesetroops had not yet returned to camp. I was very loath to send Sherman,because his men needed rest after their long march from Memphis and hardfighting at Chattanooga. But I had become satisfied that Burnside wouldnot be rescued if his relief depended upon General Granger's movements.

Sherman had left his camp on the north side of the Tennessee River, nearChattanooga, on the night of the 23d, the men having two days' cookedrations in their haversacks. Expecting to be back in their tents bythat time and to be engaged in battle while out, they took with themneither overcoats nor blankets. The weather was already cold, and atnight they must have suffered more or less. The two days' rations hadalready lasted them five days; and they were now to go through a countrywhich had been run over so much by Confederate troops that there was butlittle probability of finding much food. They did, however, succeed incapturing some flour. They also found a good deal of bran in some ofthe mills, which the men made up into bread; and in this and other waysthey eked out an existence until they could reach Knoxville.

I was so very anxious that Burnside should get news of the steps beingtaken for his relief, and thus induce him to hold out a little longer ifit became necessary, that I determined to send a message to him. Itherefore sent a member of my staff, Colonel J. H. Wilson, to get intoKnoxville if he could report to Burnside the situation fully, and givehim all the encouragement possible. Mr. Charles A. Dana was atChattanooga during the battle, and had been there even before I assumedcommand. Mr. Dana volunteered to accompany Colonel Wilson, and didaccompany him. I put the information of what was being done for therelief of Knoxville into writing, and directed that in some way or otherit must be secretly managed so as to have a copy of this fall into thehands of General Longstreet. They made the trip safely; GeneralLongstreet did learn of Sherman's coming in advance of his reachingthere, and Burnside was prepared to hold out even for a longer time ifit had been necessary.

Burnside had stretched a boom across the Holston River to catch scowsand flats as they floated down. On these, by previous arrangements withthe loyal people of East Tennessee, were placed flour and corn, withforage and provisions generally, and were thus secured for the use ofthe Union troops. They also drove cattle into Knoxville by the eastside, which was not covered by the enemy; so that when relief arrivedBurnside had more provisions on hand than when he had last reported.

Our total loss (not including Burnside's) in all these engagementsamounted to 757 killed, 4,529 wounded and 330 missing. We captured6,142 prisoners—about 50 per cent. more than the enemy reported fortheir total loss—40 pieces of artillery, 69 artillery carriages andcaissons and over 7,000 stands of small-arms. The enemy's loss in armswas probably much greater than here reported, because we picked up agreat many that were found abandoned.

I had at Chattanooga, in round numbers, about 60,000 men. Bragg hadabout half this number, but his position was supposed to be impregnable.It was his own fault that he did not have more men present. He had sentLongstreet away with his corps swelled by reinforcements up to overtwenty thousand men, thus reducing his own force more than one-third anddepriving himself of the presence of the ablest general of his command.He did this, too, after our troops had opened a line of communication byway of Brown's and Kelly's ferries with Bridgeport, thus securing fullrations and supplies of every kind; and also when he knew reinforcementswere coming to me. Knoxville was of no earthly use to him whileChattanooga was in our hands. If he should capture Chattanooga,Knoxville with its garrison would have fallen into his hands without astruggle. I have never been able to see the wisdom of this move.

Then, too, after Sherman had arrived, and when Bragg knew that he was onthe north side of the Tennessee River, he sent Buckner's division toreinforce Longstreet. He also started another division a day later, butour attack having commenced before it reached Knoxville Bragg ordered itback. It had got so far, however, that it could not return toChattanooga in time to be of service there. It is possible this latterblunder may have been made by Bragg having become confused as to whatwas going on on our side. Sherman had, as already stated, crossed tothe north side of the Tennessee River at Brown's Ferry, in full view ofBragg's troops from Lookout Mountain, a few days before the attack.They then disappeared behind foot hills, and did not come to the view ofthe troops on Missionary Ridge until they met their assault. Bragg knewit was Sherman's troops that had crossed, and, they being so long out ofview, may have supposed that they had gone up the north bank of theTennessee River to the relief of Knoxville and that Longstreet wastherefore in danger. But the first great blunder, detaching Longstreet,cannot be accounted for in any way I know of. If he had capturedChattanooga, East Tennessee would have fallen without a struggle. Itwould have been a victory for us to have got our army away fromChattanooga safely. It was a manifold greater victory to drive away thebesieging army; a still greater one to defeat that army in his chosenground and nearly annihilate it.

The probabilities are that our loss in killed was the heavier, as wewere the attacking party. The enemy reported his loss in killed at 361:but as he reported his missing at 4,146, while we held over 6,000 ofthem as prisoners, and there must have been hundreds if not thousandswho deserted, but little reliance can be placed on this report. Therewas certainly great dissatisfaction with Bragg on the part of thesoldiers for his harsh treatment of them, and a disposition to get awayif they could. Then, too, Chattanooga, following in the same half yearwith Gettysburg in the East and Vicksburg in the West, there was muchthe same feeling in the South at this time that there had been in theNorth the fall and winter before. If the same license had been allowedthe people and press in the South that was allowed in the North,Chattanooga would probably have been the last battle fought for thepreservation of the Union.

General William F. Smith's services in these battles had been such thatI thought him eminently entitled to promotion. I was aware that he hadpreviously been named by the President for promotion to the grade ofmajor-general, but that the Senate had rejected the nomination. I wasnot aware of the reasons for this course, and therefore stronglyrecommended him for a major-generalcy. My recommendation was heeded andthe appointment made.

Upon the raising of the siege of Knoxville I, of course, informed theauthorities at Washington—the President and Secretary of War—of thefact, which caused great rejoicing there. The President especially wasrejoiced that Knoxville had been relieved (*18) without furtherbloodshed. The safety of Burnside's army and the loyal people of EastTennessee had been the subject of much anxiety to the President forseveral months, during which time he was doing all he could to relievethe situation; sending a new commander (*19) with a few thousand troopsby the way of Cumberland Gap, and telegraphing me daily, almost hourly,to "remember Burnside," "do something for Burnside," and other appealsof like tenor. He saw no escape for East Tennessee until after ourvictory at Chattanooga. Even then he was afraid that Burnside might beout of ammunition, in a starving condition, or overpowered: and hisanxiety was still intense until he heard that Longstreet had been drivenfrom the field.

Burnside followed Longstreet only to Strawberry Plains, some twentymiles or more east, and then stopped, believing that Longstreet wouldleave the State. The latter did not do so, however, but stopped only ashort distance farther on and subsisted his army for the entire winteroff East Tennessee. Foster now relieved Burnside. Sherman madedisposition of his troops along the Tennessee River in accordance withinstructions. I left Thomas in command at Chattanooga, and, about the20th of December, moved my headquarters to Nashville, Tennessee.

Nashville was the most central point from which to communicate with myentire military division, and also with the authorities at Washington.While remaining at Chattanooga I was liable to have my telegraphiccommunications cut so as to throw me out of communication with both mycommand and Washington.

Nothing occurred at Nashville worthy of mention during the winter, (*20)so I set myself to the task of having troops in positions from whichthey could move to advantage, and in collecting all necessary suppliesso as to be ready to claim a due share of the enemy's attention upon theappearance of the first good weather in the spring. I expected toretain the command I then had, and prepared myself for the campaignagainst Atlanta. I also had great hopes of having a campaign madeagainst Mobile from the Gulf. I expected after Atlanta fell to occupythat place permanently, and to cut off Lee's army from the West by wayof the road running through Augusta to Atlanta and thence south-west. Iwas preparing to hold Atlanta with a small garrison, and it was myexpectation to push through to Mobile if that city was in ourpossession: if not, to Savannah; and in this manner to get possessionof the only east and west railroad that would then be left to the enemy.But the spring campaign against Mobile was not made.

The Army of the Ohio had been getting supplies over Cumberland Gap untiltheir animals had nearly all starved. I now determined to go myself tosee if there was any possible chance of using that route in the spring,and if not to abandon it. Accordingly I left Nashville in the latterpart of December by rail for Chattanooga. From Chattanooga I took one ofthe little steamers previously spoken of as having been built there,and, putting my horses aboard, went up to the junction of the Clinchwith the Tennessee. From that point the railroad had been repaired upto Knoxville and out east to Strawberry Plains. I went by railtherefore to Knoxville, where I remained for several days. General JohnG. Foster was then commanding the Department of the Ohio. It was anintensely cold winter, the thermometer being down as low as zero everymorning for more than a week while I was at Knoxville and on my way fromthere on horseback to Lexington, Kentucky, the first point where I couldreach rail to carry me back to my headquarters at Nashville.

The road over Cumberland Gap, and back of it, was strewn with debris ofbroken wagons and dead animals, much as I had found it on my first tripto Chattanooga over Waldron's Ridge. The road had been cut up to asgreat a depth as clay could be by mules and wagons, and in thatcondition frozen; so that the ride of six days from Strawberry Plains toLexington over these holes and knobs in the road was a very cheerlessone, and very disagreeable.

I found a great many people at home along that route, both in Tennesseeand Kentucky, and, almost universally, intensely loyal. They wouldcollect in little places where we would stop of evenings, to see me,generally hearing of my approach before we arrived. The peoplenaturally expected to see the commanding general the oldest person inthe party. I was then forty-one years of age, while my medical directorwas gray-haired and probably twelve or more years my senior. The crowdswould generally swarm around him, and thus give me an opportunity ofquietly dismounting and getting into the house. It also gave me anopportunity of hearing passing remarks from one spectator to anotherabout their general. Those remarks were apt to be more complimentary tothe cause than to the appearance of the supposed general, owing to hisbeing muffled up, and also owing to the travel-worn condition we wereall in after a hard day's ride. I was back in Nashville by the 13th ofJanuary, 1864.

When I started on this trip it was necessary for me to have some personalong who could turn dispatches into cipher, and who could also read thecipher dispatches which I was liable to receive daily and almost hourly.Under the rules of the War Department at that time, Mr. Stanton hadtaken entire control of the matter of regulating the telegraph anddetermining how it should be used, and of saying who, and who alone,should have the ciphers. The operators possessed of the ciphers, aswell as the ciphers used, were practically independent of the commanderswhom they were serving immediately under, and had to report to the WarDepartment through General Stager all the dispatches which they receivedor forwarded.

I was obliged to leave the telegraphic operator back at Nashville,because that was the point at which all dispatches to me would come, tobe forwarded from there. As I have said, it was necessary for me alsoto have an operator during this inspection who had possession of thiscipher to enable me to telegraph to my division and to the WarDepartment without my dispatches being read by all the operators alongthe line of wires over which they were transmitted. Accordingly Iordered the cipher operator to turn over the key to Captain Cyrus B.Comstock, of the Corps of Engineers, whom I had selected as a wise anddiscreet man who certainly could be trusted with the cipher if theoperator at my headquarters could.

The operator refused point blank to turn over the key to CaptainComstock as directed by me, stating that his orders from the WarDepartment were not to give it to anybody—the commanding general or anyone else. I told him I would see whether he would or not. He said thatif he did he would be punished. I told him if he did not he mostcertainly would be punished. Finally, seeing that punishment was certainif he refused longer to obey my order, and being somewhat remote (evenif he was not protected altogether from the consequences of hisdisobedience to his orders) from the War Department, he yielded. When Ireturned from Knoxville I found quite a commotion. The operator hadbeen reprimanded very severely and ordered to be relieved. I informedthe Secretary of War, or his assistant secretary in charge of thetelegraph, Stager, that the man could not be relieved, for he had onlyobeyed my orders. It was absolutely necessary for me to have thecipher, and the man would most certainly have been punished if he hadnot delivered it; that they would have to punish me if they punishedanybody, or words to that effect.

This was about the only thing approaching a disagreeable differencebetween the Secretary of War and myself that occurred until the war wasover, when we had another little spat. Owing to his natural dispositionto assume all power and control in all matters that he had anythingwhatever to do with, he boldly took command of the armies, and, whileissuing no orders on the subject, prohibited any order from me going outof the adjutant-general's office until he had approved it. This wasdone by directing the adjutant-general to hold any orders that came fromme to be issued from the adjutant-general's office until he had examinedthem and given his approval. He never disturbed himself, either, inexamining my orders until it was entirely convenient for him; so thatorders which I had prepared would often lie there three or four daysbefore he would sanction them. I remonstrated against this in writing,and the Secretary apologetically restored me to my rightful position ofGeneral-in-Chief of the Army. But he soon lapsed again and took controlmuch as before.

After the relief of Knoxville Sherman had proposed to Burnside that heshould go with him to drive Longstreet out of Tennessee; but Burnsideassured him that with the troops which had been brought by Granger, andwhich were to be left, he would be amply prepared to dispose ofLongstreet without availing himself of this offer. As before statedSherman's command had left their camps north of the Tennessee, nearChattanooga, with two days' rations in their haversacks, without coatsor blankets, and without many wagons, expecting to return to their campsby the end of that time. The weather was now cold and they weresuffering, but still they were ready to make the further sacrifice, hadit been required, for the good of the cause which had brought them intoservice. Sherman, having accomplished the object for which he was sent,marched back leisurely to his old camp on the Tennessee River.

CHAPTER XLVI.

OPERATIONS IN MISSISSIPPI—LONGSTREET IN EAST TENNESSEE—COMMISSIONEDLIEUTENANT-GENERAL—COMMANDING THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES—FIRSTINTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT LINCOLN.

Soon after his return from Knoxville I ordered Sherman to distribute hisforces from Stevenson to Decatur and thence north to Nashville; Shermansuggested that he be permitted to go back to Mississippi, to the limitsof his own department and where most of his army still remained, for thepurpose of clearing out what Confederates might still be left on theeast bank of the Mississippi River to impede its navigation by ourboats. He expected also to have the co-operation of Banks to do thesame thing on the west shore. Of course I approved heartily.

About the 10th of January Sherman was back in Memphis, where Hurlbutcommanded, and got together his Memphis men, or ordered them collectedand sent to Vicksburg. He then went to Vicksburg and out to whereMcPherson was in command, and had him organize his surplus troops so asto give him about 20,000 men in all.

Sherman knew that General (Bishop) Polk was occupying Meridian with hisheadquarters, and had two divisions of infantry with a considerableforce of cavalry scattered west of him. He determined, therefore, tomove directly upon Meridian.

I had sent some 2,500 cavalry under General Sooy Smith to Sherman'sdepartment, and they had mostly arrived before Sherman got to Memphis.Hurlbut had 7,000 cavalry, and Sherman ordered him to reinforce Smith soas to give the latter a force of about 7,000 with which to go againstForrest, who was then known to be south-east from Memphis. Smith wasordered to move about the 1st of February.

While Sherman was waiting at Vicksburg for the arrival of Hurlbut withhis surplus men, he sent out scouts to ascertain the position andstrength of the enemy and to bring back all the information they couldgather. When these scouts returned it was through them that he got theinformation of General Polk's being at Meridian, and of the strength anddisposition of his command.

Forrest had about 4,000 cavalry with him, composed of thoroughlywell-disciplined men, who under so able a leader were very effective.Smith's command was nearly double that of Forrest, but not equal, man toman, for the lack of a successful experience such as Forrest's men hadhad. The fact is, troops who have fought a few battles and won, andfollowed up their victories, improve upon what they were before to anextent that can hardly be counted by percentage. The difference inresult is often decisive victory instead of inglorious defeat. Thissame difference, too, is often due to the way troops are officered, andfor the particular kind of warfare which Forrest had carried on neitherarmy could present a more effective officer than he was.

Sherman got off on the 3d of February and moved out on his expedition,meeting with no opposition whatever until he crossed the Big Black, andwith no great deal of opposition after that until he reached Jackson,Mississippi. This latter place he reached on the 6th or 7th, Brandon onthe 8th, and Morton on the 9th. Up to this time he moved in two columnsto enable him to get a good supply of forage, etc., and expedite themarch. Here, however, there were indications of the concentration ofConfederate infantry, and he was obliged to keep his army closetogether. He had no serious engagement; but he met some of the enemywho destroyed a few of his wagons about Decatur, Mississippi, where, bythe way, Sherman himself came near being picked up.

He entered Meridian on the 14th of the month, the enemy having retreatedtoward Demopolis, Alabama. He spent several days in Meridian inthoroughly destroying the railroad to the north and south, and also forthe purpose of hearing from Sooy Smith, who he supposed had met Forrestbefore this time and he hoped had gained a decisive victory because of asuperiority of numbers. Hearing nothing of him, however, he started onhis return trip to Vicksburg. There he learned that Smith, whilewaiting for a few of his men who had been ice-bound in the Ohio River,instead of getting off on the 1st as expected, had not left until the11th. Smith did meet Forrest, but the result was decidedly in Forrest'sfavor.

Sherman had written a letter to Banks, proposing a co-operative movementwith him against Shreveport, subject to my approval. I disapproved ofSherman's going himself, because I had other important work for him todo, but consented that he might send a few troops to the aid of Banks,though their time to remain absent must be limited. We must have themfor the spring campaign. The trans-Mississippi movement provedabortive.

My eldest son, who had accompanied me on the Vicksburg campaign andsiege, had while there contracted disease, which grew worse, until hehad grown so dangerously ill that on the 24th of January I obtainedpermission to go to St. Louis, where he was staying at the time, to seehim, hardly expecting to find him alive on my arrival. While I waspermitted to go, I was not permitted to turn over my command to any oneelse, but was directed to keep the headquarters with me and tocommunicate regularly with all parts of my division and with Washington,just as though I had remained at Nashville.

When I obtained this leave I was at Chattanooga, having gone there againto make preparations to have the troops of Thomas in the southern partof Tennessee co-operate with Sherman's movement in Mississippi. Idirected Thomas, and Logan who was at Scottsboro, Alabama, to keep up athreatening movement to the south against J. E. Johnston, who had againrelieved Bragg, for the purpose of making him keep as many troops aspossible there.

I learned through Confederate sources that Johnston had already sent twodivisions in the direction of Mobile, presumably to operate againstSherman, and two more divisions to Longstreet in East Tennessee. Seeingthat Johnston had depleted in this way, I directed Thomas to send atleast ten thousand men, besides Stanley's division which was already tothe east, into East Tennessee, and notified Schofield, who was now incommand in East Tennessee, of this movement of troops into hisdepartment and also of the reinforcements Longstreet had received. Myobject was to drive Longstreet out of East Tennessee as a part of thepreparations for my spring campaign.

About this time General Foster, who had been in command of theDepartment of the Ohio after Burnside until Schofield relieved him(*21), advised me that he thought it would be a good thing to keepLongstreet just where he was; that he was perfectly quiet in EastTennessee, and if he was forced to leave there, his whole well-equippedarmy would be free to go to any place where it could effect the most fortheir cause. I thought the advice was good, and, adopting that view,countermanded the orders for pursuit of Longstreet.

On the 12th of February I ordered Thomas to take Dalton and hold it, ifpossible; and I directed him to move without delay. Finding that he hadnot moved, on the 17th I urged him again to start, telling him howimportant it was, that the object of the movement was to co-operate withSherman, who was moving eastward and might be in danger. Then again onthe 21st, he not yet having started, I asked him if he could not startthe next day. He finally got off on the 22d or 23d. The enemy fellback from his front without a battle, but took a new position quite asstrong and farther to the rear. Thomas reported that he could not goany farther, because it was impossible with his poor teams, nearlystarved, to keep up supplies until the railroads were repaired. He soonfell back.

Schofield also had to return for the same reason. He could not carrysupplies with him, and Longstreet was between him and the supplies stillleft in the country. Longstreet, in his retreat, would be movingtowards his supplies, while our forces, following, would be recedingfrom theirs. On the 2d of March, however, I learned of Sherman'ssuccess, which eased my mind very much. The next day, the 3d, I wasordered to Washington.

The bill restoring the grade of lieutenant-general of the army hadpassed through Congress and became a law on the 26th of February. Mynomination had been sent to the Senate on the 1st of March and confirmedthe next day (the 2d). I was ordered to Washington on the 3d to receivemy commission, and started the day following that. The commission washanded to me on the 9th. It was delivered to me at the ExecutiveMansion by President Lincoln in the presence of his Cabinet, my eldestson, those of my staff who were with me and and a few other visitors.

The President in presenting my commission read from a paper—stating,however, as a preliminary, and prior to the delivery of it, that he haddrawn that up on paper, knowing my disinclination to speak in public,and handed me a copy in advance so that I might prepare a few lines ofreply. The President said:

"General Grant, the nation's appreciation of what you have done, and itsreliance upon you for what remains to be done in the existing greatstruggle, are now presented, with this commission constituting youlieutenant-general in the Army of the United States. With this highhonor, devolves upon you, also, a corresponding responsibility. As thecountry herein trusts you, so, under God, it will sustain you. Iscarcely need to add, that, with what I here speak for the nation, goesmy own hearty personal concurrence."

To this I replied: "Mr. President, I accept the commission, withgratitude for the high honor conferred. With the aid of the noblearmies that have fought in so many fields for our common country, itwill be my earnest endeavor not to disappoint your expectations. I feelthe full weight of the responsibilities now devolving on me; and I knowthat if they are met, it will be due to those armies, and above all, tothe favor of that Providence which leads both nations and men."

On the 10th I visited the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac atBrandy Station; then returned to Washington, and pushed west at once tomake my arrangements for turning over the commands there and givinggeneral directions for the preparations to be made for the springcampaign.

It had been my intention before this to remain in the West, even if Iwas made lieutenant-general; but when I got to Washington and saw thesituation it was plain that here was the point for the commandinggeneral to be. No one else could, probably, resist the pressure thatwould be brought to bear upon him to desist from his own plans andpursue others. I determined, therefore, before I started back to haveSherman advanced to my late position, McPherson to Sherman's in commandof the department, and Logan to the command of McPherson's corps. Thesechanges were all made on my recommendation and without hesitation. Mycommission as lieutenant-general was given to me on the 9th of March,1864. On the following day, as already stated, I visited General Meade,commanding the Army of the Potomac, at his headquarters at BrandyStation, north of the Rapidan. I had known General Meade slightly inthe Mexican war, but had not met him since until this visit. I was astranger to most of the Army of the Potomac, I might say to all exceptthe officers of the regular army who had served in the Mexican war.There had been some changes ordered in the organization of that armybefore my promotion. One was the consolidation of five corps intothree, thus throwing some officers of rank out of important commands.Meade evidently thought that I might want to make still one more changenot yet ordered. He said to me that I might want an officer who hadserved with me in the West, mentioning Sherman specially, to take hisplace. If so, he begged me not to hesitate about making the change. Heurged that the work before us was of such vast importance to the wholenation that the feeling or wishes of no one person should stand in theway of selecting the right men for all positions. For himself, he wouldserve to the best of his ability wherever placed. I assured him that Ihad no thought of substituting any one for him. As to Sherman, he couldnot be spared from the West.

This incident gave me even a more favorable opinion of Meade than didhis great victory at Gettysburg the July before. It is men who wait tobe selected, and not those who seek, from whom we may always expect themost efficient service.

Meade's position afterwards proved embarrassing to me if not to him. Hewas commanding an army and, for nearly a year previous to my takingcommand of all the armies, was in supreme command of the Army of thePotomac—except from the authorities at Washington. All other generalofficers occupying similar positions were independent in their commandsso far as any one present with them was concerned. I tried to makeGeneral Meade's position as nearly as possible what it would have beenif I had been in Washington or any other place away from his command. Itherefore gave all orders for the movements of the Army of the Potomacto Meade to have them executed. To avoid the necessity of having togive orders direct, I established my headquarters near his, unless therewere reasons for locating them elsewhere. This sometimes happened, andI had on occasions to give orders direct to the troops affected. On the11th I returned to Washington and, on the day after, orders werepublished by the War Department placing me in command of all the armies.I had left Washington the night before to return to my old command inthe West and to meet Sherman whom I had telegraphed to join me inNashville.

Sherman assumed command of the military division of the Mississippi onthe 18th of March, and we left Nashville together for Cincinnati. I hadSherman accompany me that far on my way back to Washington so that wecould talk over the matters about which I wanted to see him, withoutlosing any more time from my new command than was necessary. The firstpoint which I wished to discuss was particularly about the co-operationof his command with mine when the spring campaign should commence. Therewere also other and minor points, minor as compared with the greatimportance of the question to be decided by sanguinary war—therestoration to duty of officers who had been relieved from importantcommands, namely McClellan, Burnside and Fremont in the East, and Buell,McCook, Negley and Crittenden in the West.

Some time in the winter of 1863-64 I had been invited by thegeneral-in-chief to give my views of the campaign I thought advisablefor the command under me—now Sherman's. General J. E. Johnston wasdefending Atlanta and the interior of Georgia with an army, the largestpart of which was stationed at Dalton, about 38 miles south ofChattanooga. Dalton is at the junction of the railroad from Clevelandwith the one from Chattanooga to Atlanta.

There could have been no difference of opinion as to the first duty ofthe armies of the military division of the Mississippi. Johnston's armywas the first objective, and that important railroad centre, Atlanta,the second. At the time I wrote General Halleck giving my views of theapproaching campaign, and at the time I met General Sherman, it wasexpected that General Banks would be through with the campaign which hehad been ordered upon before my appointment to the command of all thearmies, and would be ready to co-operate with the armies east of theMississippi, his part in the programme being to move upon Mobile by landwhile the navy would close the harbor and assist to the best of itsability. (*22) The plan therefore was for Sherman to attack Johnston anddestroy his army if possible, to capture Atlanta and hold it, and withhis troops and those of Banks to hold a line through to Mobile, or atleast to hold Atlanta and command the railroad running east and west,and the troops from one or other of the armies to hold important pointson the southern road, the only east and west road that would be left inthe possession of the enemy. This would cut the Confederacy in twoagain, as our gaining possession of the Mississippi River had donebefore. Banks was not ready in time for the part assigned to him, andcircumstances that could not be foreseen determined the campaign whichwas afterwards made, the success and grandeur of which has resoundedthroughout all lands.

In regard to restoring officers who had been relieved from importantcommands to duty again, I left Sherman to look after those who had beenremoved in the West while I looked out for the rest. I directed,however, that he should make no assignment until I could speak to theSecretary of War about the matter. I shortly after recommended to theSecretary the assignment of General Buell to duty. I received theassurance that duty would be offered to him; and afterwards theSecretary told me that he had offered Buell an assignment and that thelatter had declined it, saying that it would be degradation to acceptthe assignment offered. I understood afterwards that he refused toserve under either Sherman or Canby because he had ranked them both.Both graduated before him and ranked him in the old army. Shermanranked him as a brigadier-general. All of them ranked me in the oldarmy, and Sherman and Buell did as brigadiers. The worst excuse asoldier can make for declining service is that he once ranked thecommander he is ordered to report to.

On the 23d of March I was back in Washington, and on the 26th took up myheadquarters at Culpeper Court-House, a few miles south of theheadquarters of the Army of the Potomac.

Although hailing from Illinois myself, the State of the President, Inever met Mr. Lincoln until called to the capital to receive mycommission as lieutenant-general. I knew him, however, very well andfavorably from the accounts given by officers under me at the West whohad known him all their lives. I had also read the remarkable series ofdebates between Lincoln and Douglas a few years before, when they wererival candidates for the United States Senate. I was then a resident ofMissouri, and by no means a "Lincoln man" in that contest; but Irecognized then his great ability.

In my first interview with Mr. Lincoln alone he stated to me that he hadnever professed to be a military man or to know how campaigns should beconducted, and never wanted to interfere in them: but thatprocrastination on the part of commanders, and the pressure from thepeople at the North and Congress, WHICH WAS ALWAYS WITH HIM, forced himinto issuing his series of "Military Orders"—one, two, three, etc. Hedid not know but they were all wrong, and did know that some of themwere. All he wanted or had ever wanted was some one who would take theresponsibility and act, and call on him for all the assistance needed,pledging himself to use all the power of the government in renderingsuch assistance. Assuring him that I would do the best I could with themeans at hand, and avoid as far as possible annoying him or the WarDepartment, our first interview ended.

The Secretary of War I had met once before only, but felt that I knewhim better.

While commanding in West Tennessee we had occasionally heldconversations over the wires, at night, when they were not beingotherwise used. He and General Halleck both cautioned me against givingthe President my plans of campaign, saying that he was so kind-hearted,so averse to refusing anything asked of him, that some friend would besure to get from him all he knew. I should have said that in ourinterview the President told me he did not want to know what I proposedto do. But he submitted a plan of campaign of his own which he wantedme to hear and then do as I pleased about. He brought out a map ofVirginia on which he had evidently marked every position occupied by theFederal and Confederate armies up to that time. He pointed out on themap two streams which empty into the Potomac, and suggested that thearmy might be moved on boats and landed between the mouths of thesestreams. We would then have the Potomac to bring our supplies, and thetributaries would protect our flanks while we moved out. I listenedrespectfully, but did not suggest that the same streams would protectLee's flanks while he was shutting us up.

I did not communicate my plans to the President, nor did I to the
Secretary of War or to General Halleck.

March the 26th my headquarters were, as stated, at Culpeper, and thework of preparing for an early campaign commenced.

CHAPTER XLVII.

THE MILITARY SITUATION—PLANS FOR THE CAMPAIGN—SHERIDAN ASSIGNED TOCOMMAND OF THE CAVALRY—FLANK MOVEMENTS—FORREST AT FORT PILLOW—GENERALBANKS'S EXPEDITION—COLONEL MOSBY—AN INCIDENT OF THE WILDERNESSCAMPAIGN.

When I assumed command of all the armies the situation was about this:the Mississippi River was guarded from St. Louis to its mouth; the lineof the Arkansas was held, thus giving us all the North-west north ofthat river. A few points in Louisiana not remote from the river wereheld by the Federal troops, as was also the mouth of the Rio Grande.East of the Mississippi we held substantially all north of the Memphisand Charleston Railroad as far east as Chattanooga, thence along theline of the Tennessee and Holston rivers, taking in nearly all of theState of Tennessee. West Virginia was in our hands; and that part ofold Virginia north of the Rapidan and east of the Blue Ridge we alsoheld. On the sea-coast we had Fortress Monroe and Norfolk in Virginia;Plymouth, Washington and New Berne in North Carolina; Beaufort, Follyand Morris islands, Hilton Head, Port Royal and Fort Pulaski in SouthCarolina and Georgia; Fernandina, St. Augustine, Key West and Pensacolain Florida. The balance of the Southern territory, an empire in extent,was still in the hands of the enemy.

Sherman, who had succeeded me in the command of the military division ofthe Mississippi, commanded all the troops in the territory west of theAlleghanies and north of Natchez, with a large movable force aboutChattanooga. His command was subdivided into four departments, but thecommanders all reported to Sherman and were subject to his orders. Thisarrangement, however, insured the better protection of all lines ofcommunication through the acquired territory, for the reason that thesedifferent department commanders could act promptly in case of a suddenor unexpected raid within their respective jurisdictions withoutawaiting the orders of the division commander.

In the East the opposing forces stood in substantially the samerelations towards each other as three years before, or when the warbegan; they were both between the Federal and Confederate capitals. Itis true, footholds had been secured by us on the sea-coast, in Virginiaand North Carolina, but, beyond that, no substantial advantage had beengained by either side. Battles had been fought of as great severity ashad ever been known in war, over ground from the James River andChickahominy, near Richmond, to Gettysburg and Chambersburg, inPennsylvania, with indecisive results, sometimes favorable to theNational army, sometimes to the Confederate army; but in every instance,I believe, claimed as victories for the South by the Southern press ifnot by the Southern generals. The Northern press, as a whole, did notdiscourage these claims; a portion of it always magnified rebel successand belittled ours, while another portion, most sincerely earnest intheir desire for the preservation of the Union and the overwhelmingsuccess of the Federal armies, would nevertheless generally expressdissatisfaction with whatever victories were gained because they werenot more complete.

That portion of the Army of the Potomac not engaged in guarding lines ofcommunication was on the northern bank of the Rapidan. The Army ofNorthern Virginia confronting it on the opposite bank of the same river,was strongly intrenched and commanded by the acknowledged ablest generalin the Confederate army. The country back to the James River is cut upwith many streams, generally narrow, deep, and difficult to cross exceptwhere bridged. The region is heavily timbered, and the roads narrow,and very bad after the least rain. Such an enemy was not, of course,unprepared with adequate fortifications at convenient intervals all theway back to Richmond, so that when driven from one fortified positionthey would always have another farther to the rear to fall back into.

To provision an army, campaigning against so formidable a foe throughsuch a country, from wagons alone seemed almost impossible. System anddiscipline were both essential to its accomplishment.

The Union armies were now divided into nineteen departments, though fourof them in the West had been concentrated into a single militarydivision. The Army of the Potomac was a separate command and had noterritorial limits. There were thus seventeen distinct commanders.Before this time these various armies had acted separately andindependently of each other, giving the enemy an opportunity often ofdepleting one command, not pressed, to reinforce another more activelyengaged. I determined to stop this. To this end I regarded the Army ofthe Potomac as the centre, and all west to Memphis along the linedescribed as our position at the time, and north of it, the right wing;the Army of the James, under General Butler, as the left wing, and allthe troops south, as a force in rear of the enemy. Some of these latterwere occupying positions from which they could not render serviceproportionate to their numerical strength. All such were depleted tothe minimum necessary to hold their positions as a guard againstblockade runners; where they could not do this their positions wereabandoned altogether. In this way ten thousand men were added to theArmy of the James from South Carolina alone, with General Gillmore incommand. It was not contemplated that General Gillmore should leave hisdepartment; but as most of his troops were taken, presumably for activeservice, he asked to accompany them and was permitted to do so.Officers and soldiers on furlough, of whom there were many thousands,were ordered to their proper commands; concentration was the order ofthe day, and to have it accomplished in time to advance at the earliestmoment the roads would permit was the problem.

As a reinforcement to the Army of the Potomac, or to act in support ofit, the 9th army corps, over twenty thousand strong, under GeneralBurnside, had been rendezvoused at Annapolis, Maryland. This was anadmirable position for such a reinforcement. The corps could be broughtat the last moment as a reinforcement to the Army of the Potomac, or itcould be thrown on the sea-coast, south of Norfolk, in Virginia or NorthCarolina, to operate against Richmond from that direction. In factBurnside and the War Department both thought the 9th corps was intendedfor such an expedition up to the last moment.

My general plan now was to concentrate all the force possible againstthe Confederate armies in the field. There were but two such, as wehave seen, east of the Mississippi River and facing north. The Army ofNorthern Virginia, General Robert E. Lee commanding, was on the southbank of the Rapidan, confronting the Army of the Potomac; the second,under General Joseph E. Johnston, was at Dalton, Georgia, opposed toSherman who was still at Chattanooga. Beside these main armies theConfederates had to guard the Shenandoah Valley, a great storehouse tofeed their armies from, and their line of communications from Richmondto Tennessee. Forrest, a brave and intrepid cavalry general, was in theWest with a large force; making a larger command necessary to hold whatwe had gained in Middle and West Tennessee. We could not abandon anyterritory north of the line held by the enemy because it would lay theNorthern States open to invasion. But as the Army of the Potomac wasthe principal garrison for the protection of Washington even while itwas moving on Lee, so all the forces to the west, and the Army of theJames, guarded their special trusts when advancing from them as well aswhen remaining at them. Better indeed, for they forced the enemy toguard his own lines and resources at a greater distance from ours, andwith a greater force. Little expeditions could not so well be sent outto destroy a bridge or tear up a few miles of railroad track, burn astorehouse, or inflict other little annoyances. Accordingly I arrangedfor a simultaneous movement all along the line. Sherman was to movefrom Chattanooga, Johnston's army and Atlanta being his objectivepoints. (*23) Crook, commanding in West Virginia, was to move from themouth of the Gauley River with a cavalry force and some artillery, theVirginia and Tennessee Railroad to be his objective. Either the enemywould have to keep a large force to protect their communications, or seethem destroyed and a large amount of forage and provision, which they somuch needed, fall into our hands. Sigel was in command in the Valley ofVirginia. He was to advance up the valley, covering the North from aninvasion through that channel as well while advancing as by remainingnear Harper's Ferry. Every mile he advanced also gave us possession ofstores on which Lee relied. Butler was to advance by the James River,having Richmond and Petersburg as his objective.

Before the advance commenced I visited Butler at Fort Monroe. This wasthe first time I had ever met him. Before giving him any order as tothe part he was to play in the approaching campaign I invited his views.They were very much such as I intended to direct, and as I did direct(*24), in writing, before leaving.

General W. F. Smith, who had been promoted to the rank of major-generalshortly after the battle of Chattanooga on my recommendation, had notyet been confirmed. I found a decided prejudice against hisconfirmation by a majority of the Senate, but I insisted that hisservices had been such that he should be rewarded. My wishes were nowreluctantly complied with, and I assigned him to the command of one ofthe corps under General Butler. I was not long in finding out that theobjections to Smith's promotion were well founded.

In one of my early interviews with the President I expressed mydissatisfaction with the little that had been accomplished by thecavalry so far in the war, and the belief that it was capable ofaccomplishing much more than it had done if under a thorough leader. Isaid I wanted the very best man in the army for that command. Halleckwas present and spoke up, saying: "How would Sheridan do?" I replied:"The very man I want." The President said I could have anybody I wanted.Sheridan was telegraphed for that day, and on his arrival was assignedto the command of the cavalry corps with the Army of the Potomac. Thisrelieved General Alfred Pleasonton. It was not a reflection on thatofficer, however, for I did not know but that he had been as efficientas any other cavalry commander.

Banks in the Department of the Gulf was ordered to assemble all thetroops he had at New Orleans in time to join in the general move, Mobileto be his objective.

At this time I was not entirely decided as to whether I should move theArmy of the Potomac by the right flank of the enemy, or by his left.Each plan presented advantages. (*25) If by his right—my left—thePotomac, Chesapeake Bay and tributaries would furnish us an easy haulingdistance of every position the army could occupy from the Rapidan to theJames River. But Lee could, if he chose, detach or move his whole armynorth on a line rather interior to the one I would have to take infollowing. A movement by his left—our right—would obviate this; butall that was done would have to be done with the supplies and ammunitionwe started with. All idea of adopting this latter plan was abandonedwhen the limited quantity of supplies possible to take with us wasconsidered. The country over which we would have to pass was soexhausted of all food or forage that we would be obliged to carryeverything with us.

While these preparations were going on the enemy was not entirely idle.In the West Forrest made a raid in West Tennessee up to the northernborder, capturing the garrison of four or five hundred men at UnionCity, and followed it up by an attack on Paducah, Kentucky, on the banksof the Ohio. While he was able to enter the city he failed to capturethe forts or any part of the garrison. On the first intelligence ofForrest's raid I telegraphed Sherman to send all his cavalry againsthim, and not to let him get out of the trap he had put himself into.Sherman had anticipated me by sending troops against him before he gotmy order.

Forrest, however, fell back rapidly, and attacked the troops at FortPillow, a station for the protection of the navigation of theMississippi River. The garrison consisted of a regiment of coloredtroops, infantry, and a detachment of Tennessee cavalry. These troopsfought bravely, but were overpowered. I will leave Forrest in hisdispatches to tell what he did with them.

"The river was dyed," he says, "with the blood of the slaughtered fortwo hundred yards. The approximate loss was upward of five hundredkilled, but few of the officers escaping. My loss was about twentykilled. It is hoped that these facts will demonstrate to the Northernpeople that negro soldiers cannot cope with Southerners." SubsequentlyForrest made a report in which he left out the part which shockshumanity to read.

At the East, also, the rebels were busy. I had said to Halleck thatPlymouth and Washington, North Carolina, were unnecessary to hold. Itwould be better to have the garrisons engaged there added to Butler'scommand. If success attended our arms both places, and others too,would fall into our hands naturally. These places had been occupied byFederal troops before I took command of the armies, and I knew that theExecutive would be reluctant to abandon them, and therefore explained myviews; but before my views were carried out the rebels captured thegarrison at Plymouth. I then ordered the abandonment of Washington, butdirected the holding of New Berne at all hazards. This was essentialbecause New Berne was a port into which blockade runners could enter.

General Banks had gone on an expedition up the Red River long before mypromotion to general command. I had opposed the movement strenuously,but acquiesced because it was the order of my superior at the time. Bydirection of Halleck I had reinforced Banks with a corps of about tenthousand men from Sherman's command. This reinforcement was wanted backbadly before the forward movement commenced. But Banks had got so farthat it seemed best that he should take Shreveport on the Red River, andturn over the line of that river to Steele, who commanded in Arkansas,to hold instead of the line of the Arkansas. Orders were givenaccordingly, and with the expectation that the campaign would be endedin time for Banks to return A. J. Smith's command to where it belongedand get back to New Orleans himself in time to execute his part in thegeneral plan. But the expedition was a failure. Banks did not get backin time to take part in the programme as laid down. Nor was Smithreturned until long after the movements of May, 1864, had been begun.The services of forty thousand veteran troops, over and above the numberrequired to hold all that was necessary in the Department of the Gulf,were thus paralyzed. It is but just to Banks, however, to say that hisexpedition was ordered from Washington and he was in no way responsibleexcept for the conduct of it. I make no criticism on this point. Heopposed the expedition.

By the 27th of April spring had so far advanced as to justify me infixing a day for the great move. On that day Burnside left Annapolis tooccupy Meade's position between Bull Run and the Rappahannock. Meadewas notified and directed to bring his troops forward to his advance.On the following day Butler was notified of my intended advance on the4th of May, and he was directed to move the night of the same day andget as far up the James River as possible by daylight, and push on fromthere to accomplish the task given him. He was also notified thatreinforcements were being collected in Washington City, which would beforwarded to him should the enemy fall back into the trenches atRichmond. The same day Sherman was directed to get his forces up readyto advance on the 5th. Sigel was in Winchester and was notified to movein conjunction with the others.

The criticism has been made by writers on the campaign from the Rapidanto the James River that all the loss of life could have been obviated bymoving the army there on transports. Richmond was fortified andintrenched so perfectly that one man inside to defend was more thanequal to five outside besieging or assaulting. To get possession ofLee's army was the first great object. With the capture of his armyRichmond would necessarily follow. It was better to fight him outsideof his stronghold than in it. If the Army of the Potomac had been movedbodily to the James River by water Lee could have moved a part of hisforces back to Richmond, called Beauregard from the south to reinforceit, and with the balance moved on to Washington. Then, too, I ordered amove, simultaneous with that of the Army of the Potomac, up the JamesRiver by a formidable army already collected at the mouth of the river.

While my headquarters were at Culpeper, from the 26th of March to the4th of May, I generally visited Washington once a week to confer withthe Secretary of War and President. On the last occasion, a few daysbefore moving, a circumstance occurred which came near postponing mypart in the campaign altogether. Colonel John S. Mosby had for a longtime been commanding a partisan corps, or regiment, which operated inthe rear of the Army of the Potomac. On my return to the field on thisoccasion, as the train approached Warrenton Junction, a heavy cloud ofdust was seen to the east of the road as if made by a body of cavalry ona charge. Arriving at the junction the train was stopped and inquiriesmade as to the cause of the dust. There was but one man at the station,and he informed us that Mosby had crossed a few minutes before at fullspeed in pursuit of Federal cavalry. Had he seen our train coming, nodoubt he would have let his prisoners escape to capture the train. Iwas on a special train, if I remember correctly, without any guard.

Since the close of the war I have come to know Colonel Mosby personally,and somewhat intimately. He is a different man entirely from what I hadsupposed. He is slender, not tall, wiry, and looks as if he couldendure any amount of physical exercise. He is able, and thoroughlyhonest and truthful. There were probably but few men in the South whocould have commanded successfully a separate detachment in the rear ofan opposing army, and so near the border of hostilities, as long as hedid without losing his entire command.

On this same visit to Washington I had my last interview with thePresident before reaching the James River. He had of course becomeacquainted with the fact that a general movement had been ordered allalong the line, and seemed to think it a new feature in war. Iexplained to him that it was necessary to have a great number of troopsto guard and hold the territory we had captured, and to preventincursions into the Northern States. These troops could perform thisservice just as well by advancing as by remaining still; and byadvancing they would compel the enemy to keep detachments to hold themback, or else lay his own territory open to invasion. His answer was:"Oh, yes! I see that. As we say out West, if a man can't skin he musthold a leg while somebody else does."

There was a certain incident connected with the Wilderness campaign ofwhich it may not be out of place to speak; and to avoid a digressionfurther on I will mention it here.

A few days before my departure from Culpeper the Honorable E. B.Washburne visited me there, and remained with my headquarters for somedistance south, through the battle in the Wilderness and, I think, toSpottsylvania. He was accompanied by a Mr. Swinton, whom he presented asa literary gentleman who wished to accompany the army with a view ofwriting a history of the war when it was over. He assured me—and Ihave no doubt Swinton gave him the assurance—that he was not present asa correspondent of the press. I expressed an entire willingness to havehim (Swinton) accompany the army, and would have allowed him to do so asa correspondent, restricted, however, in the character of theinformation he could give. We received Richmond papers with about asmuch regularity as if there had been no war, and knew that our paperswere received with equal regularity by the Confederates. It wasdesirable, therefore, that correspondents should not be privileged spiesof the enemy within our lines.

Probably Mr. Swinton expected to be an invited guest at my headquarters,and was disappointed that he was not asked to become so. At all eventshe was not invited, and soon I found that he was corresponding with somepaper (I have now forgotten which one), thus violating his word eitherexpressed or implied. He knew of the assurance Washburne had given asto the character of his mission. I never saw the man from the day ofour introduction to the present that I recollect. He accompanied us,however, for a time at least.

The second night after crossing the Rapidan (the night of the 5th ofMay) Colonel W. R. Rowley, of my staff, was acting as night officer atmy headquarters. A short time before midnight I gave him verbalinstructions for the night. Three days later I read in a Richmond papera verbatim report of these instructions.

A few nights still later (after the first, and possibly after thesecond, day's fighting in the Wilderness) General Meade came to my tentfor consultation, bringing with him some of his staff officers. Bothhis staff and mine retired to the camp-fire some yards in front of thetent, thinking our conversation should be private. There was a stump alittle to one side, and between the front of the tent and camp-fire.One of my staff, Colonel T. S. Bowers, saw what he took to be a manseated on the ground and leaning against the stump, listening to theconversation between Meade and myself. He called the attention ofColonel Rowley to it. The latter immediately took the man by theshoulder and asked him, in language more forcible than polite, what hewas doing there. The man proved to be Swinton, the "historian," and hisreplies to the question were evasive and unsatisfactory, and he waswarned against further eaves-dropping.

The next I heard of Mr. Swinton was at Cold Harbor. General Meade cameto my headquarters saying that General Burnside had arrested Swinton,who at some previous time had given great offence, and had ordered himto be shot that afternoon. I promptly ordered the prisoner to bereleased, but that he must be expelled from the lines of the army not toreturn again on pain of punishment.

CHAPTER XLVIII.

COMMENCEMENT OF THE GRAND CAMPAIGN—GENERAL BUTLER'S POSITION—SHERIDAN'S FIRST RAID.

The armies were now all ready to move for the accomplishment of a singleobject. They were acting as a unit so far as such a thing was possibleover such a vast field. Lee, with the capital of the Confederacy, wasthe main end to which all were working. Johnston, with Atlanta, was animportant obstacle in the way of our accomplishing the result aimed at,and was therefore almost an independent objective. It was of lessimportance only because the capture of Johnston and his army would notproduce so immediate and decisive a result in closing the rebellion aswould the possession of Richmond, Lee and his army. All other troopswere employed exclusively in support of these two movements. This wasthe plan; and I will now endeavor to give, as concisely as I can, themethod of its execution, outlining first the operations of minordetached but co-operative columns.

As stated before, Banks failed to accomplish what he had been sent to doon the Red River, and eliminated the use of forty thousand veteranswhose cooperation in the grand campaign had been expected—ten thousandwith Sherman and thirty thousand against Mobile.

Sigel's record is almost equally brief. He moved out, it is true,according to programme; but just when I was hoping to hear of good workbeing done in the valley I received instead the following announcementfrom Halleck: "Sigel is in full retreat on Strasburg. He will donothing but run; never did anything else." The enemy had interceptedhim about New Market and handled him roughly, leaving him short sixguns, and some nine hundred men out of his six thousand.

The plan had been for an advance of Sigel's forces in two columns.Though the one under his immediate command failed ingloriously the otherproved more fortunate. Under Crook and Averell his western columnadvanced from the Gauley in West Virginia at the appointed time, andwith more happy results. They reached the Virginia and TennesseeRailroad at Dublin and destroyed a depot of supplies, besides tearing upseveral miles of road and burning the bridge over New River. Havingaccomplished this they recrossed the Alleghanies to Meadow Bluffs andthere awaited further orders.

Butler embarked at Fort Monroe with all his command, except the cavalryand some artillery which moved up the south bank of the James River.His steamers moved first up Chesapeake Bay and York River as ifthreatening the rear of Lee's army. At midnight they turned back, andButler by daylight was far up the James River. He seized City Point andBermuda Hundred early in the day, without loss and, no doubt, very muchto the surprise of the enemy.

This was the accomplishment of the first step contemplated in myinstructions to Butler. He was to act from here, looking to Richmond ashis objective point. I had given him to understand that I should aim tofight Lee between the Rapidan and Richmond if he would stand; but shouldLee fall back into Richmond I would follow up and make a junction of thearmies of the Potomac and the James on the James River. He was directedto secure a footing as far up the south side of the river as he could atas early a date as possible.

Butler was in position by the 6th of May and had begun intrenching, andon the 7th he sent out his cavalry from Suffolk to cut the WeldonRailroad. He also sent out detachments to destroy the railroad betweenPetersburg and Richmond, but no great success attended these latterefforts. He made no great effort to establish himself on that road andneglected to attack Petersburg, which was almost defenceless. About the11th he advanced slowly until he reached the works at Drury's Bluff,about half way between Bermuda Hundred and Richmond. In the mean timeBeauregard had been gathering reinforcements. On the 16th he attackedButler with great vigor, and with such success as to limit verymaterially the further usefulness of the Army of the James as a distinctfactor in the campaign. I afterward ordered a portion of it to join theArmy of the Potomac, leaving a sufficient force with Butler to man hisworks, hold securely the footing he had already gained and maintain athreatening front toward the rear of the Confederate capital.

The position which General Butler had chosen between the two rivers, theJames and Appomattox, was one of great natural strength, one where alarge area of ground might be thoroughly inclosed by means of a singleintrenched line, and that a very short one in comparison with the extentof territory which it thoroughly protected. His right was protected bythe James River, his left by the Appomattox, and his rear by theirjunction—the two streams uniting near by. The bends of the two streamsshortened the line that had been chosen for intrenchments, while itincreased the area which the line inclosed.

Previous to ordering any troops from Butler I sent my chief engineer,General Barnard, from the Army of the Potomac to that of the James toinspect Butler's position and ascertain whether I could again safelymake an order for General Butler's movement in co-operation with mine,now that I was getting so near Richmond; or, if I could not, whether hisposition was strong enough to justify me in withdrawing some of histroops and having them brought round by water to White House to join meand reinforce the Army of the Potomac. General Barnard reported theposition very strong for defensive purposes, and that I could do thelatter with great security; but that General Butler could not move fromwhere he was, in co-operation, to produce any effect. He said that thegeneral occupied a place between the James and Appomattox rivers whichwas of great strength, and where with an inferior force he could hold itfor an indefinite length of time against a superior; but that he coulddo nothing offensively. I then asked him why Butler could not move outfrom his lines and push across the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad tothe rear and on the south side of Richmond. He replied that it wasimpracticable, because the enemy had substantially the same line acrossthe neck of land that General Butler had. He then took out his penciland drew a sketch of the locality, remarking that the position was likea bottle and that Butler's line of intrenchments across the neckrepresented the cork; that the enemy had built an equally strong lineimmediately in front of him across the neck; and it was therefore as ifButler was in a bottle. He was perfectly safe against an attack; but,as Barnard expressed it, the enemy had corked the bottle and with asmall force could hold the cork in its place. This struck me as beingvery expressive of his position, particularly when I saw the hastysketch which General Barnard had drawn; and in making my subsequentreport I used that expression without adding quotation marks, neverthinking that anything had been said that would attract attention—asthis did, very much to the annoyance, no doubt, of General Butler and, Iknow, very much to my own. I found afterwards that this was mentionedin the notes of General Badeau's book, which, when they were shown tome, I asked to have stricken out; yet it was retained there, thoughagainst my wishes.

I make this statement here because, although I have often made itbefore, it has never been in my power until now to place it where itwill correct history; and I desire to rectify all injustice that I mayhave done to individuals, particularly to officers who were gallantlyserving their country during the trying period of the war for thepreservation of the Union. General Butler certainly gave his veryearnest support to the war; and he gave his own best efforts personallyto the suppression of the rebellion.

The further operations of the Army of the James can best be treated ofin connection with those of the Army of the Potomac, the two being sointimately associated and connected as to be substantially one body inwhich the individuality of the supporting wing is merged.

Before giving the reader a summary of Sherman's great Atlanta campaign,which must conclude my description of the various co-operative movementspreparatory to proceeding with that of the operations of the centre, Iwill briefly mention Sheridan's first raid upon Lee's communicationswhich, though an incident of the operations on the main line and notspecifically marked out in the original plan, attained in its brilliantexecution and results all the proportions of an independent campaign.By thus anticipating, in point of time, I will be able to more perfectlyobserve the continuity of events occurring in my immediate front when Ishall have undertaken to describe our advance from the Rapidan.

On the 8th of May, just after the battle of the Wilderness and when wewere moving on Spottsylvania I directed Sheridan verbally to cut loosefrom the Army of the Potomac, pass around the left of Lee's army andattack his cavalry: to cut the two roads—one running west throughGordonsville, Charlottesville and Lynchburg, the other to Richmond, and,when compelled to do so for want of forage and rations, to move on tothe James River and draw these from Butler's supplies. This move tookhim past the entire rear of Lee's army. These orders were also given inwriting through Meade.

The object of this move was three-fold. First, if successfullyexecuted, and it was, he would annoy the enemy by cutting his line ofsupplies and telegraphic communications, and destroy or get for his ownuse supplies in store in the rear and coming up. Second, he would drawthe enemy's cavalry after him, and thus better protect our flanks, rearand trains than by remaining with the army. Third, his absence wouldsave the trains drawing his forage and other supplies fromFredericksburg, which had now become our base. He started at daylightthe next morning, and accomplished more than was expected. It wassixteen days before he got back to the Army of the Potomac.

The course Sheridan took was directly to Richmond. Before night Stuart,commanding the Confederate cavalry, came on to the rear of his command.But the advance kept on, crossed the North Anna, and at Beaver Dam, astation on the Virginia Central Railroad, recaptured four hundred Unionprisoners on their way to Richmond, destroyed the road and used anddestroyed a large amount of subsistence and medical stores.

Stuart, seeing that our cavalry was pushing towards Richmond, abandonedthe pursuit on the morning of the 10th and, by a detour and anexhausting march, interposed between Sheridan and Richmond at YellowTavern, only about six miles north of the city. Sheridan destroyed therailroad and more supplies at Ashland, and on the 11th arrived inStuart's front. A severe engagement ensued in which the losses wereheavy on both sides, but the rebels were beaten, their leader mortallywounded, and some guns and many prisoners were captured.

Sheridan passed through the outer defences of Richmond, and could, nodoubt, have passed through the inner ones. But having no supports nearhe could not have remained. After caring for his wounded he struck forthe James River below the city, to communicate with Butler and to resthis men and horses as well as to get food and forage for them.

He moved first between the Chickahominy and the James, but in themorning (the 12th) he was stopped by batteries at Mechanicsville. Hethen turned to cross to the north side of the Chickahominy by MeadowBridge. He found this barred, and the defeated Confederate cavalry,reorganized, occupying the opposite side. The panic created by hisfirst entrance within the outer works of Richmond having subsided troopswere sent out to attack his rear.

He was now in a perilous position, one from which but few generals couldhave extricated themselves. The defences of Richmond, manned, were tothe right, the Chickahominy was to the left with no bridge remaining andthe opposite bank guarded, to the rear was a force from Richmond. Thisforce was attacked and beaten by Wilson's and Gregg's divisions, whileSheridan turned to the left with the remaining division and hastilybuilt a bridge over the Chickahominy under the fire of the enemy, forceda crossing and soon dispersed the Confederates he found there. The enemywas held back from the stream by the fire of the troops not engaged inbridge building.

On the 13th Sheridan was at Bottom's Bridge, over the Chickahominy. Onthe 14th he crossed this stream and on that day went into camp on theJames River at Haxall's Landing. He at once put himself intocommunication with General Butler, who directed all the supplies hewanted to be furnished.

Sheridan had left the Army of the Potomac at Spottsylvania, but did notknow where either this or Lee's army was now. Great caution thereforehad to be exercised in getting back. On the 17th, after resting hiscommand for three days, he started on his return. He moved by the wayof White House. The bridge over the Pamunkey had been burned by theenemy, but a new one was speedily improvised and the cavalry crossedover it. On the 22d he was at Aylett's on the Matapony, where helearned the position of the two armies. On the 24th he joined us on themarch from North Anna to Cold Harbor, in the vicinity of Chesterfield.

Sheridan in this memorable raid passed entirely around Lee's army:encountered his cavalry in four engagements, and defeated them in all;recaptured four hundred Union prisoners and killed and captured many ofthe enemy; destroyed and used many supplies and munitions of war;destroyed miles of railroad and telegraph, and freed us from annoyanceby the cavalry of the enemy for more than two weeks.

CHAPTER XLIX.

SHERMAN'S CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA—SIEGE OF ATLANTA—DEATH OF GENERALMCPHERSON—ATTEMPT TO CAPTURE ANDERSONVILLE—CAPTURE OF ATLANTA.

After separating from Sherman in Cincinnati I went on to Washington, asalready stated, while he returned to Nashville to assume the duties ofhis new command. His military division was now composed of fourdepartments and embraced all the territory west of the AlleghanyMountains and east of the Mississippi River, together with the State ofArkansas in the trans-Mississippi. The most easterly of these was theDepartment of the Ohio, General Schofield commanding; the next was theDepartment of the Cumberland, General Thomas commanding; the third theDepartment of the Tennessee, General McPherson commanding; and GeneralSteele still commanded the trans-Mississippi, or Department of Arkansas.The last-named department was so far away that Sherman could notcommunicate with it very readily after starting on his spring campaign,and it was therefore soon transferred from his military division to thatof the Gulf, where General Canby, who had relieved General Banks, was incommand.

The movements of the armies, as I have stated in a former chapter, wereto be simultaneous, I fixing the day to start when the season should befar enough advanced, it was hoped, for the roads to be in a conditionfor the troops to march.

General Sherman at once set himself to work preparing for the task whichwas assigned him to accomplish in the spring campaign. McPherson lay atHuntsville with about twenty-four thousand men, guarding those points ofTennessee which were regarded as most worth holding; Thomas, with oversixty thousand men of the Army of the Cumberland, was at Chattanooga;and Schofield, with about fourteen thousand men, was at Knoxville. Withthese three armies, numbering about one hundred thousand men in all,Sherman was to move on the day fixed for the general advance, with aview of destroying Johnston's army and capturing Atlanta. He visitedeach of these commands to inform himself as to their condition, and itwas found to be, speaking generally, good.

One of the first matters to turn his attention to was that of getting,before the time arrived for starting, an accumulation of suppliesforward to Chattanooga, sufficiently large to warrant a movement. Hefound, when he got to that place, that the trains over the single-trackrailroad, which was frequently interrupted for a day or two at a time,were only sufficient to meet the daily wants of the troops withoutbringing forward any surplus of any kind. He found, however, thattrains were being used to transport all the beef cattle, horses for thecavalry, and even teams that were being brought to the front. He atonce changed all this, and required beef cattle, teams, cavalry horses,and everything that could travel, even the troops, to be marched, andused the road exclusively for transporting supplies. In this way he wasable to accumulate an abundance before the time finally fixed upon forthe move, the 4th of May.

As I have said already, Johnston was at Dalton, which was nearlyone-fourth of the way between Chattanooga and Atlanta. The country ismountainous all the way to Atlanta, abounding in mountain streams, someof them of considerable volume. Dalton is on ground where water drainstowards Atlanta and into one of the main streams rising north-east fromthere and flowing south-west—this being the general direction which allthe main streams of that section take, with smaller tributaries enteringinto them. Johnston had been preparing himself for this campaign duringthe entire winter. The best positions for defence had been selected allthe way from Dalton back to Atlanta, and very strongly intrenched; sothat, as he might be forced to fall back from one position, he wouldhave another to fall into in his rear. His position at Dalton was sovery strongly intrenched that no doubt he expected, or at least hoped,to hold Sherman there and prevent him from getting any further. With aless skilful general, and one disposed to take no risks, I have no doubtthat he would have succeeded.

Sherman's plan was to start Schofield, who was farthest back, a few daysin advance from Knoxville, having him move on the direct road to Dalton.Thomas was to move out to Ringgold. It had been Sherman's intention tocross McPherson over the Tennessee River at Huntsville or Decatur, andmove him south from there so as to have him come into the road runningfrom Chattanooga to Atlanta a good distance to the rear of the pointJohnston was occupying; but when that was contemplated it was hoped thatMcPherson alone would have troops enough to cope with Johnston, if thelatter should move against him while unsupported by the balance of thearmy. In this he was disappointed. Two of McPherson's veterandivisions had re-enlisted on the express provision that they were tohave a furlough. This furlough had not yet expired, and they were notback.

Then, again, Sherman had lent Banks two divisions under A. J. Smith, thewinter before, to co-operate with the trans-Mississippi forces, and thiswith the express pledge that they should be back by a time specified, soas to be prepared for this very campaign. It is hardly necessary to saythey were not returned. That department continued to absorb troops tono purpose to the end of the war. This left McPherson so weak that thepart of the plan above indicated had to be changed. He was thereforebrought up to Chattanooga and moved from there on a road to the right ofThomas—the two coming together about Dalton. The three armies wereabreast, all ready to start promptly on time.

Sherman soon found that Dalton was so strongly fortified that it wasuseless to make any attempt to carry it by assault; and even to carry itby regular approaches was impracticable. There was a narrowing up inthe mountain, between the National and Confederate armies, through whicha stream, a wagon road and a railroad ran. Besides, the stream had beendammed so that the valley was a lake. Through this gorge the troopswould have to pass. McPherson was therefore sent around by the right,to come out by the way of Snake Creek Gap into the rear of the enemy.This was a surprise to Johnston, and about the 13th he decided toabandon his position at Dalton.

On the 15th there was very hard fighting about Resaca; but our cavalryhaving been sent around to the right got near the road in the enemy'srear. Again Johnston fell back, our army pursuing. The pursuit wascontinued to Kingston, which was reached on the 19th with very littlefighting, except that Newton's division overtook the rear of Johnston'sarmy and engaged it. Sherman was now obliged to halt for the purpose ofbringing up his railroad trains. He was depending upon the railroad forall of his supplies, and as of course the railroad was wholly destroyedas Johnston fell back, it had to be rebuilt. This work was pushedforward night and day, and caused much less delay than most personswould naturally expect in a mountainous country where there were so manybridges to be rebuilt.

The campaign to Atlanta was managed with the most consummate skill, theenemy being flanked out of one position after another all the way there.It is true this was not accomplished without a good deal of fighting—some of it very hard fighting, rising to the dignity of very importantbattles—neither were single positions gained in a day. On thecontrary, weeks were spent at some; and about Atlanta more than a monthwas consumed.

It was the 23d of May before the road was finished up to the rear ofSherman's army and the pursuit renewed. This pursuit brought him up tothe vicinity of Allatoona. This place was very strongly intrenched, andnaturally a very defensible position. An assault upon it was not thoughtof, but preparations were made to flank the enemy out of it. This wasdone by sending a large force around our right, by the way of Dallas, toreach the rear of the enemy. Before reaching there, however, they foundthe enemy fortified in their way, and there resulted hard fighting forabout a week at a place called New Hope Church. On the left our troopsalso were fortified, and as close up to the enemy as they could get.They kept working still farther around to the left toward the railroad.This was the case more particularly with the cavalry. By the 4th ofJune Johnston found that he was being hemmed in so rapidly that he drewoff and Allatoona was left in our possession.

Allatoona, being an important place, was strongly intrenched foroccupation by our troops before advancing farther, and made a secondarybase of supplies. The railroad was finished up to that point, theintrenchments completed, storehouses provided for food, and the army gotin readiness for a further advance. The rains, however, were falling insuch torrents that it was impossible to move the army by the side roadswhich they would have to move upon in order to turn Johnston out of hisnew position.

While Sherman's army lay here, General F. P. Blair returned to it,bringing with him the two divisions of veterans who had been onfurlough.

Johnston had fallen back to Marietta and Kenesaw Mountain, where strongintrenchments awaited him. At this latter place our troops made anassault upon the enemy's lines after having got their own lines up closeto him, and failed, sustaining considerable loss. But during theprogress of the battle Schofield was gaining ground to the left; and thecavalry on his left were gaining still more toward the enemy's rear.These operations were completed by the 3d of July, when it was foundthat Johnston had evacuated the place. He was pursued at once. Shermanhad made every preparation to abandon the railroad, leaving a strongguard in his intrenchments. He had intended, moving out with twentydays' rations and plenty of ammunition, to come in on the railroad againat the Chattahoochee River. Johnston frustrated this plan by himselfstarting back as above stated. This time he fell back to theChattahoochee.

About the 5th of July he was besieged again, Sherman getting easypossession of the Chattahoochee River both above and below him. Theenemy was again flanked out of his position, or so frightened byflanking movements that on the night of the 9th he fell back across theriver.

Here Johnston made a stand until the 17th, when Sherman's old tacticsprevailed again and the final movement toward Atlanta began. Johnstonwas now relieved of the command, and Hood superseded him.

Johnston's tactics in this campaign do not seem to have met with muchfavor, either in the eyes of the administration at Richmond, or of thepeople of that section of the South in which he was commanding. Thevery fact of a change of commanders being ordered under suchcircumstances was an indication of a change of policy, and that now theywould become the aggressors—the very thing our troops wanted.

For my own part, I think that Johnston's tactics were right. Anythingthat could have prolonged the war a year beyond the time that it didfinally close, would probably have exhausted the North to such an extentthat they might then have abandoned the contest and agreed to aseparation.

Atlanta was very strongly intrenched all the way around in a circleabout a mile and a half outside of the city. In addition to this, therewere advanced intrenchments which had to be taken before a close siegecould be commenced.

Sure enough, as indicated by the change of commanders, the enemy wasabout to assume the offensive. On the 20th he came out and attacked theArmy of the Cumberland most furiously. Hooker's corps, and Newton's andJohnson's divisions were the principal ones engaged in this contest,which lasted more than an hour; but the Confederates were then forced tofall back inside their main lines. The losses were quite heavy on bothsides. On this day General Gresham, since our Postmaster-General, wasvery badly wounded. During the night Hood abandoned his outer lines,and our troops were advanced. The investment had not been relinquishedfor a moment during the day.

During the night of the 21st Hood moved out again, passing by our leftflank, which was then in motion to get a position farther in rear ofhim, and a desperate battle ensued, which lasted most of the day of the22d. At first the battle went very much in favor of the Confederates,our troops being somewhat surprised. While our troops were advancingthey were struck in flank, and their flank was enveloped. But they hadbecome too thorough veterans to be thrown into irreparable confusion byan unexpected attack when off their guard, and soon they were in orderand engaging the enemy, with the advantage now of knowing where theirantagonist was. The field of battle continued to expand until itembraced about seven miles of ground. Finally, however, and beforenight, the enemy was driven back into the city (*26).

It was during this battle that McPherson, while passing from one columnto another, was instantly killed. In his death the army lost one of itsablest, purest and best generals.

Garrard had been sent out with his cavalry to get upon the railroad eastof Atlanta and to cut it in the direction of Augusta. He was successfulin this, and returned about the time of the battle. Rousseau had alsocome up from Tennessee with a small division of cavalry, having crossedthe Tennessee River about Decatur and made a raid into Alabama. Finally,when hard pressed, he had come in, striking the railroad in rear ofSherman, and reported to him about this time.

The battle of the 22d is usually known as the Battle of Atlanta,although the city did not fall into our hands until the 2d of September.Preparations went on, as before, to flank the enemy out of his position.The work was tedious, and the lines that had to be maintained were verylong. Our troops were gradually worked around to the east until theystruck the road between Decatur and Atlanta. These lines were stronglyfortified, as were those to the north and west of the city—all as closeup to the enemy's lines as practicable—in order to hold them with thesmallest possible number of men, the design being to detach an army tomove by our right and try to get upon the railroad down south ofAtlanta.

On the 27th the movement by the right flank commenced. On the 28th theenemy struck our right flank, General Logan commanding, with greatvigor. Logan intrenched himself hastily, and by that means was enabledto resist all assaults and inflict a great deal of damage upon theenemy. These assaults were continued to the middle of the afternoon,and resumed once or twice still later in the day. The enemy's losses inthese unsuccessful assaults were fearful.

During that evening the enemy in Logan's front withdrew into the town.This now left Sherman's army close up to the Confederate lines,extending from a point directly east of the city around by the north andwest of it for a distance of fully ten miles; the whole of this linebeing intrenched, and made stronger every day they remained there.

In the latter part of July Sherman sent Stoneman to destroy therailroads to the south, about Macon. He was then to go east and, ifpossible, release our prisoners about Andersonville. There were painfulstories current at the time about the great hardships these prisonershad to endure in the way of general bad treatment, in the way in whichthey were housed, and in the way in which they were fed. Great sympathywas felt for them; and it was thought that even if they could be turnedloose upon the country it would be a great relief to them. But theattempt proved a failure. McCook, who commanded a small brigade, wasfirst reported to have been captured; but he got back, having inflicteda good deal of damage upon the enemy. He had also taken some prisoners;but encountering afterwards a largely superior force of the enemy he wasobliged to drop his prisoners and get back as best he could with whatmen he had left. He had lost several hundred men out of his smallcommand. On the 4th of August Colonel Adams, commanding a littlebrigade of about a thousand men, returned reporting Stoneman and all buthimself as lost. I myself had heard around Richmond of the capture ofStoneman, and had sent Sherman word, which he received. The rumor wasconfirmed there, also, from other sources. A few days after ColonelAdams's return Colonel Capron also got in with a small detachment andconfirmed the report of the capture of Stoneman with something less thana thousand men.

It seems that Stoneman, finding the escape of all his force wasimpossible, had made arrangements for the escape of two divisions. Hecovered the movement of these divisions to the rear with a force ofabout seven hundred men, and at length surrendered himself and thisdetachment to the commanding Confederate. In this raid, however, muchdamage was inflicted upon the enemy by the destruction of cars,locomotives, army wagons, manufactories of military supplies, etc.

On the 4th and 5th Sherman endeavored to get upon the railroad to ourright, where Schofield was in command, but these attempts failedutterly. General Palmer was charged with being the cause of thisfailure, to a great extent, by both General Sherman and GeneralSchofield; but I am not prepared to say this, although a question seemsto have arisen with Palmer as to whether Schofield had any right tocommand him. If he did raise this question while an action was goingon, that act alone was exceedingly reprehensible.

About the same time Wheeler got upon our railroad north of Resaca anddestroyed it nearly up to Dalton. This cut Sherman off fromcommunication with the North for several days. Sherman responded tothis attack on his lines of communication by directing one upon theirs.

Kilpatrick started on the night of the 18th of August to reach the Maconroad about Jonesboro. He succeeded in doing so, passed entirely aroundthe Confederate lines of Atlanta, and was back again in his formerposition on our left by the 22d. These little affairs, however,contributed but very little to the grand result. They annoyed, it istrue, but any damage thus done to a railroad by any cavalry expeditionis soon repaired.

Sherman made preparations for a repetition of his tactics; that is, fora flank movement with as large a force as could be got together to somepoint in the enemy's rear. Sherman commenced this last movement on the25th of August, and on the 1st of September was well up towards therailroad twenty miles south of Atlanta. Here he found Hardeeintrenched, ready to meet him. A battle ensued, but he was unable todrive Hardee away before night set in. Under cover of the night,however, Hardee left of his own accord. That night Hood blew up hismilitary works, such as he thought would be valuable in our hands, anddecamped.

The next morning at daylight General H. W. Slocum, who was commandingnorth of the city, moved in and took possession of Atlanta, and notifiedSherman. Sherman then moved deliberately back, taking three days toreach the city, and occupied a line extending from Decatur on the leftto Atlanta in the centre, with his troops extending out of the city forsome distance to the right.

The campaign had lasted about four months, and was one of the mostmemorable in history. There was but little if anything in the wholecampaign, now that it is over, to criticise at all, and nothing tocriticise severely. It was creditable alike to the general whocommanded and the army which had executed it. Sherman had on thiscampaign some bright, wide-awake division and brigade commanders whosealertness added a host to the efficiency of his command.

The troops now went to work to make themselves comfortable, and to enjoya little rest after their arduous campaign. The city of Atlanta wasturned into a military base. The citizens were all compelled to leave.Sherman also very wisely prohibited the assembling of the army ofsutlers and traders who always follow in the wake of an army in thefield, if permitted to do so, from trading with the citizens and gettingthe money of the soldiers for articles of but little use to them, andfor which they are made to pay most exorbitant prices. He limited thenumber of these traders to one for each of his three armies.

The news of Sherman's success reached the North instantaneously, and setthe country all aglow. This was the first great political campaign forthe Republicans in their canvass of 1864. It was followed later bySheridan's campaign in the Shenandoah Valley; and these two campaignsprobably had more effect in settling the election of the followingNovember than all the speeches, all the bonfires, and all the paradingwith banners and bands of music in the North.

CHAPTER L.

GRAND MOVEMENT OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC—CROSSING THE RAPIDAN—ENTERING THE WILDERNESS—BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS.

Soon after midnight, May 3d-4th, the Army of the Potomac moved out fromits position north Rapidan, to start upon that memorable campaign,destined to result in the capture of the Confederate capital and thearmy defending it. This was not to be accomplished, however, without asdesperate fighting as the world has ever witnessed; not to beconsummated in a day, a week, a month, single season. The lossesinflicted, and endured, were destined to be severe; but the armies nowconfronting each other had already been in deadly conflict for a periodof three years, with immense losses in killed, by death from sickness,captured and wounded; and neither had made any real progressaccomplishing the final end. It is true the Confederates had, so far,held their capital, and they claimed this to be their sole object. Butpreviously they had boldly proclaimed their intention to capturePhiladelphia, New York, and the National Capital, and had made severalattempts to do so, and once or twice had come fearfully near makingtheir boast good—too near for complacent contemplation by the loyalNorth. They had also come near losing their own capital on at least oneoccasion. So here was a stand-off. The campaign now begun was destinedto result in heavier losses, to both armies, in a given time, than anypreviously suffered; but the carnage was to be limited to a single year,and to accomplish all that had been anticipated or desired at thebeginning in that time. We had to have hard fighting to achieve this.The two armies had been confronting each other so long, without anydecisive result, that they hardly knew which could whip.

Ten days' rations, with a supply of forage and ammunition were taken inwagons. Beef cattle were driven with the trains, and butchered aswanted. Three days rations in addition, in haversacks, and fifty roundsof cartridges, were carried on the person of each soldier.

The country over which the army had to operate, from the Rapidan to thecrossing of the James River, is rather flat, and is cut by numerousstreams which make their way to the Chesapeake Bay. The crossings ofthese streams by the army were generally made not far above tide-water,and where they formed a considerable obstacle to the rapid advance oftroops even when the enemy did not appear in opposition. The countryroads were narrow and poor. Most of the country is covered with a denseforest, in places, like the Wilderness and along the Chickahominy,almost impenetrable even for infantry except along the roads. Allbridges were naturally destroyed before the National troops came tothem.

The Army of the Potomac was composed of three infantry and one cavalrycorps, commanded respectively by Generals W. S. Hancock, G. K. Warren,(*27) John Sedgwick and P. H. Sheridan. The artillery was commanded byGeneral Henry J. Hunt. This arm was in such abundance that the fourthof it could not be used to advantage in such a country as we weredestined to pass through. The surplus was much in the way, taking up asit did so much of the narrow and bad roads, and consuming so much of theforage and other stores brought up by the trains.

The 5th corps, General Warren commanding, was in advance on the right,and marched directly for Germania Ford, preceded by one division ofcavalry, under General J. H. Wilson. General Sedgwick followed Warrenwith the 6th corps. Germania Ford was nine or ten miles below the rightof Lee's line. Hancock, with the 2d corps, moved by another road,farther east, directly upon Ely's Ford, six miles below Germania,preceded by Gregg's division of cavalry, and followed by the artillery.Torbert's division of cavalry was left north of the Rapidan, for thetime, to picket the river and prevent the enemy from crossing andgetting into our rear. The cavalry seized the two crossings beforedaylight, drove the enemy's pickets guarding them away, and by sixo'clock A.M. had the pontoons laid ready for the crossing of theinfantry and artillery. This was undoubtedly a surprise to Lee. Thefact that the movement was unopposed proves this.

Burnside, with the 9th corps, was left back at Warrenton, guarding therailroad from Bull Run forward to preserve control of it in case ourcrossing the Rapidan should be long delayed. He was instructed, however,to advance at once on receiving notice that the army had crossed; and adispatch was sent to him a little after one P.M. giving the informationthat our crossing had been successful.

The country was heavily wooded at all the points of crossing,particularly on the south side of the river. The battle-field from thecrossing of the Rapidan until the final movement from the Wildernesstoward Spottsylvania was of the same character. There were someclearings and small farms within what might be termed the battle-field;but generally the country was covered with a dense forest. The roadswere narrow and bad. All the conditions were favorable for defensiveoperations.

There are two roads, good for that part of Virginia, running from OrangeCourt House to the battle-field. The most southerly of these roads isknown as the Orange Court House Plank Road, the northern one as theOrange Turnpike. There are also roads from east of the battle-fieldrunning to Spottsylvania Court House, one from Chancellorsville,branching at Aldrich's; the western branch going by Piney Branch Church,Alsop's, thence by the Brock Road to Spottsylvania; the east branch goesby Gates's, thence to Spottsylvania. The Brock Road runs from GermaniaFord through the battle-field and on to the Court House. AsSpottsylvania is approached the country is cut up with numerous roads,some going to the town direct, and others crossing so as to connect thefarms with roads going there.

Lee's headquarters were at Orange Court House. From there toFredericksburg he had the use of the two roads above described runningnearly parallel to the Wilderness. This gave him unusual facilities,for that country, for concentrating his forces to his right. Theseroads strike the road from Germania Ford in the Wilderness.

As soon as the crossing of the infantry was assured, the cavalry pushedforward, Wilson's division by Wilderness Tavern to Parker's store, onthe Orange Plank Road; Gregg to the left towards Chancellorsville.Warren followed Wilson and reached the Wilderness Tavern by noon, tookposition there and intrenched. Sedgwick followed Warren. He was acrossthe river and in camp on the south bank, on the right of Warren, bysundown. Hancock, with the 2d corps, moved parallel with Warren andcamped about six miles east of him. Before night all the troops, and bythe evening of the 5th the trains of more than four thousand wagons,were safely on the south side of the river.

There never was a corps better organized than was the quartermaster'scorps with the Army of the Potomac in 1864. With a wagon-train thatwould have extended from the Rapidan to Richmond, stretched along insingle file and separated as the teams necessarily would be when moving,we could still carry only three days' forage and about ten to twelvedays' rations, besides a supply of ammunition. To overcome alldifficulties, the chief quartermaster, General Rufus Ingalls, had markedon each wagon the corps badge with the division color and the number ofthe brigade. At a glance, the particular brigade to which any wagonbelonged could be told. The wagons were also marked to note thecontents: if ammunition, whether for artillery or infantry; if forage,whether grain or hay; if rations, whether, bread, pork, beans, rice,sugar, coffee or whatever it might be. Empty wagons were never allowedto follow the army or stay in camp. As soon as a wagon was empty itwould return to the base of supply for a load of precisely the samearticle that had been taken from it. Empty trains were obliged to leavethe road free for loaded ones. Arriving near the army they would beparked in fields nearest to the brigades they belonged to. Issues,except of ammunition, were made at night in all cases. By this systemthe hauling of forage for the supply train was almost wholly dispensedwith. They consumed theirs at the depots.

I left Culpeper Court House after all the troops had been put in motion,and passing rapidly to the front, crossed the Rapidan in advance ofSedgwick's corps; and established headquarters for the afternoon andnight in a deserted house near the river.

Orders had been given, long before this movement began, to cut down thebaggage of officers and men to the lowest point possible.Notwithstanding this I saw scattered along the road from Culpeper toGermania Ford wagon-loads of new blankets and overcoats, thrown away bythe troops to lighten their knapsacks; an improvidence I had neverwitnessed before.

Lee, while his pickets and signal corps must have discovered at a veryearly hour on the morning of the 4th of May, that the Army of thePotomac was moving, evidently did not learn until about one o'clock inthe afternoon by what route we would confront his army. This I judgefrom the fact that at 1.15 P.M., an hour and a quarter after Warren hadreached Old Wilderness Tavern, our officers took off rebel signalswhich, when translated, were seen to be an order to his troops to occupytheir intrenchments at Mine Run.

Here at night dispatches were received announcing that Sherman, Butlerand Crook had moved according to programme.

On discovering the advance of the Army of the Potomac, Lee ordered Hill,Ewell and Longstreet, each commanding corps, to move to the right toattack us, Hill on the Orange Plank Road, Longstreet to follow on thesame road. Longstreet was at this time—middle of the afternoon—atGordonsville, twenty or more miles away. Ewell was ordered by theOrange Pike. He was near by and arrived some four miles east of MineRun before bivouacking for the night.

My orders were given through General Meade for an early advance on themorning of the 5th. Warren was to move to Parker's store, and Wilson'scavalry—then at Parker's store—to move on to Craig's meeting-house.Sedgwick followed Warren, closing in on his right. The Army of thePotomac was facing to the west, though our advance was made to thesouth, except when facing the enemy. Hancock was to move south-westwardto join on the left of Warren, his left to reach to Shady Grove Church.

At six o'clock, before reaching Parker's store, Warren discovered theenemy. He sent word back to this effect, and was ordered to halt andprepare to meet and attack him. Wright, with his division of Sedgwick'scorps, was ordered, by any road he could find, to join on to Warren'sright, and Getty with his division, also of Sedgwick's corps, wasordered to move rapidly by Warren's rear and get on his left. This wasthe speediest way to reinforce Warren who was confronting the enemy onboth the Orange plank and turnpike roads.

Burnside had moved promptly on the 4th, on receiving word that the Armyof the Potomac had safely crossed the Rapidan. By making a night march,although some of his troops had to march forty miles to reach the river,he was crossing with the head of his column early on the morning of the5th. Meade moved his headquarters on to Old Wilderness Tavern, fourmiles south of the river, as soon as it was light enough to see theroad. I remained to hasten Burnside's crossing and to put him inposition. Burnside at this time was not under Meade's command, and washis senior in rank. Getting information of the proximity of the enemy,I informed Meade, and without waiting to see Burnside, at once movedforward my headquarters to where Meade was.

It was my plan then, as it was on all other occasions, to take theinitiative whenever the enemy could be drawn from his intrenchments ifwe were not intrenched ourselves. Warren had not yet reached the pointwhere he was to halt, when he discovered the enemy near by. Neitherparty had any advantage of position. Warren was, therefore, ordered toattack as soon as he could prepare for it. At nine o'clock Hancock wasordered to come up to the support of Getty. He himself arrived atGetty's front about noon, but his troops were yet far in the rear.Getty was directed to hold his position at all hazards until relieved.About this hour Warren was ready, and attacked with favorable though notdecisive results. Getty was somewhat isolated from Warren and was in aprecarious condition for a time. Wilson, with his division of cavalry,was farther south, and was cut off from the rest of the army. At twoo'clock Hancock's troops began to arrive, and immediately he was orderedto join Getty and attack the enemy. But the heavy timber and narrowroads prevented him from getting into position for attack as promptly ashe generally did when receiving such orders. At four o'clock he againreceived his orders to attack, and General Getty received orders fromMeade a few minutes later to attack whether Hancock was ready or not.He met the enemy under Heth within a few hundred yards.

Hancock immediately sent two divisions, commanded by Birney and Mott,and later two brigades, Carroll's and Owen's, to the support of Getty.This was timely and saved Getty. During the battle Getty and Carrollwere wounded, but remained on the field. One of Birney's most gallantbrigade commanders—Alexander Hays—was killed.

I had been at West Point with Hays for three years, and had served withhim through the Mexican war, a portion of the time in the same regiment.He was a most gallant officer, ready to lead his command whereverordered. With him it was "Come, boys," not "Go."

Wadsworth's division and Baxter's brigade of the 2d division were sentto reinforce Hancock and Getty; but the density of the interveningforest was such that, there being no road to march upon, they did notget up with the head of column until night, and bivouacked where theywere without getting into position.

During the afternoon Sheridan sent Gregg's division of cavalry to Todd'sTavern in search of Wilson. This was fortunate. He found Wilsonengaged with a superior force under General Rosser, supported byinfantry, and falling back before it. Together they were strong enoughto turn the tables upon the enemy and themselves become aggressive.They soon drove the rebel cavalry back beyond Corbin's Bridge.

Fighting between Hancock and Hill continued until night put a close toit. Neither side made any special progress.

After the close of the battle of the 5th of May my orders were given forthe following morning. We knew Longstreet with 12,000 men was on hisway to join Hill's right, near the Brock Road, and might arrive duringthe night. I was anxious that the rebels should not take the initiativein the morning, and therefore ordered Hancock to make an assault at 4.30o'clock. Meade asked to have the hour changed to six. Deferring to hiswishes as far as I was willing, the order was modified and five wasfixed as the hour to move.

Hancock had now fully one-half of the Army of the Potomac. Wadsworthwith his division, which had arrived the night before, lay in a lineperpendicular to that held by Hill, and to the right of Hancock. He wasdirected to move at the same time, and to attack Hill's left.

Burnside, who was coming up with two divisions, was directed to get inbetween Warren and Wadsworth, and attack as soon as he could get inposition to do so. Sedgwick and Warren were to make attacks in theirfront, to detain as many of the enemy as they could and to takeadvantage of any attempt to reinforce Hill from that quarter. Burnsidewas ordered if he should succeed in breaking the enemy's centre, toswing around to the left and envelop the right of Lee's army. Hancockwas informed of all the movements ordered.

Burnside had three divisions, but one of them—a colored division—wassent to guard the wagon train, and he did not see it again until July.

Lee was evidently very anxious that there should be no battle on hisright until Longstreet got up. This is evident from the fact thatnotwithstanding the early hour at which I had ordered the assault, bothfor the purpose of being the attacking party and to strike beforeLongstreet got up, Lee was ahead in his assault on our right. Hispurpose was evident, but he failed.

Hancock was ready to advance by the hour named, but learning in timethat Longstreet was moving a part of his corps by the Catharpin Road,thus threatening his left flank, sent a division of infantry, commandedby General Barlow, with all his artillery, to cover the approaches bywhich Longstreet was expected. This disposition was made in time toattack as ordered. Hancock moved by the left of the Orange Plank Road,and Wadsworth by the right of it. The fighting was desperate for aboutan hour, when the enemy began to break up in great confusion.

I believed then, and see no reason to change that opinion now, that ifthe country had been such that Hancock and his command could have seenthe confusion and panic in the lines of the enemy, it would have beentaken advantage of so effectually that Lee would not have made anotherstand outside of his Richmond defences.

Gibbon commanded Hancock's left, and was ordered to attack, but was notable to accomplish much.

On the morning of the 6th Sheridan was sent to connect with Hancock'sleft and attack the enemy's cavalry who were trying to get on our leftand rear. He met them at the intersection of the Furnace and Brockroads and at Todd's Tavern, and defeated them at both places. Later hewas attacked, and again the enemy was repulsed.

Hancock heard the firing between Sheridan and Stuart, and thinking theenemy coming by that road, still further reinforced his positionguarding the entrance to the Brock Road. Another incident happenedduring the day to further induce Hancock to weaken his attacking column.Word reached him that troops were seen moving towards him from thedirection of Todd's Tavern, and Brooke's brigade was detached to meetthis new enemy; but the troops approaching proved to be several hundredconvalescents coming from Chancellorsville, by the road Hancock hadadvanced upon, to join their respective commands. At 6.50 o'clock A.M.,Burnside, who had passed Wilderness Tavern at six o'clock, was orderedto send a division to the support of Hancock, but to continue with theremainder of his command in the execution of his previous order. Thedifficulty of making a way through the dense forests prevented Burnsidefrom getting up in time to be of any service on the forenoon of thesixth.

Hancock followed Hill's retreating forces, in the morning, a mile ormore. He maintained this position until, along in the afternoon,Longstreet came upon him. The retreating column of Hill meetingreinforcements that had not yet been engaged, became encouraged andreturned with them. They were enabled, from the density of the forest,to approach within a few hundred yards of our advance before beingdiscovered. Falling upon a brigade of Hancock's corps thrown to theadvance, they swept it away almost instantly. The enemy followed up hisadvantage and soon came upon Mott's division, which fell back in greatconfusion. Hancock made dispositions to hold his advanced position, butafter holding it for a time, fell back into the position that he hadheld in the morning, which was strongly intrenched. In this engagementthe intrepid Wadsworth while trying to rally his men was mortallywounded and fell into the hands of the enemy. The enemy followed up,but made no immediate attack.

The Confederate General Jenkins was killed and Longstreet seriouslywounded in this engagement. Longstreet had to leave the field, not toresume command for many weeks. His loss was a severe one to Lee, andcompensated in a great measure for the mishap, or misapprehensions,which had fallen to our lot during the day.

After Longstreet's removal from the field Lee took command of his rightin person. He was not able, however, to rally his men to attackHancock's position, and withdrew from our front for the purpose ofreforming. Hancock sent a brigade to clear his front of all remnantsthat might be left of Longstreet's or Hill's commands. This brigadehaving been formed at right angles to the intrenchments held byHancock's command, swept down the whole length of them from left toright. A brigade of the enemy was encountered in this move; but itbroke and disappeared without a contest.

Firing was continued after this, but with less fury. Burnside had notyet been able to get up to render any assistance. But it was now onlyabout nine in the morning, and he was getting into position on Hancock'sright.

At 4.15 in the afternoon Lee attacked our left. His line moved up towithin a hundred yards of ours and opened a heavy fire. This status wasmaintained for about half an hour. Then a part of Mott's division andWard's brigade of Birney's division gave way and retired in disorder.The enemy under R. H. Anderson took advantage of this and pushed throughour line, planting their flags on a part of the intrenchments not onfire. But owing to the efforts of Hancock, their success was buttemporary. Carroll, of Gibbon's division, moved at a double quick withhis brigade and drove back the enemy, inflicting great loss. Fightinghad continued from five in the morning sometimes along the whole line,at other times only in places. The ground fought over had varied inwidth, but averaged three-quarters of a mile. The killed, and many ofthe severely wounded, of both armies, lay within this belt where it wasimpossible to reach them. The woods were set on fire by the burstingshells, and the conflagration raged. The wounded who had not strengthto move themselves were either suffocated or burned to death. Finallythe fire communicated with our breastworks, in places. Beingconstructed of wood, they burned with great fury. But the battle stillraged, our men firing through the flames until it became too hot toremain longer.

Lee was now in distress. His men were in confusion, and his personalefforts failed to restore order. These facts, however, were learnedsubsequently, or we would have taken advantage of his condition and nodoubt gained a decisive success. His troops were withdrawn now, but Irevoked the order, which I had given previously to this assault, forHancock to attack, because his troops had exhausted their ammunition anddid not have time to replenish from the train, which was at somedistance.

Burnside, Sedgwick, and Warren had all kept up an assault during allthis time; but their efforts had no other effect than to prevent theenemy from reinforcing his right from the troops in their front.

I had, on the 5th, ordered all the bridges over the Rapidan to be takenup except one at Germania Ford.

The troops on Sedgwick's right had been sent to enforce our left. Thisleft our right in danger of being turned, and us of being cut off fromall present base of supplies. Sedgwick had refused his right andintrenched it for protection against attack. But late in the afternoonof the 6th Early came out from his lines in considerable force and gotin upon Sedgwick's right, notwithstanding the precautions taken, andcreated considerable confusion. Early captured several hundredprisoners, among them two general officers. The defence, however, wasvigorous; and night coming on, the enemy was thrown into as muchconfusion as our troops, engaged, were. Early says in his Memoirs thatif we had discovered the confusion in his lines we might have broughtfresh troops to his great discomfort. Many officers, who had not beenattacked by Early, continued coming to my headquarters even afterSedgwick had rectified his lines a little farther to the rear, with newsof the disaster, fully impressed with the idea that the enemy waspushing on and would soon be upon me.

During the night all of Lee's army withdrew within their intrenchments.On the morning of the 7th General Custer drove the enemy's cavalry fromCatharpin Furnace to Todd's Tavern. Pickets and skirmishers were sentalong our entire front to find the position of the enemy. Some went asfar as a mile and a half before finding him. But Lee showed nodisposition to come out of his Works. There was no battle during theday, and but little firing except in Warren's front; he being directedabout noon to make a reconnoissance in force. This drew some sharpfiring, but there was no attempt on the part of Lee to drive him back.This ended the Battle of the Wilderness.

CHAPTER LI.

AFTER THE BATTLE—TELEGRAPH AND SIGNAL SERVICE—MOVEMENT BY THE LEFTFLANK.

More desperate fighting has not been witnessed on this continent thanthat of the 5th and 6th of May. Our victory consisted in havingsuccessfully crossed a formidable stream, almost in the face of anenemy, and in getting the army together as a unit. We gained anadvantage on the morning of the 6th, which, if it had been followed up,must have proven very decisive. In the evening the enemy gained anadvantage; but was speedily repulsed. As we stood at the close, the twoarmies were relatively in about the same condition to meet each other aswhen the river divided them. But the fact of having safely crossed wasa victory.

Our losses in the Wilderness were very severe. Those of theConfederates must have been even more so; but I have no means ofspeaking with accuracy upon this point. The Germania Ford bridge wastransferred to Ely's Ford to facilitate the transportation of thewounded to Washington.

It may be as well here as elsewhere to state two things connected withall movements of the Army of the Potomac: first, in every change ofposition or halt for the night, whether confronting the enemy or not,the moment arms were stacked the men intrenched themselves. For thispurpose they would build up piles of logs or rails if they could befound in their front, and dig a ditch, throwing the dirt forward on thetimber. Thus the digging they did counted in making a depression tostand in, and increased the elevation in front of them. It waswonderful how quickly they could in this way construct defences ofconsiderable strength. When a halt was made with the view of assaultingthe enemy, or in his presence, these would be strengthened or theirpositions changed under the direction of engineer officers. The secondwas, the use made of the telegraph and signal corps. Nothing could bemore complete than the organization and discipline of this body of braveand intelligent men. Insulated wires—insulated so that they wouldtransmit messages in a storm, on the ground or under water—were woundupon reels, making about two hundred pounds weight of wire to each reel.Two men and one mule were detailed to each reel. The pack-saddle onwhich this was carried was provided with a rack like a sawbuck placedcrosswise of the saddle, and raised above it so that the reel, with itswire, would revolve freely. There was a wagon, supplied with atelegraph operator, battery and telegraph instruments for each division,each corps, each army, and one for my headquarters. There were wagonsalso loaded with light poles, about the size and length of a wall tentpole, supplied with an iron spike in one end, used to hold the wires upwhen laid, so that wagons and artillery would not run over them. Themules thus loaded were assigned to brigades, and always kept with thecommand they were assigned to. The operators were also assigned toparticular headquarters, and never changed except by special orders.

The moment the troops were put in position to go into camp all the menconnected with this branch of service would proceed to put up theirwires. A mule loaded with a coil of wire would be led to the rear ofthe nearest flank of the brigade he belonged to, and would be led in aline parallel thereto, while one man would hold an end of the wire anduncoil it as the mule was led off. When he had walked the length of thewire the whole of it would be on the ground. This would be done in rearof every brigade at the same time. The ends of all the wires would thenbe joined, making a continuous wire in the rear of the whole army. Themen, attached to brigades or divisions, would all commence at onceraising the wires with their telegraph poles. This was done by making aloop in the wire and putting it over the spike and raising the pole to aperpendicular position. At intervals the wire would be attached totrees, or some other permanent object, so that one pole was sufficientat a place. In the absence of such a support two poles would have to beused, at intervals, placed at an angle so as to hold the wire firm inits place. While this was being done the telegraph wagons would taketheir positions near where the headquarters they belonged to were to beestablished, and would connect with the wire. Thus, in a few minuteslonger time than it took a mule to walk the length of its coil,telegraphic communication would be effected between all the headquartersof the army. No orders ever had to be given to establish the telegraph.

The signal service was used on the march. The men composing this corpswere assigned to specified commands. When movements were made, theywould go in advance, or on the flanks, and seize upon high points ofground giving a commanding view of the country, if cleared, or wouldclimb tall trees on the highest points if not cleared, and would denote,by signals, the positions of different parts of our own army, and oftenthe movements of the enemy. They would also take off the signals of theenemy and transmit them. It would sometimes take too long a time tomake translations of intercepted dispatches for us to receive anybenefit from them. But sometimes they gave useful information.

On the afternoon of the 7th I received news from Washington announcingthat Sherman had probably attacked Johnston that day, and that Butlerhad reached City Point safely and taken it by surprise on the 5th. Ihad given orders for a movement by the left flank, fearing that Leemight move rapidly to Richmond to crush Butler before I could get there.

My order for this movement was as follows:

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE U. S., May 7, 1864, 6.30 A.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE, Commanding A. P.

Make all preparations during the day for a night march to take positionat Spottsylvania C. H. with one army corps, at Todd's Tavern with one,and another near the intersection of the Piney Branch and Spottsylvaniaroad with the road from Alsop's to Old Court House. If this move ismade the trains should be thrown forward early in the morning to the NyRiver.

I think it would be advisable in making the change to leave Hancockwhere he is until Warren passes him. He could then follow and becomethe right of the new line. Burnside will move to Piney Branch Church.Sedgwick can move along the pike to Chancellorsville and on to hisdestination. Burnside will move on the plank road to the intersectionof it with the Orange and Fredericksburg plank road, then followSedgwick to his place of destination.

All vehicles should be got out of hearing of the enemy before the troopsmove, and then move off quietly.

It is more than probable that the enemy concentrate for a heavy attackon Hancock this afternoon. In case they do we must be prepared toresist them, and follow up any success we may gain, with our wholeforce. Such a result would necessarily modify these instructions.

All the hospitals should be moved to-day to Chancellorsville.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.

During the 7th Sheridan had a fight with the rebel cavalry at Todd'sTavern, but routed them, thus opening the way for the troops that wereto go by that route at night. Soon after dark Warren withdrew from thefront of the enemy, and was soon followed by Sedgwick. Warren's marchcarried him immediately behind the works where Hancock's command lay onthe Brock Road. With my staff and a small escort of cavalry I precededthe troops. Meade with his staff accompanied me. The greatestenthusiasm was manifested by Hancock's men as we passed by. No doubt itwas inspired by the fact that the movement was south. It indicated tothem that they had passed through the "beginning of the end" in thebattle just fought. The cheering was so lusty that the enemy must havetaken it for a night attack. At all events it drew from him a furiousfusillade of artillery and musketry, plainly heard but not felt by us.

Meade and I rode in advance. We had passed but a little way beyond ourleft when the road forked. We looked to see, if we could, which roadSheridan had taken with his cavalry during the day. It seemed to be theright-hand one, and accordingly we took it. We had not gone far,however, when Colonel C. B. Comstock, of my staff, with the instinct ofthe engineer, suspecting that we were on a road that would lead us intothe lines of the enemy, if he, too, should be moving, dashed by at arapid gallop and all alone. In a few minutes he returned and reportedthat Lee was moving, and that the road we were on would bring us intohis lines in a short distance. We returned to the forks of the road,left a man to indicate the right road to the head of Warren's columnwhen it should come up, and continued our journey to Todd's Tavern,where we arrived after midnight.

My object in moving to Spottsylvania was two-fold: first, I did notwant Lee to get back to Richmond in time to attempt to crush Butlerbefore I could get there; second, I wanted to get between his army andRichmond if possible; and, if not, to draw him into the open field. ButLee, by accident, beat us to Spottsylvania. Our wagon trains had beenordered easterly of the roads the troops were to march upon before themovement commenced. Lee interpreted this as a semi-retreat of the Armyof the Potomac to Fredericksburg, and so informed his government.Accordingly he ordered Longstreet's corps—now commanded by Anderson—tomove in the morning (the 8th) to Spottsylvania. But the woods beingstill on fire, Anderson could not go into bivouac, and marched directlyon to his destination that night. By this accident Lee got possessionof Spottsylvania. It is impossible to say now what would have been theresult if Lee's orders had been obeyed as given; but it is certain thatwe would have been in Spottsylvania, and between him and his capital.My belief is that there would have been a race between the two armies tosee which could reach Richmond first, and the Army of the Potomac wouldhave had the shorter line. Thus, twice since crossing the Rapidan wecame near closing the campaign, so far as battles were concerned, fromthe Rapidan to the James River or Richmond. The first failure wascaused by our not following up the success gained over Hill's corps onthe morning of the 6th, as before described: the second, when firescaused by that battle drove Anderson to make a march during the night ofthe 7th-8th which he was ordered to commence on the morning of the 8th.But accident often decides the fate of battle.

Sheridan's cavalry had had considerable fighting during the afternoon ofthe 7th, lasting at Todd's Tavern until after night, with the field hisat the close. He issued the necessary orders for seizing Spottsylvaniaand holding the bridge over the Po River, which Lee's troops would haveto cross to get to Spottsylvania. But Meade changed Sheridan's ordersto Merritt—who was holding the bridge—on his arrival at Todd's Tavern,and thereby left the road free for Anderson when he came up. Wilson,who was ordered to seize the town, did so, with his division of cavalry;but he could not hold it against the Confederate corps which had notbeen detained at the crossing of the Po, as it would have been but forthe unfortunate change in Merritt's orders. Had he been permitted toexecute the orders Sheridan gave him, he would have been guarding withtwo brigades of cavalry the bridge over the Po River which Anderson hadto cross, and must have detained him long enough to enable Warren toreinforce Wilson and hold the town.

Anderson soon intrenched himself—if indeed the intrenchments were notalready made—immediately across Warren's front. Warren was not aware ofhis presence, but probably supposed it was the cavalry which Merritt hadengaged earlier in the day. He assaulted at once, but was repulsed. Hesoon organized his men, as they were not pursued by the enemy, and madea second attack, this time with his whole corps. This time he succeededin gaining a position immediately in the enemy's front, where heintrenched. His right and left divisions—the former Crawford's, thelatter Wadsworth's, now commanded by Cutler—drove the enemy back somedistance.

At this time my headquarters had been advanced to Piney Branch Church.I was anxious to crush Anderson before Lee could get a force to hissupport. To this end Sedgwick who was at Piney Branch Church, wasordered to Warren's support. Hancock, who was at Todd's Tavern, wasnotified of Warren's engagement, and was directed to be in readiness tocome up. Burnside, who was with the wagon trains at Aldrich's on ourextreme left, received the same instructions. Sedgwick was slow ingetting up for some reason—probably unavoidable, because he was neverat fault when serious work was to be done—so that it was near nightbefore the combined forces were ready to attack. Even then all ofSedgwick's command did not get into the engagement. Warren led the lastassault, one division at a time, and of course it failed.

Warren's difficulty was twofold: when he received an order to doanything, it would at once occur to his mind how all the balance of thearmy should be engaged so as properly to co-operate with him. His ideaswere generally good, but he would forget that the person giving himorders had thought of others at the time he had of him. In like manner,when he did get ready to execute an order, after giving most intelligentinstructions to division commanders, he would go in with one division,holding the others in reserve until he could superintend their movementsin person also, forgetting that division commanders could execute anorder without his presence. His difficulty was constitutional andbeyond his control. He was an officer of superior ability, quickperceptions, and personal courage to accomplish anything that could bedone with a small command.

Lee had ordered Hill's corps—now commanded by Early—to move by thevery road we had marched upon. This shows that even early in themorning of the 8th Lee had not yet become acquainted with my move, butstill thought that the Army of the Potomac had gone to Fredericksburg.Indeed, he informed the authorities at Richmond he had possession ofSpottsylvania and was on my flank. Anderson was in possession ofSpottsylvania, through no foresight of Lee, however. Early only foundthat he had been following us when he ran against Hancock at Todd'sTavern. His coming detained Hancock from the battle-field ofSpottsylvania for that day; but he, in like manner, kept Early back andforced him to move by another route.

Had I ordered the movement for the night of the 7th by my left flank, itwould have put Hancock in the lead. It would also have given us an houror earlier start. It took all that time for Warren to get the head ofhis column to the left of Hancock after he had got his troops out oftheir line confronting the enemy. This hour, and Hancock's capacity touse his whole force when necessary, would, no doubt, have enabled him tocrush Anderson before he could be reinforced. But the movement made wastactical. It kept the troops in mass against a possible assault by theenemy. Our left occupied its intrenchments while the two corps to theright passed. If an attack had been made by the enemy he would havefound the 2d corps in position, fortified, and, practically, the 5th and6th corps in position as reserves, until his entire front was passed.By a left flank movement the army would have been scattered while stillpassing the front of the enemy, and before the extreme right had got byit would have been very much exposed. Then, too, I had not yet learnedthe special qualifications of the different corps commanders. At thattime my judgment was that Warren was the man I would suggest to succeedMeade should anything happen to that gallant soldier to take him fromthe field. As I have before said, Warren was a gallant soldier, an ableman; and he was beside thoroughly imbued with the solemnity andimportance of the duty he had to perform.

CHAPTER LII.

BATTLE OF SPOTTSYLVANIA—HANCOCK'S POSITION—ASSAULT OF WARREN'S ANDWRIGHT'S CORPS—UPTON PROMOTED ON THE FIELD—GOOD NEWS FROM BUTLER ANDSHERIDAN.

The Mattapony River is formed by the junction of the Mat, the Ta, the Poand the Ny rivers, the last being the northernmost of the four. Ittakes its rise about a mile south and a little east of the WildernessTavern. The Po rises south-west of the place, but farther away.Spottsylvania is on the ridge dividing these two streams, and where theyare but a few miles apart. The Brock Road reaches Spottsylvania withoutcrossing either of these streams. Lee's army coming up by the CatharpinRoad, had to cross the Po at Wooden Bridge. Warren and Hancock came bythe Brock Road. Sedgwick crossed the Ny at Catharpin Furnace. Burnsidecoming by Aldrich's to Gates's house, had to cross the Ny near theenemy. He found pickets at the bridge, but they were soon driven off bya brigade of Willcox's division, and the stream was crossed. Thisbrigade was furiously attacked; but the remainder of the division comingup, they were enabled to hold their position, and soon fortified it.

About the time I received the news of this attack, word came fromHancock that Early had left his front. He had been forced over to theCatharpin Road, crossing the Po at Corbin's and again at Wooden Bridge.These are the bridges Sheridan had given orders to his cavalry to occupyon the 8th, while one division should occupy Spottsylvania. Thesemovements of the enemy gave me the idea that Lee was about to make theattempt to get to, or towards, Fredericksburg to cut off my supplies. Imade arrangements to attack his right and get between him and Richmondif he should try to execute this design. If he had any such intentionit was abandoned as soon as Burnside was established south of the Ny.

The Po and the Ny are narrow little streams, but deep, with abruptbanks, and bordered by heavily wooded and marshy bottoms—at the time wewere there—and difficult to cross except where bridged. The countryabout was generally heavily timbered, but with occasional clearings. Itwas a much better country to conduct a defensive campaign in than anoffensive one.

By noon of the 9th the position of the two armies was as follows: Leeoccupied a semicircle facing north, north-west and north-east, inclosingthe town. Anderson was on his left extending to the Po, Ewell camenext, then Early. Warren occupied our right, covering the Brock andother roads converging at Spottsylvania; Sedgwick was to his left andBurnside on our extreme left. Hancock was yet back at Todd's Tavern,but as soon as it was known that Early had left Hancock's front thelatter was ordered up to Warren's right. He formed a line with threedivisions on the hill overlooking the Po early in the afternoon, and wasordered to cross the Po and get on the enemy's flank. The fourthdivision of Hancock's corps, Mott commanding, was left at Todd's whenthe corps first came up; but in the afternoon it was brought up andplaced to the left of Sedgwick's—now Wright's—6th corps. In themorning General Sedgwick had been killed near the right of hisintrenchments by rebel sharpshooters. His loss was a severe one to theArmy of the Potomac and to the Nation. General H. G. Wright succeededhim in the command of his corps.

Hancock was now, nine P.M. of the 9th of May, across the left flank ofLee's army, but separated from it, and also from the remainder ofMeade's army, by the Po River. But for the lateness of the hour and thedarkness of the night he would have attempted to cross the river againat Wooden Bridge, thus bringing himself on the same side with bothfriend and foe.

The Po at the points where Hancock's corps crossed runs nearly due east.Just below his lower crossing—the troops crossed at three points—itturns due south, and after passing under Wooden Bridge soon resumes amore easterly direction. During the night this corps built threebridges over the Po; but these were in rear.

The position assumed by Hancock's corps forced Lee to reinforce his leftduring the night. Accordingly on the morning of the 10th, when Hancockrenewed his effort to get over the Po to his front, he found himselfconfronted by some of Early's command, which had been brought from theextreme right of the enemy during the night. He succeeded in effectinga crossing with one brigade, however, but finding the enemy intrenchedin his front, no more were crossed.

Hancock reconnoitred his front on the morning of the 10th, with the viewof forcing a crossing, if it was found that an advantage could begained. The enemy was found strongly intrenched on the high groundoverlooking the river, and commanding the Wooden Bridge with artillery.Anderson's left rested on the Po, where it turns south; therefore, forHancock to cross over—although it would bring him to the same side ofthe stream with the rest of the army—would still farther isolate himfrom it. The stream would have to be crossed twice in the face of theenemy to unite with the main body. The idea of crossing was thereforeabandoned.

Lee had weakened the other parts of his line to meet this movement ofHancock's, and I determined to take advantage of it. Accordingly in themorning, orders were issued for an attack in the afternoon on the centreby Warren's and Wright's corps, Hancock to command all the attackingforce. Two of his divisions were brought to the north side of the Po.Gibbon was placed to the right of Warren, and Birney in his rear as areserve. Barlow's division was left south of the stream, and Mott ofthe same corps was still to the left of Wright's corps. Burnside wasordered to reconnoitre his front in force, and, if an opportunitypresented, to attack with vigor. The enemy seeing Barlow's divisionisolated from the rest of the army, came out and attacked with fury.Barlow repulsed the assault with great slaughter, and with considerableloss to himself. But the enemy reorganized and renewed the assault.Birney was now moved to the high ground overlooking the river crossingsbuilt by our troops, and covered the crossings. The second assault wasrepulsed, again with severe loss to the enemy, and Barlow was withdrawnwithout further molestation. General T. G. Stevenson was killed in thismove.

Between the lines, where Warren's assault was to take place, there was aravine grown up with large trees and underbrush, making it almostimpenetrable by man. The slopes on both sides were also covered with aheavy growth of timber. Warren, before noon, reconnoitred his fronttwice, the first time with one and the second with two divisions. Hewas repulsed on both occasions, but gained such information of theground as to induce him to report recommending the assault.

Wright also reconnoitred his front and gained a considerably advancedposition from the one he started from. He then organized a stormingparty, consisting of twelve regiments, and assigned Colonel Emory Upton,of the 121st New York Volunteers, to the command of it. About fouro'clock in the afternoon the assault was ordered, Warren's and Wright'scorps, with Mott's division of Hancock's corps, to move simultaneously.The movement was prompt, and in a few minutes the fiercest of strugglesbegan. The battle-field was so densely covered with forest that butlittle could be seen, by any one person, as to the progress made. Meadeand I occupied the best position we could get, in rear of Warren.

Warren was repulsed with heavy loss, General J. C. Rice being among thekilled. He was not followed, however, by the enemy, and was therebyenabled to reorganize his command as soon as covered from the guns ofthe enemy. To the left our success was decided, but the advantage waslost by the feeble action of Mott. Upton with his assaulting partypushed forward and crossed the enemy's intrenchments. Turning to theright and left he captured several guns and some hundreds of prisoners.Mott was ordered to his assistance but failed utterly. So much time waslost in trying to get up the troops which were in the right position toreinforce, that I ordered Upton to withdraw; but the officers and men ofhis command were so averse to giving up the advantage they had gainedthat I withdrew the order. To relieve them, I ordered a renewal of theassault. By this time Hancock, who had gone with Birney's division torelieve Barlow, had returned, bringing the division with him. His corpswas now joined with Warren's and Wright's in this last assault. It wasgallantly made, many men getting up to, and over, the works of theenemy; but they were not able to hold them. At night they werewithdrawn. Upton brought his prisoners with him, but the guns he hadcaptured he was obliged to abandon. Upton had gained an importantadvantage, but a lack in others of the spirit and dash possessed by himlost it to us. Before leaving Washington I had been authorized topromote officers on the field for special acts of gallantry. By thisauthority I conferred the rank of brigadier-general upon Upton on thespot, and this act was confirmed by the President. Upton had been badlywounded in this fight.

Burnside on the left had got up to within a few hundred yards ofSpottsylvania Court House, completely turning Lee's right. He was notaware of the importance of the advantage he had gained, and I, beingwith the troops where the heavy fighting was, did not know of it at thetime. He had gained his position with but little fighting, and almostwithout loss. Burnside's position now separated him widely fromWright's corps, the corps nearest to him. At night he was ordered tojoin on to this. This brought him back about a mile, and lost to us animportant advantage. I attach no blame to Burnside for this, but I doto myself for not having had a staff officer with him to report to mehis position.

The enemy had not dared to come out of his line at any point to followup his advantage, except in the single instance of his attack on Barlow.Then he was twice repulsed with heavy loss, though he had an entirecorps against two brigades. Barlow took up his bridges in the presenceof this force.

On the 11th there was no battle and but little firing; none except byMott who made a reconnoissance to ascertain if there was a weak point inthe enemy's line.

I wrote the following letter to General Halleck:

NEAR SPOTTSYLVANIA C. H., May 11, 1864—8.30 A.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Chief of Staff of the Army, Washington, D. C.

We have now ended the 6th day of very hard fighting. The result up tothis time is much in our favor. But our losses have been heavy as wellas those of the enemy. We have lost to this time eleven generalofficers killed, wounded and missing, and probably twenty thousand men.I think the loss of the enemy must be greater—we having taken over fourthousand prisoners in battle, whilst he has taken from us but few excepta few stragglers. I am now sending back to Belle Plain all my wagonsfor a fresh supply of provisions and ammunition, and purpose to fight itout on this line if it takes all summer.

The arrival of reinforcements here will be very encouraging to the men,and I hope they will be sent as fast as possible, and in as greatnumbers. My object in having them sent to Belle Plain was to use themas an escort to our supply trains. If it is more convenient to sendthem out by train to march from the railroad to Belle Plain orFredericksburg, send them so.

I am satisfied the enemy are very shaky, and are only kept up to themark by the greatest exertions on the part of their officers, and bykeeping them intrenched in every position they take.

Up to this time there is no indication of any portion of Lee's armybeing detached for the defence of Richmond.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.

And also, I received information, through the War Department, fromGeneral Butler that his cavalry under Kautz had cut the railroad southof Petersburg, separating Beauregard from Richmond, and had whippedHill, killing, wounding and capturing many. Also that he wasintrenched, and could maintain himself. On this same day came news fromSheridan to the effect that he had destroyed ten miles of the railroadand telegraph between Lee and Richmond, one and a half million rations,and most of the medical stores for his army.

On the 8th I had directed Sheridan verbally to cut loose from the Armyof the Potomac and pass around the left of Lee's army and attack hiscavalry and communications, which was successfully executed in themanner I have already described.

CHAPTER LIII.

HANCOCK'S ASSAULT-LOSSES OF THE CONFEDERATES—PROMOTIONS RECOMMENDED—DISCOMFITURE OF THE ENEMY—EWELL'S ATTACK-REDUCING THE ARTILLERY.

In the reconnoissance made by Mott on the 11th, a salient was discoveredat the right centre. I determined that an assault should be made at thatpoint. (*28) Accordingly in the afternoon Hancock was ordered to movehis command by the rear of Warren and Wright, under cover of night, toWright's left, and there form it for an assault at four o'clock the nextmorning. The night was dark, it rained heavily, and the road wasdifficult, so that it was midnight when he reached the point where hewas to halt. It took most of the night to get the men in position fortheir advance in the morning. The men got but little rest. Burnsidewas ordered to attack (*29) on the left of the salient at the same hour.I sent two of my staff officers to impress upon him the importance ofpushing forward vigorously. Hancock was notified of this. Warren andWright were ordered to hold themselves in readiness to join in theassault if circumstances made it advisable. I occupied a centralposition most convenient for receiving information from all points.Hancock put Barlow on his left, in double column, and Birney to hisright. Mott followed Birney, and Gibbon was held in reserve.

The morning of the 12th opened foggy, delaying the start more than halfan hour.

The ground over which Hancock had to pass to reach the enemy, wasascending and heavily wooded to within two or three hundred yards of theenemy's intrenchments. In front of Birney there was also a marsh tocross. But, notwithstanding all these difficulties, the troops pushedon in quick time without firing a gun, and when within four or fivehundred yards of the enemy's line broke out in loud cheers, and with arush went up to and over the breastworks. Barlow and Birney enteredalmost simultaneously. Here a desperate hand-to-hand conflict tookplace. The men of the two sides were too close together to fire, butused their guns as clubs. The hand conflict was soon over. Hancock'scorps captured some four thousand prisoners among them a division and abrigade commander twenty or more guns with their horses, caissons, andammunition, several thousand stand of arms, and many colors. Hancock,as soon as the hand-to-hand conflict was over, turned the guns of theenemy against him and advanced inside the rebel lines. About sixo'clock I ordered Warren's corps to the support of Hancock's. Burnside,on the left, had advanced up east of the salient to the very parapet ofthe enemy. Potter, commanding one of his divisions, got over but wasnot able to remain there. However, he inflicted a heavy loss upon theenemy; but not without loss in return.

This victory was important, and one that Lee could not afford to leaveus in full possession of. He made the most strenuous efforts to regainthe position he had lost. Troops were brought up from his left andattacked Hancock furiously. Hancock was forced to fall back: but hedid so slowly, with his face to the enemy, inflicting on him heavy loss,until behind the breastworks he had captured. These he turned, facingthem the other way, and continued to hold. Wright was ordered up toreinforce Hancock, and arrived by six o'clock. He was wounded soonafter coming up but did not relinquish the command of his corps,although the fighting lasted until one o'clock the next morning. Ateight o'clock Warren was ordered up again, but was so slow in making hisdispositions that his orders were frequently repeated, and withemphasis. At eleven o'clock I gave Meade written orders to relieveWarren from his command if he failed to move promptly. Hancock placedbatteries on high ground in his rear, which he used against the enemy,firing over the heads of his own troops.

Burnside accomplished but little on our left of a positive nature, butnegatively a great deal. He kept Lee from reinforcing his centre fromthat quarter. If the 5th corps, or rather if Warren, had been as promptas Wright was with the 6th corps, better results might have beenobtained.

Lee massed heavily from his left flank on the broken point of his line.Five times during the day he assaulted furiously, but without dislodgingour troops from their new position. His losses must have been fearful.Sometimes the belligerents would be separated by but a few feet. In oneplace a tree, eighteen inches in diameter, was cut entirely down bymusket balls. All the trees between the lines were very much cut topieces by artillery and musketry. It was three o'clock next morningbefore the fighting ceased. Some of our troops had then been twentyhours under fire. In this engagement we did not lose a singleorganization, not even a company. The enemy lost one division with itscommander, one brigade and one regiment, with heavy losseselsewhere.(*30) Our losses were heavy, but, as stated, no whole companywas captured. At night Lee took a position in rear of his former one,and by the following morning he was strongly intrenched in it.

Warren's corps was now temporarily broken up, Cutler's division sent to
Wright, and Griffin's to Hancock. Meade ordered his chief of staff,
General Humphreys, to remain with Warren and the remaining division, and
authorized him to give it orders in his name.

During the day I was passing along the line from wing to wingcontinuously. About the centre stood a house which proved to beoccupied by an old lady and her daughter. She showed such unmistakablesigns of being strongly Union that I stopped. She said she had not seena Union flag for so long a time that it did her heart good to look uponit again. She said her husband and son, being, Union men, had had toleave early in the war, and were now somewhere in the Union army, ifalive. She was without food or nearly so, so I ordered rations issuedto her, and promised to find out if I could where the husband and sonwere.

There was no fighting on the 13th, further than a little skirmishingbetween Mott's division and the enemy. I was afraid that Lee might bemoving out, and I did not want him to go without my knowing it. Theindications were that he was moving, but it was found that he was onlytaking his new position back from the salient that had been captured.Our dead were buried this day. Mott's division was reduced to abrigade, and assigned to Birney's division.

During this day I wrote to Washington recommending Sherman and Meade(*31) for promotion to the grade of Major-General in the regular army;Hancock for Brigadier-General; Wright, Gibbon and Humphreys to beMajor-Generals of Volunteers; and Upton and Carroll to be Brigadiers.Upton had already been named as such, but the appointment had to beconfirmed by the Senate on the nomination of the President.

The night of the 13th Warren and Wright were moved by the rear to theleft of Burnside. The night was very dark and it rained heavily, theroads were so bad that the troops had to cut trees and corduroy the roada part of the way, to get through. It was midnight before they got tothe point where they were to halt, and daylight before the troops couldbe organized to advance to their position in line. They gained theirposition in line, however, without any fighting, except a little inWright's front. Here Upton had to contend for an elevation which wewanted and which the enemy was not disposed to yield. Upton first drovethe enemy, and was then repulsed in turn. Ayres coming to his supportwith his brigade (of Griffin's division, Warren's corps), the positionwas secured and fortified. There was no more battle during the 14th.This brought our line east of the Court House and running north andsouth and facing west.

During the night of the 14th-15th Lee moved to cover this new front.This left Hancock without an enemy confronting him. He was brought tothe rear of our new centre, ready to be moved in any direction he mightbe wanted.

On the 15th news came from Butler and Averill. The former reported thecapture of the outer works at Drury's Bluff, on the James River, andthat his cavalry had cut the railroad and telegraph south of Richmond onthe Danville road: and the latter, the destruction of a depot ofsupplies at Dublin, West Virginia, and the breaking of New River Bridgeon the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad. The next day news came fromSherman and Sheridan. Sherman had forced Johnston out of Dalton,Georgia, and was following him south. The report from Sheridan embracedhis operations up to his passing the outer defences of Richmond. Theprospect must now have been dismal in Richmond. The road and telegraphwere cut between the capital and Lee. The roads and wires were cut inevery direction from the rebel capital. Temporarily that city was cutoff from all communication with the outside except by courier. Thiscondition of affairs, however, was of but short duration.

I wrote Halleck:

NEAR SPOTTSYLVANIA C. H., May 16, 1864, 8 A.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Washington, D. C.:

We have had five days almost constant rain without any prospect yet ofit clearing up. The roads have now become so impassable that ambulanceswith wounded men can no longer run between here and Fredericksburg. Alloffensive operations necessarily cease until we can have twenty-fourhours of dry weather. The army is in the best of spirits, and feel thegreatest confidence of ultimate success. * * * ** * You can assure the President and Secretary of War that theelements alone have suspended hostilities, and that it is in no mannerdue to weakness or exhaustion on our part.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.

The condition of the roads was such that nothing was done on the 17th.But that night Hancock and Wright were to make a night march back totheir old positions, and to make an assault at four o'clock in themorning. Lee got troops back in time to protect his old line, so theassault was unsuccessful. On this day (18th) the news was almost asdiscouraging to us as it had been two days before in the rebel capital.As stated above, Hancock's and Wright's corps had made an unsuccessfulassault. News came that Sigel had been defeated at New Market, badly,and was retreating down the valley. Not two hours before, I had sentthe inquiry to Halleck whether Sigel could not get to Staunton to stopsupplies coming from there to Lee. I asked at once that Sigel might berelieved, and some one else put in his place. Hunter's name wassuggested, and I heartily approved. Further news from Butler reportedhim driven from Drury's Bluff, but still in possession of the Petersburgroad. Banks had been defeated in Louisiana, relieved, and Canby put inhis place. This change of commander was not on my suggestion. All thisnews was very discouraging. All of it must have been known by the enemybefore it was by me. In fact, the good news (for the enemy) must havebeen known to him at the moment I thought he was in despair, and hisanguish had been already relieved when we were enjoying his supposeddiscomfiture, But this was no time for repining. I immediately gaveorders for a movement by the left flank, on towards Richmond, tocommence on the night of the 19th. I also asked Halleck to secure thecooperation of the navy in changing our base of supplies fromFredericksburg to Port Royal, on the Rappahannock.

Up to this time I had received no reinforcements, except six thousandraw troops under Brigadier General Robert O. Tyler, just arrived. Theyhad not yet joined their command, Hancock's corps, but were on ourright. This corps had been brought to the rear of the centre, ready tomove in any direction. Lee, probably suspecting some move on my part,and seeing our right entirely abandoned, moved Ewell's corps about fiveo'clock in the afternoon, with Early's as a reserve, to attack us inthat quarter. Tyler had come up from Fredericksburg, and had beenhalted on the road to the right of our line, near Kitching's brigade ofWarren's corps. Tyler received the attack with his raw troops, and theymaintained their position, until reinforced, in a manner worthy ofveterans.

Hancock was in a position to reinforce speedily, and was the soldier to
do it without waiting to make dispositions. Birney was thrown to
Tyler's right and Crawford to his left, with Gibbon as a reserve; and
Ewell was whirled back speedily and with heavy loss.

Warren had been ordered to get on Ewell's flank and in his rear, to cuthim off from his intrenchments. But his efforts were so feeble thatunder the cover of night Ewell got back with only the loss of a fewhundred prisoners, besides his killed and wounded. The army beingengaged until after dark, I rescinded the order for the march by ourleft flank that night.

As soon as it was discovered that the enemy were coming out to attack, Inaturally supposed they would detach a force to destroy our trains. Thewithdrawal of Hancock from the right uncovered one road fromSpottsylvania to Fredericksburg over which trains drew our supplies.This was guarded by a division of colored troops, commanded by GeneralFerrero, belonging to Burnside's corps. Ferrero was therefore promptlynotified, and ordered to throw his cavalry pickets out to the south andbe prepared to meet the enemy if he should come; if he had to retreat todo so towards Fredericksburg. The enemy did detach as expected, andcaptured twenty-five or thirty wagons which, however, were soon retaken.

In consequence of the disasters that had befallen us in the past fewdays, Lee could be reinforced largely, and I had no doubt he would be.Beauregard had come up from the south with troops to guard theConfederate capital when it was in danger. Butler being driven back,most of the troops could be sent to Lee. Hoke was no longer needed inNorth Carolina; and Sigel's troops having gone back to Cedar Creek,whipped, many troops could be spared from the valley.

The Wilderness and Spottsylvania battles convinced me that we had moreartillery than could ever be brought into action at any one time. Itoccupied much of the road in marching, and taxed the trains in bringingup forage. Artillery is very useful when it can be brought into action,but it is a very burdensome luxury where it cannot be used. Beforeleaving Spottsylvania, therefore, I sent back to the defences ofWashington over one hundred pieces of artillery, with the horses andcaissons. This relieved the roads over which we were to march of morethan two hundred six-horse teams, and still left us more artillery thancould be advantageously used. In fact, before reaching the James RiverI again reduced the artillery with the army largely.

I believed that, if one corps of the army was exposed on the road toRichmond, and at a distance from the main army, Lee would endeavor toattack the exposed corps before reinforcements could come up; in whichcase the main army could follow Lee up and attack him before he had timeto intrench. So I issued the following orders:

NEAR SPOTTSYLVANIA C. H., VA., May 18, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE, Commanding Army of the Potomac.

Before daylight to-morrow morning I propose to draw Hancock and Burnsidefrom the position they now hold, and put Burnside to the left of Wright.Wright and Burnside should then force their way up as close to the enemyas they can get without a general engagement, or with a generalengagement if the enemy will come out of their works to fight, andintrench. Hancock should march and take up a position as if in supportof the two left corps. To-morrow night, at twelve or one o'clock, hewill be moved south-east with all his force and as much cavalry as canbe given to him, to get as far towards Richmond on the line of theFredericksburg Railroad as he can make, fighting the enemy in whateverforce he can find him. If the enemy make a general move to meet this,they will be followed by the other three corps of the army, andattacked, if possible, before time is given to intrench.

Suitable directions will at once be given for all trains and surplusartillery to conform to this movement.

U. S. GRANT.

On the 20th, Lee showing no signs of coming out of his lines, orderswere renewed for a left-flank movement, to commence after night.

CHAPTER LIV.

MOVEMENT BY THE LEFT FLANK—BATTLE OF NORTH ANNA—AN INCIDENT OF THEMARCH—MOVING ON RICHMOND—SOUTH OF THE PAMUNKEY—POSITION OF THENATIONAL ARMY.

We were now to operate in a different country from any we had beforeseen in Virginia. The roads were wide and good, and the country wellcultivated. No men were seen except those bearing arms, even the blackman having been sent away. The country, however, was new to us, and wehad neither guides nor maps to tell us where the roads were, or wherethey led to. Engineer and staff officers were put to the dangerous dutyof supplying the place of both maps and guides. By reconnoitring theywere enabled to locate the roads in the vicinity of each army corps.Our course was south, and we took all roads leading in that directionwhich would not separate the army too widely.

Hancock who had the lead had marched easterly to Guiney's Station, onthe Fredericksburg Railroad, thence southerly to Bowling Green andMilford. He was at Milford by the night of the 21st. Here he met adetachment of Pickett's division coming from Richmond to reinforce Lee.They were speedily driven away, and several hundred captured. Warrenfollowed on the morning of the 21st, and reached Guiney's Station thatnight without molestation. Burnside and Wright were retained atSpottsylvania to keep up the appearance of an intended assault, and tohold Lee, if possible, while Hancock and Warren should get start enoughto interpose between him and Richmond.

Lee had now a superb opportunity to take the initiative either byattacking Wright and Burnside alone, or by following by the TelegraphRoad and striking Hancock's and Warren's corps, or even Hancock's alone,before reinforcements could come up. But he did not avail himself ofeither opportunity. He seemed really to be misled as to my designs; butmoved by his interior line—the Telegraph Road—to make sure of keepingbetween his capital and the Army of the Potomac. He never again hadsuch an opportunity of dealing a heavy blow.

The evening of the 21st Burnside, 9th corps, moved out followed byWright, 6th corps. Burnside was to take the Telegraph Road; but findingStanard's Ford, over the Po, fortified and guarded, he turned east tothe road taken by Hancock and Warren without an attempt to dislodge theenemy. The night of the 21st I had my headquarters near the 6th corps,at Guiney's Station, and the enemy's cavalry was between us and Hancock.There was a slight attack on Burnside's and Wright's corps as they movedout of their lines; but it was easily repulsed. The object probably wasonly to make sure that we were not leaving a force to follow upon therear of the Confederates.

By the morning of the 22d Burnside and Wright were at Guiney's Station.Hancock's corps had now been marching and fighting continuously forseveral days, not having had rest even at night much of the time. Theywere, therefore, permitted to rest during the 22d. But Warren waspushed to Harris's Store, directly west of Milford, and connected withit by a good road, and Burnside was sent to New Bethel Church. Wright'scorps was still back at Guiney's Station.

I issued the following order for the movement of the troops the nextday:

NEW BETHEL, VA., May 22, 1864

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE, Commanding Army of the Potomac.

Direct corps commanders to hold their troops in readiness to march atfive A.M. to-morrow. At that hour each command will send out cavalryand infantry on all roads to their front leading south, and ascertain,if possible, where the enemy is. If beyond the South Anna, the 5th and6th corps will march to the forks of the road, where one branch leads toBeaver Dam Station, the other to Jericho Bridge, then south by roadsreaching the Anna, as near to and east of Hawkins Creek as they can befound.

The 2d corps will move to Chesterfield Ford. The 9th corps will bedirected to move at the same time to Jericho Bridge. The map only showstwo roads for the four corps to march upon, but, no doubt, by the use ofplantation roads, and pressing in guides, others can be found, to giveone for each corps.

The troops will follow their respective reconnoitring parties. Thetrains will be moved at the same time to Milford Station.

Headquarters will follow the 9th corps.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.

Warren's corps was moved from Harris's Store to Jericho Ford, Wright'sfollowing. Warren arrived at the ford early in the afternoon, and byfive o'clock effected a crossing under the protection of sharpshooters.The men had to wade in water up to their waists. As soon as enoughtroops were over to guard the ford, pontoons were laid and the artilleryand the rest of the troops crossed. The line formed was almostperpendicular to the course of the river—Crawford on the left, next tothe river, Griffin in the centre, and Cutler on the right. Lee wasfound intrenched along the front of their line. The whole of Hill'scorps was sent against Warren's right before it had got in position. Abrigade of Cutler's division was driven back, the enemy following, butassistance coming up the enemy was in turn driven back into his trencheswith heavy loss in killed and wounded, with about five hundred prisonersleft in our hands. By night Wright's corps was up ready to reinforceWarren.

On the 23d Hancock's corps was moved to the wooden bridge which spansthe North Anna River just west of where the Fredericksburg Railroadcrosses. It was near night when the troops arrived. They found thebridge guarded, with troops intrenched, on the north side. Hancock senttwo brigades, Egan's and Pierce's, to the right and left, and whenproperly disposed they charged simultaneously. The bridge was carriedquickly, the enemy retreating over it so hastily that many were shovedinto the river, and some of them were drowned. Several hundredprisoners were captured. The hour was so late that Hancock did notcross until next morning.

Burnside's corps was moved by a middle road running between thosedescribed above, and which strikes the North Anna at Ox Ford, midwaybetween Telegraph Road and Jericho Ford. The hour of its arrival wastoo late to cross that night.

On the 24th Hancock's corps crossed to the south side of the riverwithout opposition, and formed line facing nearly west. The railroad inrear was taken possession of and destroyed as far as possible. Wright'scorps crossed at Jericho early the same day, and took position to theright of Warren's corps, extending south of the Virginia CentralRailroad. This road was torn up for a considerable distance to the rear(west), the ties burned, and the rails bent and twisted by heating themover the burning ties. It was found, however, that Burnside's corpscould not cross at Ox Ford. Lee had taken a position with his centre onthe river at this point, with the two wings thrown back, his line makingan acute angle where it overlooked the river.

Before the exact position of the whole of Lee's line was accuratelyknown, I directed Hancock and Warren each to send a brigade to Ox Fordby the south side of the river. They found the enemy too strong tojustify a serious attack. A third ford was found between Ox Ford andJericho. Burnside was directed to cross a division over this ford, andto send one division to Hancock. Crittenden was crossed by thisnewly-discovered ford, and formed up the river to connect withCrawford's left. Potter joined Hancock by way of the wooden bridge.Crittenden had a severe engagement with some of Hill's corps on hiscrossing the river, and lost heavily. When joined to Warren's corps hewas no further molested. Burnside still guarded Ox Ford from the northside.

Lee now had his entire army south of the North Anna. Our lines coveredhis front, with the six miles separating the two wings guarded by but asingle division. To get from one wing to the other the river would haveto be crossed twice. Lee could reinforce any part of his line from allpoints of it in a very short march; or could concentrate the whole of itwherever he might choose to assault. We were, for the time, practicallytwo armies besieging.

Lee had been reinforced, and was being reinforced, largely. About thistime the very troops whose coming I had predicted, had arrived or werecoming in. Pickett with a full division from Richmond was up; Hoke fromNorth Carolina had come with a brigade; and Breckinridge was there: inall probably not less than fifteen thousand men. But he did not attemptto drive us from the field.

On the 22d or 23d I received dispatches from Washington saying thatSherman had taken Kingston, crossed the Etowah River and was advancinginto Georgia.

I was seated at the time on the porch of a fine plantation house waitingfor Burnside's corps to pass. Meade and his staff, besides my ownstaff, were with me. The lady of the house, a Mrs. Tyler, and anelderly lady, were present. Burnside seeing us, came up on the porch,his big spurs and saber rattling as he walked. He touched his hatpolitely to the ladies, and remarked that he supposed they had neverseen so many "live Yankees" before in their lives. The elderly ladyspoke up promptly saying, "Oh yes, I have; many more." "Where?" saidBurnside. "In Richmond." Prisoners, of course, was understood.

I read my dispatch aloud, when it was received. This threw the youngerlady into tears. I found the information she had received (and I supposeit was the information generally in circulation through the South) wasthat Lee was driving us from the State in the most demoralized conditionand that in the South-west our troops were but little better thanprisoners of war. Seeing our troops moving south was ocular proof thata part of her information was incorrect, and she asked me if my newsfrom Sherman was true. I assured her that there was no doubt about it.I left a guard to protect the house from intrusion until the troopsshould have all passed, and assured her that if her husband was inhiding she could bring him in and he should be protected also. But Ipresume he was in the Confederate army.

On the 25th I gave orders, through Halleck, to Hunter, who had relievedSigel, to move up the Valley of Virginia, cross over the Blue Ridge toCharlottesville and go as far as Lynchburg if possible, living upon thecountry and cutting the railroads and canal as he went. After doingthis he could find his way back to his base, or join me.

On the same day news was received that Lee was falling back on Richmond.This proved not to be true. But we could do nothing where we wereunless Lee would assume the offensive. I determined, therefore, to drawout of our present position and make one more effort to get between himand Richmond. I had no expectation now, however, of succeeding in this;but I did expect to hold him far enough west to enable me to reach theJames River high up. Sheridan was now again with the Army of thePotomac.

On the 26th I informed the government at Washington of the position ofthe two armies; of the reinforcements the enemy had received; of themove I proposed to make (*32); and directed that our base of suppliesshould be shifted to White House, on the Pamunkey. The wagon train andguards moved directly from Port Royal to White House. Supplies movedaround by water, guarded by the navy. Orders had previously been sent,through Halleck, for Butler to send Smith's corps to White House. Thisorder was repeated on the 25th, with directions that they should belanded on the north side of the Pamunkey, and marched until they joinedthe Army of the Potomac.

It was a delicate move to get the right wing of the Army of the Potomacfrom its position south of the North Anna in the presence of the enemy.To accomplish it, I issued the following order:

QUARLES' MILLS, VA., May 25, 1864.

MAJOR GENERAL MEADE, Commanding A. P.

Direct Generals Warren and Wright to withdraw all their teams andartillery, not in position, to the north side of the river to-morrow.Send that belonging to General Wright's corps as far on the road toHanover Town as it can go, without attracting attention to the fact.Send with it Wright's best division or division under his ablestcommander. Have their places filled up in the line so if possible theenemy will not notice their withdrawal. Send the cavalry to-morrowafternoon, or as much of it as you may deem necessary, to watch andseize, if they can, Littlepage's Bridge and Taylor's Ford, and to remainon one or other side of the river at these points until the infantry andartillery all pass. As soon as it is dark to-morrow night start thedivision which you withdraw first from Wright's corps to make a forcedmarch to Hanover Town, taking with them no teams to impede their march.At the same time this division starts commence withdrawing all of the5th and 6th corps from the south side of the river, and march them forthe same place. The two divisions of the 9th corps not now withHancock, may be moved down the north bank of the river where they willbe handy to support Hancock if necessary, or will be that much on theirroad to follow the 5th and 6th corps. Hancock should hold his commandin readiness to follow as soon as the way is clear for him. To-morrow itwill leave nothing for him to do, but as soon as he can he should getall his teams and spare artillery on the road or roads which he willhave to take. As soon as the troops reach Hanover Town they should getpossession of all the crossings they can in that neighborhood. I thinkit would be well to make a heavy cavalry demonstration on the enemy'sleft, to-morrow afternoon, also.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.

Wilson's division of cavalry was brought up from the left and moved byour right south to Little River. Here he manoeuvred to give theimpression that we were going to attack the left flank of Lee's army.

Under cover of night our right wing was withdrawn to the north side ofthe river, Lee being completely deceived by Wilson's feint. On theafternoon of the 26th Sheridan moved, sending Gregg's and Torbert'scavalry to Taylor's and Littlepage's fords towards Hanover. As soon asit was dark both divisions moved quietly to Hanover Ferry, leaving smallguards behind to keep up the impression that crossings were to beattempted in the morning. Sheridan was followed by a division ofinfantry under General Russell. On the morning of the 27th the crossingwas effected with but little loss, the enemy losing thirty or forty,taken prisoners. Thus a position was secured south of the Pamunkey.

Russell stopped at the crossing while the cavalry pushed on to HanoverTown. Here Barringer's, formerly Gordon's, brigade of rebel cavalry wasencountered, but it was speedily driven away.

Warren's and Wright's corps were moved by the rear of Burnside's andHancock's corps. When out of the way these latter corps followed,leaving pickets confronting the enemy. Wilson's cavalry followed last,watching all the fords until everything had recrossed; then taking upthe pontoons and destroying other bridges, became the rear-guard.

Two roads were traversed by the troops in this move. The one nearest toand north of the North Anna and Pamunkey was taken by Wright, followedby Hancock. Warren, followed by Burnside, moved by a road farthernorth, and longer. The trains moved by a road still farther north, andhad to travel a still greater distance. All the troops that had crossedthe Pamunkey on the morning of the 27th remained quiet during the restof the day, while the troops north of that stream marched to reach thecrossing that had been secured for them.

Lee had evidently been deceived by our movement from North Anna; for onthe morning of the 27th he telegraphed to Richmond: "Enemy crossed tonorth side, and cavalry and infantry crossed at Hanover Town." Thetroops that had then crossed left his front the night of the 25th.

The country we were now in was a difficult one to move troops over. Thestreams were numerous, deep and sluggish, sometimes spreading out intoswamps grown up with impenetrable growths of trees and underbrush. Thebanks were generally low and marshy, making the streams difficult toapproach except where there were roads and bridges.

Hanover Town is about twenty miles from Richmond. There are two roadsleading there; the most direct and shortest one crossing theChickahominy at Meadow Bridge, near the Virginia Central Railroad, thesecond going by New and Old Cold Harbor. A few miles out from HanoverTown there is a third road by way of Mechanicsville to Richmond. NewCold Harbor was important to us because while there we both covered theroads back to White House (where our supplies came from), and the roadssouth-east over which we would have to pass to get to the James Riverbelow the Richmond defences.

On the morning of the 28th the army made an early start, and by noon allhad crossed except Burnside's corps. This was left on the north sidetemporarily to guard the large wagon train. A line was at once formedextending south from the river, Wright's corps on the right, Hancock'sin the centre, and Warren's on the left, ready to meet the enemy if heshould come.

At the same time Sheridan was directed to reconnoitre towardsMechanicsville to find Lee's position. At Hawes' Shop, just where themiddle road leaves the direct road to Richmond, he encountered theConfederate cavalry dismounted and partially intrenched. Gregg attackedwith his division, but was unable to move the enemy. In the eveningCuster came up with a brigade. The attack was now renewed, the cavalrydismounting and charging as infantry. This time the assault wassuccessful, both sides losing a considerable number of men. But ourtroops had to bury the dead, and found that more Confederate than Unionsoldiers had been killed. The position was easily held, because ourinfantry was near.

On the 29th a reconnoissance was made in force, to find the position ofLee. Wright's corps pushed to Hanover Court House. Hancock's corpspushed toward Totopotomoy Creek; Warren's corps to the left on the ShadyGrove Church Road, while Burnside was held in reserve. Our advance waspushed forward three miles on the left with but little fighting. Therewas now an appearance of a movement past our left flank, and Sheridanwas sent to meet it.

On the 30th Hancock moved to the Totopotomoy, where he found the enemystrongly fortified. Wright was moved to the right of Hancock's corps,and Burnside was brought forward and crossed, taking position to theleft of Hancock. Warren moved up near Huntley Corners on the ShadyGrove Church Road. There was some skirmishing along the centre, and inthe evening Early attacked Warren with some vigor, driving him back atfirst, and threatening to turn our left flank. As the best means ofreinforcing the left, Hancock was ordered to attack in his front. Hecarried and held the rifle-pits. While this was going on Warren got hismen up, repulsed Early, and drove him more than a mile.

On this day I wrote to Halleck ordering all the pontoons in Washingtonto be sent to City Point.

In the evening news was received of the arrival of Smith with his corpsat White House. I notified Meade, in writing, as follows:

NEAR HAWES' SHOP, VA., 6.40 P.M., May 30, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE, Commanding A. P.

General Smith will debark his force at the White House tonight and startup the south bank of the Pamunkey at an early hour, probably at 3 A.M.in the morning. It is not improbable that the enemy, being aware ofSmith's movement, will be feeling to get on our left flank for thepurpose of cutting him off, or by a dash to crush him and get backbefore we are aware of it. Sheridan ought to be notified to watch theenemy's movements well out towards Cold Harbor, and also on theMechanicsville road. Wright should be got well massed on Hancock'sright, so that, if it becomes necessary, he can take the place of thelatter readily whilst troops are being thrown east of the Totopotomoy ifnecessary.

I want Sheridan to send a cavalry force of at least half a brigade, ifnot a whole brigade, at 5 A.M. in the morning, to communicate with Smithand to return with him. I will send orders for Smith by the messengeryou send to Sheridan with his orders.

U. S. GRANT.

I also notified Smith of his danger, and the precautions that would betaken to protect him.

The night of the 30th Lee's position was substantially from Atlee'sStation on the Virginia Central Railroad south and east to the vicinityof Cold Harbor. Ours was: The left of Warren's corps was on the ShadyGrove Road, extending to the Mechanicsville Road and about three milessouth of the Totopotomoy. Burnside to his right, then Hancock, andWright on the extreme right, extending towards Hanover Court House, sixmiles south-east of it. Sheridan with two divisions of cavalry waswatching our left front towards Cold Harbor. Wilson with his divisionon our right was sent to get on the Virginia Central Railroad anddestroy it as far back as possible. He got possession of Hanover CourtHouse the next day after a skirmish with Young's cavalry brigade. Theenemy attacked Sheridan's pickets, but reinforcements were sent up andthe attack was speedily repulsed and the enemy followed some distancetowards Cold Harbor.

CHAPTER LV.

ADVANCE ON COLD HARBOR—AN ANECDOTE OF THE WAR—BATTLE OF COLD HARBOR—CORRESPONDENCE WITH LEE—RETROSPECTIVE.

On the 31st Sheridan advanced to near Old Cold Harbor. He found itintrenched and occupied by cavalry and infantry. A hard fight ensuedbut the place was carried. The enemy well knew the importance of ColdHarbor to us, and seemed determined that we should not hold it. Hereturned with such a large force that Sheridan was about withdrawingwithout making any effort to hold it against such odds; but about thetime he commenced the evacuation he received orders to hold the place atall hazards, until reinforcements could be sent to him. He speedilyturned the rebel works to face against them and placed his men inposition for defence. Night came on before the enemy was ready forassault.

Wright's corps was ordered early in the evening to march directly toCold Harbor passing by the rear of the army. It was expected to arriveby daylight or before; but the night was dark and the distance great, sothat it was nine o'clock the 1st of June before it reached itsdestination. Before the arrival of Wright the enemy had made twoassaults on Sheridan, both of which were repulsed with heavy loss to theenemy. Wright's corps coming up, there was no further assault on ColdHarbor.

Smith, who was coming up from White House, was also directed to marchdirectly to Cold Harbor, and was expected early on the morning of the1st of June; but by some blunder the order which reached Smith directedhim to Newcastle instead of Cold Harbor. Through this blunder Smith didnot reach his destination until three o'clock in the afternoon, and thenwith tired and worn-out men from their long and dusty march. He landedtwelve thousand five hundred men from Butler's command, but a divisionwas left at White House temporarily and many men had fallen out of ranksin their long march.

Before the removal of Wright's corps from our right, after dark on the31st, the two lines, Federal and Confederate, were so close together atthat point that either side could detect directly any movement made bythe other. Finding at daylight that Wright had left his front, Leeevidently divined that he had gone to our left. At all events, soonafter light on the 1st of June Anderson, who commanded the corps onLee's left, was seen moving along Warren's front. Warren was ordered toattack him vigorously in flank, while Wright was directed to move outand get on his front. Warren fired his artillery at the enemy; but lostso much time in making ready that the enemy got by, and at three o'clockhe reported the enemy was strongly intrenched in his front, and besideshis lines were so long that he had no mass of troops to move with. Heseemed to have forgotten that lines in rear of an army hold themselveswhile their defenders are fighting in their front. Wright reconnoitredsome distance to his front: but the enemy finding Old Cold Harboralready taken had halted and fortified some distance west.

By six o'clock in the afternoon Wright and Smith were ready to make anassault. In front of both the ground was clear for several hundredyards and then became wooded. Both charged across this open space andinto the wood, capturing and holding the first line of rifle-pits of theenemy, and also capturing seven or eight hundred prisoners.

While this was going on, the enemy charged Warren three separate timeswith vigor, but were repulsed each time with loss. There was no officermore capable, nor one more prompt in acting, than Warren when the enemyforced him to it. There was also an attack upon Hancock's andBurnside's corps at the same time; but it was feeble and probably onlyintended to relieve Anderson who was being pressed by Wright and Smith.

During the night the enemy made frequent attacks with the view ofdispossessing us of the important position we had gained, but withouteffecting their object.

Hancock was moved from his place in line during the night and ordered tothe left of Wright. I expected to take the offensive on the morning ofthe 2d, but the night was so dark, the heat and dust so excessive andthe roads so intricate and hard to keep, that the head of column onlyreached Old Cold Harbor at six o'clock, but was in position at 7.30 A.M.Preparations were made for an attack in the afternoon, but did not takeplace until the next morning. Warren's corps was moved to the left toconnect with Smith: Hancock's corps was got into position to the leftof Wright's, and Burnside was moved to Bethesda Church in reserve. WhileWarren and Burnside were making these changes the enemy came out severaltimes and attacked them, capturing several hundred prisoners. Theattacks were repulsed, but not followed up as they should have been. Iwas so annoyed at this that I directed Meade to instruct his corpscommanders that they should seize all such opportunities when theyoccurred, and not wait for orders, all of our manoeuvres being made forthe very purpose of getting the enemy out of his cover.

On this day Wilson returned from his raid upon the Virginia CentralRailroad, having damaged it considerably. But, like ourselves, therebels had become experts in repairing such damage. Sherman, in hismemoirs, relates an anecdote of his campaign to Atlanta that wellillustrates this point. The rebel cavalry lurking in his rear to burnbridges and obstruct his communications had become so disgusted athearing trains go whistling by within a few hours after a bridge hadbeen burned, that they proposed to try blowing up some of the tunnels.One of them said, "No use, boys, Old Sherman carries duplicate tunnelswith him, and will replace them as fast as you can blow them up; bettersave your powder."

Sheridan was engaged reconnoitring the banks of the Chickahominy, tofind crossings and the condition of the roads. He reported favorably.

During the night Lee moved his left up to make his line correspond toours. His lines extended now from the Totopotomoy to New Cold Harbor.Mine from Bethesda Church by Old Cold Harbor to the Chickahominy, with adivision of cavalry guarding our right. An assault was ordered for the3d, to be made mainly by the corps of Hancock, Wright and Smith; butWarren and Burnside were to support it by threatening Lee's left, and toattack with great earnestness if he should either reinforce morethreatened points by drawing from that quarter or if a favorableopportunity should present itself.

The corps commanders were to select the points in their respectivefronts where they would make their assaults. The move was to commenceat half-past four in the morning. Hancock sent Barlow and Gibbonforward at the appointed hour, with Birney as a reserve. Barlow pushedforward with great vigor, under a heavy fire of both artillery andmusketry, through thickets and swamps. Notwithstanding all theresistance of the enemy and the natural obstructions to overcome, hecarried a position occupied by the enemy outside their main line wherethe road makes a deep cut through a bank affording as good a shelter fortroops as if it had been made for that purpose. Three pieces ofartillery had been captured here, and several hundred prisoners. Theguns were immediately turned against the men who had just been usingthem. No (*33) assistance coming to him, he (Barlow) intrenched underfire and continued to hold his place. Gibbon was not so fortunate inhis front. He found the ground over which he had to pass cut up withdeep ravines, and a morass difficult to cross. But his men struggled onuntil some of them got up to the very parapet covering the enemy.Gibbon gained ground much nearer the enemy than that which he left, andhere he intrenched and held fast.

Wright's corps moving in two lines captured the outer rifle-pits intheir front, but accomplished nothing more. Smith's corps also gainedthe outer rifle-pits in its front. The ground over which this corps(18th) had to move was the most exposed of any over which charges weremade. An open plain intervened between the contending forces at thispoint, which was exposed both to a direct and a cross fire. Smith,however, finding a ravine running towards his front, sufficiently deepto protect men in it from cross fire, and somewhat from a direct fire,put Martindale's division in it, and with Brooks supporting him on theleft and Devens on the right succeeded in gaining the outer—probablypicket—rifle-pits. Warren and Burnside also advanced and gainedground—which brought the whole army on one line.

This assault cost us heavily and probably without benefit to compensate:but the enemy was not cheered by the occurrence sufficiently to inducehim to take the offensive. In fact, nowhere after the battle of theWilderness did Lee show any disposition to leave his defences far behindhim.

Fighting was substantially over by half-past seven in the morning. Ateleven o'clock I started to visit all the corps commanders to see formyself the different positions gained and to get their opinion of thepracticability of doing anything more in their respective fronts.

Hancock gave the opinion that in his front the enemy was too strong tomake any further assault promise success. Wright thought he could gainthe lines of the enemy, but it would require the cooperation ofHancock's and Smith's corps. Smith thought a lodgment possible, but wasnot sanguine: Burnside thought something could be done in his front,but Warren differed. I concluded, therefore to make no more assaults,and a little after twelve directed in the following letter that alloffensive action should cease.

COLD HARBOR, June 3, 1864.-12.30 P.M. MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE,

Commanding A. P.

The opinion of corps commanders not being sanguine of success in case anassault is ordered, you may direct a suspension of farther advance forthe present. Hold our most advanced positions and strengthen them.Whilst on the defensive our line may be contracted from the right ifpracticable.

Reconnoissances should be made in front of every corps and advances madeto advantageous positions by regular approaches. To aid the expeditionunder General Hunter it is necessary that we should detain all the armynow with Lee until the former gets well on his way to Lynchburg. To dothis effectually it will be better to keep the enemy out of theintrenchments of Richmond than to have them go back there.

Wright and Hancock should be ready to assault in case the enemy shouldbreak through General Smith's lines, and all should be ready to resistan assault.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

The remainder of the day was spent in strengthening the line we nowheld. By night we were as strong against Lee as he was against us.

During the night the enemy quitted our right front, abandoning some oftheir wounded, and without burying their dead. These we were able tocare for. But there were many dead and wounded men between the lines ofthe contending forces, which were now close together, who could not becared for without a cessation of hostilities.

So I wrote the following:

COLD HARBOR, VA., June 5, 1864.

GENERAL R. E. LEE, Commanding Confederate Army.

It is reported to me that there are wounded men, probably of botharmies, now lying exposed and suffering between the lines occupiedrespectively by the two armies. Humanity would dictate that someprovision should be made to provide against such hardships. I wouldpropose, therefore, that hereafter, when no battle is raging, eitherparty be authorized to send to any point between the pickets or skirmishlines, unarmed men bearing litters to pick up their dead or wounded,without being fired upon by the other party. Any other method, equallyfair to both parties, you may propose for meeting the end desired willbe accepted by me.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.

Lee replied that he feared such an arrangement would lead tomisunderstanding, and proposed that in future, when either party wishedto remove their dead and wounded, a flag of truce be sent. I answeredthis immediately by saying:

COLD HARBOR, VA., June 6, 1864.

GENERAL R. E. LEE, Commanding Army of N. Va.

Your communication of yesterday's date is received. I will sendimmediately, as you propose, to collect the dead and wounded between thelines of the two armies, and will also instruct that you be allowed todo the same. I propose that the time for doing this be between thehours of 12 M. and 3 P.M. to-day. I will direct all parties going outto bear a white flag, and not to attempt to go beyond where we have deador wounded, and not beyond or on ground occupied by your troops.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.

Lee's response was that he could not consent to the burial of the deadand removal of the wounded in the way I proposed, but when either partydesired such permission it should be asked for by flag of truce and hehad directed that any parties I may have sent out, as mentioned in myletter, to be turned back. I answered:

COLD HARBOR, VA, June 6, 1864.

GENERAL R. E. LEE. Commanding Army, N. Va.

The knowledge that wounded men are now suffering from want of attention,between the two armies, compels me to ask a suspension of hostilitiesfor sufficient time to collect them in, say two hours. Permit me to saythat the hours you may fix upon for this will be agreeable to me, andthe same privilege will be extended to such parties as you may wish tosend out on the same duty without further application.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.

Lee acceded to this; but delays in transmitting the correspondencebrought it to the 7th of June—forty-eight hours after it commenced—before parties were got out to collect the men left upon the field.In the meantime all but two of the wounded had died. And I wrote toLee:

COLD HARBOR, VA., June 7, 1864. 10.30 A.M.

GEN. R. E. LEE, Commanding Army of N. Va.

I regret that your note of seven P.M. yesterday should have beenreceived at the nearest corps headquarters, to where it was delivered,after the hour which had been given for the removal of the dead andwounded had expired; 10.45 P.M. was the hour at which it was received atcorps headquarters, and between eleven and twelve it reached myheadquarters. As a consequence, it was not understood by the troops ofthis army that there was a cessation of hostilities for the purpose ofcollecting the dead and wounded, and none were collected. Two officersand six men of the 8th and 25th North Carolina Regts., who were out insearch of the bodies of officers of their respective regiments, werecaptured and brought into our lines, owing to this want ofunderstanding. I regret this, but will state that as soon as I learnedthe fact, I directed that they should not be held as prisoners, but mustbe returned to their commands. These officers and men having beencarelessly brought through our lines to the rear have not determinedwhether they will be sent back the way they came, or whether they willbe sent by some other route.

Regretting that all my efforts for alleviating the sufferings of woundedmen left upon the battle-field have been rendered nugatory, I remain,&c.,

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

I have always regretted that the last assault at Cold Harbor was evermade. I might say the same thing of the assault of the 22d of May,1863, at Vicksburg. At Cold Harbor no advantage whatever was gained tocompensate for the heavy loss we sustained. Indeed, the advantagesother than those of relative losses, were on the Confederate side.Before that, the Army of Northern Virginia seemed to have acquired awholesome regard for the courage, endurance, and soldierly qualitiesgenerally of the Army of the Potomac. They no longer wanted to fightthem "one Confederate to five Yanks." Indeed, they seemed to have givenup any idea of gaining any advantage of their antagonist in the openfield. They had come to much prefer breastworks in their front to theArmy of the Potomac. This charge seemed to revive their hopestemporarily; but it was of short duration. The effect upon the Army ofthe Potomac was the reverse. When we reached the James River, however,all effects of the battle of Cold Harbor seemed to have disappeared.

There was more justification for the assault at Vicksburg. We were in aSouthern climate, at the beginning of the hot season. The Army of theTennessee had won five successive victories over the garrison ofVicksburg in the three preceding weeks. They had driven a portion ofthat army from Port Gibson with considerable loss, after having flankedthem out of their stronghold at Grand Gulf. They had attacked anotherportion of the same army at Raymond, more than fifty miles farther inthe interior of the State, and driven them back into Jackson with greatloss in killed, wounded, captured and missing, besides loss of large andsmall arms: they had captured the capital of the State of Mississippi,with a large amount of materials of war and manufactures. Only a fewdays before, they had beaten the enemy then penned up in the town firstat Champion's Hill, next at Big Black River Bridge, inflicting upon hima loss of fifteen thousand or more men (including those cut off fromreturning) besides large losses in arms and ammunition. The Army of theTennessee had come to believe that they could beat their antagonistunder any circumstances. There was no telling how long a regular siegemight last. As I have stated, it was the beginning of the hot season ina Southern climate. There was no telling what the casualties might beamong Northern troops working and living in trenches, drinking surfacewater filtered through rich vegetation, under a tropical sun. IfVicksburg could have been carried in May, it would not only have savedthe army the risk it ran of a greater danger than from the bullets ofthe enemy, but it would have given us a splendid army, well equipped andofficered, to operate elsewhere with. These are reasons justifying theassault. The only benefit we gained—and it was a slight one for sogreat a sacrifice—was that the men worked cheerfully in the trenchesafter that, being satisfied with digging the enemy out. Had the assaultnot been made, I have no doubt that the majority of those engaged in thesiege of Vicksburg would have believed that had we assaulted it wouldhave proven successful, and would have saved life, health and comfort.

CHAPTER LVI.

LEFT FLANK MOVEMENT ACROSS THE CHICKAHOMINY AND JAMES—GENERAL LEE—VISIT TO BUTLER—THE MOVEMENT ON PETERSBURG—THE INVESTMENT OFPETERSBURG.

Lee's position was now so near Richmond, and the intervening swamps ofthe Chickahominy so great an obstacle to the movement of troops in theface of an enemy, that I determined to make my next left flank movecarry the Army of the Potomac south of the James River. (*34)Preparations for this were promptly commenced. The move was a hazardousone to make: the Chickahominy River, with its marshy and heavilytimbered approaches, had to be crossed; all the bridges over it east ofLee were destroyed; the enemy had a shorter line and better roads totravel on to confront me in crossing; more than fifty miles intervenedbetween me and Butler, by the roads I should have to travel, with boththe James and the Chickahominy unbridged to cross; and last, the Army ofthe Potomac had to be got out of a position but a few hundred yards fromthe enemy at the widest place. Lee, if he did not choose to follow me,might, with his shorter distance to travel and his bridges over theChickahominy and the James, move rapidly on Butler and crush him beforethe army with me could come to his relief. Then too he might sparetroops enough to send against Hunter who was approaching Lynchburg,living upon the country he passed through, and without ammunitionfurther than what he carried with him.

But the move had to be made, and I relied upon Lee's not seeing mydanger as I saw it. Besides we had armies on both sides of the JamesRiver and not far from the Confederate capital. I knew that its safetywould be a matter of the first consideration with the executive,legislative and judicial branches of the so-called Confederategovernment, if it was not with the military commanders. But I took allthe precaution I knew of to guard against all dangers.

Sheridan was sent with two divisions, to communicate with Hunter and tobreak up the Virginia Central Railroad and the James River Canal, on the7th of June, taking instructions to Hunter to come back with him (*35).Hunter was also informed by way of Washington and the Valley thatSheridan was on the way to meet him. The canal and Central Road, andthe regions penetrated by them, were of vast importance to the enemy,furnishing and carrying a large per cent. of all the supplies for theArmy of Northern Virginia and the people of Richmond. Before Sheridangot off on the 7th news was received from Hunter reporting his advanceto Staunton and successful engagement with the enemy near that place onthe 5th, in which the Confederate commander, W. S. Jones, was killed.On the 4th of June the enemy having withdrawn his left corps, Burnsideon our right was moved up between Warren and Smith. On the 5th Birneyreturned to Hancock, which extended his left now to the Chickahominy,and Warren was withdrawn to Cold Harbor. Wright was directed to sendtwo divisions to the left to extend down the banks of that stream toBottom's Bridge. The cavalry extended still farther east to Jones'sBridge.

On the 7th Abercrombie—who was in command at White House, and who hadbeen in command at our base of supplies in all the changes made from thestart—was ordered to take up the iron from the York River Railroad andput it on boats, and to be in readiness to move by water to City Point.

On the 8th Meade was directed to fortify a line down the bankoverlooking the Chickahominy, under cover of which the army could move.

On the 9th Abercrombie was directed to send all organized troopsarriving at White House, without debarking from their transports, toreport to Butler. Halleck was at this time instructed to send allreinforcements to City Point.

On the 11th I wrote:

COLD HARBOR, VA., June 11, 1864.

MAJOR-GEN. B. F. BUTLER, Commanding Department of Va. and N. C.

The movement to transfer this army to the south side of the James Riverwill commence after dark to-morrow night. Col. Comstock, of my staff,was sent specially to ascertain what was necessary to make your positionsecure in the interval during which the enemy might use most of hisforce against you, and also, to ascertain what point on the river weshould reach to effect a crossing if it should not be practicable toreach this side of the river at Bermuda Hundred. Colonel Comstock hasnot yet returned, so that I cannot make instructions as definite as Iwould wish, but the time between this and Sunday night being so short inwhich to get word to you, I must do the best I can. Colonel Dent goesto the Chickahominy to take to you the 18th corps. The corps will leaveits position in the trenches as early in the evening, tomorrow, aspossible, and make a forced march to Cole's Landing or Ferry, where itshould reach by ten A.M. the following morning. This corps numbers now15,300 men. They take with them neither wagons nor artillery; theselatter marching with the balance of the army to the James River. Theremainder of the army will cross the Chickahominy at Long Bridge and atJones's, and strike the river at the most practicable crossing belowCity Point.

I directed several days ago that all reinforcements for the army shouldbe sent to you. I am not advised of the number that may have gone, butsuppose you have received from six to ten thousand. General Smith willalso reach you as soon as the enemy could, going by the way of Richmond.

The balance of the force will not be more than one day behind, unlessdetained by the whole of Lee's army, in which case you will be strongenough.

I wish you would direct the proper staff officers, your chief-engineerand your chief-quartermaster, to commence at once the collection of allthe means in their reach for crossing the army on its arrival. If thereis a point below City Point where a pontoon bridge can be thrown, haveit laid.

Expecting the arrival of the 18th corps by Monday night, if you deem itpracticable from the force you have to seize and hold Petersburg, youmay prepare to start, on the arrival of troops to hold your presentlines. I do not want Petersburg visited, however, unless it is held,nor an attempt to take it, unless you feel a reasonable degree ofconfidence of success. If you should go there, I think troops shouldtake nothing with them except what they can carry, depending uponsupplies being sent after the place is secured. If Colonel Dent shouldnot succeed in securing the requisite amount of transportation for the18th corps before reaching you, please have the balance supplied.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.

P. S.—On reflection I will send the 18th corps by way of White House.The distance which they will have to march will be enough shorter toenable them to reach you about the same time, and the uncertainty ofnavigation on the Chickahominy will be avoided.

U. S. GRANT.

COLD HARBOR, VA., June 11,1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL G. G. MEADE, Commanding Army of the Potomac.

Colonel Comstock, who visited the James River for the purpose ofascertaining the best point below Bermuda Hundred to which to march thearmy has not yet returned. It is now getting so late, however, that allpreparations may be made for the move to-morrow night without waitinglonger.

The movement will be made as heretofore agreed upon, that is, the 18thcorps make a rapid march with the infantry alone, their wagons andartillery accompanying the balance of the army to Cole's Landing orFerry, and there embark for City Point, losing no time for rest untilthey reach the latter point.

The 5th corps will seize Long Bridge and move out on the Long Bridge
Road to its junction with Quaker Road, or until stopped by the enemy.

The other three corps will follow in such order as you may direct, oneof them crossing at Long Bridge, and two at Jones's Bridge. After thecrossing is effected, the most practicable roads will be taken to reachabout Fort Powhattan. Of course, this is supposing the enemy makes noopposition to our advance. The 5th corps, after securing the passage ofthe balance of the army, will join or follow in rear of the corps whichcrosses the same bridge with themselves. The wagon trains should bekept well east of the troops, and if a crossing can be found, or madelower down than Jones's they should take it.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.

P. S.—In view of the long march to reach Cole's Landing, and theuncertainty of being able to embark a large number of men there, thedirection of the 18th corps may be changed to White House. They shouldbe directed to load up transports, and start them as fast as loadedwithout waiting for the whole corps or even whole divisions to gotogether.

U. S. GRANT.

About this time word was received (through the Richmond papers of the11th) that Crook and Averell had united and were moving east. This,with the news of Hunter's successful engagement near Staunton, was nodoubt known to Lee before it was to me. Then Sheridan leaving with twodivisions of cavalry, looked indeed threatening, both to Lee'scommunications and supplies. Much of his cavalry was sent afterSheridan, and Early with Ewell's entire corps was sent to the Valley.Supplies were growing scarce in Richmond, and the sources from which todraw them were in our hands. People from outside began to pour intoRichmond to help eat up the little on hand. Consternation reignedthere.

On the 12th Smith was ordered to move at night to White House, not tostop until he reached there, and to take boats at once for City Point,leaving his trains and artillery to move by land.

Soon after dark some of the cavalry at Long Bridge effected a crossingby wading and floundering through the water and mud, leaving theirhorses behind, and drove away the cavalry pickets. A pontoon bridge wasspeedily thrown across, over which the remainder of the army soon passedand pushed out for a mile or two to watch and detain any advance thatmight be made from the other side. Warren followed the cavalry, and bythe morning of the 13th had his whole corps over. Hancock followedWarren. Burnside took the road to Jones's Bridge, followed by Wright.Ferrero's division, with the wagon train, moved farther east, by WindowShades and Cole's Ferry, our rear being covered by cavalry.

It was known that the enemy had some gunboats at Richmond. These mightrun down at night and inflict great damage upon us before they could besunk or captured by our navy. General Butler had, in advance, loadedsome vessels with stone ready to be sunk so as to obstruct the channelin an emergency. On the 13th I sent orders to have these sunk as highup the river as we could guard them, and prevent their removal by theenemy.

As soon as Warren's corps was over the Chickahominy it marched out andjoined the cavalry in holding the roads from Richmond while the armypassed. No attempt was made by the enemy to impede our march, however,but Warren and Wilson reported the enemy strongly fortified in theirfront. By the evening of the 13th Hancock's corps was at Charles CityCourt House on the James River. Burnside's and Wright's corps were onthe Chickahominy, and crossed during the night, Warren's corps and thecavalry still covering the army. The material for a pontoon bridge wasalready at hand and the work of laying it was commenced immediately,under the superintendence of Brigadier-General Benham, commanding theengineer brigade. On the evening of the 14th the crossing commenced,Hancock in advance, using both the bridge and boats.

When the Wilderness campaign commenced the Army of the Potomac,including Burnside's—which was a separate command until the 24th of Maywhen it was incorporated with the main army—numbered about 116,000 men.During the progress of the campaign about 40,000 reinforcements werereceived. At the crossing of the James River June 14th-15th the armynumbered about 115,000. Besides the ordinary losses incident to acampaign of six weeks' nearly constant fighting or skirmishing, aboutone-half of the artillery was sent back to Washington, and many men weredischarged by reason of the expiration of their term of service.* Inestimating our strength every enlisted man and every commissionedofficer present is included, no matter how employed; in bands, sick infield hospitals, hospital attendants, company cooks and all. Operatingin an enemy's country, and being supplied always from a distant base,large detachments had at all times to be sent from the front, not onlyto guard the base of supplies and the roads to it, but all the roadsleading to our flanks and rear. We were also operating in a countryunknown to us, and without competent guides or maps showing the roadsaccurately.

The manner of estimating numbers in the two armies differs materially.In the Confederate army often only bayonets are taken into account,never, I believe, do they estimate more than are handling the guns ofthe artillery and armed with muskets (*36) or carbines. Generally thelatter are far enough away to be excluded from the count in any onefield. Officers and details of enlisted men are not included. In theNorthern armies the estimate is most liberal, taking in all connectedwith the army and drawing pay.

Estimated in the same manner as ours, Lee had not less than 80,000 menat the start. His reinforcements were about equal to ours during thecampaign, deducting the discharged men and those sent back. He was onthe defensive, and in a country in which every stream, every road, everyobstacle to the movement of troops and every natural defence wasfamiliar to him and his army. The citizens were all friendly to him andhis cause, and could and did furnish him with accurate reports of ourevery move. Rear guards were not necessary for him, and having always arailroad at his back, large wagon trains were not required. Allcircumstances considered we did not have any advantage in numbers.

General Lee, who had led the Army of Northern Virginia in all thesecontests, was a very highly estimated man in the Confederate army andStates, and filled also a very high place in the estimation of thepeople and press of the Northern States. His praise was soundedthroughout the entire North after every action he was engaged in: thenumber of his forces was always lowered and that of the National forcesexaggerated. He was a large, austere man, and I judge difficult ofapproach to his subordinates. To be extolled by the entire press of theSouth after every engagement, and by a portion of the press North withequal vehemence, was calculated to give him the entire confidence of histroops and to make him feared by his antagonists. It was not anuncommon thing for my staff-officers to hear from Eastern officers,"Well, Grant has never met Bobby Lee yet." There were good and trueofficers who believe now that the Army of Northern Virginia was superiorto the Army of the Potomac man to man. I do not believe so, except asthe advantages spoken of above made them so. Before the end I believethe difference was the other way. The Army of Northern Virginia becamedespondent and saw the end. It did not please them. The National armysaw the same thing, and were encouraged by it.

The advance of the Army of the Potomac reached the James on the 14th ofJune. Preparations were at once commenced for laying the pontoonbridges and crossing the river. As already stated, I had previouslyordered General Butler to have two vessels loaded with stone and carriedup the river to a point above that occupied by our gunboats, where thechannel was narrow, and sunk there so as to obstruct the passage andprevent Confederate gunboats from coming down the river. Butler had hadthese boats filled and put in position, but had not had them sunk beforemy arrival. I ordered this done, and also directed that he should turnover all material and boats not then in use in the river to be used inferrying the troops across.

I then, on the 14th, took a steamer and ran up to Bermuda Hundred to see
General Butler for the purpose of directing a movement against
Petersburg, while our troops of the Army of the Potomac were crossing.

I had sent General W. F. Smith back from Cold Harbor by the way of WhiteHouse, thence on steamers to City Point for the purpose of givingGeneral Butler more troops with which to accomplish this result.General Butler was ordered to send Smith with his troops reinforced, asfar as that could be conveniently done, from other parts of the Army ofthe James. He gave Smith about six thousand reinforcements, includingsome twenty-five hundred cavalry under Kautz, and about thirty-fivehundred colored infantry under Hinks.

The distance which Smith had to move to reach the enemy's lines wasabout six miles, and the Confederate advance line of works was but twomiles outside of Petersburg. Smith was to move under cover of night, upclose to the enemy's works, and assault as soon as he could afterdaylight. I believed then, and still believe, that Petersburg couldhave been easily captured at that time. It only had about 2,500 men inthe defences besides some irregular troops, consisting of citizens andemployees in the city who took up arms in case of emergency. Smithstarted as proposed, but his advance encountered a rebel forceintrenched between City Point and their lines outside of Petersburg.This position he carried, with some loss to the enemy; but there was somuch delay that it was daylight before his troops really got off fromthere. While there I informed General Butler that Hancock's corps wouldcross the river and move to Petersburg to support Smith in case thelatter was successful, and that I could reinforce there more rapidlythan Lee could reinforce from his position.

I returned down the river to where the troops of the Army of the Potomacnow were, communicated to General Meade, in writing, the directions Ihad given to General Butler and directed him (Meade) to cross Hancock'scorps over under cover of night, and push them forward in the morning toPetersburg; halting them, however, at a designated point until theycould hear from Smith. I also informed General Meade that I had orderedrations from Bermuda Hundred for Hancock's corps, and desired him toissue them speedily, and to lose no more time than was absolutelynecessary. The rations did not reach him, however, and Hancock, whilehe got all his corps over during the night, remained until half-past tenin the hope of receiving them. He then moved without them, and on theroad received a note from General W. F. Smith, asking him to come on.This seems to be the first information that General Hancock had receivedof the fact that he was to go to Petersburg, or that anything particularwas expected of him. Otherwise he would have been there by four o'clockin the afternoon.

Smith arrived in front of the enemy's lines early in the forenoon of the15th, and spent the day until after seven o'clock in the evening inreconnoitering what appeared to be empty works. The enemy's lineconsisted of redans occupying commanding positions, with rifle-pitsconnecting them. To the east side of Petersburg, from the Appomattoxback, there were thirteen of these redans extending a distance ofseveral miles, probably three. If they had been properly manned theycould have held out against any force that could have attacked them, atleast until reinforcements could have got up from the north of Richmond.

Smith assaulted with the colored troops, and with success. By nineo'clock at night he was in possession of five of these redans and, ofcourse, of the connecting lines of rifle-pits. All of them containedartillery, which fell into our hands. Hancock came up and proposed totake any part assigned to him; and Smith asked him to relieve his menwho were in the trenches.

Next morning, the 16th, Hancock himself was in command, and capturedanother redan. Meade came up in the afternoon and succeeded Hancock,who had to be relieved, temporarily, from the command of his corps onaccount of the breaking out afresh of the wound he had received atGettysburg. During the day Meade assaulted and carried one more redanto his right and two to his left. In all this we lost very heavily.The works were not strongly manned, but they all had guns in them whichfell into our hands, together with the men who were handling them in theeffort to repel these assaults.

Up to this time Beauregard, who had commanded south of Richmond, hadreceived no reinforcements, except Hoke's division from Drury'sBluff,(*37) which had arrived on the morning of the 16th; though he hadurged the authorities very strongly to send them, believing, as he did,that Petersburg would be a valuable prize which we might seek.

During the 17th the fighting was very severe and the losses heavy; andat night our troops occupied about the same position they had occupiedin the morning, except that they held a redan which had been captured byPotter during the day. During the night, however, Beauregard fell backto the line which had been already selected, and commenced fortifyingit. Our troops advanced on the 18th to the line which he had abandoned,and found that the Confederate loss had been very severe, many of theenemy's dead still remaining in the ditches and in front of them.

Colonel J. L. Chamberlain, of the 20th Maine, was wounded on the 18th.He was gallantly leading his brigade at the time, as he had been inthe habit of doing in all the engagements in which he had previouslybeen engaged. He had several times been recommended for abrigadier-generalcy for gallant and meritorious conduct. On thisoccasion, however, I promoted him on the spot, and forwarded a copy ofmy order to the War Department, asking that my act might be confirmedand Chamberlain's name sent to the Senate for confirmation without anydelay. This was done, and at last a gallant and meritorious officerreceived partial justice at the hands of his government, which he hadserved so faithfully and so well.

If General Hancock's orders of the 15th had been communicated to him,that officer, with his usual promptness, would undoubtedly have beenupon the ground around Petersburg as early as four o'clock in theafternoon of the 15th. The days were long and it would have given himconsiderable time before night. I do not think there is any doubt thatPetersburg itself could have been carried without much loss; or, atleast, if protected by inner detached works, that a line could have beenestablished very much in rear of the one then occupied by the enemy.This would have given us control of both the Weldon and South Siderailroads. This would also have saved an immense amount of hardfighting which had to be done from the 15th to the 18th, and would havegiven us greatly the advantage in the long siege which ensued.

I now ordered the troops to be put under cover and allowed some of therest which they had so long needed. They remained quiet, except thatthere was more or less firing every day, until the 22d, when GeneralMeade ordered an advance towards the Weldon Railroad. We were veryanxious to get to that road, and even round to the South Side Railroadif possible.

Meade moved Hancock's corps, now commanded by Birney, to the left, witha view to at least force the enemy to stay within the limits of his ownline. General Wright, with the 6th corps, was ordered by a road farthersouth, to march directly for the Weldon road. The enemy passed inbetween these two corps and attacked vigorously, and with very seriousresults to the National troops, who were then withdrawn from theiradvanced position.

The Army of the Potomac was given the investment of Petersburg, whilethe Army of the James held Bermuda Hundred and all the ground wepossessed north of the James River. The 9th corps, Burnside's, wasplaced upon the right at Petersburg; the 5th, Warren's, next; the 2d,Birney's, next; then the 6th, Wright's, broken off to the left andsouth. Thus began the siege of Petersburg.

CHAPTER LVII.

RAID ON THE VIRGINIA CENTRAL RAILROAD—RAID ON THE WELDON RAILROAD—EARLY 'S MOVEMENT UPON WASHINGTON—MINING THE WORKS BEFORE PETERSBURG—EXPLOSION OF THE MINE BEFORE PETERSBURG—CAMPAIGN IN THE SHENANDOAHVALLEY—CAPTURE OF THE WELDON RAILROAD.

On the 7th of June, while at Cold Harbor, I had as already indicatedsent Sheridan with two divisions of cavalry to destroy as much as hecould of the Virginia Central Railroad. General Hunter had beenoperating up the Shenandoah Valley with some success, having fought abattle near Staunton where he captured a great many prisoners, besideskilling and wounding a good many men. After the battle he formed ajunction at Staunton with Averell and Crook, who had come up from theKanawha, or Gauley River. It was supposed, therefore, that GeneralHunter would be about Charlottesville, Virginia, by the time Sheridancould get there, doing on the way the damage that he was sent to do.

I gave Sheridan instructions to have Hunter, in case he should meet himabout Charlottesville, join and return with him to the Army of thePotomac. Lee, hearing of Hunter's success in the valley, startedBreckinridge out for its defence at once. Learning later of Sheridan'sgoing with two divisions, he also sent Hampton with two divisions ofcavalry, his own and Fitz-Hugh Lee's.

Sheridan moved to the north side of the North Anna to get out west, andlearned of the movement of these troops to the south side of the samestream almost as soon as they had started. He pushed on to get toTrevilian Station to commence his destruction at that point. On thenight of the 10th he bivouacked some six or seven miles east ofTrevilian, while Fitz-Hugh Lee was the same night at Trevilian Stationand Hampton but a few miles away.

During the night Hampton ordered an advance on Sheridan, hoping, nodoubt, to surprise and very badly cripple him. Sheridan, however, by acounter move sent Custer on a rapid march to get between the twodivisions of the enemy and into their rear. This he did successfully, sothat at daylight, when the assault was made, the enemy found himself atthe same time resisted in front and attacked in rear, and broke in someconfusion. The losses were probably very light on both sides in killedand wounded, but Sheridan got away with some five hundred prisoners andsent them to City Point.

During that day, the 11th, Sheridan moved into Trevilian Station, andthe following day proceeded to tear up the road east and west. Therewas considerable fighting during the whole of the day, but the work ofdestruction went on. In the meantime, at night, the enemy had takenpossession of the crossing which Sheridan had proposed to take to gonorth when he left Trevilian. Sheridan learned, however, from some ofthe prisoners he had captured here, that General Hunter was aboutLynchburg, and therefore that there was no use of his going on toCharlottesville with a view to meet him.

Sheridan started back during the night of the 12th, and made his waynorth and farther east, coming around by the north side of White House,and arriving there on the 21st. Here he found an abundance of foragefor his animals, food for his men, and security while resting. He hadbeen obliged to leave about ninety of his own men in the field-hospitalwhich he had established near Trevilian, and these necessarily fell intothe hands of the enemy.

White House up to this time had been a depot; but now that our troopswere all on the James River, it was no longer wanted as a store ofsupplies. Sheridan was, therefore, directed to break it up; which hedid on the 22d of June, bringing the garrison and an immense wagon trainwith him. All these were over the James River by the 26th of the month,and Sheridan ready to follow.

In the meantime Meade had sent Wilson's division on a raid to destroythe Weldon and South Side roads. Now that Sheridan was safe and Hamptonfree to return to Richmond with his cavalry, Wilson's position becameprecarious. Meade therefore, on the 27th, ordered Sheridan over theriver to make a demonstration in favor of Wilson. Wilson got back,though not without severe loss, having struck both roads, but the damagedone was soon repaired.

After these events comparative quiet reigned about Petersburg until latein July. The time, however, was spent in strengthening theintrenchments and making our position generally more secure against asudden attack. In the meantime I had to look after other portions of mycommand, where things had not been going on so favorably, always, as Icould have wished.

General Hunter who had been appointed to succeed Sigel in the ShenandoahValley immediately took up the offensive. He met the enemy on the 5thof June at Piedmont, and defeated him. On the 8th he formed a junctionwith Crook and Averell at Staunton, from which place he moved direct onLynchburg, via Lexington, which he reached and invested on the 16th. Upto this time he was very successful; and but for the difficulty oftaking with him sufficient ordnance stores over so long a march, througha hostile country, he would, no doubt, have captured Lynchburg. Thedestruction of the enemy's supplies and manufactories had been verygreat. To meet this movement under General Hunter, General Lee sentEarly with his corps, a part of which reached Lynchburg before Hunter.After some skirmishing on the 17th and 18th, General Hunter, owing to awant of ammunition to give battle, retired from before the place.Unfortunately, this want of ammunition left him no choice of route forhis return but by the way of the Gauley and Kanawha rivers, thence upthe Ohio River, returning to Harper's Ferry by way of the Baltimore andOhio Railroad. A long time was consumed in making this movement.Meantime the valley was left open to Early's troops, and others in thatquarter; and Washington also was uncovered. Early took advantage of thiscondition of affairs and moved on Washington.

In the absence of Hunter, General Lew Wallace, with headquarters atBaltimore, commanded the department in which the Shenandoah lay. Hissurplus of troops with which to move against the enemy was small innumber. Most of these were raw and, consequently, very much inferior toour veterans and to the veterans which Early had with him; but thesituation of Washington was precarious, and Wallace moved withcommendable promptitude to meet the enemy at the Monocacy. He couldhardly have expected to defeat him badly, but he hoped to cripple anddelay him until Washington could be put into a state of preparation forhis reception. I had previously ordered General Meade to send adivision to Baltimore for the purpose of adding to the defences ofWashington, and he had sent Ricketts's division of the 6th corps(Wright's), which arrived in Baltimore on the 8th of July. Finding thatWallace had gone to the front with his command, Ricketts immediatelytook the cars and followed him to the Monocacy with his entire division.They met the enemy and, as might have been expected, were defeated; butthey succeeded in stopping him for the day on which the battle tookplace. The next morning Early started on his march to the capital ofthe Nation, arriving before it on the 11th.

Learning of the gravity of the situation I had directed General Meade toalso order Wright with the rest of his corps directly to Washington forthe relief of that place, and the latter reached there the very day thatEarly arrived before it. The 19th corps, which had been stationed inLouisiana, having been ordered up to reinforce the armies aboutRichmond, had about this time arrived at Fortress Monroe, on their wayto join us. I diverted them from that point to Washington, which placethey reached, almost simultaneously with Wright, on the 11th. The 19thcorps was commanded by Major-General Emory.

Early made his reconnoissance with a view of attacking on the followingmorning, the 12th; but the next morning he found our intrenchments,which were very strong, fully manned. He at once commenced to retreat,Wright following. There is no telling how much this result wascontributed to by General Lew Wallace's leading what might well beconsidered almost a forlorn hope. If Early had been but one day earlierhe might have entered the capital before the arrival of thereinforcements I had sent. Whether the delay caused by the battleamounted to a day or not, General Wallace contributed on this occasion,by the defeat of the troops under him a greater benefit to the causethan often falls to the lot of a commander of an equal force to renderby means of a victory.

Farther west also the troubles were threatening. Some time before,Forrest had met Sturgis in command of some of our cavalry in Mississippiand handled him very roughly, gaining a very great victory over him.This left Forrest free to go almost where he pleased, and to cut theroads in rear of Sherman who was then advancing. Sherman was abundantlyable to look after the army that he was immediately with, and all of hismilitary division so long as he could communicate with it; but it was myplace to see that he had the means with which to hold his rear. Twodivisions under A. J. Smith had been sent to Banks in Louisiana somemonths before. Sherman ordered these back, with directions to attackForrest. Smith met and defeated him very badly. I then directed thatSmith should hang to Forrest and not let him go; and to prevent by allmeans his getting upon the Memphis and Nashville Railroad. Sherman hadanticipated me in this matter, and given the same orders in substance;but receiving my directions for this order to Smith, he repeated it.

On the 25th of June General Burnside had commenced running a mine fromabout the centre of his front under the Confederate works confrontinghim. He was induced to do this by Colonel Pleasants, of thePennsylvania Volunteers, whose regiment was mostly composed of miners,and who was himself a practical miner. Burnside had submitted thescheme to Meade and myself, and we both approved of it, as a means ofkeeping the men occupied. His position was very favorable for carryingon this work, but not so favorable for the operations to follow itscompletion. The position of the two lines at that point were only abouta hundred yards apart with a comparatively deep ravine intervening. Inthe bottom of this ravine the work commenced. The position wasunfavorable in this particular: that the enemy's line at that point wasre-entering, so that its front was commanded by their own lines both tothe right and left. Then, too, the ground was sloping upward back ofthe Confederate line for a considerable distance, and it was presumablethat the enemy had, at least, a detached work on this highest point.The work progressed, and on the 23d of July the mine was finished readyfor charging; but I had this work of charging deferred until we wereready for it.

On the 17th of July several deserters came in and said that there wasgreat consternation in Richmond, and that Lee was coming out to make anattack upon us the object being to put us on the defensive so that hemight detach troops to go to Georgia where the army Sherman wasoperating against was said to be in great trouble. I put the armycommanders, Meade and Butler, on the lookout, but the attack was notmade.

I concluded, then, a few days later, to do something in the way ofoffensive movement myself, having in view something of the same objectthat Lee had had. Wright's and Emory's corps were in Washington, andwith this reduction of my force Lee might very readily have spared sometroops from the defences to send West. I had other objects in view,however, besides keeping Lee where he was. The mine was constructed andready to be exploded, and I wanted to take that occasion to carryPetersburg if I could. It was the object, therefore, to get as many ofLee's troops away from the south side of the James River as possible.Accordingly, on the 26th, we commenced a movement with Hancock's corpsand Sheridan's cavalry to the north side by the way of Deep Bottom,where Butler had a pontoon bridge laid. The plan, in the main, was tolet the cavalry cut loose and, joining with Kautz's cavalry of the Armyof the James, get by Lee's lines and destroy as much as they could ofthe Virginia Central Railroad, while, in the mean time, the infantry wasto move out so as to protect their rear and cover their retreat backwhen they should have got through with their work. We were successfulin drawing the enemy's troops to the north side of the James as Iexpected. The mine was ordered to be charged, and the morning of the30th of July was the time fixed for its explosion. I gave Meade minuteorders (*38) on the 24th directing how I wanted the assault conducted,which orders he amplified into general instructions for the guidance ofthe troops that were to be engaged.

Meade's instructions, which I, of course, approved most heartily, wereall that I can see now was necessary. The only further precaution whichhe could have taken, and which he could not foresee, would have been tohave different men to execute them.

The gallery to the mine was over five hundred feet long from where itentered the ground to the point where it was under the enemy's works,and with a cross gallery of something over eighty feet running undertheir lines. Eight chambers had been left, requiring a ton of powdereach to charge them. All was ready by the time I had prescribed; and onthe 29th Hancock and Sheridan were brought back near the James Riverwith their troops. Under cover of night they started to recross thebridge at Deep Bottom, and to march directly for that part of our linesin front of the mine.

Warren was to hold his line of intrenchments with a sufficient number ofmen and concentrate the balance on the right next to Burnside's corps,while Ord, now commanding the 18th corps, temporarily under Meade, wasto form in the rear of Burnside to support him when he went in. Allwere to clear off the parapets and the abatisin their front so as toleave the space as open as possible, and be able to charge the momentthe mine had been sprung and Burnside had taken possession. Burnside'scorps was not to stop in the crater at all but push on to the top of thehill, supported on the right and left by Ord's and Warren's corps.

Warren and Ord fulfilled their instructions perfectly so far as makingready was concerned. Burnside seemed to have paid no attention whateverto the instructions, and left all the obstruction in his own front forhis troops to get over in the best way they could. The four divisionsof his corps were commanded by Generals Potter, Willcox, Ledlie andFerrero. The last was a colored division; and Burnside selected it tomake the assault. Meade interfered with this. Burnside then tookLedlie's division—a worse selection than the first could have been. Infact, Potter and Willcox were the only division commanders Burnside hadwho were equal to the occasion. Ledlie besides being otherwiseinefficient, proved also to possess disqualification less common amongsoldiers.

There was some delay about the explosion of the mine so that it did notgo off until about five o'clock in the morning. When it did explode itwas very successful, making a crater twenty feet deep and something likea hundred feet in length. Instantly one hundred and ten cannon andfifty mortars, which had been placed in the most commanding positionscovering the ground to the right and left of where the troops were toenter the enemy's lines, commenced playing. Ledlie's division marchedinto the crater immediately on the explosion, but most of the menstopped there in the absence of any one to give directions; theircommander having found some safe retreat to get into before theystarted. There was some delay on the left and right in advancing, butsome of the troops did get in and turn to the right and left, carryingthe rifle-pits as I expected they would do.

There had been great consternation in Petersburg, as we were well aware,about a rumored mine that we were going to explode. They knew we weremining, and they had failed to cut our mine off by countermining, thoughBeauregard had taken the precaution to run up a line of intrenchments tothe rear of that part of their line fronting where they could see thatour men were at work. We had learned through deserters who had come inthat the people had very wild rumors about what was going on on ourside. They said that we had undermined the whole of Petersburg; thatthey were resting upon a slumbering volcano and did not know at whatmoment they might expect an eruption. I somewhat based my calculationsupon this state of feeling, and expected that when the mine was explodedthe troops to the right and left would flee in all directions, and thatour troops, if they moved promptly, could get in and strengthenthemselves before the enemy had come to a realization of the truesituation. It was just as I expected it would be. We could see the menrunning without any apparent object except to get away. It was half anhour before musketry firing, to amount to anything, was opened upon ourmen in the crater. It was an hour before the enemy got artillery up toplay upon them; and it was nine o'clock before Lee got up reinforcementsfrom his right to join in expelling our troops.

The effort was a stupendous failure. It cost us about four thousandmen, mostly, however, captured; and all due to inefficiency on the partof the corps commander and the incompetency of the division commanderwho was sent to lead the assault.

After being fully assured of the failure of the mine, and finding thatmost of that part of Lee's army which had been drawn north of the JamesRiver were still there, I gave Meade directions to send a corps ofinfantry and the cavalry next morning, before Lee could get his forcesback, to destroy fifteen or twenty miles of the Weldon Railroad. Butmisfortunes never come singly. I learned during that same afternoonthat Wright's pursuit of Early was feeble because of the constant andcontrary orders he had been receiving from Washington, while I was cutoff from immediate communication by reason of our cable acrossChesapeake Bay being broken. Early, however, was not aware of the factthat Wright was not pursuing until he had reached Strasburg. Findingthat he was not pursued he turned back to Winchester, where Crook wasstationed with a small force, and drove him out. He then pushed northuntil he had reached the Potomac, then he sent McCausland across toChambersburg, Pa., to destroy that town. Chambersburg was a purelydefenceless town with no garrison whatever, and no fortifications; yetMcCausland, under Early's orders, burned the place and left about threehundred families houseless. This occurred on the 30th of July. Irescinded my orders for the troops to go out to destroy the WeldonRailroad, and directed them to embark for Washington City. Afterburning Chambersburg McCausland retreated, pursued by our cavalry,towards Cumberland. They were met and defeated by General Kelley anddriven into Virginia.

The Shenandoah Valley was very important to the Confederates, because itwas the principal storehouse they now had for feeding their armies aboutRichmond. It was well known that they would make a desperate struggleto maintain it. It had been the source of a great deal of trouble to usheretofore to guard that outlet to the north, partly because of theincompetency of some of the commanders, but chiefly because ofinterference from Washington.

It seemed to be the policy of General Halleck and Secretary Stanton tokeep any force sent there, in pursuit of the invading army, moving rightand left so as to keep between the enemy and our capital; and, generallyspeaking, they pursued this policy until all knowledge of thewhereabouts of the enemy was lost. They were left, therefore, free tosupply themselves with horses, beef cattle, and such provisions as theycould carry away from Western Maryland and Pennsylvania. I determinedto put a stop to this. I started Sheridan at once for that field ofoperation, and on the following day sent another division of hiscavalry.

I had previously asked to have Sheridan assigned to that command, butMr. Stanton objected, on the ground that he was too young for soimportant a command. On the 1st of August when I sent reinforcementsfor the protection of Washington, I sent the following orders:

CITY POINT, VA.,

August 1, 1864, 11.30 A.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Washington D. C.

I am sending General Sheridan for temporary duty whilst the enemy isbeing expelled from the border. Unless General Hunter is in the fieldin person, I want Sheridan put in command of all the troops in thefield, with instructions to put himself south of the enemy and followhim to the death. Wherever the enemy goes let our troops go also. Oncestarted up the valley they ought to be followed until we get possessionof the Virginia Central Railroad. If General Hunter is in the field,give Sheridan direct command of the 6th corps and cavalry division. Allthe cavalry, I presume, will reach Washington in the course ofto-morrow.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

The President in some way or other got to see this dispatch of minedirecting certain instructions to be given to the commanders in thefield, operating against Early, and sent me the following verycharacteristic dispatch:

OFFICE U. S. MILITARY TELEGRAPH, WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.,
August 3, 1864.

Cypher. 6 P.M.,

LT. GENERAL GRANT, City Point, Va.

I have seen your despatch in which you say, "I want Sheridan put incommand of all the troops in the field, with instructions to put himselfsouth of the enemy, and follow him to the death. Wherever the enemygoes, let our troops go also." This, I think, is exactly right, as tohow our forces should move. But please look over the despatches you mayhave received from here, even since you made that order, and discover,if you can, that there is any idea in the head of any one here, of"putting our army south of the enemy," or of "following him to thedeath" in any direction. I repeat to you it will neither be done norattempted unless you watch it every day, and hour, and force it.

A. LINCOLN.

I replied to this that "I would start in two hours for Washington," andsoon got off, going directly to the Monocacy without stopping atWashington on my way. I found General Hunter's army encamped there,scattered over the fields along the banks of the Monocacy, with manyhundreds of cars and locomotives, belonging to the Baltimore and OhioRailroad, which he had taken the precaution to bring back and collect atthat point. I asked the general where the enemy was. He replied thathe did not know. He said the fact was, that he was so embarrassed withorders from Washington moving him first to the right and then to theleft that he had lost all trace of the enemy.

I then told the general that I would find out where the enemy was, andat once ordered steam got up and trains made up, giving directions topush for Halltown, some four miles above Harper's Ferry, in theShenandoah Valley. The cavalry and the wagon trains were to march, butall the troops that could be transported by the cars were to go in thatway. I knew that the valley was of such importance to the enemy that,no matter how much he was scattered at that time, he would in a veryshort time be found in front of our troops moving south.

I then wrote out General Hunter's instructions. (*39) I told him thatSheridan was in Washington, and still another division was on its way;and suggested that he establish the headquarters of the department atany point that would suit him best, Cumberland, Baltimore, or elsewhere,and give Sheridan command of the troops in the field. The generalreplied to this, that he thought he had better be relieved entirely. Hesaid that General Halleck seemed so much to distrust his fitness for theposition he was in that he thought somebody else ought to be there. Hedid not want, in any way, to embarrass the cause; thus showing apatriotism that was none too common in the army. There were not manymajor-generals who would voluntarily have asked to have the command of adepartment taken from them on the supposition that for some particularreason, or for any reason, the service would be better performed. Itold him, "very well then," and telegraphed at once for Sheridan to cometo the Monocacy, and suggested that I would wait and meet him there.

Sheridan came at once by special train, but reached there after thetroops were all off. I went to the station and remained there until hearrived. Myself and one or two of my staff were about all the Unionpeople, except General Hunter and his staff, who were left at theMonocacy when Sheridan arrived. I hastily told Sheridan what had beendone and what I wanted him to do, giving him, at the same time, thewritten instructions which had been prepared for General Hunter anddirected to that officer.

Sheridan now had about 30,000 men to move with, 8,000 of them beingcavalry. Early had about the same number, but the superior ability ofthe National commander over the Confederate commander was so great thatall the latter's advantage of being on the defensive was more thancounterbalanced by this circumstance. As I had predicted, Early wassoon found in front of Sheridan in the valley, and Pennsylvania andMaryland were speedily freed from the invaders. The importance of thevalley was so great to the Confederates that Lee reinforced Early, butnot to the extent that we thought and feared he would.

To prevent as much as possible these reinforcements from being sent outfrom Richmond, I had to do something to compel Lee to retain his forcesabout his capital. I therefore gave orders for another move to thenorth side of the James River, to threaten Richmond. Hancock's corps,part of the 10th corps under Birney, and Gregg's division of cavalrywere crossed to the north side of the James during the night of the13th-14th of August. A threatening position was maintained for a numberof days, with more or less skirmishing, and some tolerably hardfighting; although it was my object and my instructions that anythinglike a battle should be avoided, unless opportunities should presentthemselves which would insure great success. General Meade was left incommand of the few troops around Petersburg, strongly intrenched; andwas instructed to keep a close watch upon the enemy in that quarter, andhimself to take advantage of any weakening that might occur through aneffort on the part of the enemy to reinforce the north side. There wasno particular victory gained on either side; but during that time nomore reinforcements were sent to the valley.

I informed Sheridan of what had been done to prevent reinforcementsbeing sent from Richmond against him, and also that the efforts we hadmade had proven that one of the divisions which we supposed had gone tothe valley was still at Richmond, because we had captured six or sevenhundred prisoners from that division, each of its four brigades havingcontributed to our list of captures. I also informed him that but onedivision had gone, and it was possible that I should be able to preventthe going of any more.

To add to my embarrassment at this time Sherman, who was now nearAtlanta, wanted reinforcements. He was perfectly willing to take theraw troops then being raised in the North-west, saying that he couldteach them more soldiering in one day among his troops than they wouldlearn in a week in a camp of instruction. I therefore asked that alltroops in camps of instruction in the North-west be sent to him.Sherman also wanted to be assured that no Eastern troops were moving outagainst him. I informed him of what I had done and assured him that Iwould hold all the troops there that it was possible for me to hold, andthat up to that time none had gone. I also informed him that his realdanger was from Kirby Smith, who commanded the trans-MississippiDepartment. If Smith should escape Steele, and get across theMississippi River, he might move against him. I had, therefore, askedto have an expedition ready to move from New Orleans against Mobile incase Kirby Smith should get across. This would have a tendency to drawhim to the defence of that place, instead of going against Sherman.

Right in the midst of all these embarrassments Halleck informed me thatthere was an organized scheme on foot in the North to resist the draft,and suggested that it might become necessary to draw troops from thefield to put it down. He also advised taking in sail, and not going toofast.

The troops were withdrawn from the north side of the James River on thenight of the 20th. Before they were withdrawn, however, and while mostof Lee's force was on that side of the river, Warren had been sent withmost of the 5th corps to capture the Weldon Railroad. He took up hisline of march well back to the rear, south of the enemy, while thetroops remaining in the trenches extended so as to cover that part ofthe line which he had vacated by moving out. From our left, near theold line, it was about three miles to the Weldon Railroad. A divisionwas ordered from the right of the Petersburg line to reinforce Warren,while a division was brought back from the north side of the James Riverto take its place.

This road was very important to the enemy. The limits from which hissupplies had been drawn were already very much contracted, and I knewthat he must fight desperately to protect it. Warren carried the road,though with heavy loss on both sides. He fortified his new position,and our trenches were then extended from the left of our main line toconnect with his new one. Lee made repeated attempts to dislodgeWarren's corps, but without success, and with heavy loss.

As soon as Warren was fortified and reinforcements reached him, troopswere sent south to destroy the bridges on the Weldon Railroad; and withsuch success that the enemy had to draw in wagons, for a distance ofabout thirty miles, all the supplies they got thereafter from thatsource. It was on the 21st that Lee seemed to have given up the WeldonRailroad as having been lost to him; but along about the 24th or 25th hemade renewed attempts to recapture it; again he failed and with veryheavy losses to him as compared with ours.

On the night of the 20th our troops on the north side of the James werewithdrawn, and Hancock and Gregg were sent south to destroy the WeldonRailroad. They were attacked on the 25th at Reams's Station, and afterdesperate fighting a part of our line gave way, losing five pieces ofartillery. But the Weldon Railroad never went out of our possessionfrom the 18th of August to the close of the war.

CHAPTER LVIII.

SHERIDAN'S ADVANCE—VISIT TO SHERIDAN—SHERIDAN'S VICTORY IN THESHENANDOAH—SHERIDAN'S RIDE TO WINCHESTER—CLOSE OF THE CAMPAIGN FOR THEWINTER.

We had our troops on the Weldon Railroad contending against a largeforce that regarded this road of so much importance that they couldafford to expend many lives in retaking it; Sherman just getting throughto Atlanta with great losses of men from casualties, discharges anddetachments left along as guards to occupy and hold the road in rear ofhim; Washington threatened but a short time before, and now Early beingstrengthened in the valley so as, probably, to renew that attempt. Itkept me pretty active in looking after all these points.

On the 10th of August Sheridan had advanced on Early up the ShenandoahValley, Early falling back to Strasburg. On the 12th I learned that Leehad sent twenty pieces of artillery, two divisions of infantry and aconsiderable cavalry force to strengthen Early. It was important thatSheridan should be informed of this, so I sent the information toWashington by telegraph, and directed a courier to be sent from there toget the message to Sheridan at all hazards, giving him the information.The messenger, an officer of the army, pushed through with great energyand reached Sheridan just in time. The officer went through by way ofSnicker's Gap, escorted by some cavalry. He found Sheridan just makinghis preparations to attack Early in his chosen position. Now, however,he was thrown back on the defensive.

On the 15th of September I started to visit General Sheridan in theShenandoah Valley. My purpose was to have him attack Early, or drivehim out of the valley and destroy that source of supplies for Lee'sarmy. I knew it was impossible for me to get orders through Washingtonto Sheridan to make a move, because they would be stopped there and suchorders as Halleck's caution (and that of the Secretary of War) wouldsuggest would be given instead, and would, no doubt, be contradictory tomine. I therefore, without stopping at Washington, went directlythrough to Charlestown, some ten miles above Harper's Ferry, and waitedthere to see General Sheridan, having sent a courier in advance toinform him where to meet me.

When Sheridan arrived I asked him if he had a map showing the positionsof his army and that of the enemy. He at once drew one out of his sidepocket, showing all roads and streams, and the camps of the two armies.He said that if he had permission he would move so and so (pointing outhow) against the Confederates, and that he could "whip them." Beforestarting I had drawn up a plan of campaign for Sheridan, which I hadbrought with me; but, seeing that he was so clear and so positive in hisviews and so confident of success, I said nothing about this and did nottake it out of my pocket.

Sheridan's wagon trains were kept at Harper's Ferry, where all of hisstores were. By keeping the teams at that place, their forage did nothave to be hauled to them. As supplies of ammunition, provisions andrations for the men were wanted, trains would be made up to deliver thestores to the commissaries and quartermasters encamped at Winchester.Knowing that he, in making preparations to move at a given day, wouldhave to bring up wagons trains from Harper's Ferry, I asked him if hecould be ready to get off by the following Tuesday. This was on Friday."O Yes," he said, he "could be off before daylight on Monday." I toldhim then to make the attack at that time and according to his own plan;and I immediately started to return to the army about Richmond. Aftervisiting Baltimore and Burlington, New Jersey, I arrived at City Pointon the 19th.

On the way out to Harper's Ferry I had met Mr. Robert Garrett, Presidentof the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. He seemed very anxious to know whenworkmen might be put upon the road again so as to make repairs and putit in shape for running. It was a large piece of property to havestanding idle. I told him I could not answer then positively but wouldtry and inform him before a great while. On my return Mr. Garrett metme again with the same and I told him I thought that by the Wednesday hemight send his workmen out on his road. I gave him no furtherinformation however, and he had no suspicion of how I expected to havethe road cleared for his workmen.

Sheridan moved at the time he had fixed upon. He met Early at thecrossing of Opequon Creek, a most decisive victory—one which thecountry. Early had invited this attack himself by his bad generalshipand made the victory easy. He had sent G. T. Anderson's division eastof the Blue Ridge before I went to Harper's Ferry; and about the time Iarrived there he started other divisions (leaving but two in theircamps) to march to Martinsburg for the purpose destroying the Baltimoreand Ohio Railroad at that point. Early here learned that I had beenwith Sheridan and, supposing there was some movement on foot, startedback as soon as he got the information. But his forces were separatedand, as I have said, he was very badly defeated. He fell back toFisher's Hill, Sheridan following.

The valley is narrow at that point, and Early made another stand there,behind works which extended across. But Sheridan turned both his flanksand again sent him speeding up the valley, following in hot pursuit.The pursuit was continued up the valley to Mount Jackson and New Market.Sheridan captured about eleven hundred prisoners and sixteen guns. Thehouses which he passed all along the route were found to be filled withEarly's wounded, and the country swarmed with his deserters. Finally,on the 25th, Early turned from the valley eastward, leaving Sheridan atHarrisonburg in undisputed possession.

Now one of the main objects of the expedition began to be accomplished.Sheridan went to work with his command, gathering in the crops, cattle,and everything in the upper part of the valley required by our troops;and especially taking what might be of use to the enemy. What he couldnot take away he destroyed, so that the enemy would not be invited tocome back there. I congratulated Sheridan upon his recent great victoryand had a salute of a hundred guns fired in honor of it, the guns beingaimed at the enemy around Petersburg. I also notified the othercommanders throughout the country, who also fired salutes in honor ofhis victory.

I had reason to believe that the administration was a little afraid tohave a decisive battle at that time, for fear it might go against us andhave a bad effect on the November elections. The convention which hadmet and made its nomination of the Democratic candidate for thepresidency had declared the war a failure. Treason was talked as boldlyin Chicago at that convention as ever been in Charleston. It was aquestion whether the government would then have had the power to makearrests and punish those who talked treason. But this decisive victorywas the most effective campaign argument made in the canvass.

Sheridan, in his pursuit, got beyond where they could hear from him inWashington, and the President became very much frightened about him. Hewas afraid that the hot pursuit had been a little like that of GeneralCass was said to have been, in one of our Indian wars, when he was anofficer of army. Cass was pursuing the Indians so closely that thefirst thing he knew he found himself in front, and the Indians pursuinghim. The President was afraid that Sheridan had got on the other sideof Early and that Early was in behind him. He was afraid that Sheridanwas getting so far away that reinforcements would be sent out fromRichmond to enable Early to beat him. I replied to the President that Ihad taken steps to prevent Lee from sending reinforcements to Early, byattacking the former where he was.

On the 28th of September, to retain Lee in his position, I sent Ord withthe 18th corps and Birney with the 10th corps to make an advance onRichmond, to threaten it. Ord moved with the left wing up to Chaffin'sBluff; Birney with the 10th corps took a road farther north; while Kautzwith the cavalry took the Darby road, still farther to the north. Theygot across the river by the next morning, and made an effort to surprisethe enemy. In that, however, they were unsuccessful.

The enemy's lines were very strong and very intricate. Stannard'sdivision of the 18th corps with General Burnham's brigade leading, triedan assault against Fort Harrison and captured it with sixteen guns and agood many prisoners. Burnham was killed in the assault. Colonel Stevenswho succeeded him was badly wounded; and his successor also fell in thesame way. Some works to the right and left were also carried with theguns in them—six in number—and a few more prisoners. Birney's troopsto the right captured the enemy's intrenched picket-lines, but wereunsuccessful in their efforts upon the main line.

Our troops fortified their new position, bringing Fort Harrison into thenew line and extending it to the river. This brought us pretty close tothe enemy on the north side of the James, and the two opposing linesmaintained their relative positions to the close of the siege.

In the afternoon a further attempt was made to advance, but it failed.Ord fell badly wounded, and had to be relieved; the command devolvedupon General Heckman, and later General Weitzel was assigned to thecommand of the 18th corps. During the night Lee reinforced his troopsabout Fort Gilmer, which was at the right of Fort Harrison, by eightadditional brigades from Petersburg, and attempted to retake the workswhich we had captured by concentrating ten brigades against them. Alltheir efforts failed, their attacks being all repulsed with very heavyloss. In one of these assaults upon us General Stannard, a gallantofficer who was defending Fort Harrison, lost an arm. Our casualtiesduring these operations amounted to 394 killed, I,554 wounded and 324missing.

Whilst this was going on General Meade was instructed to keep up anappearance of moving troops to our extreme left. Parke and Warren werekept with two divisions, each under arms, ready to move leaving theirenclosed batteries manned, with a scattering line on the otherintrenchments. The object of this was to prevent reinforcements fromgoing to the north side of the river. Meade was instructed to watch theenemy closely and, if Lee weakened his lines, to make an attack.

On the 30th these troops moved out, under Warren, and captured anadvanced intrenched camp at Peeble's farm, driving the enemy back to themain line. Our troops followed and made an attack in the hope ofcarrying the enemy's main line; but in this they were unsuccessful andlost a large number of men, mostly captured. The number of killed andwounded was not large. The next day our troops advanced again andestablished themselves, intrenching a new line about a mile in front ofthe enemy. This advanced Warren's position on the Weldon Railroad veryconsiderably.

Sheridan having driven the enemy out of the valley, and taken theproductions of the valley so that instead of going there for suppliesthe enemy would have to bring his provisions with him if he againentered it, recommended a reduction of his own force, the surplus to besent where it could be of more use. I approved of his suggestion, andordered him to send Wright's corps back to the James River. I furtherdirected him to repair the railroad up the Shenandoah Valley towards theadvanced position which we would hold with a small force. The troopswere to be sent to Washington by the way of Culpeper, in order to watchthe east side of the Blue Ridge, and prevent the enemy from getting intothe rear of Sheridan while he was still doing his work of destruction.

The valley was so very important, however, to the Confederate army that,contrary to our expectations, they determined to make one more strike,and save it if possible before the supplies should be all destroyed.Reinforcements were sent therefore to Early, and this before any of ourtroops had been withdrawn. Early prepared to strike Sheridan atHarrisonburg; but the latter had not remained there.

On the 6th of October Sheridan commenced retiring down the valley,taking or destroying all the food and forage and driving the cattlebefore him, Early following. At Fisher's Hill Sheridan turned hiscavalry back on that of Early, which, under the lead of Rosser, waspursuing closely, and routed it most completely, capturing eleven gunsand a large number of prisoners. Sheridan lost only about sixty men.His cavalry pursued the enemy back some twenty-five miles. On the 10thof October the march down the valley was again resumed, Early againfollowing.

I now ordered Sheridan to halt, and to improve the opportunity ifafforded by the enemy's having been sufficiently weakened, to move backagain and cut the James River Canal and Virginia Central Railroad. Butthis order had to go through Washington where it was intercepted; andwhen Sheridan received what purported to be a statement of what I wantedhim to do it was something entirely different. Halleck informedSheridan that it was my wish for him to hold a forward position as abase from which to act against Charlottesville and Gordonsville; that heshould fortify this position and provision it.

Sheridan objected to this most decidedly; and I was impelled totelegraph him, on the 14th, as follows:

CITY POINT, VA., October 14, 1864.—12.30 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL SHERIDAN, Cedar Creek, Va.

What I want is for you to threaten the Virginia Central Railroad andcanal in the manner your judgment tells you is best, holding yourselfready to advance, if the enemy draw off their forces. If you make theenemy hold a force equal to your own for the protection of thosethoroughfares, it will accomplish nearly as much as their destruction.If you cannot do this, then the next best thing to do is to send hereall the force you can. I deem a good cavalry force necessary for youroffensive, as well as defensive operations. You need not therefore sendhere more than one division of cavalry.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

Sheridan having been summoned to Washington City, started on the 15thleaving Wright in command. His army was then at Cedar Creek, sometwenty miles south of Winchester. The next morning while at FrontRoyal, Sheridan received a dispatch from Wright, saying that a dispatchfrom Longstreet to Early had been intercepted. It directed the latterto be ready to move and to crush Sheridan as soon as he, Longstreet,arrived. On the receipt of this news Sheridan ordered the cavalry upthe valley to join Wright.

On the 18th of October Early was ready to move, and during the nightsucceeded in getting his troops in the rear of our left flank, whichfled precipitately and in great confusion down the valley, losingeighteen pieces of artillery and a thousand or more prisoners. Theright under General Getty maintained a firm and steady front, fallingback to Middletown where it took a position and made a stand. Thecavalry went to the rear, seized the roads leading to Winchester andheld them for the use of our troops in falling back, General Wrighthaving ordered a retreat back to that place.

Sheridan having left Washington on the 18th, reached Winchester thatnight. The following morning he started to join his command. He hadscarcely got out of town, when he met his men returning in panic fromthe front and also heard heavy firing to the south. He immediatelyordered the cavalry at Winchester to be deployed across the valley tostop the stragglers. Leaving members of his staff to take care ofWinchester and the public property there, he set out with a small escortdirectly for the scene of battle. As he met the fugitives he orderedthem to turn back, reminding them that they were going the wrong way.His presence soon restored confidence. Finding themselves worsefrightened than hurt the men did halt and turn back. Many of those whohad run ten miles got back in time to redeem their reputation as gallantsoldiers before night.

When Sheridan got to the front he found Getty and Custer still holdingtheir ground firmly between the Confederates and our retreating troops.Everything in the rear was now ordered up. Sheridan at once proceeded tointrench his position; and he awaited an assault from the enemy. Thiswas made with vigor, and was directed principally against Emory's corps,which had sustained the principal loss in the first attack. By oneo'clock the attack was repulsed. Early was so badly damaged that heseemed disinclined to make another attack, but went to work to intrenchhimself with a view to holding the position he had already gained. Hethought, no doubt, that Sheridan would be glad enough to leave himunmolested; but in this he was mistaken.

About the middle of the afternoon Sheridan advanced. He sent hiscavalry by both flanks, and they penetrated to the enemy's rear. Thecontest was close for a time, but at length the left of the enemy broke,and disintegration along the whole line soon followed. Early tried torally his men, but they were followed so closely that they had to giveway very quickly every time they attempted to make a stand. Ourcavalry, having pushed on and got in the rear of the Confederates,captured twenty-four pieces of artillery, besides retaking what had beenlost in the morning. This victory pretty much closed the campaigning inthe Valley of Virginia. All the Confederate troops were sent back toRichmond with the exception of one division of infantry and a littlecavalry. Wright's corps was ordered back to the Army of the Potomac,and two other divisions were withdrawn from the valley. Early had lostmore men in killed, wounded and captured in the valley than Sheridan hadcommanded from first to last.

On more than one occasion in these engagements General R. B. Hayes, whosucceeded me as President of the United States, bore a very honorablepart. His conduct on the field was marked by conspicuous gallantry aswell as the display of qualities of a higher order than that of merepersonal daring. This might well have been expected of one who couldwrite at the time he is said to have done so: "Any officer fit for dutywho at this crisis would abandon his post to electioneer for a seat inCongress, ought to be scalped." Having entered the army as a Major ofVolunteers at the beginning of the war, General Hayes attained bymeritorious service the rank of Brevet Major-General before its close.

On the north side of the James River the enemy attacked Kautz's cavalryon the 7th of October, and drove it back with heavy loss in killed,wounded and prisoners, and the loss of all the artillery. This wasfollowed up by an attack on our intrenched infantry line, but wasrepulsed with severe slaughter. On the 13th a reconnoissance was sentout by General Butler, with a view to drive the enemy from some newworks he was constructing, which resulted in heavy loss to us.

On the 24th I ordered General Meade to attempt to get possession of theSouth Side Railroad, and for that purpose to advance on the 27th. Theattempt proved a failure, however, the most advanced of our troops notgetting nearer than within six miles of the point aimed for. Seeing theimpossibility of its accomplishment I ordered the troops to withdraw,and they were all back in their former positions the next day.

Butler, by my directions, also made a demonstration on the north side ofthe James River in order to support this move, by detaining there theConfederate troops who were on that side. He succeeded in this, butfailed of further results by not marching past the enemy's left beforeturning in on the Darby road and by reason of simply coming up againsttheir lines in place.

This closed active operations around Richmond for the winter. Of coursethere was frequent skirmishing between pickets, but no serious battlewas fought near either Petersburg or Richmond. It would prolong thiswork to give a detailed account of all that took place from day to dayaround Petersburg and at other parts of my command, and it would notinterest the general reader if given. All these details can be found bythe military student in a series of books published by the Scribners,Badeau's history of my campaigns, and also in the publications of theWar Department, including both the National and Confederate reports.

In the latter part of November General Hancock was relieved from thecommand of the 2d corps by the Secretary of War and ordered toWashington, to organize and command a corps of veteran troops to bedesignated the 1st corps. It was expected that this would give him alarge command to co-operate with in the spring. It was my expectation,at the time, that in the final operations Hancock should move either upthe valley, or else east of the Blue Ridge to Lynchburg; the idea beingto make the spring campaign the close of the war. I expected, withSherman coming up from the South, Meade south of Petersburg and aroundRichmond, and Thomas's command in Tennessee with depots of suppliesestablished in the eastern part of that State, to move from thedirection of Washington or the valley towards Lynchburg. We would thenhave Lee so surrounded that his supplies would be cut off entirely,making it impossible for him to support his army.

General Humphreys, chief-of-staff of the Army of the Potomac, wasassigned to the command of the 2d corps, to succeed Hancock.

CHAPTER LIX.

THE CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA—SHERMAN'S MARCH TO THE SEA—WAR ANECDOTES—THEMARCH ON SAVANNAH—INVESTMENT OF SAVANNAH—CAPTURE OF SAVANNAH.

Let us now return to the operations in the military division of the
Mississippi, and accompany Sherman in his march to the sea.

The possession of Atlanta by us narrowed the territory of the enemy verymaterially and cut off one of his two remaining lines of roads from eastto west.

A short time after the fall of Atlanta Mr. Davis visited Palmetto andMacon and made speeches at each place. He spoke at Palmetto on the 20thof September, and at Macon on the 22d. Inasmuch as he had relievedJohnston and appointed Hood, and Hood had immediately taken theinitiative, it is natural to suppose that Mr. Davis was disappointedwith General Johnston's policy. My own judgment is that Johnston actedvery wisely: he husbanded his men and saved as much of his territory ashe could, without fighting decisive battles in which all might be lost.As Sherman advanced, as I have show, his army became spread out, until,if this had been continued, it would have been easy to destroy it indetail. I know that both Sherman and I were rejoiced when we heard ofthe change. Hood was unquestionably a brave, gallant soldier and notdestitute of ability; but unfortunately his policy was to fight theenemy wherever he saw him, without thinking much of the consequences ofdefeat.

In his speeches Mr. Davis denounced Governor Brown, of Georgia, andGeneral Johnston in unmeasured terms, even insinuating that theirloyalty to the Southern cause was doubtful. So far as General Johnstonis concerned, I think Davis did him a great injustice in thisparticular. I had know the general before the war and strongly believedit would be impossible for him to accept a high commission for thepurpose of betraying the cause he had espoused. There, as I have said,I think that his policy was the best one that could have been pursued bythe whole South—protract the war, which was all that was necessary toenable them to gain recognition in the end. The North was alreadygrowing weary, as the South evidently was also, but with thisdifference. In the North the people governed, and could stophostilities whenever they chose to stop supplies. The South was amilitary camp, controlled absolutely by the government with soldiers toback it, and the war could have been protracted, no matter to whatextent the discontent reached, up to the point of open mutiny of thesoldiers themselves. Mr. Davis's speeches were frank appeals to thepeople of Georgia and that portion of the South to come to their relief.He tried to assure his frightened hearers that the Yankees were rapidlydigging their own graves; that measures were already being taken to cutthem off from supplies from the North; and that with a force in front,and cut off from the rear, they must soon starve in the midst of ahostile people. Papers containing reports of these speeches immediatelyreached the Northern States, and they were republished. Of course, thatcaused no alarm so long as telegraphic communication was kept up withSherman.

When Hood was forced to retreat from Atlanta he moved to the south-westand was followed by a portion of Sherman's army. He soon appeared uponthe railroad in Sherman's rear, and with his whole army began destroyingthe road. At the same time also the work was begun in Tennessee andKentucky which Mr. Davis had assured his hearers at Palmetto and Maconwould take place. He ordered Forrest (about the ablest cavalry generalin the South) north for this purpose; and Forrest and Wheeler carriedout their orders with more or less destruction, occasionally picking upa garrison. Forrest indeed performed the very remarkable feat ofcapturing, with cavalry, two gunboats and a number of transports,something the accomplishment of which is very hard to account for.Hood's army had been weakened by Governor Brown's withdrawing theGeorgia State troops for the purpose of gathering in the season's cropsfor the use of the people and for the use of the army. This not onlydepleted Hood's forces but it served a most excellent purpose ingathering in supplies of food and forage for the use of our army in itssubsequent march. Sherman was obliged to push on with his force and gohimself with portions of it hither and thither, until it was clearlydemonstrated to him that with the army he then had it would beimpossible to hold the line from Atlanta back and leave him any forcewhatever with which to take the offensive. Had that plan been adheredto, very large reinforcements would have been necessary; and Mr. Davis'sprediction of the destruction of the army would have been realized, orelse Sherman would have been obliged to make a successful retreat, whichMr. Davis said in his speeches would prove more disastrous thanNapoleon's retreat from Moscow.

These speeches of Mr. Davis were not long in reaching Sherman. He tookadvantage of the information they gave, and made all the preparationpossible for him to make to meet what now became expected, attempts tobreak his communications. Something else had to be done: and toSherman's sensible and soldierly mind the idea was not long in dawningupon him, not only that something else had to be done, but what thatsomething else should be.

On September 10th I telegraphed Sherman as follows:

CITY POINT, VA., Sept. 10, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL SHERMAN, Atlanta, Georgia.

So soon as your men are sufficiently rested, and preparations can bemade, it is desirable that another campaign should be commenced. Wewant to keep the enemy constantly pressed to the end of the war. If wegive him no peace whilst the war lasts, the end cannot be distant. Nowthat we have all of Mobile Bay that is valuable, I do not know but itwill be the best move to transfer Canby's troops to act upon Savannah,whilst you move on Augusta. I should like to hear from you, however, inthis matter.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

Sherman replied promptly:

"If I could be sure of finding provisions and ammunition at Augusta, orColumbus, Georgia, I can march to Milledgeville, and compel Hood to giveup Augusta or Macon, and then turn on the other. * * * If you canmanage to take the Savannah River as high up as Augusta, or theChattahoochee as far up as Columbus, I can sweep the whole State ofGeorgia."

On the 12th I sent a special messenger, one of my own staff, with aletter inviting Sherman's views about the next campaign.

CITY POINT, VA., Sept. 12, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN, Commanding Mill Division of the
Mississippi.

I send Lieutenant-Colonel Porter, of my staff, with this. Colonel Porterwill explain to you the exact condition of affairs here better than Ican do in the limits of a letter. Although I feel myself strong enoughfor offensive operations, I am holding on quietly to get advantage ofrecruits and convalescents, who are coming forward very rapidly. Mylines are necessarily very long, extending from Deep Bottom north of theJames across the peninsula formed by the Appomattox and the James, andsouth of the Appomattox to the Weldon Road. This line is very stronglyfortified, and can be held with comparatively few men, but from itsgreat length takes many in the aggregate. I propose, when I do move, toextend my left so as to control what is known as the South Side, orLynchburg and Petersburg Road, then if possible to keep the DanvilleRoad cut. At the same time this move is made, I want to send a force offrom six to ten thousand men against Wilmington.

The way I propose to do this is to land the men north of Fort Fisher,and hold that point. At the same time a large naval fleet will beassembled there, and the iron-clads will run the batteries as they didat Mobile. This will give us the same control of the harbor ofWilmington that we now have of the harbor of Mobile. What you are to dowith the forces at your command, I do not see. The difficulties ofsupplying your army, except when you are constantly moving, beyond whereyou are, I plainly see. If it had not been for Price's movements Canbywould have sent twelve thousand more men to Mobile. From your commandon the Mississippi an equal number could have been taken. With theseforces my idea would have been to divide them, sending one half toMobile and the other half to Savannah. You could then move as proposedin your telegram, so as to threaten Macon and Augusta equally.Whichever was abandoned by the enemy you could take and open up a newbase of supplies. My object now in sending a staff officer is not somuch to suggest operations for you, as to get your views and have plansmatured by the time everything can be got ready. It will probably bethe 5th of October before any of the plans herein indicated will beexecuted.

If you have any promotions to recommend, send the names forward and Iwill approve them. * *

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

This reached Sherman on September 20th.

On the 25th of September Sherman reported to Washington that Hood'stroops were in his rear. He had provided against this by sending adivision to Chattanooga and a division to Rome, Georgia, which was inthe rear of Hood, supposing that Hood would fall back in the directionfrom which he had come to reach the railroad. At the same time Shermanand Hood kept up a correspondence relative to the exchange of prisoners,the treatment of citizens, and other matters suitable to be arrangedbetween hostile commanders in the field. On the 27th of September Itelegraphed Sherman as follows:

CITY POINT, VA., September 27, 1864—10.30 A.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL SHERMAN:

I have directed all recruits and new troops from the Western States tobe sent to Nashville, to receive their further orders from you. * *

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

On the 29th Sherman sent Thomas back to Chattanooga, and afterwards toNashville, with another division (Morgan's) of the advanced army.Sherman then suggested that, when he was prepared, his movements shouldtake place against Milledgeville and then to Savannah. His expectationat that time was, to make this movement as soon as he could get up hissupplies. Hood was moving in his own country, and was moving light sothat he could make two miles to Sherman's one. He depended upon thecountry to gather his supplies, and so was not affected by delays.

As I have said, until this unexpected state of affairs happened, Mobilehad been looked upon as the objective point of Sherman's army. It hadbeen a favorite move of mine from 1862, when I first suggested to thethen commander-in-chief that the troops in Louisiana, instead offrittering away their time in the trans-Mississippi, should moveagainst Mobile. I recommended this from time to time until I came intocommand of the army, the last of March 1864. Having the power in my ownhands, I now ordered the concentration of supplies, stores and troops,in the department of the Gulf about New Orleans, with a view to a moveagainst Mobile, in support of, and in conjunction with, the other armiesoperating in the field. Before I came into command, these troops hadbeen scattered over the trans-Mississippi department in such a way thatthey could not be, or were not, gotten back in time to take any part inthe original movement; hence the consideration, which had caused Mobileto be selected as the objective point for Sherman's army to find hisnext base of supplies after having cut loose from Atlanta, no longerexisted.

General G. M. Dodge, an exceedingly efficient officer, having been badlywounded, had to leave the army about the first of October. He was incommand of two divisions of the 16th corps, consolidated into one.Sherman then divided his army into the right and left wings the rightcommanded by General O. O. Howard and the left by General Slocum.General Dodge's two divisions were assigned, one to each of these wings.Howard's command embraced the 15th and 17th corps, and Slocum's the 14thand 20th corps, commanded by Generals Jeff. C. Davis and A. S. Williams.Generals Logan and Blair commanded the two corps composing the rightwing. About this time they left to take part in the presidentialelection, which took place that year, leaving their corps to Osterhausand Ransom. I have no doubt that their leaving was at the earnestsolicitation of the War Department. General Blair got back in time toresume his command and to proceed with it throughout the march to thesea and back to the grand review at Washington. General Logan did notreturn to his command until after it reached Savannah.

Logan felt very much aggrieved at the transfer of General Howard fromthat portion of the Army of the Potomac which was then with the WesternArmy, to the command of the Army of the Tennessee, with which armyGeneral Logan had served from the battle of Belmont to the fall ofAtlanta—having passed successively through all grades from colonelcommanding a regiment to general commanding a brigade, division and armycorps, until upon the death of McPherson the command of the entire Armyof the Tennessee devolved upon him in the midst of a hotly contestedbattle. He conceived that he had done his full duty as commander inthat engagement; and I can bear testimony, from personal observation,that he had proved himself fully equal to all the lower positions whichhe had occupied as a soldier. I will not pretend to question the motivewhich actuated Sherman in taking an officer from another army tosupersede General Logan. I have no doubt, whatever, that he did thisfor what he considered would be to the good of the service, which wasmore important than that the personal feelings of any individual shouldnot be aggrieved; though I doubt whether he had an officer with him whocould have filled the place as Logan would have done. Differences ofopinion must exist between the best of friends as to policies in war,and of judgment as to men's fitness. The officer who has the command,however, should be allowed to judge of the fitness of the officers underhim, unless he is very manifestly wrong.

Sherman's army, after all the depletions, numbered about sixty thousandeffective men. All weak men had been left to hold the rear, and thoseremaining were not only well men, but strong and hardy, so that he hadsixty thousand as good soldiers as ever trod the earth; better than anyEuropean soldiers, because they not only worked like a machine but themachine thought. European armies know very little what they are fightingfor, and care less. Included in these sixty thousand troops, there weretwo small divisions of cavalry, numbering altogether about four thousandmen. Hood had about thirty-five to forty thousand men, independent ofForrest, whose forces were operating in Tennessee and Kentucky, as Mr.Davis had promised they should. This part of Mr. Davis's military planwas admirable, and promised the best results of anything he could havedone, according to my judgment. I say this because I have criticised hismilitary judgment in the removal of Johnston, and also in theappointment of Hood. I am aware, however, that there was high feelingexisting at that time between Davis and his subordinate, whom I regardedas one of his ablest lieutenants.

On the 5th of October the railroad back from Atlanta was again verybadly broken, Hood having got on the track with his army. Sherman sawafter night, from a high point, the road burning for miles. The defenceof the railroad by our troops was very gallant, but they could not holdpoints between their intrenched positions against Hood's whole army; infact they made no attempt to do so; but generally the intrenchedpositions were held, as well as important bridges, and store located atthem. Allatoona, for instance, was defended by a small force of menunder the command of General Corse, one of the very able and efficientvolunteer officers produced by the war. He, with a small force, was cutoff from the remainder of the National army and was attacked with greatvigor by many times his own number. Sherman from his high position couldsee the battle raging, with the Confederate troops between him and hissubordinate. He sent men, of course, to raise the temporary siege, butthe time that would be necessarily consumed in reaching Corse, would beso great that all occupying the intrenchments might be dead. Corse wasa man who would never surrender. From a high position some of Sherman'ssignal corps discovered a signal flag waving from a hole in the blockhouse at Allatoona. It was from Corse. He had been shot through theface, but he signalled to his chief a message which left no doubt of hisdetermination to hold his post at all hazards. It was at this pointprobably, that Sherman first realized that with the forces at hisdisposal, the keeping open of his line of communication with the Northwould be impossible if he expected to retain any force with which tooperate offensively beyond Atlanta. He proposed, therefore, to destroythe roads back to Chattanooga, when all ready to move, and leave thelatter place garrisoned. Yet, before abandoning the railroad, it wasnecessary that he should repair damages already done, and hold the roaduntil he could get forward such supplies, ordnance stores and smallrations, as he wanted to carry with him on his proposed march, and toreturn to the north his surplus artillery; his object being to movelight and to have no more artillery than could be used to advantage onthe field.

Sherman thought Hood would follow him, though he proposed to prepare forthe contingency of the latter moving the other way while he was movingsouth, by making Thomas strong enough to hold Tennessee and Kentucky.I, myself, was thoroughly satisfied that Hood would go north, as he did.On the 2d of November I telegraphed Sherman authorizing him definitelyto move according to the plan he had proposed: that is, cutting loosefrom his base, giving up Atlanta and the railroad back to Chattanooga.To strengthen Thomas he sent Stanley (4th corps) back, and also orderedSchofield, commanding the Army of the Ohio, twelve thousand strong, toreport to him. In addition to this, A. J. Smith, who, with twodivisions of Sherman's army, was in Missouri aiding Rosecrans in drivingthe enemy from that State, was under orders to return to Thomas and,under the most unfavorable circumstances, might be expected to arrivethere long before Hood could reach Nashville.

In addition to this, the new levies of troops that were being raised inthe North-west went to Thomas as rapidly as enrolled and equipped.Thomas, without any of these additions spoken of, had a garrison atChattanooga which had been strengthened by one division and garrisons atBridgeport, Stevenson, Decatur, Murfreesboro, and Florence. There werealready with him in Nashville ten thousand soldiers in round numbers,and many thousands of employees in the quartermaster's and otherdepartments who could be put in the intrenchments in front of Nashville,for its defence. Also, Wilson was there with ten thousand dismountedcavalrymen, who were being equipped for the field. Thomas had at thistime about forty-five thousand men without any of the reinforcementshere above enumerated. These reinforcements gave him altogether aboutseventy thousand men, without counting what might be added by the newlevies already spoken of.

About this time Beauregard arrived upon the field, not to supersede Hoodin command, but to take general charge over the entire district in whichHood and Sherman were, or might be, operating. He made the most franticappeals to the citizens for assistance to be rendered in every way: bysending reinforcements, by destroying supplies on the line of march ofthe invaders, by destroying the bridges over which they would have tocross, and by, in every way, obstructing the roads to their front. Butit was hard to convince the people of the propriety of destroyingsupplies which were so much needed by themselves, and each one hopedthat his own possessions might escape.

Hood soon started north, and went into camp near Decatur, Alabama, wherehe remained until the 29th of October, but without making an attack onthe garrison of that place.

The Tennessee River was patrolled by gunboats, from Muscle Shoals east;and, also, below the second shoals out to the Ohio River. These, withthe troops that might be concentrated from the garrisons along the riverat any point where Hood might choose to attempt to cross, made itimpossible for him to cross the Tennessee at any place where it wasnavigable. But Muscle Shoals is not navigable, and below them again isanother shoal which also obstructs navigation. Hood therefore moveddown to a point nearly opposite Florence, Alabama, crossed over andremained there for some time, collecting supplies of food, forage andammunition. All of these had to come from a considerable distance south,because the region in which he was then situated was mountainous, withsmall valleys which produced but little, and what they had produced hadlong since been exhausted. On the 1st of November I suggested toSherman, and also asked his views thereon, the propriety of destroyingHood before he started on his campaign.

On the 2d of November, as stated, I approved definitely his making hisproposed campaign through Georgia, leaving Hood behind to the tendermercy of Thomas and the troops in his command. Sherman fixed the 10thof November as the day of starting.

Sherman started on that day to get back to Atlanta, and on the 15th thereal march to the sea commenced. The right wing, under Howard, and thecavalry went to Jonesboro, Milledgeville, then the capital of Georgia,being Sherman's objective or stopping place on the way to Savannah. Theleft wing moved to Stone Mountain, along roads much farther east thanthose taken by the right wing. Slocum was in command, and threatenedAugusta as the point to which he was moving, but he was to turn off andmeet the right wing at Milledgeville.

Atlanta was destroyed so far as to render it worthless for militarypurposes before starting, Sherman himself remaining over a day tosuperintend the work, and see that it was well done. Sherman's ordersfor this campaign were perfect. Before starting, he had sent back allsick, disabled and weak men, retaining nothing but the hardy,well-inured soldiers to accompany him on his long march in prospect.His artillery was reduced to sixty-five guns. The ammunition carriedwith them was two hundred rounds for musket and gun. Small rations weretaken in a small wagon train, which was loaded to its capacity for rapidmovement. The army was expected to live on the country, and to alwayskeep the wagons full of forage and provisions against a possible delayof a few days.

The troops, both of the right and left wings, made most of their advancealong the line of railroads, which they destroyed. The method adoptedto perform this work, was to burn and destroy all the bridges andculverts, and for a long distance, at places, to tear up the track andbend the rails. Soldiers to do this rapidly would form a line along oneside of the road with crowbars and poles, place these under the railsand, hoisting all at once, turn over many rods of road at one time. Theties would then be placed in piles, and the rails, as they wereloosened, would be carried and put across these log heaps. When asufficient number of rails were placed upon a pile of ties it would beset on fire. This would heat the rails very much more in the middle,that being over the main part of the fire, than at the ends, so thatthey would naturally bend of their own weight; but the soldiers, toincrease the damage, would take tongs and, one or two men at each end ofthe rail, carry it with force against the nearest tree and twist itaround, thus leaving rails forming bands to ornament the forest trees ofGeorgia. All this work was going on at the same time, there being asufficient number of men detailed for that purpose. Some piled the logsand built the fire; some put the rails upon the fire; while others wouldbend those that were sufficiently heated: so that, by the time the lastbit of road was torn up, that it was designed to destroy at a certainplace, the rails previously taken up were already destroyed.

The organization for supplying the army was very complete. Each brigadefurnished a company to gather supplies of forage and provisions for thecommand to which they belonged. Strict injunctions were issued againstpillaging, or otherwise unnecessarily annoying the people; buteverything in shape of food for man and forage for beast was taken. Thesupplies were turned over to the brigade commissary and quartermaster,and were issued by them to their respective commands precisely the sameas if they had been purchased. The captures consisted largely ofcattle, sheep, poultry, some bacon, cornmeal, often molasses, andoccasionally coffee or other small rations.

The skill of these men, called by themselves and the army "bummers," incollecting their loads and getting back to their respective commands,was marvellous. When they started out in the morning, they were alwayson foot; but scarcely one of them returned in the evening without beingmounted on a horse or mule. These would be turned in for the general useof the army, and the next day these men would start out afoot and returnagain in the evening mounted.

Many of the exploits of these men would fall under the head of romance;indeed, I am afraid that in telling some of their experiences, theromance got the better of the truth upon which the story was founded,and that, in the way many of these anecdotes are told, very little ofthe foundation is left. I suspect that most of them consist chiefly ofthe fiction added to make the stories better. In one instance it wasreported that a few men of Sherman's army passed a house where theydiscovered some chickens under the dwelling. They immediately proceededto capture them, to add to the army's supplies. The lady of the house,who happened to be at home, made piteous appeals to have these spared,saying they were a few she had put away to save by permission of otherparties who had preceded and who had taken all the others that she had.The soldiers seemed moved at her appeal; but looking at the chickensagain they were tempted and one of them replied: "The rebellion must besuppressed if it takes the last chicken in the Confederacy," andproceeded to appropriate the last one.

Another anecdote characteristic of these times has been told. The South,prior to the rebellion, kept bloodhounds to pursue runaway slaves whotook refuge in the neighboring swamps, and also to hunt convicts.Orders were issued to kill all these animals as they were met with. Onone occasion a soldier picked up a poodle, the favorite pet of itsmistress, and was carrying it off to execution when the lady made astrong appeal to him to spare it. The soldier replied, "Madam, ourorders are to kill every bloodhound." "But this is not a bloodhound,"said the lady. "Well, madam, we cannot tell what it will grow into ifwe leave it behind," said the soldier as he went off with it.

Notwithstanding these anecdotes, and the necessary hardship they wouldseem to imply, I do not believe there was much unwarrantable pillagingconsidering that we were in the enemy's territory and without anysupplies except such as the country afforded.

On the 23d Sherman, with the left wing, reached Milledgeville. The rightwing was not far off: but proceeded on its way towards Savannahdestroying the road as it went. The troops at Milledgeville remainedover a day to destroy factories, buildings used for military purposes,etc., before resuming its march.

The governor, who had been almost defying Mr. Davis before this, nowfled precipitately, as did the legislature of the State and all theState officers. The governor, Sherman says, was careful to carry awayeven his garden vegetables, while he left the archives of the State tofall into our hands. The only military force that was opposed toSherman's forward march was the Georgia militia, a division under thecommand of General G. W. Smith, and a battalion under Harry Wayne.Neither the quality of the forces nor their numbers was sufficient toeven retard the progress of Sherman's army.

The people at the South became so frantic at this time at the successfulinvasion of Georgia that they took the cadets from the military collegeand added them to the ranks of the militia. They even liberated theState convicts under promise from them that they would serve in thearmy. I have but little doubt that the worst acts that were attributedto Sherman's army were committed by these convicts, and by otherSouthern people who ought to have been under sentence—such people ascould be found in every community, North and South—who took advantageof their country being invaded to commit crime. They were in but littledanger of detection, or of arrest even if detected.

The Southern papers in commenting upon Sherman's movements pictured himas in the most deplorable condition: stating that his men werestarving, that they were demoralized and wandering about almost withoutobject, aiming only to reach the sea coast and get under the protectionof our navy. These papers got to the North and had more or less effectupon the minds of the people, causing much distress to all loyal personsparticularly to those who had husbands, sons or brothers with Sherman.Mr. Lincoln seeing these accounts, had a letter written asking me if Icould give him anything that he could say to the loyal people that wouldcomfort them. I told him there was not the slightest occasion foralarm; that with 60,000 such men as Sherman had with him, such acommanding officer as he was could not be cut off in the open country.He might possibly be prevented from reaching the point he had startedout to reach, but he would get through somewhere and would finally getto his chosen destination: and even if worst came to worst he couldreturn North. I heard afterwards of Mr. Lincoln's saying, to those whowould inquire of him as to what he thought about the safety of Sherman'sarmy, that Sherman was all right: "Grant says they are safe with such ageneral, and that if they cannot get out where they want to, they cancrawl back by the hole they went in at."

While at Milledgeville the soldiers met at the State House, organized alegislature, and proceeded to business precisely as if they were thelegislative body belonging to the State of Georgia. The debates wereexciting, and were upon the subject of the situation the South was in atthat time, particularly the State of Georgia. They went so far as torepeal, after a spirited and acrimonious debate, the ordinance ofsecession.

The next day (24th) Sherman continued his march, going by the way ofWaynesboro and Louisville, Millen being the next objective and where thetwo columns (the right and left wings) were to meet. The left wingmoved to the left of the direct road, and the cavalry still farther offso as to make it look as though Augusta was the point they were aimingfor. They moved on all the roads they could find leading in thatdirection. The cavalry was sent to make a rapid march in hope ofsurprising Millen before the Union prisoners could be carried away; butthey failed in this.

The distance from Milledgeville to Millen was about one hundred miles.At this point Wheeler, who had been ordered from Tennessee, arrived andswelled the numbers and efficiency of the troops confronting Sherman.Hardee, a native of Georgia, also came, but brought no troops with him.It was intended that he should raise as large an army as possible withwhich to intercept Sherman's march. He did succeed in raising sometroops, and with these and those under the command of Wheeler and Wayne,had an army sufficient to cause some annoyance but no great detention.Our cavalry and Wheeler's had a pretty severe engagement, in whichWheeler was driven towards Augusta, thus giving the idea that Shermanwas probably making for that point.

Millen was reached on the 3d of December, and the march was resumed thefollowing day for Savannah, the final objective. Bragg had now been sentto Augusta with some troops. Wade Hampton was there also trying toraise cavalry sufficient to destroy Sherman's army. If he ever raised aforce it was too late to do the work expected of it. Hardee's wholeforce probably numbered less than ten thousand men.

From Millen to Savannah the country is sandy and poor, and affords butvery little forage other than rice straw, which was then growing. Thisanswered a very good purpose as forage, and the rice grain was anaddition to the soldier's rations. No further resistance worthy of notewas met with, until within a few miles of Savannah. This place wasfound to be intrenched and garrisoned. Sherman proceeded at once on hisarrival to invest the place, and found that the enemy had placedtorpedoes in the ground, which were to explode when stepped on by man orbeast. One of these exploded under an officer's horse, blowing theanimal to pieces and tearing one of the legs of the officer so badlythat it had to be amputated. Sherman at once ordered his prisoners tothe front, moving them in a compact body in advance, to either explodethe torpedoes or dig them up. No further explosion took place.

On the 10th of December the siege of Savannah commenced. Sherman then,before proceeding any further with operations for the capture of theplace, started with some troops to open communication with our fleet,which he expected to find in the lower harbor or as near by as the fortsof the enemy would permit. In marching to the coast he encountered FortMcAllister, which it was necessary to reduce before the supplies hemight find on shipboard could be made available. Fort McAllister wassoon captured by an assault made by General Hazen's division.Communication was then established with the fleet. The capture ofSavannah then only occupied a few days, and involved no great loss oflife. The garrison, however, as we shall see, was enabled to escape bycrossing the river and moving eastward.

When Sherman had opened communication with the fleet he found there asteamer, which I had forwarded to him, carrying the accumulated mailsfor his army, also supplies which I supposed he would be in need of.General J. G. Foster, who commanded all the troops south of NorthCarolina on the Atlantic sea-board, visited General Sherman before hehad opened communication with the fleet, with the view of ascertainingwhat assistance he could be to him. Foster returned immediately to hisown headquarters at Hilton Head, for the purpose of sending Shermansiege guns, and also if he should find he had them to spare, supplies ofclothing, hard bread, etc., thinking that these articles might not befound outside. The mail on the steamer which I sent down, had beencollected by Colonel A. H. Markland of the Post Office Department, whowent in charge of it. On this same vessel I sent an officer of my staff(Lieutenant Dunn) with the following letter to General Sherman:

CITY POINT, VA., Dec. 3, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN, Commanding Armies near Savannah, Ga.

The little information gleaned from the Southern press, indicating nogreat obstacle to your progress, I have directed your mails (which hadbeen previously collected at Baltimore by Colonel Markland, SpecialAgent of the Post Office Department) to be sent as far as the blockadingsquadron off Savannah, to be forwarded to you as soon as heard from onthe coast.

Not liking to rejoice before the victory is assured, I abstain fromcongratulating you and those under your command, until bottom has beenstruck. I have never had a fear, however, for the result.

Since you left Atlanta, no very great progress has been made here. Theenemy has been closely watched though, and prevented from detachingagainst you. I think not one man has gone from here, except some twelveor fifteen hundred dismounted cavalry. Bragg has gone from Wilmington.I am trying to take advantage of his absence to get possession of thatplace. Owing to some preparations Admiral Porter and General Butler aremaking to blow up Fort Fisher (which, while hoping for the best, I donot believe a particle in), there is a delay in getting this expeditionoff. I hope they will be ready to start by the 7th, and that Bragg willnot have started back by that time.

In this letter I do not intend to give you anything like directions forfuture action, but will state a general idea I have, and will get yourviews after you have established yourself on the sea-coast. With yourveteran army I hope to get control of the only two through routes fromeast to west possessed by the enemy before the fall of Atlanta. Thecondition will be filled by holding Savannah and Augusta, or by holdingany other port to the east of Savannah and Branchville. If Wilmingtonfalls, a force from there can co-operate with you.

Thomas has got back into the defences of Nashville, with Hood close uponhim. Decatur has been abandoned, and so have all the roads except themain one leading to Chattanooga. Part of this falling back wasundoubtedly necessary and all of it may have been. It did not look so,however, to me. In my opinion, Thomas far outnumbers Hood in infantry.In cavalry, Hood has the advantage in morale and numbers. I hope yetthat Hood will be badly crippled if not destroyed. The general news youwill learn from the papers better than I could give it.

After all becomes quiet, and roads become so bad up here that there islikely to be a week or two when nothing can be done, I will run down thecoast to see you. If you desire it, I will ask Mrs. Sherman to go withme.

Yours truly, U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General

I quote this letter because it gives the reader a full knowledge of theevents of that period.

Sherman now (the 15th) returned to Savannah to complete its investmentand insure the surrender of the garrison. The country about Savannah islow and marshy, and the city was well intrenched from the river above tothe river below; and assaults could not be made except along acomparatively narrow causeway. For this reason assaults must haveresulted in serious destruction of life to the Union troops, with thechance of failing altogether. Sherman therefore decided upon a completeinvestment of the place. When he believed this investment completed, hesummoned the garrison to surrender. General Hardee, who was in command,replied in substance that the condition of affairs was not such asSherman had described. He said he was in full communication with hisdepartment and was receiving supplies constantly.

Hardee, however, was cut off entirely from all communication with thewest side of the river, and by the river itself to the north and south.On the South Carolina side the country was all rice fields, throughwhich it would have been impossible to bring supplies so that Hardee hadno possible communication with the outside world except by a dilapidatedplank road starting from the west bank of the river. Sherman, receivingthis reply, proceeded in person to a point on the coast, where GeneralFoster had troops stationed under General Hatch, for the purpose ofmaking arrangements with the latter officer to go through by one of thenumerous channels running inland along that part of the coast of SouthCarolina, to the plank road which General Hardee still possessed, andthus to cut him off from the last means he had of getting supplies, ifnot of communication.

While arranging for this movement, and before the attempt to execute theplan had been commenced, Sherman received information through one of hisstaff officers that the enemy had evacuated Savannah the night before.This was the night of the 21st of December. Before evacuating the placeHardee had blown up the navy yard. Some iron-clads had been destroyed,as well as other property that might have been valuable to us; but heleft an immense amount of stores untouched, consisting of cotton,railroad cars, workshops, numerous pieces of artillery, and severalthousand stands of small arms.

A little incident occurred, soon after the fall of Savannah, whichSherman relates in his Memoirs, and which is worthy of repetition.Savannah was one of the points where blockade runners entered. Shortlyafter the city fell into our possession, a blockade runner came sailingup serenely, not doubting but the Confederates were still in possession.It was not molested, and the captain did not find out his mistake untilhe had tied up and gone to the Custom House, where he found a newoccupant of the building, and made a less profitable disposition of hisvessel and cargo than he had expected.

As there was some discussion as to the authorship of Sherman's march tothe sea, by critics of his book when it appeared before the public, Iwant to state here that no question upon that subject was ever raisedbetween General Sherman and myself. Circumstances made the plan on whichSherman expected to act impracticable, as as commander of the forces henecessarily had to devise a new on which would give more promise ofsuccess: consequently he recommended the destruction of the railroadback to Chattanooga, and that he should be authorized then to move, ashe did, from Atlanta forward. His suggestions were finally approved,although they did not immediately find favor in Washington. Even whenit came to the time of starting, the greatest apprehension, as to thepropriety of the campaign he was about commence, filled the mind of thePresident, induced no doubt by his advisers. This went so far as tomove the President to ask me to suspend Sherman's march for a day or twountil I could think the matter over. My recollection is, though I findno record to show it, that out of deference to the President's wish Idid send a dispatch to Sherman asking him to wait a day or two, or elsethe connections between us were already cut so that I could not do so.However this may be, the question of who devised the plan of march fromAtlanta to Savannah is easily answered: it was clearly Sherman, and tohim also belongs the credit of its brilliant execution. It was hardlypossible that any one else than those on the spot could have devised anew plan of campaign to supersede one that did not promise success.(*40)

I was in favor of Sherman's plan from the time it was first submitted tome. My chief of staff, however, was very bitterly opposed to it and, asI learned subsequently, finding that he could not move me, he appealedto the authorities at Washington to stop it.

CHAPTER LX.

THE BATTLE OF FRANKLIN—THE BATTLE OF NASHVILLE.

As we have seen, Hood succeeded in crossing the Tennessee River betweenMuscle Shoals and the lower shoals at the end of October, 1864. Thomassent Schofield with the 4th and 23d corps, together with three brigadesof Wilson's cavalry to Pulaski to watch him. On the 17th of NovemberHood started and moved in such a manner as to avoid Schofield, therebyturning his position. Hood had with him three infantry corps, commandedrespectively by Stephen D. Lee, Stewart and Cheatham. These, with hiscavalry, numbered about forty-five thousand men. Schofield had, of allarms, about thirty thousand. Thomas's orders were, therefore, forSchofield to watch the movements of the enemy, but not to fight a battleif he could avoid it; but to fall back in case of an advance onNashville, and to fight the enemy, as he fell back, so as to retard theenemy's movements until he could be reinforced by Thomas himself. Assoon as Schofield saw this movement of Hood's, he sent his trains to therear, but did not fall back himself until the 21st, and then only toColumbia. At Columbia there was a slight skirmish but no battle. Fromthis place Schofield then retreated to Franklin. He had sent his wagonsin advance, and Stanley had gone with them with two divisions to protectthem. Cheatham's corps of Hood's army pursued the wagon train and wentinto camp at Spring Hill, for the night of the 29th.

Schofield retreating from Columbia on the 29th, passed Spring Hill,where Cheatham was bivouacked, during the night without molestation,though within half a mile of where the Confederates were encamped. Onthe morning of the 30th he had arrived at Franklin.

Hood followed closely and reached Franklin in time to make an attack thesame day. The fight was very desperate and sanguinary. The Confederategenerals led their men in the repeated charges, and the loss among themwas of unusual proportions. This fighting continued with great severityuntil long after the night closed in, when the Confederates drew off.General Stanley, who commanded two divisions of the Union troops, andwhose troops bore the brunt of the battle, was wounded in the fight, butmaintained his position.

The enemy's loss at Franklin, according to Thomas's report, was 1,750buried upon the field by our troops, 3,800 in the hospital, and 702prisoners besides. Schofield's loss, as officially reported, was 189killed, 1,033 wounded, and 1,104 captured and missing.

Thomas made no effort to reinforce Schofield at Franklin, as it seemedto me at the time he should have done, and fight out the battle there.He simply ordered Schofield to continue his retreat to Nashville, whichthe latter did during that night and the next day.

Thomas, in the meantime, was making his preparations to receive Hood.The road to Chattanooga was still well guarded with strong garrisons atMurfreesboro, Stevenson, Bridgeport and Chattanooga. Thomas hadpreviously given up Decatur and had been reinforced by A. J. Smith's twodivisions just returned from Missouri. He also had Steedman's divisionand R. S. Granger's, which he had drawn from the front. Hisquartermaster's men, about ten thousand in number, had been organizedand armed under the command of the chief quartermaster, General J. L.Donaldson, and placed in the fortifications under the generalsupervision of General Z. B. Tower, of the United States Engineers.

Hood was allowed to move upon Nashville, and to invest that place almostwithout interference. Thomas was strongly fortified in his position, sothat he would have been safe against the attack of Hood. He had troopsenough even to annihilate him in the open field. To me his delay wasunaccountable—sitting there and permitting himself to be invested, sothat, in the end, to raise the siege he would have to fight the enemystrongly posted behind fortifications. It is true the weather was verybad. The rain was falling and freezing as it fell, so that the groundwas covered with a sheet of ice, that made it very difficult to move.But I was afraid that the enemy would find means of moving, elude Thomasand manage to get north of the Cumberland River. If he did this, Iapprehended most serious results from the campaign in the North, and wasafraid we might even have to send troops from the East to head him offif he got there, General Thomas's movements being always so deliberateand so slow, though effective in defence.

I consequently urged Thomas in frequent dispatches sent from CityPoint(*41) to make the attack at once. The country was alarmed, theadministration was alarmed, and I was alarmed lest the very thing wouldtake place which I have just described that is, Hood would get north.It was all without avail further than to elicit dispatches from Thomassaying that he was getting ready to move as soon as he could, that hewas making preparations, etc. At last I had to say to General Thomasthat I should be obliged to remove him unless he acted promptly. Hereplied that he was very sorry, but he would move as soon as he could.

General Logan happening to visit City Point about that time, and knowinghim as a prompt, gallant and efficient officer, I gave him an order toproceed to Nashville to relieve Thomas. I directed him, however, not todeliver the order or publish it until he reached there, and if Thomashad moved, then not to deliver it at all, but communicate with me bytelegraph. After Logan started, in thinking over the situation, Ibecame restless, and concluded to go myself. I went as far asWashington City, when a dispatch was received from General Thomasannouncing his readiness at last to move, and designating the time ofhis movement. I concluded to wait until that time. He did move, and wassuccessful from the start. This was on the 15th of December. GeneralLogan was at Louisville at the time this movement was made, andtelegraphed the fact to Washington, and proceeded no farther himself.

The battle during the 15th was severe, but favorable to the Uniontroops, and continued until night closed in upon the combat. The nextday the battle was renewed. After a successful assault upon Hood's menin their intrenchments the enemy fled in disorder, routed and broken,leaving their dead, their artillery and small arms in great numbers onthe field, besides the wounded that were captured. Our cavalry hadfought on foot as infantry, and had not their horses with them; so thatthey were not ready to join in the pursuit the moment the enemyretreated. They sent back, however, for their horses, and endeavored toget to Franklin ahead of Hood's broken army by the Granny White Road,but too much time was consumed in getting started. They had got but afew miles beyond the scene of the battle when they found the enemy'scavalry dismounted and behind intrenchments covering the road on whichthey were advancing. Here another battle ensued, our men dismounting andfighting on foot, in which the Confederates were again routed and drivenin great disorder. Our cavalry then went into bivouac, and renewed thepursuit on the following morning. They were too late. The enemyalready had possession of Franklin, and was beyond them. It now became achase in which the Confederates had the lead.

Our troops continued the pursuit to within a few miles of Columbia,where they found the rebels had destroyed the railroad bridge as well asall other bridges over Duck River. The heavy rains of a few days beforehad swelled the stream into a mad torrent, impassable except on bridges.Unfortunately, either through a mistake in the wording of the order orotherwise, the pontoon bridge which was to have been sent by rail out toFranklin, to be taken thence with the pursuing column, had gone towardChattanooga. There was, consequently, a delay of some four days inbuilding bridges out of the remains of the old railroad bridge. Ofcourse Hood got such a start in this time that farther pursuit wasuseless, although it was continued for some distance, but without comingupon him again.

CHAPTER LXI.

EXPEDITION AGAINST FORT FISHER—ATTACK ON THE FORT—FAILURE OF THEEXPEDITION—SECOND EXPEDITION AGAINST THE FORT—CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER.

Up to January, 1865, the enemy occupied Fort Fisher, at the mouth ofCape Fear River and below the City of Wilmington. This port was ofimmense importance to the Confederates, because it formed theirprincipal inlet for blockade runners by means of which they brought infrom abroad such supplies and munitions of war as they could not produceat home. It was equally important to us to get possession of it, notonly because it was desirable to cut off their supplies so as to insurea speedy termination of the war, but also because foreign governments,particularly the British Government, were constantly threatening thatunless ours could maintain the blockade of that coast they should ceaseto recognize any blockade. For these reasons I determined, with theconcurrence of the Navy Department, in December, to send an expeditionagainst Fort Fisher for the purpose of capturing it.

To show the difficulty experienced in maintaining the blockade, I willmention a circumstance that took place at Fort Fisher after its fall.Two English blockade runners came in at night. Their commanders, notsupposing the fort had fallen, worked their way through all our fleetand got into the river unobserved. They then signalled the fort,announcing their arrival. There was a colored man in the fort who hadbeen there before and who understood these signals. He informed GeneralTerry what reply he should make to have them come in, and Terry did ashe advised. The vessels came in, their officers entirely unconsciousthat they were falling into the hands of the Union forces. Even afterthey were brought in to the fort they were entertained in conversationfor some little time before suspecting that the Union troops wereoccupying the fort. They were finally informed that their vessels andcargoes were prizes.

I selected General Weitzel, of the Army of the James, to go with theexpedition, but gave instructions through General Butler. He commandedthe department within whose geographical limits Fort Fisher wassituated, as well as Beaufort and other points on that coast held by ourtroops; he was, therefore, entitled to the right of fitting out theexpedition against Fort Fisher.

General Butler conceived the idea that if a steamer loaded heavily withpowder could be run up to near the shore under the fort and exploded, itwould create great havoc and make the capture an easy matter. AdmiralPorter, who was to command the naval squadron, seemed to fall in withthe idea, and it was not disapproved of in Washington; the navy wastherefore given the task of preparing the steamer for this purpose. Ihad no confidence in the success of the scheme, and so expressed myself;but as no serious harm could come of the experiment, and the authoritiesat Washington seemed desirous to have it tried, I permitted it. Thesteamer was sent to Beaufort, North Carolina, and was there loaded withpowder and prepared for the part she was to play in the reduction ofFort Fisher.

General Butler chose to go in command of the expedition himself, and wasall ready to sail by the 9th of December (1864). Very heavy stormsprevailed, however, at that time along that part of the sea-coast, andprevented him from getting off until the 13th or 14th. His advancearrived off Fort Fisher on the 15th. The naval force had been alreadyassembled, or was assembling, but they were obliged to run into Beaufortfor munitions, coal, etc.; then, too, the powder-boat was not yet fullyprepared. The fleet was ready to proceed on the 18th; but Butler, whohad remained outside from the 15th up to that time, now found himselfout of coal, fresh water, etc., and had to put into Beaufort toreplenish. Another storm overtook him, and several days more were lostbefore the army and navy were both ready at the same time to co-operate.

On the night of the 23d the powder-boat was towed in by a gunboat asnear to the fort as it was safe to run. She was then propelled by herown machinery to within about five hundred yards of the shore. Therethe clockwork, which was to explode her within a certain length of time,was set and she was abandoned. Everybody left, and even the vessels putout to sea to prevent the effect of the explosion upon them. At twoo'clock in the morning the explosion took place—and produced no moreeffect on the fort, or anything else on land, than the bursting of aboiler anywhere on the Atlantic Ocean would have done. Indeed when thetroops in Fort Fisher heard the explosion they supposed it was thebursting of a boiler in one of the Yankee gunboats.

Fort Fisher was situated upon a low, flat peninsula north of Cape FearRiver. The soil is sandy. Back a little the peninsula is very heavilywooded, and covered with fresh-water swamps. The fort ran across thispeninsula, about five hundred yards in width, and extended along the seacoast about thirteen hundred yards. The fort had an armament of 21 gunsand 3 mortars on the land side, and 24 guns on the sea front. At thattime it was only garrisoned by four companies of infantry, one lightbattery and the gunners at the heavy guns less than seven hundred menwith a reserve of less than a thousand men five miles up the peninsula.General Whiting of the Confederate army was in command, and GeneralBragg was in command of the force at Wilmington. Both commenced callingfor reinforcements the moment they saw our troops landing. The Governorof North Carolina called for everybody who could stand behind a parapetand shoot a gun, to join them. In this way they got two or threehundred additional men into Fort Fisher; and Hoke's division, five orsix thousand strong, was sent down from Richmond. A few of these troopsarrived the very day that Butler was ready to advance.

On the 24th the fleet formed for an attack in arcs of concentriccircles, their heavy iron-clads going in very close range, being nearestthe shore, and leaving intervals or spaces so that the outer vesselscould fire between them. Porter was thus enabled to throw one hundredand fifteen shells per minute. The damage done to the fort by theseshells was very slight, only two or three cannon being disabled in thefort. But the firing silenced all the guns by making it too hot for themen to maintain their positions about them and compelling them to seekshelter in the bomb-proofs.

On the next day part of Butler's troops under General Adelbert Ameseffected a landing out of range of the fort without difficulty. Thiswas accomplished under the protection of gunboats sent for the purpose,and under cover of a renewed attack upon the fort by the fleet. Theyformed a line across the peninsula and advanced, part going north andpart toward the fort, covering themselves as they did so. Curtis pushedforward and came near to Fort Fisher, capturing the small garrison atwhat was called the Flag Pond Battery. Weitzel accompanied him towithin a half a mile of the works. Here he saw that the fort had notbeen injured, and so reported to Butler, advising against an assault.Ames, who had gone north in his advance, captured 228 of the reserves.These prisoners reported to Butler that sixteen hundred of Hoke'sdivision of six thousand from Richmond had already arrived and the restwould soon be in his rear.

Upon these reports Butler determined to withdraw his troops from thepeninsula and return to the fleet. At that time there had not been aman on our side injured except by one of the shells from the fleet.Curtis had got within a few yards of the works. Some of his men hadsnatched a flag from the parapet of the fort, and others had taken ahorse from the inside of the stockade. At night Butler informed Porterof his withdrawal, giving the reasons above stated, and announced hispurpose as soon as his men could embark to start for Hampton Roads.Porter represented to him that he had sent to Beaufort for moreammunition. He could fire much faster than he had been doing, and wouldkeep the enemy from showing himself until our men were within twentyyards of the fort, and he begged that Butler would leave some bravefellows like those who had snatched the flag from the parapet and takenthe horse from the fort.

Butler was unchangeable. He got all his troops aboard, except Curtis'sbrigade, and started back. In doing this, Butler made a fearfulmistake. My instructions to him, or to the officer who went in commandof the expedition, were explicit in the statement that to effect alanding would be of itself a great victory, and if one should beeffected, the foothold must not be relinquished; on the contrary, aregular siege of the fort must be commenced and, to guard againstinterference by reason of storms, supplies of provisions must be laid inas soon as they could be got on shore. But General Butler seems to havelost sight of this part of his instructions, and was back at Fort Monroeon the 28th.

I telegraphed to the President as follows:

CITY POINT, VA., Dec. 28, 1864.—8.30 P.M.

The Wilmington expedition has proven a gross and culpable failure. Manyof the troops are back here. Delays and free talk of the object of theexpedition enabled the enemy to move troops to Wilmington to defeat it.After the expedition sailed from Fort Monroe, three days of fine weatherwere squandered, during which the enemy was without a force to protecthimself. Who is to blame will, I hope, be known.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

Porter sent dispatches to the Navy Department in which he complainedbitterly of having been abandoned by the army just when the fort wasnearly in our possession, and begged that our troops might be sent backagain to cooperate, but with a different commander. As soon as I heardthis I sent a messenger to Porter with a letter asking him to hold on.I assured him that I fully sympathized with him in his disappointment,and that I would send the same troops back with a different commander,with some reinforcements to offset those which the enemy had received.I told him it would take some little time to get transportation for theadditional troops; but as soon as it could be had the men should be ontheir way to him, and there would be no delay on my part. I selected A.H. Terry to command.

It was the 6th of January before the transports could be got ready andthe troops aboard. They sailed from Fortress Monroe on that day. Theobject and destination of the second expedition were at the time kept asecret to all except a few in the Navy Department and in the army towhom it was necessary to impart the information. General Terry had notthe slightest idea of where he was going or what he was to do. Hesimply knew that he was going to sea and that he had his orders withhim, which were to be opened when out at sea.

He was instructed to communicate freely with Porter and have entireharmony between army and navy, because the work before them wouldrequire the best efforts of both arms of service. They arrived offBeaufort on the 8th. A heavy storm, however, prevented a landing atForth Fisher until the 13th. The navy prepared itself for attack aboutas before, and the same time assisted the army in landing, this timefive miles away. Only iron-clads fired at first; the object being todraw the fire of the enemy's guns so as to ascertain their positions.This object being accomplished, they then let in their shots thick andfast. Very soon the guns were all silenced, and the fort showed evidentsigns of being much injured.

Terry deployed his men across the peninsula as had been done before, andat two o'clock on the following morning was up within two miles of thefort with a respectable abatis in front of his line. His artillery wasall landed on that day, the 14th. Again Curtis's brigade of Ame'sdivision had the lead. By noon they had carried an unfinished work lessthan a half mile from the fort, and turned it so as to face the otherway.

Terry now saw Porter and arranged for an assault on the following day.The two commanders arranged their signals so that they could communicatewith each other from time to time as they might have occasion. At daylight the fleet commenced its firing. The time agreed upon for theassault was the middle of the afternoon, and Ames who commanded theassaulting column moved at 3.30. Porter landed a force of sailors andmarines to move against the sea-front in co-operation with Ames'sassault. They were under Commander Breese of the navy. These sailorsand marines had worked their way up to within a couple of hundred yardsof the fort before the assault. The signal was given and the assaultwas made; but the poor sailors and marines were repulsed and very badlyhandled by the enemy, losing 280 killed and wounded out of their number.

Curtis's brigade charged successfully though met by a heavy fire, someof the men having to wade through the swamp up to their waists to reachthe fort. Many were wounded, of course, and some killed; but they soonreached the palisades. These they cut away, and pushed on through. Theother troops then came up, Pennypacker's following Curtis, and Bell, whocommanded the 3d brigade of Ames's division, following Pennypacker. Butthe fort was not yet captured though the parapet was gained.

The works were very extensive. The large parapet around the work wouldhave been but very little protection to those inside except when theywere close up under it. Traverses had, therefore, been run until reallythe work was a succession of small forts enclosed by a large one. Therebels made a desperate effort to hold the fort, and had to be drivenfrom these traverses one by one. The fight continued till long afternight. Our troops gained first one traverse and then another, and by 10o'clock at night the place was carried. During this engagement thesailors, who had been repulsed in their assault on the bastion, renderedthe best service they could by reinforcing Terry's northern line—thusenabling him to send a detachment to the assistance of Ames. The fleetkept up a continuous fire upon that part of the fort which was stilloccupied by the enemy. By means of signals they could be informed whereto direct their shots.

During the succeeding nights the enemy blew up Fort Caswell on theopposite side of Cape Fear River, and abandoned two extensive works onSmith's Island in the river.

Our captures in all amounted to 169 guns, besides small-arms, with fullsupplies of ammunition, and 2,083 prisoners. In addition to these,there were about 700 dead and wounded left there. We had lost 110killed and 536 wounded.

In this assault on Fort Fisher, Bell, one of the brigade commanders, waskilled, and two, Curtis and Pennypacker, were badly wounded.

Secretary Stanton, who was on his way back from Savannah, arrived offFort Fisher soon after it fell. When he heard the good news he promotedall the officers of any considerable rank for their conspicuousgallantry. Terry had been nominated for major-general, but had not beenconfirmed. This confirmed him; and soon after I recommended him for abrigadier-generalcy in the regular army, and it was given to him forthis victory.

CHAPTER LXII.

SHERMAN'S MARCH NORTH—SHERIDAN ORDERED TO LYNCHBURG—CANBY ORDERED TOMOVE AGAINST MOBILE—MOVEMENTS OF SCHOFIELD AND THOMAS—CAPTURE OFCOLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA—SHERMAN IN THE CAROLINAS.

When news of Sherman being in possession of Savannah reached the North,distinguished statesmen and visitors began to pour in to see him. Amongothers who went was the Secretary of War, who seemed much pleased at theresult of his campaign. Mr. Draper, the collector of customs of NewYork, who was with Mr. Stanton's party, was put in charge of the publicproperty that had been abandoned and captured. Savannah was then turnedover to General Foster's command to hold, so that Sherman might have hisown entire army free to operate as might be decided upon in the future.I sent the chief engineer of the Army of the Potomac (General Barnard)with letters to General Sherman. He remained some time with thegeneral, and when he returned brought back letters, one of whichcontained suggestions from Sherman as to what ought to be done inco-operation with him, when he should have started upon his marchnorthward.

I must not neglect to state here the fact that I had no idea originallyof having Sherman march from Savannah to Richmond, or even to NorthCarolina. The season was bad, the roads impassable for anything exceptsuch an army as he had, and I should not have thought of ordering such amove. I had, therefore, made preparations to collect transports tocarry Sherman and his army around to the James River by water, and soinformed him. On receiving this letter he went to work immediately toprepare for the move, but seeing that it would require a long time tocollect the transports, he suggested the idea then of marching up norththrough the Carolinas. I was only too happy to approve this; for ifsuccessful, it promised every advantage. His march through Georgia hadthoroughly destroyed all lines of transportation in that State, and hadcompletely cut the enemy off from all sources of supply to the west ofit. If North and South Carolina were rendered helpless so far ascapacity for feeding Lee's army was concerned, the Confederate garrisonat Richmond would be reduced in territory, from which to draw supplies,to very narrow limits in the State of Virginia; and, although thatsection of the country was fertile, it was already well exhausted ofboth forage and food. I approved Sherman's suggestion therefore atonce.

The work of preparation was tedious, because supplies, to load thewagons for the march, had to be brought from a long distance. Shermanwould now have to march through a country furnishing fewer provisionsthan that he had previously been operating in during his march to thesea. Besides, he was confronting, or marching toward, a force of theenemy vastly superior to any his troops had encountered on theirprevious march; and the territory through which he had to pass had nowbecome of such vast importance to the very existence of the Confederatearmy, that the most desperate efforts were to be expected in order tosave it.

Sherman, therefore, while collecting the necessary supplies to startwith, made arrangements with Admiral Dahlgren, who commanded that partof the navy on the South Carolina and Georgia coast, and General Foster,commanding the troops, to take positions, and hold a few points on thesea coast, which he (Sherman) designated, in the neighborhood ofCharleston.

This provision was made to enable him to fall back upon the sea coast,in case he should encounter a force sufficient to stop his onwardprogress. He also wrote me a letter, making suggestions as to what hewould like to have done in support of his movement farther north. Thisletter was brought to City Point by General Barnard at a time when Ihappened to be going to Washington City, where I arrived on the 21st ofJanuary. I cannot tell the provision I had already made to co-operatewith Sherman, in anticipation of his expected movement, better than bygiving my reply to this letter.

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, WASHINGTON, D. C., Jan. 21,1865.

MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN, Commanding Mill Div. of the Mississippi.

GENERAL:—Your letters brought by General Barnard were received at CityPoint, and read with interest. Not having them with me, however, Icannot say that in this I will be able to satisfy you on all points ofrecommendation. As I arrived here at one P.M., and must leave at sixP.M., having in the meantime spent over three hours with the Secretaryand General Halleck, I must be brief. Before your last request to haveThomas make a campaign into the heart of Alabama, I had orderedSchofield to Annapolis, Md., with his corps. The advance (six thousand)will reach the seaboard by the 23d, the remainder following as rapidlyas railroad transportation can be procured from Cincinnati. The corpsnumbers over twenty-one thousand men. I was induced to do this becauseI did not believe Thomas could possibly be got off before spring. Hispursuit of Hood indicated a sluggishness that satisfied me that he wouldnever do to conduct one of your campaigns. The command of the advanceof the pursuit was left to subordinates, whilst Thomas followed farbehind. When Hood had crossed the Tennessee, and those in pursuit hadreached it, Thomas had not much more than half crossed the State, fromwhence he returned to Nashville to take steamer for Eastport. He ispossessed of excellent judgment, great coolness and honesty, but he isnot good on a pursuit. He also reported his troops fagged, and that itwas necessary to equip up. This report and a determination to give theenemy no rest determined me to use his surplus troops elsewhere.

Thomas is still left with a sufficient force surplus to go to Selmaunder an energetic leader. He has been telegraphed to, to know whetherhe could go, and, if so, which of the several routes he would select.No reply is yet received. Canby has been ordered to act offensivelyfrom the sea-coast to the interior, towards Montgomery and Selma.Thomas's forces will move from the north at an early day, or some of histroops will be sent to Canby. Without further reinforcements Canby willhave a moving column of twenty thousand men.

Fort Fisher, you are aware, has been captured. We have a force there ofeight thousand effective. At New Bern about half the number. It isrumored, through deserters, that Wilmington also has fallen. I aminclined to believe the rumor, because on the 17th we knew the enemywere blowing up their works about Fort Caswell, and that on the 18thTerry moved on Wilmington.

If Wilmington is captured, Schofield will go there. If not, he will besent to New Bern. In either event, all the surplus forces at the twopoints will move to the interior toward Goldsboro' in co-operation withyour movements. From either point, railroad communications can be runout, there being here abundance of rolling-stock suited to the gauge ofthose roads.

There have been about sixteen thousand men sent from Lee's army south.Of these, you will have fourteen thousand against you, if Wilmington isnot held by the enemy, casualties at Fort Fisher having overtaken abouttwo thousand.

All these troops are subject to your orders as you come in communicationwith them. They will be so instructed. From about Richmond I willwatch Lee closely, and if he detaches much more, or attempts toevacuate, will pitch in. In the meantime, should you be brought to ahalt anywhere, I can send two corps of thirty thousand effective men toyour support, from the troops about Richmond.

To resume: Canby is ordered to operate to the interior from the Gulf.A. J. Smith may go from the north, but I think it doubtful. A force oftwenty-eight or thirty thousand will co-operate with you from New Bernor Wilmington, or both. You can call for reinforcements.

This will be handed you by Captain Hudson, of my staff, who will returnwith any message you may have for me. If there is anything I can do foryou in the way of having supplies on ship-board, at any point on thesea-coast, ready for you, let me know it.

Yours truly, U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.

I had written on the 18th of January to General Sherman, giving him thenews of the battle of Nashville. He was much pleased at the result,although, like myself, he had been very much disappointed at Thomas forpermitting Hood to cross the Tennessee River and nearly the whole Stateof Tennessee, and come to Nashville to be attacked there. He, however,as I had done, sent Thomas a warm congratulatory letter.

On the 10th of January, 1865, the resolutions of thanks to Sherman andhis army passed by Congress were approved.

Sherman, after the capture, at once had the debris cleared up,commencing the work by removing the piling and torpedoes from the river,and taking up all obstructions. He had then intrenched the city, sothat it could be held by a small garrison. By the middle of January allhis work was done, except the accumulation of supplies to commence hismovement with.

He proposed to move in two columns, one from Savannah, going along bythe river of the same name, and the other by roads farther east,threatening Charleston. He commenced the advance by moving his rightwing to Beaufort, South Carolina, then to Pocotaligo by water. Thiscolumn, in moving north, threatened Charleston, and, indeed, it was notdetermined at first that they would have a force visit Charleston.South Carolina had done so much to prepare the public mind of the Southfor secession, and had been so active in precipitating the decision ofthe question before the South was fully prepared to meet it, that therewas, at that time, a feeling throughout the North and also largelyentertained by people of the South, that the State of South Carolina,and Charleston, the hot-bed of secession in particular, ought to have aheavy hand laid upon them. In fact, nothing but the decisive resultsthat followed, deterred the radical portion of the people fromcondemning the movement, because Charleston had been left out. To passinto the interior would, however, be to insure the evacuation of thecity, and its possession by the navy and Foster's troops. It is sosituated between two formidable rivers that a small garrison could haveheld it against all odds as long as their supplies would hold out.Sherman therefore passed it by.

By the first of February all preparations were completed for the finalmarch, Columbia, South Carolina, being the first objective;Fayetteville, North Carolina, the second; and Goldsboro, orneighborhood, the final one, unless something further should bedetermined upon. The right wing went from Pocotaligo, and the left fromabout Hardeeville on the Savannah River, both columns taking a prettydirect route for Columbia. The cavalry, however, were to threatenCharleston on the right, and Augusta on the left.

On the 15th of January Fort Fisher had fallen, news of which Sherman hadreceived before starting out on his march. We already had New Bern andhad soon Wilmington, whose fall followed that of Fort Fisher; as didother points on the sea coast, where the National troops were now inreadiness to co-operate with Sherman's advance when he had passedFayetteville.

On the 18th of January I ordered Canby, in command at New Orleans, tomove against Mobile, Montgomery and Selma, Alabama, for the purpose ofdestroying roads, machine shops, etc. On the 8th of February I orderedSheridan, who was in the Valley of Virginia, to push forward as soon asthe weather would permit and strike the canal west of Richmond at orabout Lynchburg; and on the 20th I made the order to go to Lynchburg assoon as the roads would permit, saying: "As soon as it is possible totravel, I think you will have no difficulty about reaching Lynchburgwith a cavalry force alone. From there you could destroy the railroadand canal in every direction, so as to be of no further use to therebellion. * * * This additional raid, with one starting from EastTennessee under Stoneman, numbering about four or five thousand cavalry;one from Eastport, Mississippi, ten thousand cavalry; Canby, from MobileBay, with about eighteen thousand mixed troops—these three latterpushing for Tuscaloosa, Selma and Montgomery; and Sherman with a largearmy eating out the vitals of South Carolina—is all that will be wantedto leave nothing for the rebellion to stand upon. I would advise you toovercome great obstacles to accomplish this. Charleston was evacuatedon Tuesday last."

On the 27th of February, more than a month after Canby had received hisorders, I again wrote to him, saying that I was extremely anxious tohear of his being in Alabama. I notified him, also, that I had sentGrierson to take command of his cavalry, he being a very efficientofficer. I further suggested that Forrest was probably in Mississippi,and if he was there, he would find him an officer of great courage andcapacity whom it would be difficult to get by. I still further informedhim that Thomas had been ordered to start a cavalry force intoMississippi on the 20th of February, or as soon as possible thereafter.This force did not get off however.

All these movements were designed to be in support of Sherman's march,the object being to keep the Confederate troops in the West from leavingthere. But neither Canby nor Thomas could be got off in time. I hadsome time before depleted Thomas's army to reinforce Canby, for thereason that Thomas had failed to start an expedition which he had beenordered to send out, and to have the troops where they might dosomething. Canby seemed to be equally deliberate in all of hismovements. I ordered him to go in person; but he prepared to send adetachment under another officer. General Granger had got down to NewOrleans, in some way or other, and I wrote Canby that he must not puthim in command of troops. In spite of this he asked the War Departmentto assign Granger to the command of a corps.

Almost in despair of having adequate service rendered to the cause inthat quarter, I said to Canby: "I am in receipt of a dispatch * * *informing me that you have made requisitions for a construction corpsand material to build seventy miles of railroad. I have directed thatnone be sent. Thomas's army has been depleted to send a force to youthat they might be where they could act in winter, and at least detainthe force the enemy had in the West. If there had been any idea ofrepairing railroads, it could have been done much better from the North,where we already had the troops. I expected your movements to beco-operative with Sherman's last. This has now entirely failed. Iwrote to you long ago, urging you to push promptly and to live upon thecountry, and destroy railroads, machine shops, etc., not to build them.Take Mobile and hold it, and push your forces to the interior—toMontgomery and to Selma. Destroy railroads, rolling stock, andeverything useful for carrying on war, and, when you have done this,take such positions as can be supplied by water. By this means aloneyou can occupy positions from which the enemy's roads in the interiorcan be kept broken."

Most of these expeditions got off finally, but too late to render anyservice in the direction for which they were designed.

The enemy, ready to intercept his advance, consisted of Hardee's troopsand Wheeler's cavalry, perhaps less than fifteen thousand men in all;but frantic efforts were being made in Richmond, as I was sure would bethe case, to retard Sherman's movements. Everything possible was beingdone to raise troops in the South. Lee dispatched against Sherman thetroops which had been sent to relieve Fort Fisher, which, includingthose of the other defences of the harbor and its neighborhood,amounted, after deducting the two thousand killed, wounded and captured,to fourteen thousand men. After Thomas's victory at Nashville whatremained, of Hood's army were gathered together and forwarded as rapidlyas possible to the east to co-operate with these forces; and, finally,General Joseph E. Johnston, one of the ablest commanders of the Souththough not in favor with the administration (or at least with Mr.Davis), was put in command of all the troops in North and SouthCarolina.

Schofield arrived at Annapolis in the latter part of January, but beforesending his troops to North Carolina I went with him down the coast tosee the situation of affairs, as I could give fuller directions afterbeing on the ground than I could very well have given without. We soonreturned, and the troops were sent by sea to Cape Fear River. Both NewBern and Wilmington are connected with Raleigh by railroads which uniteat Goldsboro. Schofield was to land troops at Smithville, near themouth of the Cape Fear River on the west side, and move up to secure theWilmington and Charlotteville Railroad. This column took their pontoonbridges with them, to enable them to cross over to the island south ofthe city of Wilmington. A large body was sent by the north side toco-operate with them. They succeeded in taking the city on the 22d ofFebruary. I took the precaution to provide for Sherman's army, in casehe should be forced to turn in toward the sea coast before reachingNorth Carolina, by forwarding supplies to every place where he wasliable to have to make such a deflection from his projected march. Ialso sent railroad rolling stock, of which we had a great abundance, nowthat we were not operating the roads in Virginia. The gauge of theNorth Carolina railroads being the same as the Virginia railroads hadbeen altered too; these cars and locomotives were ready for use therewithout any change.

On the 31st of January I countermanded the orders given to Thomas tomove south to Alabama and Georgia. (I had previously reduced his forceby sending a portion of it to Terry.) I directed in lieu of thismovement, that he should send Stoneman through East Tennessee, and pushhim well down toward Columbia, South Carolina, in support of Sherman.Thomas did not get Stoneman off in time, but, on the contrary, when Ihad supposed he was on his march in support of Sherman I heard of hisbeing in Louisville, Kentucky. I immediately changed the order, anddirected Thomas to send him toward Lynchburg. Finally, however, on the12th of March, he did push down through the north-western end of SouthCarolina, creating some consternation. I also ordered Thomas to sendthe 4th corps (Stanley's) to Bull Gap and to destroy no more roads eastof that. I also directed him to concentrate supplies at Knoxville, witha view to a probable movement of his army through that way towardLynchburg.

Goldsboro is four hundred and twenty-five miles from Savannah. Sherman'smarch was without much incident until he entered Columbia, on the 17thof February. He was detained in his progress by having to repair andcorduroy the roads, and rebuild the bridges. There was constantskirmishing and fighting between the cavalry of the two armies, but thisdid not retard the advance of the infantry. Four days, also, were lostin making complete the destruction of the most important railroads southof Columbia; there was also some delay caused by the high water, and thedestruction of the bridges on the line of the road. A formidable riverhad to be crossed near Columbia, and that in the face of a smallgarrison under General Wade Hampton. There was but little delay,however, further than that caused by high water in the stream. Hamptonleft as Sherman approached, and the city was found to be on fire.

There has since been a great deal of acrimony displayed in discussionsof the question as to who set Columbia on fire. Sherman denies it on thepart of his troops, and Hampton denies it on the part of theConfederates. One thing is certain: as soon as our troops tookpossession, they at once proceeded to extinguish the flames to the bestof their ability with the limited means at hand. In any case, theexample set by the Confederates in burning the village of Chambersburg,Pa., a town which was not garrisoned, would seem to make a defence ofthe act of firing the seat of government of the State most responsiblefor the conflict then raging, not imperative.

The Confederate troops having vacated the city, the mayor tookpossession, and sallied forth to meet the commander of the Nationalforces for the purpose of surrendering the town, making terms for theprotection of property, etc. Sherman paid no attention at all to theoverture, but pushed forward and took the town without making anyconditions whatever with its citizens. He then, however, co-operatedwith the mayor in extinguishing the flames and providing for the peoplewho were rendered destitute by this destruction of their homes. When heleft there he even gave the mayor five hundred head of cattle to bedistributed among the citizens, to tide them over until some arrangementcould be made for their future supplies. He remained in Columbia untilthe roads, public buildings, workshops and everything that could beuseful to the enemy were destroyed. While at Columbia, Sherman learnedfor the first time that what remained of Hood's army was confrontinghim, under the command of General Beauregard.

Charleston was evacuated on the 18th of February, and Foster garrisonedthe place. Wilmington was captured on the 22d. Columbia and Cherawfarther north, were regarded as so secure from invasion that the wealthypeople of Charleston and Augusta had sent much of their valuableproperty to these two points to be stored. Among the goods sent therewere valuable carpets, tons of old Madeira, silverware, and furniture.I am afraid much of these goods fell into the hands of our troops.There was found at Columbia a large amount of powder, some artillery,small-arms and fixed ammunition. These, of course were among thearticles destroyed. While here, Sherman also learned of Johnston'srestoration to command. The latter was given, as already stated, alltroops in North and South Carolina. After the completion of thedestruction of public property about Columbia, Sherman proceeded on hismarch and reached Cheraw without any special opposition and withoutincident to relate. The railroads, of course, were thoroughly destroyedon the way. Sherman remained a day or two at Cheraw; and, finally, onthe 6th of March crossed his troops over the Pedee and advanced straightfor Fayetteville. Hardee and Hampton were there, and barely escaped.Sherman reached Fayetteville on the 11th of March. He had dispatchedscouts from Cheraw with letters to General Terry, at Wilmington, askinghim to send a steamer with some supplies of bread, clothing and otherarticles which he enumerated. The scouts got through successfully, anda boat was sent with the mail and such articles for which Sherman hadasked as were in store at Wilmington; unfortunately, however, thosestores did not contain clothing.

Four days later, on the 15th, Sherman left Fayetteville for Goldsboro.The march, now, had to be made with great caution, for he wasapproaching Lee's army and nearing the country that still remained opento the enemy. Besides, he was confronting all that he had had toconfront in his previous march up to that point, reinforced by thegarrisons along the road and by what remained of Hood's army. Franticappeals were made to the people to come in voluntarily and swell theranks of our foe. I presume, however, that Johnston did not have in allover 35,000 or 40,000 men. The people had grown tired of the war, anddesertions from the Confederate army were much more numerous than thevoluntary accessions.

There was some fighting at Averysboro on the 16th between Johnston'stroops and Sherman's, with some loss; and at Bentonville on the 19th and21st of March, but Johnston withdrew from the contest before the morningof the 22d. Sherman's loss in these last engagements in killed,wounded, and missing, was about sixteen hundred. Sherman's troops atlast reached Goldsboro on the 23d of the month and went into bivouac;and there his men were destined to have a long rest. Schofield wasthere to meet him with the troops which had been sent to Wilmington.

Sherman was no longer in danger. He had Johnston confronting him; butwith an army much inferior to his own, both in numbers and morale. Hehad Lee to the north of him with a force largely superior; but I washolding Lee with a still greater force, and had he made his escape andgotten down to reinforce Johnston, Sherman, with the reinforcements henow had from Schofield and Terry, would have been able to hold theConfederates at bay for an indefinite period. He was near the sea-shorewith his back to it, and our navy occupied the harbors. He had arailroad to both Wilmington and New Bern, and his flanks were thoroughlyprotected by streams, which intersect that part of the country anddeepen as they approach the sea. Then, too, Sherman knew that if Leeshould escape me I would be on his heels, and he and Johnson togetherwould be crushed in one blow if they attempted to make a stand. Withthe loss of their capital, it is doubtful whether Lee's army would haveamounted to much as an army when it reached North Carolina. Johnston'sarmy was demoralized by constant defeat and would hardly have made anoffensive movement, even if they could have been induced to remain onduty. The men of both Lee's and Johnston's armies were, like theirbrethren of the North, as brave as men can be; but no man is so bravethat he may not meet such defeats and disasters as to discourage him anddampen his ardor for any cause, no matter how just he deems it.

CHAPTER LXIII.

ARRIVAL OF THE PEACE COMMISSIONERS—LINCOLN AND THE PEACE COMMISSIONERS—AN ANECDOTE OF LINCOLN—THE WINTER BEFORE PETERSBURG—SHERIDAN DESTROYSTHE RAILROAD—GORDON CARRIES THE PICKET LINE—PARKE RECAPTURES THE LINE—THE LINE OF BATTLE OF WHITE OAK ROAD.

On the last of January, 1865, peace commissioners from the so-calledConfederate States presented themselves on our lines around Petersburg,and were immediately conducted to my headquarters at City Point. Theyproved to be Alexander H. Stephens, Vice-President of the Confederacy,Judge Campbell, Assistant-Secretary of War, and R. M. T. Hunt, formerlyUnited States Senator and then a member of the Confederate Senate.

It was about dark when they reached my headquarters, and I at onceconducted them to the steam Mary Martin, a Hudson River boat which wasvery comfortably fitted up for the use of passengers. I at oncecommunicated by telegraph with Washington and informed the Secretary ofWar and the President of the arrival of these commissioners and thattheir object was to negotiate terms of peace between he United Statesand, as they termed it, the Confederate Government. I was instructed toretain them at City Point, until the President, or some one whom hewould designate, should come to meet them. They remained several daysas guests on board the boat. I saw them quite frequently, though I haveno recollection of having had any conversation whatever with them on thesubject of their mission. It was something I had nothing to do with,and I therefore did not wish to express any views on the subject. Formy own part I never had admitted, and never was ready to admit, thatthey were the representatives of a GOVERNMENT. There had been too greata waste of blood and treasure to concede anything of the kind. As longas they remained there, however, our relations were pleasant and I foundthem all very agreeable gentlemen. I directed the captain to furnishthem with the best the boat afforded, and to administer to their comfortin every way possible. No guard was placed over them and no restrictionwas put upon their movements; nor was there any pledge asked that theywould not abuse the privileges extended to them. They were permitted toleave the boat when they felt like it, and did so, coming up on the bankand visiting me at my headquarters.

I had never met either of these gentlemen before the war, but knew themwell by reputation and through their public services, and I had been aparticular admirer of Mr. Stephens. I had always supposed that he was avery small man, but when I saw him in the dusk of the evening I was verymuch surprised to find so large a man as he seemed to be. When he gotdown on to the boat I found that he was wearing a coarse gray woollenovercoat, a manufacture that had been introduced into the South duringthe rebellion. The cloth was thicker than anything of the kind I hadever seen, even in Canada. The overcoat extended nearly to his feet,and was so large that it gave him the appearance of being anaverage-sized man. He took this off when he reached the cabin of theboat, and I was struck with the apparent change in size, in the coat andout of it.

After a few days, about the 2d of February, I received a dispatch fromWashington, directing me to send the commissioners to Hampton Roads tomeet the President and a member of the cabinet. Mr. Lincoln met themthere and had an interview of short duration. It was not a great whileafter they met that the President visited me at City Point. He spoke ofhis having met the commissioners, and said he had told them that therewould be no use in entering into any negotiations unless they wouldrecognize, first: that the Union as a whole must be forever preserved,and second: that slavery must be abolished. If they were willing toconcede these two points, then he was ready to enter into negotiationsand was almost willing to hand them a blank sheet of paper with hissignature attached for them to fill in the terms upon which they werewilling to live with us in the Union and be one people. He alwaysshowed a generous and kindly spirit toward the Southern people, and Inever heard him abuse an enemy. Some of the cruel things said aboutPresident Lincoln, particularly in the North, used to pierce him to theheart; but never in my presence did he evince a revengeful dispositionand I saw a great deal of him at City Point, for he seemed glad to getaway from the cares and anxieties of the capital.

Right here I might relate an anecdote of Mr. Lincoln. It was on theoccasion of his visit to me just after he had talked with the peacecommissioners at Hampton Roads. After a little conversation, he askedme if I had seen that overcoat of Stephens's. I replied that I had."Well," said he, "did you see him take it off?" I said yes. "Well,"said he, "didn't you think it was the biggest shuck and the littlest earthat ever you did see?" Long afterwards I told this story to theConfederate General J. B. Gordon, at the time a member of the Senate.He repeated it to Stephens, and, as I heard afterwards, Stephens laughedimmoderately at the simile of Mr. Lincoln.

The rest of the winter, after the departure of the peace commissioners,passed off quietly and uneventfully, except for two or three littleincidents. On one occasion during this period, while I was visitingWashington City for the purpose of conferring with the administration,the enemy's cavalry under General Wade Hampton, passing our extreme leftand then going to the south, got in east of us. Before their presencewas known, they had driven off a large number of beef cattle that weregrazing in that section. It was a fair capture, and they weresufficiently needed by the Confederates. It was only retaliating forwhat we had done, sometimes for many weeks at a time, when out ofsupplies taking what the Confederate army otherwise would have gotten.As appears in this book, on one single occasion we captured fivethousand head of cattle which were crossing the Mississippi River nearPort Hudson on their way from Texas to supply the Confederate army inthe East.

One of the most anxious periods of my experience during the rebellionwas the last few weeks before Petersburg. I felt that the situation ofthe Confederate army was such that they would try to make an escape atthe earliest practicable moment, and I was afraid, every morning, that Iwould awake from my sleep to hear that Lee had gone, and that nothingwas left but a picket line. He had his railroad by the way of Danvillesouth, and I was afraid that he was running off his men and all storesand ordnance except such as it would be necessary to carry with him forhis immediate defence. I knew he could move much more lightly and morerapidly than I, and that, if he got the start, he would leave me behindso that we would have the same army to fight again farther south and thewar might be prolonged another year.

I was led to this fear by the fact that I could not see how it waspossible for the Confederates to hold out much longer where they were.There is no doubt that Richmond would have been evacuated much soonerthan it was, if it had not been that it was the capital of the so-calledConfederacy, and the fact of evacuating the capital would, of course,have had a very demoralizing effect upon the Confederate army. When itwas evacuated (as we shall see further on), the Confederacy at oncebegan to crumble and fade away. Then, too, desertions were takingplace, not only among those who were with General Lee in theneighborhood of their capital, but throughout the whole Confederacy. Iremember that in a conversation with me on one occasion long prior tothis, General Butler remarked that the Confederates would find greatdifficulty in getting more men for their army; possibly adding, though Iam not certain as to this, "unless they should arm the slave."

The South, as we all knew, were conscripting every able-bodied manbetween the ages of eighteen and forty-five; and now they had passed alaw for the further conscription of boys from fourteen to eighteen,calling them the junior reserves, and men from forty-five to sixty to becalled the senior reserves. The latter were to hold the necessarypoints not in immediate danger, and especially those in the rear.General Butler, in alluding to this conscription, remarked that theywere thus "robbing both the cradle and the grave," an expression which Iafterwards used in writing a letter to Mr. Washburn.

It was my belief that while the enemy could get no more recruits theywere losing at least a regiment a day, taking it throughout the entirearmy, by desertions alone. Then by casualties of war, sickness, andother natural causes, their losses were much heavier. It was a merequestion of arithmetic to calculate how long they could hold out whilethat rate of depletion was going on. Of course long before their armywould be thus reduced to nothing the army which we had in the fieldwould have been able to capture theirs. Then too I knew from the greatnumber of desertions, that the men who had fought so bravely, sogallantly and so long for the cause which they believed in—and asearnestly, I take it, as our men believed in the cause for which theywere fighting—had lost hope and become despondent. Many of them weremaking application to be sent North where they might get employmentuntil the war was over, when they could return to their Southern homes.

For these and other reasons I was naturally very impatient for the timeto come when I could commence the spring campaign, which I thoroughlybelieved would close the war.

There were two considerations I had to observe, however, and whichdetained me. One was the fact that the winter had been one of heavyrains, and the roads were impassable for artillery and teams. It wasnecessary to wait until they had dried sufficiently to enable us to movethe wagon trains and artillery necessary to the efficiency of an armyoperating in the enemy's country. The other consideration was thatGeneral Sheridan with the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac wasoperating on the north side of the James River, having come down fromthe Shenandoah. It was necessary that I should have his cavalry with me,and I was therefore obliged to wait until he could join me south of theJames River.

Let us now take account of what he was doing.

On the 5th of March I had heard from Sheridan. He had met Early betweenStaunton and Charlottesville and defeated him, capturing nearly hisentire command. Early and some of his officers escaped by findingrefuge in the neighboring houses or in the woods.

On the 12th I heard from him again. He had turned east, to come toWhite House. He could not go to Lynchburg as ordered, because the rainshad been so very heavy and the streams were so very much swollen. Hehad a pontoon train with him, but it would not reach half way acrosssome of the streams, at their then stage of water, which he would haveto get over in going south as first ordered.

I had supplies sent around to White House for him, and kept the depotthere open until he arrived. We had intended to abandon it because theJames River had now become our base of supplies.

Sheridan had about ten thousand cavalry with him, divided into twodivisions commanded respectively by Custer and Devin. General Merrittwas acting as chief of cavalry. Sheridan moved very light, carryingonly four days' provisions with him, with a larger supply of coffee,salt and other small rations, and a very little else besides ammunition.They stopped at Charlottesville and commenced tearing up the railroadback toward Lynchburg. He also sent a division along the James RiverCanal to destroy locks, culverts etc. All mills and factories along thelines of march of his troops were destroyed also.

Sheridan had in this way consumed so much time that his making a marchto White House was now somewhat hazardous. He determined therefore tofight his way along the railroad and canal till he was as near toRichmond as it was possible to get, or until attacked. He did this,destroying the canal as far as Goochland, and the railroad to a point asnear Richmond as he could get. On the 10th he was at Columbia. Negroeshad joined his column to the number of two thousand or more, and theyassisted considerably in the work of destroying the railroads and thecanal. His cavalry was in as fine a condition as when he started,because he had been able to find plenty of forage. He had captured mostof Early's horses and picked up a good many others on the road. When hereached Ashland he was assailed by the enemy in force. He resistedtheir assault with part of his command, moved quickly across the Southand North Anna, going north, and reached White House safely on the 19th.

The time for Sherman to move had to be fixed with reference to the timehe could get away from Goldsboro where he then was. Supplies had to begot up to him which would last him through a long march, as there wouldprobably not be much to be obtained in the country through which hewould pass. I had to arrange, therefore, that he should start fromwhere he was, in the neighborhood of Goldsboro on the 18th of April, theearliest day at which he supposed he could be ready.

Sherman was anxious that I should wait where I was until he could comeup, and make a sure thing of it; but I had determined to move as soon asthe roads and weather would admit of my doing so. I had been tied downsomewhat in the matter of fixing any time at my pleasure for starting,until Sheridan, who was on his way from the Shenandoah Valley to joinme, should arrive, as both his presence and that of his cavalry werenecessary to the execution of the plans which I had in mind. However,having arrived at White House on the 19th of March, I was enabled tomake my plans.

Prompted by my anxiety lest Lee should get away some night before I wasaware of it, and having the lead of me, push into North Carolina to joinwith Johnston in attempting to crush out Sherman, I had, as early as the1st of the month of March, given instructions to the troops aroundPetersburg to keep a sharp lookout to see that such a movement shouldnot escape their notice, and to be ready strike at once if it wasundertaken.

It is now known that early in the month of March Mr. Davis and GeneralLee had a consultation about the situation of affairs in and about andPetersburg, and they both agreed places were no longer tenable for them,and that they must get away as soon as possible. They, too, werewaiting for dry roads, or a condition of the roads which would make itpossible to move.

General Lee, in aid of his plan of escape, and to secure a wider openingto enable them to reach the Danville Road with greater security than hewould have in the way the two armies were situated, determined upon anassault upon the right of our lines around Petersburg. The night of the24th of March was fixed upon for this assault, and General Gordon wasassigned to the execution of the plan. The point between Fort Stedmanand Battery No. 10, where our lines were closest together, was selectedas the point of his attack. The attack was to be made at night, and thetroops were to get possession of the higher ground in the rear wherethey supposed we had intrenchments, then sweep to the right and left,create a panic in the lines of our army, and force me to contract mylines. Lee hoped this would detain me a few days longer and give him anopportunity of escape. The plan was well conceived and the execution ofit very well done indeed, up to the point of carrying a portion of ourline.

Gordon assembled his troops under the cover of night, at the point atwhich they were to make their charge, and got possession of ourpicket-line, entirely without the knowledge of the troops inside of ourmain line of intrenchments; this reduced the distance he would have tocharge over to not much more than fifty yards. For some time before thedeserters had been coming in with great frequency, often bringing theirarms with them, and this the Confederate general knew. Taking advantageof this knowledge he sent his pickets, with their arms, creeping throughto ours as if to desert. When they got to our lines they at once tookpossession and sent our pickets to the rear as prisoners. In the mainline our men were sleeping serenely, as if in great security. This planwas to have been executed and much damage done before daylight; but thetroops that were to reinforce Gordon had to be brought from the northside of the James River and, by some accident on the railroad on theirway over, they were detained for a considerable time; so that it got tobe nearly daylight before they were ready to make the charge.

The charge, however, was successful and almost without loss, the enemypassing through our lines between Fort Stedman and Battery No. 10. Thenturning to the right and left they captured the fort and the battery,with all the arms and troops in them. Continuing the charge, they alsocarried batteries Eleven and Twelve to our left, which they turnedtoward City Point.

Meade happened to be at City Point that night, and this break in hisline cut him off from all communication with his headquarters. Parke,however, commanding the 9th corps when this breach took place,telegraphed the facts to Meade's headquarters, and learning that thegeneral was away, assumed command himself and with commendablepromptitude made all preparations to drive the enemy back. GeneralTidball gathered a large number of pieces of artillery and planted themin rear of the captured works so as to sweep the narrow space of groundbetween the lines very thoroughly. Hartranft was soon out with hisdivision, as also was Willcox. Hartranft to the right of the breachheaded the rebels off in that direction and rapidly drove them back intoFort Stedman. On the other side they were driven back into theintrenchments which they had captured, and batteries eleven and twelvewere retaken by Willcox early in the morning.

Parke then threw a line around outside of the captured fort andbatteries, and communication was once more established. The artilleryfire was kept up so continuously that it was impossible for theConfederates to retreat, and equally impossible for reinforcements tojoin them. They all, therefore, fell captives into our hands. Thiseffort of Lee's cost him about four thousand men, and resulted in theirkilling, wounding and capturing about two thousand of ours.

After the recapture of the batteries taken by the Confederates, ourtroops made a charge and carried the enemy's intrenched picket line,which they strengthened and held. This, in turn, gave us but a shortdistance to charge over when our attack came to be made a few dayslater.

The day that Gordon was making dispositions for this attack (24th ofMarch) I issued my orders for the movement to commence on the 29th.Ord, with three divisions of infantry and Mackenzie's cavalry, was tomove in advance on the night of the 27th, from the north side of theJames River and take his place on our extreme left, thirty miles away.He left Weitzel with the rest of the Army of the James to hold BermudaHundred and the north of the James River. The engineer brigade was tobe left at City Point, and Parke's corps in the lines about Petersburg.(*42)

Ord was at his place promptly. Humphreys and Warren were then on ourextreme left with the 2d and 5th corps. They were directed on thearrival of Ord, and on his getting into position in their places, tocross Hatcher's Run and extend out west toward Five Forks, the objectbeing to get into a position from which we could strike the South SideRailroad and ultimately the Danville Railroad. There was considerablefighting in taking up these new positions for the 2d and 5th corps, inwhich the Army of the James had also to participate somewhat, and thelosses were quite severe.

This was what was known as the Battle of White Oak Road.

CHAPTER LXIV.

INTERVIEW WITH SHERIDAN—GRAND MOVEMENT OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC—SHERIDAN'S ADVANCE ON FIVE FORKS—BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS—PARKE ANDWRIGHT STORM THE ENEMY'S LINE—BATTLES BEFORE PETERSBURG.

Sheridan reached City Point on the 26th day of March. His horses, ofcourse, were jaded and many of them had lost their shoes. A few days ofrest were necessary to recuperate the animals and also to have them shodand put in condition for moving. Immediately on General Sheridan'sarrival at City Point I prepared his instructions for the move which Ihad decided upon. The movement was to commence on the 29th of themonth.

After reading the instructions I had given him, Sheridan walked out ofmy tent, and I followed to have some conversation with him by himself—not in the presence of anybody else, even of a member of my staff. Inpreparing his instructions I contemplated just what took place; that isto say, capturing Five Forks, driving the enemy from Petersburg andRichmond and terminating the contest before separating from the enemy.But the Nation had already become restless and discouraged at theprolongation of the war, and many believed that it would never terminateexcept by compromise. Knowing that unless my plan proved an entiresuccess it would be interpreted as a disastrous defeat, I provided inthese instructions that in a certain event he was to cut loose from theArmy of the Potomac and his base of supplies, and living upon thecountry proceed south by the way of the Danville Railroad, or near it,across the Roanoke, get in the rear of Johnston, who was guarding thatroad, and cooperate with Sherman in destroying Johnston; then with thesecombined forces to help carry out the instructions which Sherman alreadyhad received, to act in cooperation with the armies around Petersburgand Richmond.

I saw that after Sheridan had read his instructions he seemed somewhatdisappointed at the idea, possibly, of having to cut loose again fromthe Army of the Potomac, and place himself between the two main armiesof the enemy. I said to him: "General, this portion of yourinstructions I have put in merely as a blind;" and gave him the reasonfor doing so, heretofore described. I told him that, as a matter offact, I intended to close the war right here, with this movement, andthat he should go no farther. His face at once brightened up, andslapping his hand on his leg he said: "I am glad to hear it, and we cando it."

Sheridan was not however to make his movement against Five Forks untilhe got further instructions from me.

One day, after the movement I am about to describe had commenced, andwhen his cavalry was on our extreme left and far to the rear, south,Sheridan rode up to where my headquarters were then established, atDabney's Mills. He met some of my staff officers outside, and washighly jubilant over the prospects of success, giving reasons why hebelieved this would prove the final and successful effort. Although mychief-of-staff had urged very strongly that we return to our positionabout City Point and in the lines around Petersburg, he asked Sheridanto come in to see me and say to me what he had been saying to them.Sheridan felt a little modest about giving his advice where it had notbeen asked; so one of my staff came in and told me that Sheridan hadwhat they considered important news, and suggested that I send for him.I did so, and was glad to see the spirit of confidence with which he wasimbued. Knowing as I did from experience, of what great value thatfeeling of confidence by a commander was, I determined to make amovement at once, although on account of the rains which had fallenafter I had started out the roads were still very heavy. Orders weregiven accordingly.

Finally the 29th of March came, and fortunately there having been a fewdays free from rain, the surface of the ground was dry, givingindications that the time had come when we could move. On that date Imoved out with all the army available after leaving sufficient force tohold the line about Petersburg. It soon set in raining again however,and in a very short time the roads became practically impassable forteams, and almost so for cavalry. Sometimes a horse or mule would bestanding apparently on firm ground, when all at once one foot wouldsink, and as he commenced scrambling to catch himself all his feet wouldsink and he would have to be drawn by hand out of the quicksands socommon in that part of Virginia and other southern States. It becamenecessary therefore to build corduroy roads every foot of the way as weadvanced, to move our artillery upon. The army had become so accustomedto this kind of work, and were so well prepared for it, that it was donevery rapidly. The next day, March 30th, we had made sufficient progressto the south-west to warrant me in starting Sheridan with his cavalryover by Dinwiddie with instructions to then come up by the road leadingnorth-west to Five Forks, thus menacing the right of Lee's line.

This movement was made for the purpose of extending our lines to thewest as far as practicable towards the enemy's extreme right, or FiveForks. The column moving detached from the army still in the trencheswas, excluding the cavalry, very small. The forces in the trenches werethemselves extending to the left flank. Warren was on the extreme leftwhen the extension began, but Humphreys was marched around later andthrown into line between him and Five Forks.

My hope was that Sheridan would be able to carry Five Forks, get on theenemy's right flank and rear, and force them to weaken their centre toprotect their right so that an assault in the centre might besuccessfully made. General Wright's corps had been designated to makethis assault, which I intended to order as soon as information reachedme of Sheridan's success. He was to move under cover as close to theenemy as he could get.

It is natural to suppose that Lee would understand my design to be toget up to the South Side and ultimately to the Danville Railroad, assoon as he had heard of the movement commenced on the 29th. These roadswere so important to his very existence while he remained in Richmondand Petersburg, and of such vital importance to him even in case ofretreat, that naturally he would make most strenuous efforts to defendthem. He did on the 30th send Pickett with five brigades to reinforceFive Forks. He also sent around to the right of his army some two orthree other divisions, besides directing that other troops be held inreadiness on the north side of the James River to come over on call. Hecame over himself to superintend in person the defence of his rightflank.

Sheridan moved back to Dinwiddie Court-House on the night of the 30th,and then took a road leading north-west to Five Forks. He had only hiscavalry with him. Soon encountering the rebel cavalry he met with avery stout resistance. He gradually drove them back however until inthe neighborhood of Five Forks. Here he had to encounter other troopsbesides those he had been contending with, and was forced to give way.

In this condition of affairs he notified me of what had taken place andstated that he was falling back toward Dinwiddie gradually and slowly,and asked me to send Wright's corps to his assistance. I replied to himthat it was impossible to send Wright's corps because that corps wasalready in line close up to the enemy, where we should want to assaultwhen the proper time came, and was besides a long distance from him; butthe 2d (Humphreys's) and 5th (Warren's) corps were on our extreme leftand a little to the rear of it in a position to threaten the left flankof the enemy at Five Forks, and that I would send Warren.

Accordingly orders were sent to Warren to move at once that night (the31st) to Dinwiddie Court House and put himself in communication withSheridan as soon as possible, and report to him. He was very slow inmoving, some of his troops not starting until after 5 o'clock nextmorning. When he did move it was done very deliberately, and onarriving at Gravelly Run he found the stream swollen from the recentrains so that he regarded it as not fordable. Sheridan of course knewof his coming, and being impatient to get the troops up as soon aspossible, sent orders to him to hasten. He was also hastened or atleast ordered to move up rapidly by General Meade. He now felt that hecould not cross that creek without bridges, and his orders were changedto move so as to strike the pursuing enemy in flank or get in theirrear; but he was so late in getting up that Sheridan determined to moveforward without him. However, Ayres's division of Warren's corpsreached him in time to be in the fight all day, most of the timeseparated from the remainder of the 5th corps and fighting directlyunder Sheridan.

Warren reported to Sheridan about 11 o'clock on the 1st, but the wholeof his troops were not up so as to be much engaged until late in theafternoon. Griffin's division in backing to get out of the way of asevere cross fire of the enemy was found marching away from thefighting. This did not continue long, however; the division was broughtback and with Ayres's division did most excellent service during theday. Crawford's division of the same corps had backed still fartheroff, and although orders were sent repeatedly to bring it up, it waslate before it finally got to where it could be of material assistance.Once there it did very excellent service.

Sheridan succeeded by the middle of the afternoon or a little later, inadvancing up to the point from which to make his designed assault uponFive Forks itself. He was very impatient to make the assault and haveit all over before night, because the ground he occupied would beuntenable for him in bivouac during the night. Unless the assault wasmade and was successful, he would be obliged to return to DinwiddieCourt-House, or even further than that for the night.

It was at this junction of affairs that Sheridan wanted to getCrawford's division in hand, and he also wanted Warren. He sent staffofficer after staff officer in search of Warren, directing that generalto report to him, but they were unable to find him. At all eventsSheridan was unable to get that officer to him. Finally he wenthimself. He issued an order relieving Warren and assigning Griffin tothe command of the 5th corps. The troops were then brought up and theassault successfully made.

I was so much dissatisfied with Warren's dilatory movements in thebattle of White Oak Road and in his failure to reach Sheridan in time,that I was very much afraid that at the last moment he would failSheridan. He was a man of fine intelligence, great earnestness, quickperception, and could make his dispositions as quickly as any officer,under difficulties where he was forced to act. But I had beforediscovered a defect which was beyond his control, that was veryprejudicial to his usefulness in emergencies like the one just beforeus. He could see every danger at a glance before he had encountered it.He would not only make preparations to meet the danger which mightoccur, but he would inform his commanding officer what others should dowhile he was executing his move.

I had sent a staff officer to General Sheridan to call his attention tothese defects, and to say that as much as I liked General Warren, nowwas not a time when we could let our personal feelings for any one standin the way of success; and if his removal was necessary to success, notto hesitate. It was upon that authorization that Sheridan removedWarren. I was very sorry that it had been done, and regretted stillmore that I had not long before taken occasion to assign him to anotherfield of duty.

It was dusk when our troops under Sheridan went over the parapets of theenemy. The two armies were mingled together there for a time in suchmanner that it was almost a question which one was going to demand thesurrender of the other. Soon, however, the enemy broke and ran in everydirection; some six thousand prisoners, besides artillery and small-armsin large quantities, falling into our hands. The flying troops werepursued in different directions, the cavalry and 5th corps underSheridan pursuing the larger body which moved north-west.

This pursuit continued until about nine o'clock at night, when Sheridanhalted his troops, and knowing the importance to him of the part of theenemy's line which had been captured, returned, sending the 5th corpsacross Hatcher's Run to just south-west of Petersburg, and facing themtoward it. Merritt, with the cavalry, stopped and bivouacked west ofFive Forks.

This was the condition which affairs were in on the night of the 1st ofApril. I then issued orders for an assault by Wright and Parke at fouro'clock on the morning of the 2d. I also ordered the 2d corps, GeneralHumphreys, and General Ord with the Army of the James, on the left, tohold themselves in readiness to take any advantage that could be takenfrom weakening in their front.

I notified Mr. Lincoln at City Point of the success of the day; in factI had reported to him during the day and evening as I got news, becausehe was so much interested in the movements taking place that I wanted torelieve his mind as much as I could. I notified Weitzel on the northside of the James River, directing him, also, to keep close up to theenemy, and take advantage of the withdrawal of troops from there topromptly enter the city of Richmond.

I was afraid that Lee would regard the possession of Five Forks as of somuch importance that he would make a last desperate effort to retake it,risking everything upon the cast of a single die. It was for thisreason that I had ordered the assault to take place at once, as soon asI had received the news of the capture of Five Forks. The corpscommanders, however, reported that it was so dark that the men could notsee to move, and it would be impossible to make the assault then. But wekept up a continuous artillery fire upon the enemy around the whole lineincluding that north of the James River, until it was light enough tomove, which was about a quarter to five in the morning.

At that hour Parke's and Wright's corps moved out as directed, brushedthe abatis from their front as they advanced under a heavy fire ofmusketry and artillery, and went without flinching directly on till theymounted the parapets and threw themselves inside of the enemy's line.Parke, who was on the right, swept down to the right and captured a veryconsiderable length of line in that direction, but at that point theouter was so near the inner line which closely enveloped the city ofPetersburg that he could make no advance forward and, in fact, had avery serious task to turn the lines which he had captured to the defenceof his own troops and to hold them; but he succeeded in this.

Wright swung around to his left and moved to Hatcher's Run, sweepingeverything before him. The enemy had traverses in rear of his capturedline, under cover of which he made something of a stand, from one toanother, as Wright moved on; but the latter met no serious obstacle. Asyou proceed to the left the outer line becomes gradually much fartherfrom the inner one, and along about Hatcher's Run they must be nearlytwo miles apart. Both Parke and Wright captured a considerable amount ofartillery and some prisoners—Wright about three thousand of them.

In the meantime Ord and Humphreys, in obedience to the instructions theyhad received, had succeeded by daylight, or very early in the morning,in capturing the intrenched picket-lines in their front; and beforeWright got up to that point, Ord had also succeeded in getting inside ofthe enemy's intrenchments. The second corps soon followed; and theouter works of Petersburg were in the hands of the National troops,never to be wrenched from them again. When Wright reached Hatcher'sRun, he sent a regiment to destroy the South Side Railroad just outsideof the city.

My headquarters were still at Dabney's saw-mills. As soon as I receivedthe news of Wright's success, I sent dispatches announcing the fact toall points around the line, including the troops at Bermuda Hundred andthose on the north side of the James, and to the President at CityPoint. Further dispatches kept coming in, and as they did I sent theadditional news to these points. Finding at length that they were allin, I mounted my horse to join the troops who were inside the works.When I arrived there I rode my horse over the parapet just as Wright'sthree thousand prisoners were coming out. I was soon joined inside byGeneral Meade and his staff.

Lee made frantic efforts to recover at least part of the lost ground.Parke on our right was repeatedly assaulted, but repulsed every effort.Before noon Longstreet was ordered up from the north side of the JamesRiver thus bringing the bulk of Lee's army around to the support of hisextreme right. As soon as I learned this I notified Weitzel anddirected him to keep up close to the enemy and to have Hartsuff,commanding the Bermuda Hundred front, to do the same thing, and if theyfound any break to go in; Hartsuff especially should do so, for thiswould separate Richmond and Petersburg.

Sheridan, after he had returned to Five Forks, swept down to Petersburg,coming in on our left. This gave us a continuous line from theAppomattox River below the city to the same river above. At eleveno'clock, not having heard from Sheridan, I reinforced Parke with twobrigades from City Point. With this additional force he completed hiscaptured works for better defence, and built back from his right, so asto protect his flank. He also carried in and made an abatis betweenhimself and the enemy. Lee brought additional troops and artilleryagainst Parke even after this was done, and made several assaults withvery heavy losses.

The enemy had in addition to their intrenched line close up toPetersburg, two enclosed works outside of it, Fort Gregg and FortWhitworth. We thought it had now become necessary to carry them byassault. About one o'clock in the day, Fort Gregg was assaulted byFoster's division of the 24th corps (Gibbon's), supported by twobrigades from Ord's command. The battle was desperate and the Nationaltroops were repulsed several times; but it was finally carried, andimmediately the troops in Fort Whitworth evacuated the place. The gunsof Fort Gregg were turned upon the retreating enemy, and the commandingofficer with some sixty of the men of Fort Whitworth surrendered.

I had ordered Miles in the morning to report to Sheridan. In moving toexecute this order he came upon the enemy at the intersection of theWhite Oak Road and the Claiborne Road. The enemy fell back toSutherland Station on the South Side Road and were followed by Miles.This position, naturally a strong and defensible one, was also stronglyintrenched. Sheridan now came up and Miles asked permission from him tomake the assault, which Sheridan gave. By this time Humphreys had gotthrough the outer works in his front, and came up also and assumedcommand over Miles, who commanded a division in his corps. I had sentan order to Humphreys to turn to his right and move towards Petersburg.This order he now got, and started off, thus leaving Miles alone. Thelatter made two assaults, both of which failed, and he had to fall backa few hundred yards.

Hearing that Miles had been left in this position, I directed Humphreysto send a division back to his relief. He went himself.

Sheridan before starting to sweep down to Petersburg had sent Merrittwith his cavalry to the west to attack some Confederate cavalry that hadassembled there. Merritt drove them north to the Appomattox River.Sheridan then took the enemy at Sutherland Station on the reverse sidefrom where Miles was, and the two together captured the place, with alarge number of prisoners and some pieces of artillery, and put theremainder, portions of three Confederate corps, to flight. Sheridanfollowed, and drove them until night, when further pursuit was stopped.Miles bivouacked for the night on the ground which he with Sheridan hadcarried so handsomely by assault. I cannot explain the situation herebetter than by giving my dispatch to City Point that evening:

BOYDTON ROAD, NEAR PETERSBURG, April 2, 1865.—4.40 P.M.

COLONEL T. S. BOWERS, City Point.

We are now up and have a continuous line of troops, and in a few hourswill be intrenched from the Appomattox below Petersburg to the riverabove. Heth's and Wilcox's divisions, such part of them as were notcaptured, were cut off from town, either designedly on their part orbecause they could not help it. Sheridan with the cavalry and 5th corpsis above them. Miles's division, 2d corps, was sent from the White OakRoad to Sutherland Station on the South Side Railroad, where he metthem, and at last accounts was engaged with them. Not knowing whetherSheridan would get up in time, General Humphreys was sent with anotherdivision from here. The whole captures since the army started outgunning will amount to not less than twelve thousand men, and probablyfifty pieces of artillery. I do not know the number of men and gunsaccurately however. * * * I think the President might come out and payus a visit tomorrow.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

During the night of April 2d our line was intrenched from the riverabove to the river below. I ordered a bombardment to be commenced thenext morning at five A.M., to be followed by an assault at six o'clock;but the enemy evacuated Petersburg early in the morning.

CHAPTER LXV.

THE CAPTURE OF PETERSBURG—MEETING PRESIDENT LINCOLN IN PETERSBURG—THECAPTURE OF RICHMOND—PURSUING THE ENEMY—VISIT TO SHERIDAN AND MEADE.

General Meade and I entered Petersburg on the morning of the 3d and tooka position under cover of a house which protected us from the enemy'smusketry which was flying thick and fast there. As we wouldoccasionally look around the corner we could see the streets and theAppomattox bottom, presumably near the bridge, packed with theConfederate army. I did not have artillery brought up, because I wassure Lee was trying to make his escape, and I wanted to push immediatelyin pursuit. At all events I had not the heart to turn the artilleryupon such a mass of defeated and fleeing men, and I hoped to capturethem soon.

Soon after the enemy had entirely evacuated Petersburg, a man came inwho represented himself to be an engineer of the Army of NorthernVirginia. He said that Lee had for some time been at work preparing astrong enclosed intrenchment, into which he would throw himself whenforced out of Petersburg, and fight his final battle there; that he wasactually at that time drawing his troops from Richmond, and falling backinto this prepared work. This statement was made to General Meade andmyself when we were together. I had already given orders for themovement up the south side of the Appomattox for the purpose of headingoff Lee; but Meade was so much impressed by this man's story that hethought we ought to cross the Appomattox there at once and move againstLee in his new position. I knew that Lee was no fool, as he would havebeen to have put himself and his army between two formidable streamslike the James and Appomattox rivers, and between two such armies asthose of the Potomac and the James. Then these streams coming togetheras they did to the east of him, it would be only necessary to close upin the west to have him thoroughly cut off from all supplies orpossibility of reinforcement. It would only have been a question ofdays, and not many of them, if he had taken the position assigned to himby the so-called engineer, when he would have been obliged to surrenderhis army. Such is one of the ruses resorted to in war to deceive yourantagonist. My judgment was that Lee would necessarily have to evacuateRichmond, and that the only course for him to pursue would be to followthe Danville Road. Accordingly my object was to secure a point on thatroad south of Lee, and I told Meade this. He suggested that if Lee wasgoing that way we would follow him. My reply was that we did not wantto follow him; we wanted to get ahead of him and cut him off, and if hewould only stay in the position he (Meade) believed him to be in at thattime, I wanted nothing better; that when we got in possession of theDanville Railroad, at its crossing of the Appomattox River, if we stillfound him between the two rivers, all we had to do was to move eastwardand close him up. That we would then have all the advantage we couldpossibly have by moving directly against him from Petersburg, even if heremained in the position assigned him by the engineer officer.

I had held most of the command aloof from the intrenchments, so as to
start them out on the Danville Road early in the morning, supposing that
Lee would be gone during the night. During the night I strengthened
Sheridan by sending him Humphreys's corps.

Lee, as we now know, had advised the authorities at Richmond, during theday, of the condition of affairs, and told them it would be impossiblefor him to hold out longer than night, if he could hold out that long.Davis was at church when he received Lee's dispatch. The congregationwas dismissed with the notice that there would be no evening service.The rebel government left Richmond about two o'clock in the afternoon ofthe 2d.

At night Lee ordered his troops to assemble at Amelia Court House, hisobject being to get away, join Johnston if possible, and to try to crushSherman before I could get there. As soon as I was sure of this Inotified Sheridan and directed him to move out on the Danville Railroadto the south side of the Appomattox River as speedily as possible. Hereplied that he already had some of his command nine miles out. I thenordered the rest of the Army of the Potomac under Meade to follow thesame road in the morning. Parke's corps followed by the same road, andthe Army of the James was directed to follow the road which ranalongside of the South Side Railroad to Burke's Station, and to repairthe railroad and telegraph as they proceeded. That road was a 5 feetgauge, while our rolling stock was all of the 4 feet 8 1/2 inches gauge;consequently the rail on one side of the track had to be taken upthroughout the whole length and relaid so as to conform to the gauge ofour cars and locomotives.

Mr. Lincoln was at City Point at the time, and had been for some days.I would have let him know what I contemplated doing, only while I felt astrong conviction that the move was going to be successful, yet it mightnot prove so; and then I would have only added another to the manydisappointments he had been suffering for the past three years. Butwhen we started out he saw that we were moving for a purpose, andbidding us Godspeed, remained there to hear the result.

The next morning after the capture of Petersburg, I telegraphed Mr.Lincoln asking him to ride out there and see me, while I would await hisarrival. I had started all the troops out early in the morning, so thatafter the National army left Petersburg there was not a soul to be seen,not even an animal in the streets. There was absolutely no one there,except my staff officers and, possibly, a small escort of cavalry. Wehad selected the piazza of a deserted house, and occupied it until thePresident arrived.

About the first thing that Mr. Lincoln said to me, after warmcongratulations for the victory, and thanks both to myself and to thearmy which had accomplished it, was: "Do you know, general, that I havehad a sort of a sneaking idea for some days that you intended to dosomething like this." Our movements having been successful up to thispoint, I no longer had any object in concealing from the President allmy movements, and the objects I had in view. He remained for some daysnear City Point, and I communicated with him frequently and fully bytelegraph.

Mr. Lincoln knew that it had been arranged for Sherman to join me at afixed time, to co-operate in the destruction of Lee's army. I told himthat I had been very anxious to have the Eastern armies vanquish theirold enemy who had so long resisted all their repeated and gallantattempts to subdue them or drive them from their capital. The Westernarmies had been in the main successful until they had conquered all theterritory from the Mississippi River to the State of North Carolina, andwere now almost ready to knock at the back door of Richmond, askingadmittance. I said to him that if the Western armies should be evenupon the field, operating against Richmond and Lee, the credit would begiven to them for the capture, by politicians and non-combatants fromthe section of country which those troops hailed from. It might lead todisagreeable bickerings between members of Congress of the East andthose of the West in some of their debates. Western members might bethrowing it up to the members of the East that in the suppression of therebellion they were not able to capture an army, or to accomplish muchin the way of contributing toward that end, but had to wait until theWestern armies had conquered all the territory south and west of them,and then come on to help them capture the only army they had beenengaged with.

Mr. Lincoln said he saw that now, but had never thought of it before,because his anxiety was so great that he did not care where the aid camefrom so the work was done.

The Army of the Potomac has every reason to be proud of its four years'record in the suppression of the rebellion. The army it had to fightwas the protection to the capital of a people which was attempting tofound a nation upon the territory of the United States. Its loss wouldbe the loss of the cause. Every energy, therefore, was put forth by theConfederacy to protect and maintain their capital. Everything elsewould go if it went. Lee's army had to be strengthened to enable it tomaintain its position, no matter what territory was wrested from theSouth in another quarter.

I never expected any such bickering as I have indicated, between thesoldiers of the two sections; and, fortunately, there has been nonebetween the politicians. Possibly I am the only one who thought of theliability of such a state of things in advance.

When our conversation was at an end Mr. Lincoln mounted his horse andstarted on his return to City Point, while I and my staff started tojoin the army, now a good many miles in advance. Up to this time I hadnot received the report of the capture of Richmond.

Soon after I left President Lincoln I received a dispatch from GeneralWeitzel which notified me that he had taken possession of Richmond atabout 8.15 o'clock in the morning of that day, the 3d, and that he hadfound the city on fire in two places. The city was in the most utterconfusion. The authorities had taken the precaution to empty all theliquor into the gutter, and to throw out the provisions which theConfederate government had left, for the people to gather up. The cityhad been deserted by the authorities, civil and military, without anynotice whatever that they were about to leave. In fact, up to the veryhour of the evacuation the people had been led to believe that Lee hadgained an important victory somewhere around Petersburg.

Weitzel's command found evidence of great demoralization in Lee's army,there being still a great many men and even officers in the town. Thecity was on fire. Our troops were directed to extinguish the flames,which they finally succeeded in doing. The fire had been started by someone connected with the retreating army. All authorities deny that itwas authorized, and I presume it was the work of excited men who wereleaving what they regarded as their capital and may have felt that itwas better to destroy it than have it fall into the hands of theirenemy. Be that as it may, the National troops found the city in flames,and used every effort to extinguish them.

The troops that had formed Lee's right, a great many of them, were cutoff from getting back into Petersburg, and were pursued by our cavalryso hotly and closely that they threw away caissons, ammunition,clothing, and almost everything to lighten their loads, and pushed alongup the Appomattox River until finally they took water and crossed over.

I left Mr. Lincoln and started, as I have already said, to join thecommand, which halted at Sutherland Station, about nine miles out. Wehad still time to march as much farther, and time was an object; but theroads were bad and the trains belonging to the advance corps had blockedup the road so that it was impossible to get on. Then, again, ourcavalry had struck some of the enemy and were pursuing them; and theorders were that the roads should be given up to the cavalry wheneverthey appeared. This caused further delay.

General Wright, who was in command of one of the corps which were leftback, thought to gain time by letting his men go into bivouac and tryingto get up some rations for them, and clearing out the road, so that whenthey did start they would be uninterrupted. Humphreys, who was farahead, was also out of rations. They did not succeed in getting them upthrough the night; but the Army of the Potomac, officers and men, wereso elated by the reflection that at last they were following up avictory to its end, that they preferred marching without rations torunning a possible risk of letting the enemy elude them. So the marchwas resumed at three o'clock in the morning.

Merritt's cavalry had struck the enemy at Deep Creek, and driven themnorth to the Appomattox, where, I presume, most of them were forced tocross.

On the morning of the 4th I learned that Lee had ordered rations up fromDanville for his famishing army, and that they were to meet him atFarmville. This showed that Lee had already abandoned the idea offollowing the railroad down to Danville, but had determined to gofarther west, by the way of Farmville. I notified Sheridan of this anddirected him to get possession of the road before the supplies couldreach Lee. He responded that he had already sent Crook's division toget upon the road between Burkesville and Jetersville, then to facenorth and march along the road upon the latter place; and he thoughtCrook must be there now. The bulk of the army moved directly forJetersville by two roads.

After I had received the dispatch from Sheridan saying that Crook was onthe Danville Road, I immediately ordered Meade to make a forced marchwith the Army of the Potomac, and to send Parke's corps across from theroad they were on to the South Side Railroad, to fall in the rear of theArmy of the James and to protect the railroad which that army wasrepairing as it went along.

Our troops took possession of Jetersville and in the telegraph office,they found a dispatch from Lee, ordering two hundred thousand rationsfrom Danville. The dispatch had not been sent, but Sheridan sent aspecial messenger with it to Burkesville and had it forwarded fromthere. In the meantime, however, dispatches from other sources hadreached Danville, and they knew there that our army was on the line ofthe road; so that they sent no further supplies from that quarter.

At this time Merritt and Mackenzie, with the cavalry, were off betweenthe road which the Army of the Potomac was marching on and theAppomattox River, and were attacking the enemy in flank. They picked upa great many prisoners and forced the abandonment of some property.

Lee intrenched himself at Amelia Court House, and also his advance northof Jetersville, and sent his troops out to collect forage. The countrywas very poor and afforded but very little. His foragers scattered agreat deal; many of them were picked up by our men, and many othersnever returned to the Army of Northern Virginia.

Griffin's corps was intrenched across the railroad south of Jetersville,and Sheridan notified me of the situation. I again ordered Meade upwith all dispatch, Sheridan having but the one corps of infantry with alittle cavalry confronting Lee's entire army. Meade, always prompt inobeying orders, now pushed forward with great energy, although he washimself sick and hardly able to be out of bed. Humphreys moved at two,and Wright at three o'clock in the morning, without rations, as I havesaid, the wagons being far in the rear.

I stayed that night at Wilson's Station on the South Side Railroad. Onthe morning of the 5th I sent word to Sheridan of the progress Meade wasmaking, and suggested that he might now attack Lee. We had now no otherobjective than the Confederate armies, and I was anxious to close thething up at once.

On the 5th I marched again with Ord's command until within about tenmiles of Burkesville, where I stopped to let his army pass. I thenreceived from Sheridan the following dispatch:

"The whole of Lee's army is at or near Amelia Court House, and on thisside of it. General Davies, whom I sent out to Painesville on theirright flank, has just captured six pieces of artillery and some wagons.We can capture the Army of Northern Virginia if force enough can bethrown to this point, and then advance upon it. My cavalry was atBurkesville yesterday, and six miles beyond, on the Danville Road, lastnight. General Lee is at Amelia Court House in person. They are out ofrations, or nearly so. They were advancing up the railroad towardsBurkesville yesterday, when we intercepted them at this point."

It now became a life and death struggle with Lee to get south to hisprovisions.

Sheridan, thinking the enemy might turn off immediately towardsFarmville, moved Davies's brigade of cavalry out to watch him. Daviesfound the movement had already commenced. He attacked and drove awaytheir cavalry which was escorting wagons to the west, capturing andburning 180 wagons. He also captured five pieces of artillery. TheConfederate infantry then moved against him and probably would havehandled him very roughly, but Sheridan had sent two more brigades ofcavalry to follow Davies, and they came to his relief in time. A sharpengagement took place between these three brigades of cavalry and theenemy's infantry, but the latter was repulsed.

Meade himself reached Jetersville about two o'clock in the afternoon,but in advance of all his troops. The head of Humphreys's corpsfollowed in about an hour afterwards. Sheridan stationed the troops asthey came up, at Meade's request, the latter still being very sick. Heextended two divisions of this corps off to the west of the road to theleft of Griffin's corps, and one division to the right. The cavalry bythis time had also come up, and they were put still farther off to theleft, Sheridan feeling certain that there lay the route by which theenemy intended to escape. He wanted to attack, feeling that if time wasgiven, the enemy would get away; but Meade prevented this, preferring towait till his troops were all up.

At this juncture Sheridan sent me a letter which had been handed to himby a colored man, with a note from himself saying that he wished I wasthere myself. The letter was dated Amelia Court House, April 5th, andsigned by Colonel Taylor. It was to his mother, and showed thedemoralization of the Confederate army. Sheridan's note also gave me theinformation as here related of the movements of that day. I received asecond message from Sheridan on the 5th, in which he urged moreemphatically the importance of my presence. This was brought to me by ascout in gray uniform. It was written on tissue paper, and wrapped upin tin-foil such as chewing tobacco is folded in. This was a precautiontaken so that if the scout should be captured he could take thistin-foil out of his pocket and putting it into his mouth, chew it. Itwould cause no surprise at all to see a Confederate soldier chewingtobacco. It was nearly night when this letter was received. I gave Orddirections to continue his march to Burkesville and there intrenchhimself for the night, and in the morning to move west to cut off allthe roads between there and Farmville.

I then started with a few of my staff and a very small escort ofcavalry, going directly through the woods, to join Meade's army. Thedistance was about sixteen miles; but the night being dark our progresswas slow through the woods in the absence of direct roads. However, wegot to the outposts about ten o'clock in the evening, and after somelittle parley convinced the sentinels of our identity and were conductedin to where Sheridan was bivouacked. We talked over the situation forsome little time, Sheridan explaining to me what he thought Lee wastrying to do, and that Meade's orders, if carried out, moving to theright flank, would give him the coveted opportunity of escaping us andputting us in rear of him.

We then together visited Meade, reaching his headquarters aboutmidnight. I explained to Meade that we did not want to follow theenemy; we wanted to get ahead of him, and that his orders would allowthe enemy to escape, and besides that, I had no doubt that Lee wasmoving right then. Meade changed his orders at once. They were nowgiven for an advance on Amelia Court House, at an early hour in themorning, as the army then lay; that is, the infantry being across therailroad, most of it to the west of the road, with the cavalry swung outstill farther to the left.

CHAPTER LXVI.

BATTLE OF SAILOR'S CREEK—ENGAGEMENT AT FARMVILLE—CORRESPONDENCE WITHGENERAL LEE—SHERIDAN INTERCEPTS THE ENEMY.

The Appomattox, going westward, takes a long sweep to the south-westfrom the neighborhood of the Richmond and Danville Railroad bridge, andthen trends north-westerly. Sailor's Creek, an insignificant stream,running northward, empties into the Appomattox between the High Bridgeand Jetersville. Near the High Bridge the stage road from Petersburg toLynchburg crosses the Appomattox River, also on a bridge. The railroadruns on the north side of the river to Farmville, a few miles west, andfrom there, recrossing, continues on the south side of it. The roadscoming up from the south-east to Farmville cross the Appomattox Riverthere on a bridge and run on the north side, leaving the Lynchburg andPetersburg Railroad well to the left.

Lee, in pushing out from Amelia Court House, availed himself of all theroads between the Danville Road and Appomattox River to move upon, andnever permitted the head of his columns to stop because of any fightingthat might be going on in his rear. In this way he came very nearsucceeding in getting to his provision trains and eluding us with atleast part of his army.

As expected, Lee's troops had moved during the night before, and ourarmy in moving upon Amelia Court House soon encountered them. There wasa good deal of fighting before Sailor's Creek was reached. Our cavalrycharged in upon a body of theirs which was escorting a wagon train inorder to get it past our left. A severe engagement ensued, in which wecaptured many prisoners, and many men also were killed and wounded.There was as much gallantry displayed by some of the Confederates inthese little engagements as was displayed at any time during the war,notwithstanding the sad defeats of the past week.

The armies finally met on Sailor's Creek, when a heavy engagement tookplace, in which infantry, artillery and cavalry were all brought intoaction. Our men on the right, as they were brought in against theenemy, came in on higher ground, and upon his flank, giving us everyadvantage to be derived from the lay of the country. Our firing wasalso very much more rapid, because the enemy commenced his retreatwestward and in firing as he retreated had to turn around every time hefired. The enemy's loss was very heavy, as well in killed and woundedas in captures. Some six general officers fell into our hands in thisengagement, and seven thousand men were made prisoners. This engagementwas commenced in the middle of the afternoon of the 6th, and the retreatand pursuit were continued until nightfall, when the armies bivouackedupon the ground where the night had overtaken them.

When the move towards Amelia Court House had commenced that morning, Iordered Wright's corps, which was on the extreme right, to be moved tothe left past the whole army, to take the place of Griffin's, andordered the latter at the same time to move by and place itself on theright. The object of this movement was to get the 6th corps, Wright's,next to the cavalry, with which they had formerly served so harmoniouslyand so efficiently in the valley of Virginia.

The 6th corps now remained with the cavalry and under Sheridan's directcommand until after the surrender.

Ord had been directed to take possession of all the roads southwardbetween Burkesville and the High Bridge. On the morning of the 6th hesent Colonel Washburn with two infantry regiments with instructions todestroy High Bridge and to return rapidly to Burkesville Station; and heprepared himself to resist the enemy there. Soon after Washburn hadstarted Ord became a little alarmed as to his safety and sent ColonelRead, of his staff, with about eighty cavalrymen, to overtake him andbring him back. Very shortly after this he heard that the head of Lee'scolumn had got up to the road between him and where Washburn now was,and attempted to send reinforcements, but the reinforcements could notget through. Read, however, had got through ahead of the enemy. Herode on to Farmville and was on his way back again when he found hisreturn cut off, and Washburn confronting apparently the advance of Lee'sarmy. Read drew his men up into line of battle, his force nowconsisting of less than six hundred men, infantry and cavalry, and rodealong their front, making a speech to his men to inspire them with thesame enthusiasm that he himself felt. He then gave the order to charge.This little band made several charges, of course unsuccessful ones, butinflicted a loss upon the enemy more than equal to their own entirenumber. Colonel Read fell mortally wounded, and then Washburn; and atthe close of the conflict nearly every officer of the command and mostof the rank and file had been either killed or wounded. The remainderthen surrendered. The Confederates took this to be only the advance ofa larger column which had headed them off, and so stopped to intrench;so that this gallant band of six hundred had checked the progress of astrong detachment of the Confederate army.

This stoppage of Lee's column no doubt saved to us the trains following.Lee himself pushed on and crossed the wagon road bridge near the HighBridge, and attempted to destroy it. He did set fire to it, but theflames had made but little headway when Humphreys came up with his corpsand drove away the rear-guard which had been left to protect it while itwas being burned up. Humphreys forced his way across with some loss,and followed Lee to the intersection of the road crossing at Farmvillewith the one from Petersburg. Here Lee held a position which was verystrong, naturally, besides being intrenched. Humphreys was alone,confronting him all through the day, and in a very hazardous position.He put on a bold face, however, and assaulted with some loss, but wasnot assaulted in return.

Our cavalry had gone farther south by the way of Prince Edward's CourtHouse, along with the 5th corps (Griffin's), Ord falling in betweenGriffin and the Appomattox. Crook's division of cavalry and Wright'scorps pushed on west of Farmville. When the cavalry reached Farmvillethey found that some of the Confederates were in ahead of them, and hadalready got their trains of provisions back to that point; but ourtroops were in time to prevent them from securing anything to eat,although they succeeded in again running the trains off, so that we didnot get them for some time. These troops retreated to the north side ofthe Appomattox to join Lee, and succeeded in destroying the bridge afterthem. Considerable fighting ensued there between Wright's corps and aportion of our cavalry and the Confederates, but finally the cavalryforded the stream and drove them away. Wright built a foot-bridge forhis men to march over on and then marched out to the junction of theroads to relieve Humphreys, arriving there that night. I had stoppedthe night before at Burkesville Junction. Our troops were then prettymuch all out of the place, but we had a field hospital there, and Ord'scommand was extended from that point towards Farmville.

Here I met Dr. Smith, a Virginian and an officer of the regular army,who told me that in a conversation with General Ewell, one of theprisoners and a relative of his, Ewell had said that when we had gotacross the James River he knew their cause was lost, and it was the dutyof their authorities to make the best terms they could while they stillhad a right to claim concessions. The authorities thought differently,however. Now the cause was lost and they had no right to claimanything. He said further, that for every man that was killed afterthis in the war somebody is responsible, and it would be but very littlebetter than murder. He was not sure that Lee would consent to surrenderhis army without being able to consult with the President, but he hopedhe would.

I rode in to Farmville on the 7th, arriving there early in the day.Sheridan and Ord were pushing through, away to the south. Meade wasback towards the High Bridge, and Humphreys confronting Lee as beforestated. After having gone into bivouac at Prince Edward's Court House,Sheridan learned that seven trains of provisions and forage were atAppomattox, and determined to start at once and capture them; and aforced march was necessary in order to get there before Lee's army couldsecure them. He wrote me a note telling me this. This fact, togetherwith the incident related the night before by Dr. Smith, gave me theidea of opening correspondence with General Lee on the subject of thesurrender of his army. I therefore wrote to him on this day, asfollows:

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE U. S., 5 P.M., April 7, 1865.

GENERAL R. E. LEE Commanding C. S. A.

The result of the last week must convince you of the hopelessness offurther resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia in thisstruggle. I feel that it is so, and regard it as my duty to shift frommyself the responsibility of any further effusion of blood, by asking ofyou the surrender of that portion of the Confederate States army knownas the Army of Northern Virginia.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.

Lee replied on the evening of the same day as follows:

April 7, 1865.

GENERAL: I have received your note of this day. Though notentertaining the opinion you express on the hopelessness of furtherresistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia, I reciprocateyour desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and therefore beforeconsidering your proposition, ask the terms you will offer on conditionof its surrender.

R. E. LEE, General.

LIEUT.-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, Commanding Armies of the U. S.

This was not satisfactory, but I regarded it as deserving another letterand wrote him as follows:

April 8, 1865.

GENERAL R. E. LEE, Commanding C. S. A.

Your note of last evening in reply to mine of same date, asking thecondition on which I will accept the surrender of the Army of NorthernVirginia is just received. In reply I would say that, peace being mygreat desire, there is but one condition I would insist upon, namely:that the men and officers surrendered shall be disqualified for takingup arms again against the Government of the United States until properlyexchanged. I will meet you, or will designate officers to meet anyofficers you may name for the same purpose, at any point agreeable toyou, for the purpose of arranging definitely the terms upon which thesurrender of the Army of Northern Virginia will be received.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.

Lee's army was rapidly crumbling. Many of his soldiers had enlistedfrom that part of the State where they now were, and were continuallydropping out of the ranks and going to their homes. I know that Ioccupied a hotel almost destitute of furniture at Farmville, which hadprobably been used as a Confederate hospital. The next morning when Icame out I found a Confederate colonel there, who reported to me andsaid that he was the proprietor of that house, and that he was a colonelof a regiment that had been raised in that neighborhood. He said thatwhen he came along past home, he found that he was the only man of theregiment remaining with Lee's army, so he just dropped out, and nowwanted to surrender himself. I told him to stay there and he would notbe molested. That was one regiment which had been eliminated from Lee'sforce by this crumbling process.

Although Sheridan had been marching all day, his troops moved withalacrity and without any straggling. They began to see the end of whatthey had been fighting four years for. Nothing seemed to fatigue them.They were ready to move without rations and travel without rest untilthe end. Straggling had entirely ceased, and every man was now a rivalfor the front. The infantry marched about as rapidly as the cavalrycould.

Sheridan sent Custer with his division to move south of AppomattoxStation, which is about five miles south-west of the Court House, to getwest of the trains and destroy the roads to the rear. They got therethe night of the 8th, and succeeded partially; but some of the train menhad just discovered the movement of our troops and succeeded in runningoff three of the trains. The other four were held by Custer.

The head of Lee's column came marching up there on the morning of the9th, not dreaming, I suppose, that there were any Union soldiers near.The Confederates were surprised to find our cavalry had possession ofthe trains. However, they were desperate and at once assaulted, hopingto recover them. In the melee that ensued they succeeded in burning oneof the trains, but not in getting anything from it. Custer then orderedthe other trains run back on the road towards Farmville, and the fightcontinued.

So far, only our cavalry and the advance of Lee's army were engaged.Soon, however, Lee's men were brought up from the rear, no doubtexpecting they had nothing to meet but our cavalry. But our infantryhad pushed forward so rapidly that by the time the enemy got up theyfound Griffin's corps and the Army of the James confronting them. Asharp engagement ensued, but Lee quickly set up a white flag.

CHAPTER LXVII.

NEGOTIATIONS AT APPOMATTOX—INTERVIEW WITH LEE AT MCLEAN'S HOUSE—THETERMS OF SURRENDER—LEE'S SURRENDER—INTERVIEW WITH LEE AFTER THESURRENDER.

On the 8th I had followed the Army of the Potomac in rear of Lee. I wassuffering very severely with a sick headache, and stopped at a farmhouseon the road some distance in rear of the main body of the army. I spentthe night in bathing my feet in hot water and mustard, and puttingmustard plasters on my wrists and the back part of my neck, hoping to becured by morning. During the night I received Lee's answer to my letterof the 8th, inviting an interview between the lines on the followingmorning. (*43) But it was for a different purpose from that ofsurrendering his army, and I answered him as follows:

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE U. S., April 9, 1865.

GENERAL R. E. LEE, Commanding C. S. A.

Your note of yesterday is received. As I have no authority to treat onthe subject of peace, the meeting proposed for ten A.M. to-day couldlead to no good. I will state, however, General, that I am equallyanxious for peace with yourself, and the whole North entertains the samefeeling. The terms upon which peace can be had are well understood. Bythe South laying down their arms they will hasten that most desirableevent, save thousands of human lives and hundreds of millions ofproperty not yet destroyed. Sincerely hoping that all our difficultiesmay be settled without the loss of another life, I subscribe myself,etc.,

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

I proceeded at an early hour in the morning, still suffering with theheadache, to get to the head of the column. I was not more than two orthree miles from Appomattox Court House at the time, but to go direct Iwould have to pass through Lee's army, or a portion of it. I hadtherefore to move south in order to get upon a road coming up fromanother direction.

When the white flag was put out by Lee, as already described, I was inthis way moving towards Appomattox Court House, and consequently couldnot be communicated with immediately, and be informed of what Lee haddone. Lee, therefore, sent a flag to the rear to advise Meade and oneto the front to Sheridan, saying that he had sent a message to me forthe purpose of having a meeting to consult about the surrender of hisarmy, and asked for a suspension of hostilities until I could becommunicated with. As they had heard nothing of this until the fightinghad got to be severe and all going against Lee, both of these commandershesitated very considerably about suspending hostilities at all. Theywere afraid it was not in good faith, and we had the Army of NorthernVirginia where it could not escape except by some deception. They,however, finally consented to a suspension of hostilities for two hoursto give an opportunity of communicating with me in that time, ifpossible. It was found that, from the route I had taken, they wouldprobably not be able to communicate with me and get an answer backwithin the time fixed unless the messenger should pass through the rebellines.

Lee, therefore, sent an escort with the officer bearing this messagethrough his lines to me.

April 9, 1865.

GENERAL: I received your note of this morning on the picket-linewhither I had come to meet you and ascertain definitely what terms wereembraced in your proposal of yesterday with reference to the surrenderof this army. I now request an interview in accordance with the offercontained in your letter of yesterday for that purpose.

R. E. LEE, General.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT Commanding U. S. Armies.

When the officer reached me I was still suffering with the sickheadache, but the instant I saw the contents of the note I was cured. Iwrote the following note in reply and hastened on:

April 9, 1865.

GENERAL R. E. LEE, Commanding C. S. Armies.

Your note of this date is but this moment (11.50 A.M.) received, inconsequence of my having passed from the Richmond and Lynchburg road tothe Farmville and Lynchburg road. I am at this writing about four mileswest of Walker's Church and will push forward to the front for thepurpose of meeting you. Notice sent to me on this road where you wishthe interview to take place will meet me.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

I was conducted at once to where Sheridan was located with his troopsdrawn up in line of battle facing the Confederate army near by. Theywere very much excited, and expressed their view that this was all aruse employed to enable the Confederates to get away. They said theybelieved that Johnston was marching up from North Carolina now, and Leewas moving to join him; and they would whip the rebels where they nowwere in five minutes if I would only let them go in. But I had no doubtabout the good faith of Lee, and pretty soon was conducted to where hewas. I found him at the house of a Mr. McLean, at Appomattox CourtHouse, with Colonel Marshall, one of his staff officers, awaiting myarrival. The head of his column was occupying a hill, on a portion ofwhich was an apple orchard, beyond a little valley which separated itfrom that on the crest of which Sheridan's forces were drawn up in lineof battle to the south.

Before stating what took place between General Lee and myself, I willgive all there is of the story of the famous apple tree.

Wars produce many stories of fiction, some of which are told until theyare believed to be true. The war of the rebellion was no exception tothis rule, and the story of the apple tree is one of those fictionsbased on a slight foundation of fact. As I have said, there was an appleorchard on the side of the hill occupied by the Confederate forces.Running diagonally up the hill was a wagon road, which, at one point,ran very near one of the trees, so that the wheels of vehicles had, onthat side, cut off the roots of this tree, leaving a little embankment.General Babcock, of my staff, reported to me that when he first metGeneral Lee he was sitting upon this embankment with his feet in theroad below and his back resting against the tree. The story had noother foundation than that. Like many other stories, it would be verygood if it was only true.

I had known General Lee in the old army, and had served with him in theMexican War; but did not suppose, owing to the difference in our age andrank, that he would remember me, while I would more naturally rememberhim distinctly, because he was the chief of staff of General Scott inthe Mexican War.

When I had left camp that morning I had not expected so soon the resultthat was then taking place, and consequently was in rough garb. I waswithout a sword, as I usually was when on horseback on the field, andwore a soldier's blouse for a coat, with the shoulder straps of my rankto indicate to the army who I was. When I went into the house I foundGeneral Lee. We greeted each other, and after shaking hands took ourseats. I had my staff with me, a good portion of whom were in the roomduring the whole of the interview.

What General Lee's feelings were I do not know. As he was a man of muchdignity, with an impassible face, it was impossible to say whether hefelt inwardly glad that the end had finally come, or felt sad over theresult, and was too manly to show it. Whatever his feelings, they wereentirely concealed from my observation; but my own feelings, which hadbeen quite jubilant on the receipt of his letter, were sad anddepressed. I felt like anything rather than rejoicing at the downfallof a foe who had fought so long and valiantly, and had suffered so muchfor a cause, though that cause was, I believe, one of the worst forwhich a people ever fought, and one for which there was the leastexcuse. I do not question, however, the sincerity of the great mass ofthose who were opposed to us.

General Lee was dressed in a full uniform which was entirely new, andwas wearing a sword of considerable value, very likely the sword whichhad been presented by the State of Virginia; at all events, it was anentirely different sword from the one that would ordinarily be worn inthe field. In my rough traveling suit, the uniform of a private withthe straps of a lieutenant-general, I must have contrasted verystrangely with a man so handsomely dressed, six feet high and offaultless form. But this was not a matter that I thought of untilafterwards.

We soon fell into a conversation about old army times. He remarked thathe remembered me very well in the old army; and I told him that as amatter of course I remembered him perfectly, but from the difference inour rank and years (there being about sixteen years' difference in ourages), I had thought it very likely that I had not attracted hisattention sufficiently to be remembered by him after such a longinterval. Our conversation grew so pleasant that I almost forgot theobject of our meeting. After the conversation had run on in this stylefor some time, General Lee called my attention to the object of ourmeeting, and said that he had asked for this interview for the purposeof getting from me the terms I proposed to give his army. I said that Imeant merely that his army should lay down their arms, not to take themup again during the continuance of the war unless duly and properlyexchanged. He said that he had so understood my letter.

Then we gradually fell off again into conversation about matters foreignto the subject which had brought us together. This continued for somelittle time, when General Lee again interrupted the course of theconversation by suggesting that the terms I proposed to give his armyought to be written out. I called to General Parker, secretary on mystaff, for writing materials, and commenced writing out the followingterms:

APPOMATTOX C. H., VA.,

Ap 19th, 1865.

GEN. R. E. LEE, Comd'g C. S. A.

GEN: In accordance with the substance of my letter to you of the 8thinst., I propose to receive the surrender of the Army of N. Va. on thefollowing terms, to wit: Rolls of all the officers and men to be madein duplicate. One copy to be given to an officer designated by me, theother to be retained by such officer or officers as you may designate.The officers to give their individual paroles not to take up armsagainst the Government of the United States until properly exchanged,and each company or regimental commander sign a like parole for the menof their commands. The arms, artillery and public property to be parkedand stacked, and turned over to the officer appointed by me to receivethem. This will not embrace the side-arms of the officers, nor theirprivate horses or baggage. This done, each officer and man will beallowed to return to their homes, not to be disturbed by United Statesauthority so long as they observe their paroles and the laws in forcewhere they may reside.

Very respectfully, U. S. GRANT, Lt. Gen.

When I put my pen to the paper I did not know the first word that Ishould make use of in writing the terms. I only knew what was in mymind, and I wished to express it clearly, so that there could be nomistaking it. As I wrote on, the thought occurred to me that theofficers had their own private horses and effects, which were importantto them, but of no value to us; also that it would be an unnecessaryhumiliation to call upon them to deliver their side arms.

No conversation, not one word, passed between General Lee and myself,either about private property, side arms, or kindred subjects. Heappeared to have no objections to the terms first proposed; or if he hada point to make against them he wished to wait until they were inwriting to make it. When he read over that part of the terms about sidearms, horses and private property of the officers, he remarked, withsome feeling, I thought, that this would have a happy effect upon hisarmy.

Then, after a little further conversation, General Lee remarked to meagain that their army was organized a little differently from the armyof the United States (still maintaining by implication that we were twocountries); that in their army the cavalrymen and artillerists ownedtheir own horses; and he asked if he was to understand that the men whoso owned their horses were to be permitted to retain them. I told himthat as the terms were written they would not; that only the officerswere permitted to take their private property. He then, after readingover the terms a second time, remarked that that was clear.

I then said to him that I thought this would be about the last battle ofthe war—I sincerely hoped so; and I said further I took it that most ofthe men in the ranks were small farmers. The whole country had been soraided by the two armies that it was doubtful whether they would be ableto put in a crop to carry themselves and their families through the nextwinter without the aid of the horses they were then riding. The UnitedStates did not want them and I would, therefore, instruct the officers Ileft behind to receive the paroles of his troops to let every man of theConfederate army who claimed to own a horse or mule take the animal tohis home. Lee remarked again that this would have a happy effect.

He then sat down and wrote out the following letter:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, April 9, 1865.

GENERAL:—I received your letter of this date containing the terms ofthe surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia as proposed by you. Asthey are substantially the same as those expressed in your letter of the8th inst., they are accepted. I will proceed to designate the properofficers to carry the stipulations into effect.

R. E. LEE, General. LIEUT.-GENERAL U. S. GRANT.

While duplicates of the two letters were being made, the Union generalspresent were severally presented to General Lee.

The much talked of surrendering of Lee's sword and my handing it back,this and much more that has been said about it is the purest romance.The word sword or side arms was not mentioned by either of us until Iwrote it in the terms. There was no premeditation, and it did not occurto me until the moment I wrote it down. If I had happened to omit it,and General Lee had called my attention to it, I should have put it inthe terms precisely as I acceded to the provision about the soldiersretaining their horses.

General Lee, after all was completed and before taking his leave,remarked that his army was in a very bad condition for want of food, andthat they were without forage; that his men had been living for somedays on parched corn exclusively, and that he would have to ask me forrations and forage. I told him "certainly," and asked for how many menhe wanted rations. His answer was "about twenty-five thousand;" and Iauthorized him to send his own commissary and quartermaster toAppomattox Station, two or three miles away, where he could have, out ofthe trains we had stopped, all the provisions wanted. As for forage, wehad ourselves depended almost entirely upon the country for that.

Generals Gibbon, Griffin and Merritt were designated by me to carry intoeffect the paroling of Lee's troops before they should start for theirhomes—General Lee leaving Generals Longstreet, Gordon and Pendleton forthem to confer with in order to facilitate this work. Lee and I thenseparated as cordially as we had met, he returning to his own lines, andall went into bivouac for the night at Appomattox.

Soon after Lee's departure I telegraphed to Washington as follows:

HEADQUARTERS APPOMATTOX C. H., VA., April 9th, 1865, 4.30 P.M.

HON. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War, Washington.

General Lee surrendered the Army of Northern Virginia this afternoon onterms proposed by myself. The accompanying additional correspondencewill show the conditions fully.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.

When news of the surrender first reached our lines our men commencedfiring a salute of a hundred guns in honor of the victory. I at oncesent word, however, to have it stopped. The Confederates were now ourprisoners, and we did not want to exult over their downfall.

I determined to return to Washington at once, with a view to putting astop to the purchase of supplies, and what I now deemed other uselessoutlay of money. Before leaving, however, I thought I (*44) would liketo see General Lee again; so next morning I rode out beyond our linestowards his headquarters, preceded by a bugler and a staff-officercarrying a white flag.

Lee soon mounted his horse, seeing who it was, and met me. We had therebetween the lines, sitting on horseback, a very pleasant conversation ofover half an hour, in the course of which Lee said to me that the Southwas a big country and that we might have to march over it three or fourtimes before the war entirely ended, but that we would now be able to doit as they could no longer resist us. He expressed it as his earnesthope, however, that we would not be called upon to cause more loss andsacrifice of life; but he could not foretell the result. I thensuggested to General Lee that there was not a man in the Confederacywhose influence with the soldiery and the whole people was as great ashis, and that if he would now advise the surrender of all the armies Ihad no doubt his advice would be followed with alacrity. But Lee said,that he could not do that without consulting the President first. Iknew there was no use to urge him to do anything against his ideas ofwhat was right.

I was accompanied by my staff and other officers, some of whom seemed tohave a great desire to go inside the Confederate lines. They finallyasked permission of Lee to do so for the purpose of seeing some of theirold army friends, and the permission was granted. They went over, had avery pleasant time with their old friends, and brought some of them backwith them when they returned.

When Lee and I separated he went back to his lines and I returned to thehouse of Mr. McLean. Here the officers of both armies came in greatnumbers, and seemed to enjoy the meeting as much as though they had beenfriends separated for a long time while fighting battles under the sameflag. For the time being it looked very much as if all thought of thewar had escaped their minds. After an hour pleasantly passed in thisway I set out on horseback, accompanied by my staff and a small escort,for Burkesville Junction, up to which point the railroad had by thistime been repaired.

CHAPTER LXVIII.

MORALE OF THE TWO ARMIES—RELATIVE CONDITIONS OF THE NORTH AND SOUTH—PRESIDENT LINCOLN VISITS RICHMOND—ARRIVAL AT WASHINGTON—PRESIDENTLINCOLN'S ASSASSINATION—PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S POLICY.

After the fall of Petersburg, and when the armies of the Potomac and theJames were in motion to head off Lee's army, the morale of the Nationaltroops had greatly improved. There was no more straggling, no more rearguards. The men who in former times had been falling back, were now, asI have already stated, striving to get to the front. For the first timein four weary years they felt that they were now nearing the time whenthey could return to their homes with their country saved. On the otherhand, the Confederates were more than correspondingly depressed. Theirdespondency increased with each returning day, and especially after thebattle of Sailor's Creek. They threw away their arms in constantlyincreasing numbers, dropping out of the ranks and betaking themselves tothe woods in the hope of reaching their homes. I have already instancedthe case of the entire disintegration of a regiment whose colonel I metat Farmville. As a result of these and other influences, when Leefinally surrendered at Appomattox, there were only 28,356 officers andmen left to be paroled, and many of these were without arms. It wasprobably this latter fact which gave rise to the statement sometimesmade, North and South, that Lee surrendered a smaller number of men thanwhat the official figures show. As a matter of official record, and inaddition to the number paroled as given above, we captured between March29th and the date of surrender 19,132 Confederates, to say nothing ofLee's other losses, killed, wounded and missing, during the series ofdesperate conflicts which marked his headlong and determined flight.The same record shows the number of cannon, including those atAppomattox, to have been 689 between the dates named.

There has always been a great conflict of opinion as to the number oftroops engaged in every battle, or all important battles, fought betweenthe sections, the South magnifying the number of Union troops engagedand belittling their own. Northern writers have fallen, in manyinstances, into the same error. I have often heard gentlemen, who werethoroughly loyal to the Union, speak of what a splendid fight the Southhad made and successfully continued for four years before yielding, withtheir twelve million of people against our twenty, and of the twelvefour being colored slaves, non-combatants. I will add to theirargument. We had many regiments of brave and loyal men who volunteeredunder great difficulty from the twelve million belonging to the South.

But the South had rebelled against the National government. It was notbound by any constitutional restrictions. The whole South was amilitary camp. The occupation of the colored people was to furnishsupplies for the army. Conscription was resorted to early, and embracedevery male from the age of eighteen to forty-five, excluding only thosephysically unfit to serve in the field, and the necessary number ofcivil officers of State and intended National government. The old andphysically disabled furnished a good portion of these. The slaves, thenon-combatants, one-third of the whole, were required to work in thefield without regard to sex, and almost without regard to age. Childrenfrom the age of eight years could and did handle the hoe; they were notmuch older when they began to hold the plough. The four million ofcolored non-combatants were equal to more than three times their numberin the North, age for age and sex for sex, in supplying food from thesoil to support armies. Women did not work in the fields in the North,and children attended school.

The arts of peace were carried on in the North. Towns and cities grewduring the war. Inventions were made in all kinds of machinery toincrease the products of a day's labor in the shop, and in the field.In the South no opposition was allowed to the government which had beenset up and which would have become real and respected if the rebellionhad been successful. No rear had to be protected. All the troops inservice could be brought to the front to contest every inch of groundthreatened with invasion. The press of the South, like the people whoremained at home, were loyal to the Southern cause.

In the North, the country, the towns and the cities presented about thesame appearance they do in time of peace. The furnace was in blast, theshops were filled with workmen, the fields were cultivated, not only tosupply the population of the North and the troops invading the South,but to ship abroad to pay a part of the expense of the war. In theNorth the press was free up to the point of open treason. The citizencould entertain his views and express them. Troops were necessary inthe Northern States to prevent prisoners from the Southern army beingreleased by outside force, armed and set at large to destroy by fire ourNorthern cities. Plans were formed by Northern and Southern citizens toburn our cities, to poison the water supplying them, to spread infectionby importing clothing from infected regions, to blow up our river andlake steamers—regardless of the destruction of innocent lives. Thecopperhead disreputable portion of the press magnified rebel successes,and belittled those of the Union army. It was, with a large following,an auxiliary to the Confederate army. The North would have been muchstronger with a hundred thousand of these men in the Confederate ranksand the rest of their kind thoroughly subdued, as the Union sentimentwas in the South, than we were as the battle was fought.

As I have said, the whole South was a military camp. The coloredpeople, four million in number, were submissive, and worked in the fieldand took care of the families while the able-bodied white men were atthe front fighting for a cause destined to defeat. The cause waspopular, and was enthusiastically supported by the young men. Theconscription took all of them. Before the war was over, furtherconscriptions took those between fourteen and eighteen years of age asjunior reserves, and those between forty-five and sixty as seniorreserves. It would have been an offence, directly after the war, andperhaps it would be now, to ask any able-bodied man in the South, whowas between the ages of fourteen and sixty at any time during the war,whether he had been in the Confederate army. He would assert that hehad, or account for his absence from the ranks. Under suchcircumstances it is hard to conceive how the North showed such asuperiority of force in every battle fought. I know they did not.

During 1862 and '3, John H. Morgan, a partisan officer, of no militaryeducation, but possessed of courage and endurance, operated in the rearof the Army of the Ohio in Kentucky and Tennessee. He had no base ofsupplies to protect, but was at home wherever he went. The armyoperating against the South, on the contrary, had to protect its linesof communication with the North, from which all supplies had to come tothe front. Every foot of road had to be guarded by troops stationed atconvenient distances apart. These guards could not render assistancebeyond the points where stationed. Morgan Was foot-loose and couldoperate where, his information—always correct—led him to believe hecould do the greatest damage. During the time he was operating in thisway he killed, wounded and captured several times the number he ever hadunder his command at any one time. He destroyed many millions ofproperty in addition. Places he did not attack had to be guarded as ifthreatened by him. Forrest, an abler soldier, operated farther west,and held from the National front quite as many men as could be sparedfor offensive operations. It is safe to say that more than half theNational army was engaged in guarding lines of supplies, or were onleave, sick in hospital or on detail which prevented their bearing arms.Then, again, large forces were employed where no Confederate armyconfronted them. I deem it safe to say that there were no largeengagements where the National numbers compensated for the advantage ofposition and intrenchment occupied by the enemy.

While I was in pursuit of General Lee, the President went to Richmond incompany with Admiral Porter, and on board his flagship. He found thepeople of that city in great consternation. The leading citizens amongthe people who had remained at home surrounded him, anxious thatsomething should be done to relieve them from suspense. General Weitzelwas not then in the city, having taken offices in one of the neighboringvillages after his troops had succeeded in subduing the conflagrationwhich they had found in progress on entering the Confederate capital.The President sent for him, and, on his arrival, a short interview washad on board the vessel, Admiral Porter and a leading citizen ofVirginia being also present. After this interview the President wrote anorder in about these words, which I quote from memory: "General Weitzelis authorized to permit the body calling itself the Legislature ofVirginia to meet for the purpose of recalling the Virginia troops fromthe Confederate armies."

Immediately some of the gentlemen composing that body wrote out a callfor a meeting and had it published in their papers. This call, however,went very much further than Mr. Lincoln had contemplated, as he did notsay the "Legislature of Virginia" but "the body which called itself theLegislature of Virginia." Mr. Stanton saw the call as published in theNorthern papers the very next issue and took the liberty ofcountermanding the order authorizing any meeting of the Legislature, orany other body, and this notwithstanding the fact that the President wasnearer the spot than he was.

This was characteristic of Mr. Stanton. He was a man who neverquestioned his own authority, and who always did in war time what hewanted to do. He was an able constitutional lawyer and jurist; but theConstitution was not an impediment to him while the war lasted. In thislatter particular I entirely agree with the view he evidently held. TheConstitution was not framed with a view to any such rebellion as that of1861-5. While it did not authorize rebellion it made no provisionagainst it. Yet the right to resist or suppress rebellion is asinherent as the right of self-defence, and as natural as the right of anindividual to preserve his life when in jeopardy. The Constitution wastherefore in abeyance for the time being, so far as it in any wayaffected the progress and termination of the war.

Those in rebellion against the government of the United States were notrestricted by constitutional provisions, or any other, except the actsof their Congress, which was loyal and devoted to the cause for whichthe South was then fighting. It would be a hard case when one-third ofa nation, united in rebellion against the national authority, isentirely untrammeled, that the other two-thirds, in their efforts tomaintain the Union intact, should be restrained by a Constitutionprepared by our ancestors for the express purpose of insuring thepermanency of the confederation of the States.

After I left General Lee at Appomattox Station, I went with my staff anda few others directly to Burkesville Station on my way to Washington.The road from Burkesville back having been newly repaired and the groundbeing soft, the train got off the track frequently, and, as a result, itwas after midnight of the second day when I reached City Point. As soonas possible I took a dispatch-boat thence to Washington City.

While in Washington I was very busy for a time in preparing thenecessary orders for the new state of affairs; communicating with mydifferent commanders of separate departments, bodies of troops, etc.But by the 14th I was pretty well through with this work, so as to beable to visit my children, who were then in Burlington, New Jersey,attending school. Mrs. Grant was with me in Washington at the time, andwe were invited by President and Mrs. Lincoln to accompany them to thetheatre on the evening of that day. I replied to the President's verbalinvitation to the effect, that if we were in the city we would takegreat pleasure in accompanying them; but that I was very anxious to getaway and visit my children, and if I could get through my work duringthe day I should do so. I did get through and started by the eveningtrain on the 14th, sending Mr. Lincoln word, of course, that I would notbe at the theatre.

At that time the railroad to New York entered Philadelphia on BroadStreet; passengers were conveyed in ambulances to the Delaware River,and then ferried to Camden, at which point they took the cars again.When I reached the ferry, on the east side of the City of Philadelphia,I found people awaiting my arrival there; and also dispatches informingme of the assassination of the President and Mr. Seward, and of theprobable assassination of the Vice President, Mr. Johnson, andrequesting my immediate return.

It would be impossible for me to describe the feeling that overcame meat the news of these assassinations, more especially the assassinationof the President. I knew his goodness of heart, his generosity, hisyielding disposition, his desire to have everybody happy, and above allhis desire to see all the people of the United States enter again uponthe full privileges of citizenship with equality among all. I knew alsothe feeling that Mr. Johnson had expressed in speeches and conversationagainst the Southern people, and I feared that his course towards themwould be such as to repel, and make them unwilling citizens; and if theybecame such they would remain so for a long while. I felt thatreconstruction had been set back, no telling how far.

I immediately arranged for getting a train to take me back to WashingtonCity; but Mrs. Grant was with me; it was after midnight and Burlingtonwas but an hour away. Finding that I could accompany her to our houseand return about as soon as they would be ready to take me from thePhiladelphia station, I went up with her and returned immediately by thesame special train. The joy that I had witnessed among the people inthe street and in public places in Washington when I left there, hadbeen turned to grief; the city was in reality a city of mourning. Ihave stated what I believed then the effect of this would be, and myjudgment now is that I was right. I believe the South would have beensaved from very much of the hardness of feeling that was engendered byMr. Johnson's course towards them during the first few months of hisadministration. Be this as it may, Mr. Lincoln's assassination wasparticularly unfortunate for the entire nation.

Mr. Johnson's course towards the South did engender bitterness offeeling. His denunciations of treason and his ever-ready remark,"Treason is a crime and must be made odious," was repeated to all thosemen of the South who came to him to get some assurances of safety sothat they might go to work at something with the feeling that what theyobtained would be secure to them. He uttered his denunciations withgreat vehemence, and as they were accompanied with no assurances ofsafety, many Southerners were driven to a point almost beyond endurance.

The President of the United States is, in a large degree, or ought tobe, a representative of the feeling, wishes and judgment of those overwhom he presides; and the Southerners who read the denunciations ofthemselves and their people must have come to the conclusion that heuttered the sentiments of the Northern people; whereas, as a matter offact, but for the assassination of Mr. Lincoln, I believe the greatmajority of the Northern people, and the soldiers unanimously, wouldhave been in favor of a speedy reconstruction on terms that would be theleast humiliating to the people who had rebelled against theirgovernment. They believed, I have no doubt, as I did, that besidesbeing the mildest, it was also the wisest, policy.

The people who had been in rebellion must necessarily come back into theUnion, and be incorporated as an integral part of the nation. Naturallythe nearer they were placed to an equality with the people who had notrebelled, the more reconciled they would feel with their oldantagonists, and the better citizens they would be from the beginning.They surely would not make good citizens if they felt that they had ayoke around their necks.

I do not believe that the majority of the Northern people at that timewere in favor of negro suffrage. They supposed that it would naturallyfollow the freedom of the negro, but that there would be a time ofprobation, in which the ex-slaves could prepare themselves for theprivileges of citizenship before the full right would be conferred; butMr. Johnson, after a complete revolution of sentiment, seemed to regardthe South not only as an oppressed people, but as the people bestentitled to consideration of any of our citizens. This was more thanthe people who had secured to us the perpetuation of the Union wereprepared for, and they became more radical in their views. TheSoutherners had the most power in the executive branch, Mr. Johnsonhaving gone to their side; and with a compact South, and such sympathyand support as they could get from the North, they felt that they wouldbe able to control the nation at once, and already many of them acted asif they thought they were entitled to do so.

Thus Mr. Johnson, fighting Congress on the one hand, and receiving thesupport of the South on the other, drove Congress, which wasoverwhelmingly republican, to the passing of first one measure and thenanother to restrict his power. There being a solid South on one sidethat was in accord with the political party in the North which hadsympathized with the rebellion, it finally, in the judgment of Congressand of the majority of the legislatures of the States, became necessaryto enfranchise the negro, in all his ignorance. In this work, I shallnot discuss the question of how far the policy of Congress in thisparticular proved a wise one. It became an absolute necessity, however,because of the foolhardiness of the President and the blindness of theSouthern people to their own interest. As to myself, while stronglyfavoring the course that would be the least humiliating to the peoplewho had been in rebellion, I gradually worked up to the point where,with the majority of the people, I favored immediate enfranchisement.

CHAPTER LXIX.

SHERMAN AND JOHNSTON—JOHNSTON'S SURRENDER TO SHERMAN—CAPTURE OFMOBILE—WILSON'S EXPEDITION—CAPTURE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS—GENERALTHOMAS'S QUALITIES—ESTIMATE OF GENERAL CANBY.

When I left Appomattox I ordered General Meade to proceed leisurely backto Burkesville Station with the Army of the Potomac and the Army of theJames, and to go into camp there until further orders from me. GeneralJohnston, as has been stated before, was in North Carolina confrontingGeneral Sherman. It could not be known positively, of course, whetherJohnston would surrender on the news of Lee's surrender, though Isupposed he would; and if he did not, Burkesville Station was thenatural point from which to move to attack him. The army which I couldhave sent against him was superior to his, and that with which Shermanconfronted him was also superior; and between the two he wouldnecessarily have been crushed, or driven away. With the loss of theircapital and the Army of Northern Virginia it was doubtful whetherJohnston's men would have the spirit to stand. My belief was that hewould make no such attempt; but I adopted this course as a precautionagainst what might happen, however improbable.

Simultaneously with my starting from City Point, I sent a messenger toNorth Carolina by boat with dispatches to General Sherman, informing himof the surrender of Lee and his army; also of the terms which I hadgiven him; and I authorized Sherman to give the same terms to Johnstonif the latter chose to accept them. The country is familiar with theterms that Sherman agreed to CONDITIONALLY, because they embraced apolitical question as well as a military one and he would therefore haveto confer with the government before agreeing to them definitely.

General Sherman had met Mr. Lincoln at City Point while visiting thereto confer with me about our final movement, and knew what Mr. Lincolnhad said to the peace commissioners when he met them at Hampton Roads,viz.: that before he could enter into negotiations with them they wouldhave to agree to two points: one being that the Union should bepreserved, and the other that slavery should be abolished; and if theywere ready to concede these two points he was almost ready to sign hisname to a blank piece of paper and permit them to fill out the balanceof the terms upon which we would live together. He had also seennotices in the newspapers of Mr. Lincoln's visit to Richmond, and hadread in the same papers that while there he had authorized the conveningof the Legislature of Virginia.

Sherman thought, no doubt, in adding to the terms that I had made withgeneral Lee, that he was but carrying out the wishes of the President ofthe United States. But seeing that he was going beyond his authority,he made it a point that the terms were only conditional. They signedthem with this understanding, and agreed to a truce until the termscould be sent to Washington for approval; if approved by the properauthorities there, they would then be final; if not approved, then hewould give due notice, before resuming hostilities. As the world knows,Sherman, from being one of the most popular generals of the land(Congress having even gone so far as to propose a bill providing for asecond lieutenant-general for the purpose of advancing him to thatgrade), was denounced by the President and Secretary of War in verybitter terms. Some people went so far as to denounce him as a traitor—a most preposterous term to apply to a man who had rendered so muchservice as he had, even supposing he had made a mistake in granting suchterms as he did to Johnston and his army. If Sherman had takenauthority to send Johnston with his army home, with their arms to be putin the arsenals of their own States, without submitting the question tothe authorities at Washington, the suspicions against him might havesome foundation. But the feeling against Sherman died out very rapidly,and it was not many weeks before he was restored to the fullestconfidence of the American people.

When, some days after my return to Washington, President Johnson and theSecretary of war received the terms which General Sherman had forwardedfor approval, a cabinet meeting was immediately called and I was sentfor. There seemed to be the greatest consternation, lest Sherman wouldcommit the government to terms which they were not willing to accede toand which he had no right to grant. A message went out directing thetroops in the South not to obey General Sherman. I was ordered toproceed at once to North Carolina and take charge of matter theremyself. Of course I started without delay, and reached there as soon aspossible. I repaired to Raleigh, where Sherman was, as quietly aspossible, hoping to see him without even his army learning of mypresence.

When I arrived I went to Sherman's headquarters, and we were at oncecloseted together. I showed him the instruction and orders under whichI visited him. I told him that I wanted him to notify General Johnstonthat the terms which they had conditionally agreed upon had not beenapproved in Washington, and that he was authorized to offer the sameterms I had given General Lee. I sent Sherman to do this himself. Idid not wish the knowledge of my presence to be known to the armygenerally; so I left it to Sherman to negotiate the terms of thesurrender solely by himself, and without the enemy knowing that I wasanywhere near the field. As soon as possible I started to get away, toleave Sherman quite free and untrammelled.

At Goldsboro', on my way back, I met a mail, containing the lastnewspapers, and I found in them indications of great excitement in theNorth over the terms Sherman had given Johnston; and harsh orders thathad been promulgated by the President and Secretary of War. I knew thatSherman must see these papers, and I fully realized what greatindignation they would cause him, though I do not think his feelingscould have been more excited than were my own. But like the true andloyal soldier that he was, he carried out the instructions I had givenhim, obtained the surrender of Johnston's army, and settled down in hiscamp about Raleigh, to await final orders.

There were still a few expeditions out in the South that could not becommunicated with, and had to be left to act according to the judgmentof their respective commanders. With these it was impossible to tellhow the news of the surrender of Lee and Johnston, of which they musthave heard, might affect their judgment as to what was best to do.

The three expeditions which I had tried so hard to get off from thecommands of Thomas and Canby did finally get off: one under Canbyhimself, against Mobile, late in March; that under Stoneman from EastTennessee on the 20th; and the one under Wilson, starting from Eastport,Mississippi, on the 22d of March. They were all eminently successful,but without any good result. Indeed much valuable property was destroyedand many lives lost at a time when we would have liked to spare them.The war was practically over before their victories were gained. Theywere so late in commencing operations, that they did not hold any troopsaway that otherwise would have been operating against the armies whichwere gradually forcing the Confederate armies to a surrender. The onlypossible good that we may have experienced from these raids was byStoneman's getting near Lynchburg about the time the armies of thePotomac and the James were closing in on Lee at Appomattox.

Stoneman entered North Carolina and then pushed north to strike theVirginia and Tennessee Railroad. He got upon that road, destroyed itsbridges at different places and rendered the road useless to the enemyup to within a few miles of Lynchburg. His approach caused theevacuation of that city about the time we were at Appomattox, and wasthe cause of a commotion we heard of there. He then pushed south, andwas operating in the rear of Johnston's army about the time thenegotiations were going on between Sherman and Johnston for the latter'ssurrender. In this raid Stoneman captured and destroyed a large amountof stores, while fourteen guns and nearly two thousand prisoners werethe trophies of his success.

Canby appeared before Mobile on the 27th of March. The city of Mobilewas protected by two forts, besides other intrenchments—Spanish Fort,on the east side of the bay, and Fort Blakely, north of the city. Theseforts were invested. On the night of the 8th of April, the Nationaltroops having carried the enemy's works at one point, Spanish Fort wasevacuated; and on the 9th, the very day of Lee's surrender, Blakely wascarried by assault, with a considerable loss to us. On the 11th thecity was evacuated.

I had tried for more than two years to have an expedition sent againstMobile when its possession by us would have been of great advantage. Itfinally cost lives to take it when its possession was of no importance,and when, if left alone, it would within a few days have fallen into ourhands without any bloodshed whatever.

Wilson moved out with full 12,000 men, well equipped and well armed. Hewas an energetic officer and accomplished his work rapidly. Forrest wasin his front, but with neither his old-time army nor his old-timeprestige. He now had principally conscripts. His conscripts weregenerally old men and boys. He had a few thousand regular cavalry left,but not enough to even retard materially the progress of Wilson'scavalry. Selma fell on the 2d of April, with a large number ofprisoners and a large quantity of war material, machine shops, etc., tobe disposed of by the victors. Tuscaloosa, Montgomery and West Pointfell in quick succession. These were all important points to the enemyby reason of their railroad connections, as depots of supplies, andbecause of their manufactories of war material. They were fortified orintrenched, and there was considerable fighting before they werecaptured. Macon surrendered on the 21st of April. Here news wasreceived of the negotiations for the surrender of Johnston's army.Wilson belonged to the military division commanded by Sherman, and ofcourse was bound by his terms. This stopped all fighting.

General Richard Taylor had now become the senior Confederate officerstill at liberty east of the Mississippi River, and on the 4th of May hesurrendered everything within the limits of this extensive command.General E. Kirby Smith surrendered the trans-Mississippi department onthe 26th of May, leaving no other Confederate army at liberty tocontinue the war.

Wilson's raid resulted in the capture of the fugitive president of thedefunct confederacy before he got out of the country. This occurred atIrwinsville, Georgia, on the 11th of May. For myself, and I believe Mr.Lincoln shared the feeling, I would have been very glad to have seen Mr.Davis succeed in escaping, but for one reason: I feared that if notcaptured, he might get into the trans-Mississippi region and there setup a more contracted confederacy. The young men now out of homes andout of employment might have rallied under his standard and protractedthe war yet another year. The Northern people were tired of the war,they were tired of piling up a debt which would be a further mortgageupon their homes.

Mr. Lincoln, I believe, wanted Mr. Davis to escape, because he did notwish to deal with the matter of his punishment. He knew there would bepeople clamoring for the punishment of the ex-Confederate president, forhigh treason. He thought blood enough had already been spilled to atonefor our wickedness as a nation. At all events he did not wish to be thejudge to decide whether more should be shed or not. But his own lifewas sacrificed at the hands of an assassin before the ex-president ofthe Confederacy was a prisoner in the hands of the government which hehad lent all his talent and all his energies to destroy.

All things are said to be wisely directed, and for the best interest ofall concerned. This reflection does not, however, abate in theslightest our sense of bereavement in the untimely loss of so good andgreat a man as Abraham Lincoln.

He would have proven the best friend the South could have had, and savedmuch of the wrangling and bitterness of feeling brought out byreconstruction under a President who at first wished to revenge himselfupon Southern men of better social standing than himself, but who stillsought their recognition, and in a short time conceived the idea andadvanced the proposition to become their Moses to lead them triumphantlyout of all their difficulties.

The story of the legislation enacted during the reconstruction period tostay the hands of the President is too fresh in the minds of the peopleto be told now. Much of it, no doubt, was unconstitutional; but it washoped that the laws enacted would serve their purpose before thequestion of constitutionality could be submitted to the judiciary and adecision obtained. These laws did serve their purpose, and now remain "adead letter" upon the statute books of the United States, no one takinginterest enough in them to give them a passing thought.

Much was said at the time about the garb Mr. Davis was wearing when hewas captured. I cannot settle this question from personal knowledge ofthe facts; but I have been under the belief, from information given tome by General Wilson shortly after the event, that when Mr. Davislearned that he was surrounded by our cavalry he was in his tent dressedin a gentleman's dressing gown. Naturally enough, Mr. Davis wanted toescape, and would not reflect much how this should be accomplishedprovided it might be done successfully. If captured, he would be noordinary prisoner. He represented all there was of that hostility tothe government which had caused four years of the bloodiest war—and themost costly in other respects of which history makes any record. Everyone supposed he would be tried for treason if captured, and that hewould be executed. Had he succeeded in making his escape in anydisguise it would have been adjudged a good thing afterwards by hisadmirers.

As my official letters on file in the War Department, as well as myremarks in this book, reflect upon General Thomas by dwelling somewhatupon his tardiness, it is due to myself, as well as to him, that I givemy estimate of him as a soldier. The same remark will apply also in thecase of General Canby. I had been at West Point with Thomas one year,and had known him later in the old army. He was a man of commandingappearance, slow and deliberate in speech and action; sensible, honestand brave. He possessed valuable soldierly qualities in an eminentdegree. He gained the confidence of all who served under him, andalmost their love. This implies a very valuable quality. It is aquality which calls out the most efficient services of the troopsserving under the commander possessing it.

Thomas's dispositions were deliberately made, and always good. He couldnot be driven from a point he was given to hold. He was not as good,however, in pursuit as he was in action. I do not believe that he couldever have conducted Sherman's army from Chattanooga to Atlanta againstthe defences and the commander guarding that line in 1864. On the otherhand, if it had been given him to hold the line which Johnston tried tohold, neither that general nor Sherman, nor any other officer could havedone it better.

Thomas was a valuable officer, who richly deserved, as he has received,the plaudits of his countrymen for the part he played in the greattragedy of 1861-5.

General Canby was an officer of great merit. He was naturally studious,and inclined to the law. There have been in the army but very few, ifany, officers who took as much interest in reading and digesting everyact of Congress and every regulation for the government of the army ashe. His knowledge gained in this way made him a most valuable staffofficer, a capacity in which almost all his army services were renderedup to the time of his being assigned to the Military Division of theGulf. He was an exceedingly modest officer, though of great talent andlearning. I presume his feelings when first called upon to command alarge army against a fortified city, were somewhat like my own whenmarching a regiment against General Thomas Harris in Missouri in 1861.Neither of us would have felt the slightest trepidation in going intobattle with some one else commanding. Had Canby been in otherengagements afterwards, he would, I have no doubt, have advanced withoutany fear arising from a sense of the responsibility. He was afterwardskilled in the lava beds of Southern Oregon, while in pursuit of thehostile Modoc Indians. His character was as pure as his talent andlearning were great. His services were valuable during the war, butprincipally as a bureau officer. I have no idea that it was from choicethat his services were rendered in an office, but because of hissuperior efficiency there.

CHAPTER LXX.

THE END OF THE WAR—THE MARCH TO WASHINGTON—ONE OF LINCOLN'S ANECDOTES—GRAND REVIEW AT WASHINGTON—CHARACTERISTICS OF LINCOLN AND STANTON—ESTIMATE OF THE DIFFERENT CORPS COMMANDERS.

Things began to quiet down, and as the certainty that there would be nomore armed resistance became clearer, the troops in North Carolina andVirginia were ordered to march immediately to the capital, and go intocamp there until mustered out. Suitable garrisons were left at theprominent places throughout the South to insure obedience to the lawsthat might be enacted for the government of the several States, and toinsure security to the lives and property of all classes. I do not knowhow far this was necessary, but I deemed it necessary, at that time,that such a course should be pursued. I think now that these garrisonswere continued after they ceased to be absolutely required; but it isnot to be expected that such a rebellion as was fought between thesections from 1861 to 1865 could terminate without leaving many seriousapprehensions in the mind of the people as to what should be done.

Sherman marched his troops from Goldsboro, up to Manchester, on thesouth side of the James River, opposite Richmond, and there put them incamp, while he went back to Savannah to see what the situation wasthere.

It was during this trip that the last outrage was committed upon him.Halleck had been sent to Richmond to command Virginia, and had issuedorders prohibiting even Sherman's own troops from obeying his,Sherman's, orders. Sherman met the papers on his return, containingthis order of Halleck, and very justly felt indignant at the outrage.On his arrival at Fortress Monroe returning from Savannah, Shermanreceived an invitation from Halleck to come to Richmond and be hisguest. This he indignantly refused, and informed Halleck, furthermore,that he had seen his order. He also stated that he was coming up totake command of his troops, and as he marched through it would probablybe as well for Halleck not to show himself, because he (Sherman) wouldnot be responsible for what some rash person might do throughindignation for the treatment he had received. Very soon after that,Sherman received orders from me to proceed to Washington City, and to gointo camp on the south side of the city pending the mustering-out of thetroops.

There was no incident worth noting in the march northward fromGoldsboro, to Richmond, or in that from Richmond to Washington City.The army, however, commanded by Sherman, which had been engaged in allthe battles of the West and had marched from the Mississippi through theSouthern States to the sea, from there to Goldsboro, and thence toWashington City, had passed over many of the battle-fields of the Armyof the Potomac, thus having seen, to a greater extent than any otherbody of troops, the entire theatre of the four years' war for thepreservation of the Union.

The march of Sherman's army from Atlanta to the sea and north toGoldsboro, while it was not accompanied with the danger that wasanticipated, yet was magnificent in its results, and equally magnificentin the way it was conducted. It had an important bearing, in variousways, upon the great object we had in view, that of closing the war.All the States east of the Mississippi River up to the State of Georgia,had felt the hardships of the war. Georgia, and South Carolina, andalmost all of North Carolina, up to this time, had been exempt frominvasion by the Northern armies, except upon their immediate sea coasts.Their newspapers had given such an account of Confederate success, thatthe people who remained at home had been convinced that the Yankees hadbeen whipped from first to last, and driven from pillar to post, andthat now they could hardly be holding out for any other purpose than tofind a way out of the war with honor to themselves.

Even during this march of Sherman's the newspapers in his front wereproclaiming daily that his army was nothing better than a mob of men whowere frightened out of their wits and hastening, panic-stricken, to tryto get under the cover of our navy for protection against the Southernpeople. As the army was seen marching on triumphantly, however, theminds of the people became disabused and they saw the true state ofaffairs. In turn they became disheartened, and would have been glad tosubmit without compromise.

Another great advantage resulting from this march, and which wascalculated to hasten the end, was the fact that the great storehouse ofGeorgia was entirely cut off from the Confederate armies. As the troopsadvanced north from Savannah, the destruction of the railroads in SouthCarolina and the southern part of North Carolina, further cut off theirresources and left the armies still in Virginia and North Carolinadependent for supplies upon a very small area of country, already verymuch exhausted of food and forage.

In due time the two armies, one from Burkesville Junction and the otherfrom the neighborhood of Raleigh, North Carolina, arrived and went intocamp near the Capital, as directed. The troops were hardy, being inuredto fatigue, and they appeared in their respective camps as ready and fitfor duty as they had ever been in their lives. I doubt whether an equalbody of men of any nation, take them man for man, officer for officer,was ever gotten together that would have proved their equal in a greatbattle.

The armies of Europe are machines; the men are brave and the officerscapable; but the majority of the soldiers in most of the nations ofEurope are taken from a class of people who are not very intelligent andwho have very little interest in the contest in which they are calledupon to take part. Our armies were composed of men who were able toread, men who knew what they were fighting for, and could not be inducedto serve as soldiers, except in an emergency when the safety of thenation was involved, and so necessarily must have been more than equalto men who fought merely because they were brave and because they werethoroughly drilled and inured to hardships.

There was nothing of particular importance occurred during the timethese troops were in camp before starting North.

I remember one little incident which I will relate as an anecdotecharacteristic of Mr. Lincoln. It occurred a day after I reachedWashington, and about the time General Meade reached Burkesville withthe army. Governor Smith of Virginia had left Richmond with theConfederate States government, and had gone to Danville. Supposing Iwas necessarily with the army at Burkesville, he addressed a letter tome there informing me that, as governor of the Commonwealth of the Stateof Virginia, he had temporarily removed the State capital from Richmondto Danville, and asking if he would be permitted to perform thefunctions of his office there without molestation by the Federalauthorities. I give this letter only in substance. He also inquired ofme whether in case he was not allowed to perform the duties of hisoffice, he with a few others might not be permitted to leave the countryand go abroad without interference. General Meade being informed that aflag of truce was outside his pickets with a letter to me, at once sentout and had the letter brought in without informing the officer whobrought it that I was not present. He read the letter and telegraphedme its contents. Meeting Mr. Lincoln shortly after receiving thisdispatch, I repeated its contents to him. Mr. Lincoln, supposing I wasasking for instructions, said, in reply to that part of Governor Smith'sletter which inquired whether he with a few friends would be permittedto leave the country unmolested, that his position was like that of acertain Irishman (giving the name) he knew in Springfield who was verypopular with the people, a man of considerable promise, and very muchliked. Unfortunately he had acquired the habit of drinking, and hisfriends could see that the habit was growing on him. These friendsdetermined to make an effort to save him, and to do this they drew up apledge to abstain from all alcoholic drinks. They asked Pat to jointhem in signing the pledge, and he consented. He had been so long outof the habit of using plain water as a beverage that he resorted tosoda-water as a substitute. After a few days this began to growdistasteful to him. So holding the glass behind him, he said: "Doctor,couldn't you drop a bit of brandy in that unbeknownst to myself."

I do not remember what the instructions were the President gave me, butI know that Governor Smith was not permitted to perform the duties ofhis office. I also know that if Mr. Lincoln had been spared, therewould have been no efforts made to prevent any one from leaving thecountry who desired to do so. He would have been equally willing topermit the return of the same expatriated citizens after they had timeto repent of their choice.

On the 18th of May orders were issued by the adjutant-general for agrand review by the President and his cabinet of Sherman's and Meade'sarmies. The review commenced on the 23d and lasted two days. Meade'sarmy occupied over six hours of the first day in passing the grand standwhich had been erected in front of the President's house. Shermanwitnessed this review from the grand stand which was occupied by thePresident and his cabinet. Here he showed his resentment for the crueland harsh treatment that had unnecessarily been inflicted upon him bythe Secretary of War, by refusing to take his extended hand.

Sherman's troops had been in camp on the south side of the Potomac.During the night of the 23d he crossed over and bivouacked not far fromthe Capitol. Promptly at ten o'clock on the morning of the 24th, histroops commenced to pass in review. Sherman's army made a differentappearance from that of the Army of the Potomac. The latter had beenoperating where they received directly from the North full supplies offood and clothing regularly: the review of this army therefore was thereview of a body of 65,000 well-drilled, well-disciplined and orderlysoldiers inured to hardship and fit for any duty, but without theexperience of gathering their own food and supplies in an enemy'scountry, and of being ever on the watch. Sherman's army was not sowell-dressed as the Army of the Potomac, but their marching could notbe excelled; they gave the appearance of men who had been thoroughlydrilled to endure hardships, either by long and continuous marches orthrough exposure to any climate, without the ordinary shelter of a camp.They exhibited also some of the order of march through Georgia where the"sweet potatoes sprung up from the ground" as Sherman's army wentmarching through. In the rear of a company there would be a capturedhorse or mule loaded with small cooking utensils, captured chickens andother food picked up for the use of the men. Negro families who hadfollowed the army would sometimes come along in the rear of a company,with three or four children packed upon a single mule, and the motherleading it.

The sight was varied and grand: nearly all day for two successive days,from the Capitol to the Treasury Building, could be seen a mass oforderly soldiers marching in columns of companies. The National flagwas flying from almost every house and store; the windows were filledwith spectators; the door-steps and side-walks were crowded with coloredpeople and poor whites who did not succeed in securing better quartersfrom which to get a view of the grand armies. The city was about asfull of strangers who had come to see the sights as it usually is oninauguration day when a new President takes his seat.

It may not be out of place to again allude to President Lincoln and theSecretary of War, Mr. Stanton, who were the great conspicuous figures inthe executive branch of the government. There is no great difference ofopinion now, in the public mind, as to the characteristics of thePresident. With Mr. Stanton the case is different. They were the veryopposite of each other in almost every particular, except that eachpossessed great ability. Mr. Lincoln gained influence over men bymaking them feel that it was a pleasure to serve him. He preferredyielding his own wish to gratify others, rather than to insist uponhaving his own way. It distressed him to disappoint others. In mattersof public duty, however, he had what he wished, but in the leastoffensive way. Mr. Stanton never questioned his own authority tocommand, unless resisted. He cared nothing for the feeling of others.In fact it seemed to be pleasanter to him to disappoint than to gratify.He felt no hesitation in assuming the functions of the executive, or inacting without advising with him. If his act was not sustained, hewould change it—if he saw the matter would be followed up until he didso.

It was generally supposed that these two officials formed the complementof each other. The Secretary was required to prevent the President'sbeing imposed upon. The President was required in the more responsibleplace of seeing that injustice was not done to others. I do not knowthat this view of these two men is still entertained by the majority ofthe people. It is not a correct view, however, in my estimation. Mr.Lincoln did not require a guardian to aid him in the fulfilment of apublic trust.

Mr. Lincoln was not timid, and he was willing to trust his generals inmaking and executing their plans. The Secretary was very timid, and itwas impossible for him to avoid interfering with the armies covering thecapital when it was sought to defend it by an offensive movement againstthe army guarding the Confederate capital. He could see our weakness,but he could not see that the enemy was in danger. The enemy would nothave been in danger if Mr. Stanton had been in the field. Thesecharacteristics of the two officials were clearly shown shortly afterEarly came so near getting into the capital.

Among the army and corps commanders who served with me during the warbetween the States, and who attracted much public attention, but ofwhose ability as soldiers I have not yet given any estimate, are Meade,Hancock, Sedgwick, Burnside, Terry and Hooker. There were others ofgreat merit, such as Griffin, Humphreys, Wright and Mackenzie. Of thosefirst named, Burnside at one time had command of the Army of thePotomac, and later of the Army of the Ohio. Hooker also commanded theArmy of the Potomac for a short time.

General Meade was an officer of great merit, with drawbacks to hisusefulness that were beyond his control. He had been an officer of theengineer corps before the war, and consequently had never served withtroops until he was over forty-six years of age. He never had, Ibelieve, a command of less than a brigade. He saw clearly anddistinctly the position of the enemy, and the topography of the countryin front of his own position. His first idea was to take advantage ofthe lay of the ground, sometimes without reference to the direction wewanted to move afterwards. He was subordinate to his superiors in rankto the extent that he could execute an order which changed his own planswith the same zeal he would have displayed if the plan had been his own.He was brave and conscientious, and commanded the respect of all whoknew him. He was unfortunately of a temper that would get beyond hiscontrol, at times, and make him speak to officers of high rank in themost offensive manner. No one saw this fault more plainly than hehimself, and no one regretted it more. This made it unpleasant attimes, even in battle, for those around him to approach him even withinformation. In spite of this defect he was a most valuable officer anddeserves a high place in the annals of his country.

General Burnside was an officer who was generally liked and respected.He was not, however, fitted to command an army. No one knew this betterthan himself. He always admitted his blunders, and extenuated those ofofficers under him beyond what they were entitled to. It was hardly hisfault that he was ever assigned to a separate command.

Of Hooker I saw but little during the war. I had known him very wellbefore, however. Where I did see him, at Chattanooga, his achievementin bringing his command around the point of Lookout Mountain and intoChattanooga Valley was brilliant. I nevertheless regarded him as adangerous man. He was not subordinate to his superiors. He wasambitious to the extent of caring nothing for the rights of others. Hisdisposition was, when engaged in battle, to get detached from the mainbody of the army and exercise a separate command, gathering to hisstandard all he could of his juniors.

Hancock stands the most conspicuous figure of all the general officerswho did not exercise a separate command. He commanded a corps longerthan any other one, and his name was never mentioned as having committedin battle a blunder for which he was responsible. He was a man of veryconspicuous personal appearance. Tall, well-formed and, at the time ofwhich I now write, young and fresh-looking, he presented an appearancethat would attract the attention of an army as he passed. His genialdisposition made him friends, and his personal courage and his presencewith his command in the thickest of the fight won for him the confidenceof troops serving under him. No matter how hard the fight, the 2d corpsalways felt that their commander was looking after them.

Sedgwick was killed at Spottsylvania before I had an opportunity offorming an estimate of his qualifications as a soldier from personalobservation. I had known him in Mexico when both of us werelieutenants, and when our service gave no indication that either of uswould ever be equal to the command of a brigade. He stood very high inthe army, however, as an officer and a man. He was brave andconscientious. His ambition was not great, and he seemed to dreadresponsibility. He was willing to do any amount of battling, but alwayswanted some one else to direct. He declined the command of the Army ofthe Potomac once, if not oftener.

General Alfred H. Terry came into the army as a volunteer without amilitary education. His way was won without political influence up toan important separate command—the expedition against Fort Fisher, inJanuary, 1865. His success there was most brilliant, and won for himthe rank of brigadier-general in the regular army and of major-generalof volunteers. He is a man who makes friends of those under him by hisconsideration of their wants and their dues. As a commander, he wontheir confidence by his coolness in action and by his clearness ofperception in taking in the situation under which he was placed at anygiven time.

Griffin, Humphreys, and Mackenzie were good corps commanders, but cameinto that position so near to the close of the war as not to attractpublic attention. All three served as such, in the last campaign of thearmies of the Potomac and the James, which culminated at AppomattoxCourt House, on the 9th of April, 1865. The sudden collapse of therebellion monopolized attention to the exclusion of almost everythingelse. I regarded Mackenzie as the most promising young officer in thearmy. Graduating at West Point, as he did, during the second year ofthe war, he had won his way up to the command of a corps before itsclose. This he did upon his own merit and without influence.

CONCLUSION.

The cause of the great War of the Rebellion against the United Statuswill have to be attributed to slavery. For some years before the warbegan it was a trite saying among some politicians that "A state halfslave and half free cannot exist." All must become slave or all free,or the state will go down. I took no part myself in any such view ofthe case at the time, but since the war is over, reviewing the wholequestion, I have come to the conclusion that the saying is quite true.

Slavery was an institution that required unusual guarantees for itssecurity wherever it existed; and in a country like ours where thelarger portion of it was free territory inhabited by an intelligent andwell-to-do population, the people would naturally have but littlesympathy with demands upon them for its protection. Hence the people ofthe South were dependent upon keeping control of the general governmentto secure the perpetuation of their favorite institution. They wereenabled to maintain this control long after the States where slaveryexisted had ceased to have the controlling power, through the assistancethey received from odd men here and there throughout the NorthernStates. They saw their power waning, and this led them to encroach uponthe prerogatives and independence of the Northern States by enactingsuch laws as the Fugitive Slave Law. By this law every Northern manwas obliged, when properly summoned, to turn out and help apprehendthe runaway slave of a Southern man. Northern marshals becameslave-catchers, and Northern courts had to contribute to the supportand protection of the institution.

This was a degradation which the North would not permit any longer thanuntil they could get the power to expunge such laws from the statutebooks. Prior to the time of these encroachments the great majority ofthe people of the North had no particular quarrel with slavery, so longas they were not forced to have it themselves. But they were notwilling to play the role of police for the South in the protection ofthis particular institution.

In the early days of the country, before we had railroads, telegraphsand steamboats—in a word, rapid transit of any sort—the States wereeach almost a separate nationality. At that time the subject of slaverycaused but little or no disturbance to the public mind. But the countrygrew, rapid transit was established, and trade and commerce between theStates got to be so much greater than before, that the power of theNational government became more felt and recognized and, therefore, hadto be enlisted in the cause of this institution.

It is probably well that we had the war when we did. We are better offnow than we would have been without it, and have made more rapidprogress than we otherwise should have made. The civilized nations ofEurope have been stimulated into unusual activity, so that commerce,trade, travel, and thorough acquaintance among people of differentnationalities, has become common; whereas, before, it was but the fewwho had ever had the privilege of going beyond the limits of their owncountry or who knew anything about other people. Then, too, ourrepublican institutions were regarded as experiments up to the breakingout of the rebellion, and monarchical Europe generally believed that ourrepublic was a rope of sand that would part the moment the slighteststrain was brought upon it. Now it has shown itself capable of dealingwith one of the greatest wars that was ever made, and our people haveproven themselves to be the most formidable in war of any nationality.

But this war was a fearful lesson, and should teach us the necessity ofavoiding wars in the future.

The conduct of some of the European states during our troubles shows thelack of conscience of communities where the responsibility does not comeupon a single individual. Seeing a nation that extended from ocean toocean, embracing the better part of a continent, growing as we weregrowing in population, wealth and intelligence, the European nationsthought it would be well to give us a check. We might, possibly, aftera while threaten their peace, or, at least, the perpetuity of theirinstitutions. Hence, England was constantly finding fault with theadministration at Washington because we were not able to keep up aneffective blockade. She also joined, at first, with France and Spain insetting up an Austrian prince upon the throne in Mexico, totallydisregarding any rights or claims that Mexico had of being treated as anindependent power. It is true they trumped up grievances as a pretext,but they were only pretexts which can always be found when wanted.

Mexico, in her various revolutions, had been unable to give thatprotection to the subjects of foreign nations which she would have likedto give, and some of her revolutionary leaders had forced loans fromthem. Under pretence of protecting their citizens, these nations seizedupon Mexico as a foothold for establishing a European monarchy upon ourcontinent, thus threatening our peace at home. I, myself, regarded thisas a direct act of war against the United States by the powers engaged,and supposed as a matter of course that the United States would treat itas such when their hands were free to strike. I often spoke of thematter to Mr. Lincoln and the Secretary of War, but never heard anyspecial views from them to enable me to judge what they thought or feltabout it. I inferred that they felt a good deal as I did, but wereunwilling to commit themselves while we had our own troubles upon ourhands.

All of the powers except France very soon withdrew from the armedintervention for the establishment of an Austrian prince upon the throneof Mexico; but the governing people of these countries continued to theclose of the war to throw obstacles in our way. After the surrender ofLee, therefore, entertaining the opinion here expressed, I sent Sheridanwith a corps to the Rio Grande to have him where he might aid Juarez inexpelling the French from Mexico. These troops got off before theycould be stopped; and went to the Rio Grande, where Sheridan distributedthem up and down the river, much to the consternation of the troops inthe quarter of Mexico bordering on that stream. This soon led to arequest from France that we should withdraw our troops from the RioGrande and to negotiations for the withdrawal of theirs. FinallyBazaine was withdrawn from Mexico by order of the French Government.From that day the empire began to totter. Mexico was then able tomaintain her independence without aid from us.

France is the traditional ally and friend of the United States. I didnot blame France for her part in the scheme to erect a monarchy upon theruins of the Mexican Republic. That was the scheme of one man, animitator without genius or merit. He had succeeded in stealing thegovernment of his country, and made a change in its form against thewishes and instincts of his people. He tried to play the part of thefirst Napoleon, without the ability to sustain that role. He sought bynew conquests to add to his empire and his glory; but the signal failureof his scheme of conquest was the precursor of his own overthrow.

Like our own war between the States, the Franco-Prussian war was anexpensive one; but it was worth to France all it cost her people. Itwas the completion of the downfall of Napoleon III. The beginning waswhen he landed troops on this continent. Failing here, the prestige ofhis name—all the prestige he ever had—was gone. He must achieve asuccess or fall. He tried to strike down his neighbor, Prussia—andfell.

I never admired the character of the first Napoleon; but I recognize hisgreat genius. His work, too, has left its impress for good on the faceof Europe. The third Napoleon could have no claim to having done a goodor just act.

To maintain peace in the future it is necessary to be prepared for war.There can scarcely be a possible chance of a conflict, such as the lastone, occurring among our own people again; but, growing as we are, inpopulation, wealth and military power, we may become the envy of nationswhich led us in all these particulars only a few years ago; and unlesswe are prepared for it we may be in danger of a combined movement beingsome day made to crush us out. Now, scarcely twenty years after thewar, we seem to have forgotten the lessons it taught, and are going onas if in the greatest security, without the power to resist an invasionby the fleets of fourth-rate European powers for a time until we couldprepare for them.

We should have a good navy, and our sea-coast defences should be put inthe finest possible condition. Neither of these cost much when it isconsidered where the money goes, and what we get in return. Moneyexpended in a fine navy, not only adds to our security and tends toprevent war in the future, but is very material aid to our commerce withforeign nations in the meantime. Money spent upon sea-coast defences isspent among our own people, and all goes back again among the people.The work accomplished, too, like that of the navy, gives us a feeling ofsecurity.

England's course towards the United States during the rebellionexasperated the people of this country very much against the mothercountry. I regretted it. England and the United States are naturalallies, and should be the best of friends. They speak one language, andare related by blood and other ties. We together, or even eitherseparately, are better qualified than any other people to establishcommerce between all the nationalities of the world.

England governs her own colonies, and particularly those embracingthe people of different races from her own, better than any othernation. She is just to the conquered, but rigid. She makes themself-supporting, but gives the benefit of labor to the laborer. Shedoes not seem to look upon the colonies as outside possessions which sheis at liberty to work for the support and aggrandizement of the homegovernment.

The hostility of England to the United States during our rebellion wasnot so much real as it was apparent. It was the hostility of theleaders of one political party. I am told that there was no time duringthe civil war when they were able to get up in England a demonstrationin favor of secession, while these were constantly being gotten up infavor of the Union, or, as they called it, in favor of the North. Evenin Manchester, which suffered so fearfully by having the cotton cut offfrom her mills, they had a monster demonstration in favor of the Northat the very time when their workmen were almost famishing.

It is possible that the question of a conflict between races may come upin the future, as did that between freedom and slavery before. Thecondition of the colored man within our borders may become a source ofanxiety, to say the least. But he was brought to our shores bycompulsion, and he now should be considered as having as good a right toremain here as any other class of our citizens. It was looking to asettlement of this question that led me to urge the annexation of SantoDomingo during the time I was President of the United States.

Santo Domingo was freely offered to us, not only by the administration,but by all the people, almost without price. The island is upon ourshores, is very fertile, and is capable of supporting fifteen millionsof people. The products of the soil are so valuable that labor in herfields would be so compensated as to enable those who wished to go thereto quickly repay the cost of their passage. I took it that the coloredpeople would go there in great numbers, so as to have independent statesgoverned by their own race. They would still be States of the Union,and under the protection of the General Government; but the citizenswould be almost wholly colored.

By the war with Mexico, we had acquired, as we have seen, territoryalmost equal in extent to that we already possessed. It was seen thatthe volunteers of the Mexican war largely composed the pioneers tosettle up the Pacific coast country. Their numbers, however, werescarcely sufficient to be a nucleus for the population of the importantpoints of the territory acquired by that war. After our rebellion, whenso many young men were at liberty to return to their homes, they foundthey were not satisfied with the farm, the store, or the work-shop ofthe villages, but wanted larger fields. The mines of the mountainsfirst attracted them; but afterwards they found that rich valleys andproductive grazing and farming lands were there. This territory, thegeography of which was not known to us at the close of the rebellion, isnow as well mapped as any portion of our country. Railroads traverse itin every direction, north, south, east, and west. The mines are worked.The high lands are used for grazing purposes, and rich agriculturallands are found in many of the valleys. This is the work of thevolunteer. It is probable that the Indians would have had control ofthese lands for a century yet but for the war. We must conclude,therefore, that wars are not always evils unmixed with some good.

Prior to the rebellion the great mass of the people were satisfied toremain near the scenes of their birth. In fact an immense majority ofthe whole people did not feel secure against coming to want should theymove among entire strangers. So much was the country divided into smallcommunities that localized idioms had grown up, so that you could almosttell what section a person was from by hearing him speak. Before, newterritories were settled by a "class"; people who shunned contact withothers; people who, when the country began to settle up around them,would push out farther from civilization. Their guns furnished meat,and the cultivation of a very limited amount of the soil, their breadand vegetables. All the streams abounded with fish. Trapping wouldfurnish pelts to be brought into the States once a year, to pay fornecessary articles which they could not raise—powder, lead, whiskey,tobacco and some store goods. Occasionally some little articles ofluxury would enter into these purchases—a quarter of a pound of tea,two or three pounds of coffee, more of sugar, some playing cards, and ifanything was left over of the proceeds of the sale, more whiskey.

Little was known of the topography of the country beyond the settlementsof these frontiersmen. This is all changed now. The war begot a spiritof independence and enterprise. The feeling now is, that a youth mustcut loose from his old surroundings to enable him to get up in theworld. There is now such a commingling of the people that particularidioms and pronunciation are no longer localized to any great extent;the country has filled up "from the centre all around to the sea";railroads connect the two oceans and all parts of the interior; maps,nearly perfect, of every part of the country are now furnished thestudent of geography.

The war has made us a nation of great power and intelligence. We havebut little to do to preserve peace, happiness and prosperity at home,and the respect of other nations. Our experience ought to teach us thenecessity of the first; our power secures the latter.

I feel that we are on the eve of a new era, when there is to be greatharmony between the Federal and Confederate. I cannot stay to be aliving witness to the correctness of this prophecy; but I feel it withinme that it is to be so. The universally kind feeling expressed for meat a time when it was supposed that each day would prove my last, seemedto me the beginning of the answer to "Let us have peace."

The expression of these kindly feelings were not restricted to a sectionof the country, nor to a division of the people. They came fromindividual citizens of all nationalities; from all denominations—theProtestant, the Catholic, and the Jew; and from the various societies ofthe land—scientific, educational, religious or otherwise. Politics didnot enter into the matter at all.

I am not egotist enough to suppose all this significance should be givenbecause I was the object of it. But the war between the States was avery bloody and a very costly war. One side or the other had to yieldprinciples they deemed dearer than life before it could be brought to anend. I commanded the whole of the mighty host engaged on the victoriousside. I was, no matter whether deservedly so or not, a representativeof that side of the controversy. It is a significant and gratifyingfact that Confederates should have joined heartily in this spontaneousmove. I hope the good feeling inaugurated may continue to the end.

APPENDIX.

REPORT OF LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, OF THE UNITED STATES ARMIES1864-65.

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, WASHINGTON, D. C., July 22,1865.

HON. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operationsof the Armies of the United States from the date of my appointment tocommand the same.

From an early period in the rebellion I had been impressed with the ideathat active and continuous operations of all the troops that could bebrought into the field, regardless of season and weather, were necessaryto a speedy termination of the war. The resources of the enemy and hisnumerical strength were far inferior to ours; but as an offset to this,we had a vast territory, with a population hostile to the government, togarrison, and long lines of river and railroad communications toprotect, to enable us to supply the operating armies.

The armies in the East and West acted independently and without concert,like a balky team, no two ever pulling together, enabling the enemy touse to great advantage his interior lines of communication fortransporting troops from East to West, reinforcing the army mostvigorously pressed, and to furlough large numbers, during seasons ofinactivity on our part, to go to their homes and do the work ofproducing, for the support of their armies. It was a question whetherour numerical strength and resources were not more than balanced bythese disadvantages and the enemy's superior position.

From the first, I was firm in the conviction that no peace could be hadthat would be stable and conducive to the happiness of the people, bothNorth and South, until the military power of the rebellion was entirelybroken.

I therefore determined, first, to use the greatest number of troopspracticable against the armed force of the enemy; preventing him fromusing the same force at different seasons against first one and thenanother of our armies, and the possibility of repose for refitting andproducing necessary supplies for carrying on resistance. Second, tohammer continuously against the armed force of the enemy and hisresources, until by mere attrition, if in no other way, there should benothing left to him but an equal submission with the loyal section ofour common country to the constitution and laws of the land.

These views have been kept constantly in mind, and orders given andcampaigns made to carry them out. Whether they might have been betterin conception and execution is for the people, who mourn the loss offriends fallen, and who have to pay the pecuniary cost, to say. All Ican say is, that what I have done has been done conscientiously, to thebest of my ability, and in what I conceived to be for the best interestsof the whole country.

At the date when this report begins, the situation of the contendingforces was about as follows: The Mississippi River was stronglygarrisoned by Federal troops, from St. Louis, Missouri, to its mouth.The line of the Arkansas was also held, thus giving us armed possessionof all west of the Mississippi, north of that stream. A few points inSouthern Louisiana, not remote from the river, were held by us, togetherwith a small garrison at and near the mouth of the Rio Grande. All thebalance of the vast territory of Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas was inthe almost undisputed possession of the enemy, with an army of probablynot less than eighty thousand effective men, that could have beenbrought into the field had there been sufficient opposition to havebrought them out. The let-alone policy had demoralized this force sothat probably but little more than one-half of it was ever present ingarrison at any one time. But the one-half, or forty thousand men, withthe bands of guerillas scattered through Missouri, Arkansas, and alongthe Mississippi River, and the disloyal character of much of thepopulation, compelled the use of a large number of troops to keepnavigation open on the river, and to protect the loyal people to thewest of it. To the east of the Mississippi we held substantially withthe line of the Tennessee and Holston rivers, running eastward toinclude nearly all of the State of Tennessee. South of Chattanooga, asmall foothold had been obtained in Georgia, sufficient to protect EastTennessee from incursions from the enemy's force at Dalton, Georgia.West Virginia was substantially within our lines. Virginia, with theexception of the northern border, the Potomac River, a small area aboutthe mouth of James River, covered by the troops at Norfolk and FortMonroe, and the territory covered by the Army of the Potomac lying alongthe Rapidan, was in the possession of the enemy. Along the sea-coastfootholds had been obtained at Plymouth, Washington, and New Bern, inNorth Carolina; Beaufort, Folly and Morris Islands, Hilton Head, FortPulaski, and Port Royal, in South Carolina; Fernandina and St.Augustine, in Florida. Key West and Pensacola were also in ourpossession, while all the important ports were blockaded by the navy.The accompanying map, a copy of which was sent to General Sherman andother commanders in March, 1864, shows by red lines the territoryoccupied by us at the beginning of the rebellion, and at the opening ofthe campaign of 1864, while those in blue are the lines which it wasproposed to occupy.

Behind the Union lines there were many bands of guerillas and a largepopulation disloyal to the government, making it necessary to guardevery foot of road or river used in supplying our armies. In the South,a reign of military despotism prevailed, which made every man and boycapable of bearing arms a soldier; and those who could not bear arms inthe field acted as provosts for collecting deserters and returning them.This enabled the enemy to bring almost his entire strength into thefield.

The enemy had concentrated the bulk of his forces east of theMississippi into two armies, commanded by Generals R. E. Lee and J. E.Johnston, his ablest and best generals. The army commanded by Leeoccupied the south bank of the Rapidan, extending from Mine Runwestward, strongly intrenched, covering and defending Richmond, therebel capital, against the Army of the Potomac. The army under Johnstonoccupied a strongly intrenched position at Dalton, Georgia, covering anddefending Atlanta, Georgia, a place of great importance as a railroadcentre, against the armies under Major-General W. T. Sherman. Inaddition to these armies he had a large cavalry force under Forrest, inNorth-east Mississippi; a considerable force, of all arms, in theShenandoah Valley, and in the western part of Virginia and extremeeastern part of Tennessee; and also confronting our sea-coast garrisons,and holding blockaded ports where we had no foothold upon land.

These two armies, and the cities covered and defended by them, were themain objective points of the campaign.

Major-General W. T. Sherman, who was appointed to the command of theMilitary Division of the Mississippi, embracing all the armies andterritory east of the Mississippi River to the Alleghanies and theDepartment of Arkansas, west of the Mississippi, had the immediatecommand of the armies operating against Johnston.

Major-General George G. Meade had the immediate command of the Army ofthe Potomac, from where I exercised general supervision of the movementsof all our armies.

General Sherman was instructed to move against Johnston's army, to breakit up, and to go into the interior of the enemy's country as far as hecould, inflicting all the damage he could upon their war resources. Ifthe enemy in his front showed signs of joining Lee, to follow him up tothe full extent of his ability, while I would prevent the concentrationof Lee upon him, if it was in the power of the Army of the Potomac to doso. More specific written instructions were not given, for the reasonthat I had talked over with him the plans of the campaign, and wassatisfied that he understood them and would execute them to the fullestextent possible.

Major-General N. P. Banks, then on an expedition up Red River againstShreveport, Louisiana (which had been organized previous to myappointment to command), was notified by me on the 15th of March, of theimportance it was that Shreveport should be taken at the earliestpossible day, and that if he found that the taking of it would occupyfrom ten to fifteen days' more time than General Sherman had given histroops to be absent from their command, he would send them back at thetime specified by General Sherman, even if it led to the abandonment ofthe main object of the Red River expedition, for this force wasnecessary to movements east of the Mississippi; that should hisexpedition prove successful, he would hold Shreveport and the Red Riverwith such force as he might deem necessary, and return the balance ofhis troops to the neighborhood of New Orleans, commencing no move forthe further acquisition of territory, unless it was to make that thenheld by him more easily held; that it might be a part of the springcampaign to move against Mobile; that it certainly would be, if troopsenough could be obtained to make it without embarrassing othermovements; that New Orleans would be the point of departure for such anexpedition; also, that I had directed General Steele to make a real movefrom Arkansas, as suggested by him (General Banks), instead of ademonstration, as Steele thought advisable.

On the 31st of March, in addition to the foregoing notification anddirections, he was instructed as follows:

"1st. If successful in your expedition against Shreveport, that youturn over the defence of the Red River to General Steele and the navy.

"2d. That you abandon Texas entirely, with the exception of your holdupon the Rio Grande. This can be held with four thousand men, if theywill turn their attention immediately to fortifying their positions. Atleast one-half of the force required for this service might be takenfrom the colored troops.

"3d. By properly fortifying on the Mississippi River, the force toguard it from Port Hudson to New Orleans can be reduced to ten thousandmen, if not to a less number. Six thousand more would then hold all therest of the territory necessary to hold until active operations canagain be resumed west of the river. According to your last return, thiswould give you a force of over thirty thousand effective men with whichto move against Mobile. To this I expect to add five thousand men fromMissouri. If however, you think the force here stated too small to holdthe territory regarded as necessary to hold possession of, I would sayconcentrate at least twenty-five thousand men of your present commandfor operations against Mobile. With these and such additions as I cangive you from elsewhere, lose no time in making a demonstration, to befollowed by an attack upon Mobile. Two or more iron-clads will beordered to report to Admiral Farragut. This gives him a strong navalfleet with which to co-operate. You can make your own arrangements withthe admiral for his co-operation, and select your own line of approach.My own idea of the matter is that Pascagoula should be your base; but,from your long service in the Gulf Department, you will know best aboutthe matter. It is intended that your movements shall be co-operativewith movements elsewhere, and you cannot now start too soon. All Iwould now add is, that you commence the concentration of your forces atonce. Preserve a profound secrecy of what you intend doing, and startat the earliest possible moment.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL N. P. BANKS."

Major-General Meade was instructed that Lee's army would be hisobjective point; that wherever Lee went he would go also. For hismovement two plans presented themselves: One to cross the Rapidan belowLee, moving by his right flank; the other above, moving by his left.Each presented advantages over the other, with corresponding objections.By crossing above, Lee would be cut off from all chance of ignoringRichmond or going north on a raid. But if we took this route, all wedid would have to be done whilst the rations we started with held out;besides, it separated us from Butler, so that he could not be directedhow to cooperate. If we took the other route, Brandy Station could beused as a base of supplies until another was secured on the York orJames rivers. Of these, however, it was decided to take the lowerroute.

The following letter of instruction was addressed to Major-General B. F.
Butler:

"FORT MONROE, VIRGINIA, April 2, 1864.

"GENERAL:-In the spring campaign, which it is desirable shall commenceat as early a day as practicable, it is proposed to have cooperativeaction of all the armies in the field, as far as this object can beaccomplished.

"It will not be possible to unite our armies into two or three largeones to act as so many units, owing to the absolute necessity of holdingon to the territory already taken from the enemy. But, generallyspeaking, concentration can be practically effected by armies moving tothe interior of the enemy's country from the territory they have toguard. By such movement, they interpose themselves between the enemyand the country to be guarded, thereby reducing the number necessary toguard important points, or at least occupy the attention of a part ofthe enemy's force, if no greater object is gained. Lee's army andRichmond being the greater objects towards which our attention must bedirected in the next campaign, it is desirable to unite all the force wecan against them. The necessity of covering Washington with the Army ofthe Potomac, and of covering your department with your army, makes itimpossible to unite these forces at the beginning of any move. Ipropose, therefore, what comes nearest this of anything that seemspracticable: The Army of the Potomac will act from its present base,Lee's army being the objective point. You will collect all the forcesfrom your command that can be spared from garrison duty—I should saynot less than twenty thousand effective men—to operate on the southside of James River, Richmond being your objective point. To the forceyou already have will be added about ten thousand men from SouthCarolina, under Major-General Gillmore, who will command them in person.Major-General W. F. Smith is ordered to report to you, to command thetroops sent into the field from your own department.

"General Gillmore will be ordered to report to you at Fortress Monroe,with all the troops on transports, by the 18th instant, or as soonthereafter as practicable. Should you not receive notice by that timeto move, you will make such disposition of them and your other forces asyou may deem best calculated to deceive the enemy as to the real move tobe made.

"When you are notified to move, take City Point with as much force aspossible. Fortify, or rather intrench, at once, and concentrate allyour troops for the field there as rapidly as you can. From City Pointdirections cannot be given at this time for your further movements.

"The fact that has already been stated—that is, that Richmond is to beyour objective point, and that there is to be co-operation between yourforce and the Army of the Potomac—must be your guide. This indicatesthe necessity of your holding close to the south bank of the James Riveras you advance. Then, should the enemy be forced into his intrenchmentsin Richmond, the Army of the Potomac would follow, and by means oftransports the two armies would become a unit.

"All the minor details of your advance are left entirely to yourdirection. If, however, you think it practicable to use your cavalrysouth of you, so as to cut the railroad about Hicksford, about the timeof the general advance, it would be of immense advantage.

"You will please forward for my information, at the earliest practicableday, all orders, details, and instructions you may give for theexecution of this order.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL B. F. BUTLER."

On the 16th these instructions were substantially reiterated. On the19th, in order to secure full co-operation between his army and that ofGeneral Meade, he was informed that I expected him to move from FortMonroe the same day that General Meade moved from Culpeper. The exacttime I was to telegraph him as soon as it was fixed, and that it wouldnot be earlier than the 27th of April; that it was my intention to fightLee between Culpeper and Richmond, if he would stand. Should he,however, fall back into Richmond, I would follow up and make a junctionwith his (General Butler's) army on the James River; that, could I becertain he would be able to invest Richmond on the south side, so as tohave his left resting on the James, above the city, I would form thejunction there; that circumstances might make this course advisableanyhow; that he should use every exertion to secure footing as far upthe south side of the river as he could, and as soon as possible afterthe receipt of orders to move; that if he could not carry the city, heshould at least detain as large a force there as possible.

In co-operation with the main movements against Lee and Johnston, I wasdesirous of using all other troops necessarily kept in departmentsremote from the fields of immediate operations, and also those kept inthe background for the protection of our extended lines between theloyal States and the armies operating against them.

A very considerable force, under command of Major-General Sigel, was soheld for the protection of West Virginia, and the frontiers of Marylandand Pennsylvania. Whilst these troops could not be withdrawn to distantfields without exposing the North to invasion by comparatively smallbodies of the enemy, they could act directly to their front, and givebetter protection than if lying idle in garrison. By such a movementthey would either compel the enemy to detach largely for the protectionof his supplies and lines of communication, or he would lose them.General Sigel was therefore directed to organize all his available forceinto two expeditions, to move from Beverly and Charleston, under commandof Generals Ord and Crook, against the East Tennessee and VirginiaRailroad. Subsequently, General Ord having been relieved at his ownrequest, General Sigel was instructed at his own suggestion, to give upthe expedition by Beverly, and to form two columns, one under GeneralCrook, on the Kanawha, numbering about ten thousand men, and one on theShenandoah, numbering about seven thousand men. The one on theShenandoah to assemble between Cumberland and the Shenandoah, and theinfantry and artillery advanced to Cedar Creek with such cavalry ascould be made available at the moment, to threaten the enemy in theShenandoah Valley, and advance as far as possible; while General Crookwould take possession of Lewisburg with part of his force and move downthe Tennessee Railroad, doing as much damage as he could, destroying theNew River Bridge and the salt-works, at Saltville, Va.

Owing to the weather and bad condition of the roads, operations weredelayed until the 1st of May, when, everything being in readiness andthe roads favorable, orders were given for a general movement of all thearmies not later than the 4th of May.

My first object being to break the military power of the rebellion, andcapture the enemy's important strongholds, made me desirous that GeneralButler should succeed in his movement against Richmond, as that wouldtend more than anything else, unless it were the capture of Lee's army,to accomplish this desired result in the East. If he failed, it was mydetermination, by hard fighting, either to compel Lee to retreat, or toso cripple him that he could not detach a large force to go north, andstill retain enough for the defence of Richmond. It was wellunderstood, by both Generals Butler and Meade, before starting on thecampaign, that it was my intention to put both their armies south of theJames River, in case of failure to destroy Lee without it.

Before giving General Butler his instructions, I visited him at FortMonroe, and in conversation pointed out the apparent importance ofgetting possession of Petersburg, and destroying railroad communicationas far south as possible. Believing, however, in the practicability ofcapturing Richmond unless it was reinforced, I made that the objectivepoint of his operations. As the Army of the Potomac was to movesimultaneously with him, Lee could not detach from his army with safety,and the enemy did not have troops elsewhere to bring to the defence ofthe city in time to meet a rapid movement from the north of James River.

I may here state that, commanding all the armies as I did, I tried, asfar as possible, to leave General Meade in independent command of theArmy of the Potomac. My instructions for that army were all throughhim, and were general in their nature, leaving all the details and theexecution to him. The campaigns that followed proved him to be theright man in the right place. His commanding always in the presence ofan officer superior to him in rank, has drawn from him much of thatpublic attention that his zeal and ability entitle him to, and which hewould otherwise have received.

The movement of the Army of the Potomac commenced early on the morningof the 4th of May, under the immediate direction and orders ofMajor-General Meade, pursuant to instructions. Before night, the wholearmy was across the Rapidan (the fifth and sixth corps crossing atGermania Ford, and the second corps at Ely's Ford, the cavalry, underMajor-General Sheridan, moving in advance,) with the greater part of itstrains, numbering about four thousand wagons, meeting with but slightopposition. The average distance travelled by the troops that day wasabout twelve miles. This I regarded as a great success, and it removedfrom my mind the most serious apprehensions I had entertained, that ofcrossing the river in the face of an active, large, well-appointed, andably commanded army, and how so large a train was to be carried througha hostile country, and protected. Early on the 5th, the advance corps(the fifth, Major-General G. K. Warren commanding) met and engaged theenemy outside his intrenchments near Mine Run. The battle ragedfuriously all day, the whole army being brought into the fight as fastas the corps could be got upon the field, which, considering the densityof the forest and narrowness of the roads, was done with commendablepromptness.

General Burnside, with the ninth corps, was, at the time the Army of thePotomac moved, left with the bulk of his corps at the crossing of theRappahannock River and Alexandria Railroad, holding the road back toBull Run, with instructions not to move until he received notice that acrossing of the Rapidan was secured, but to move promptly as soon assuch notice was received. This crossing he was apprised of on theafternoon of the 4th. By six o'clock of the morning of the 6th he wasleading his corps into action near the Wilderness Tavern, some of histroops having marched a distance of over thirty miles, crossing both theRappahannock and Rapidan rivers. Considering that a large proportion,probably two-thirds of his command, was composed of new troops,unaccustomed to marches, and carrying the accoutrements of a soldier,this was a remarkable march.

The battle of the Wilderness was renewed by us at five o'clock on themorning of the 6th, and continued with unabated fury until darkness setin, each army holding substantially the same position that they had onthe evening of the 5th. After dark, the enemy made a feeble attempt toturn our right flank, capturing several hundred prisoners and creatingconsiderable confusion. But the promptness of General Sedgwick, who waspersonally present and commanded that part of our line, soon reformed itand restored order. On the morning of the 7th, reconnoissances showedthat the enemy had fallen behind his intrenched lines, with pickets tothe front, covering a part of the battle-field. From this it wasevident to my mind that the two days' fighting had satisfied him of hisinability to further maintain the contest in the open field,notwithstanding his advantage of position, and that he would wait anattack behind his works. I therefore determined to push on and put mywhole force between him and Richmond; and orders were at once issued fora movement by his right flank. On the night of the 7th, the march wascommenced towards Spottsylvania Court House, the fifth corps moving onthe most direct road. But the enemy having become apprised of ourmovement, and having the shorter line, was enabled to reach there first.On the 8th, General Warren met a force of the enemy, which had been sentout to oppose and delay his advance, to gain time to fortify the linetaken up at Spottsylvania. This force was steadily driven back on themain force, within the recently constructed works, after considerablefighting, resulting in severe loss to both sides. On the morning of the9th, General Sheridan started on a raid against the enemy's lines ofcommunication with Richmond. The 9th, 10th, and 11th were spent inmanoeuvring and fighting, without decisive results. Among the killed onthe 9th was that able and distinguished soldier Major-General JohnSedgwick, commanding the sixth army corps. Major-General H. G. Wrightsucceeded him in command. Early on the morning of the 12th a generalattack was made on the enemy in position. The second corps,Major-General Hancock commanding, carried a salient of his line,capturing most of Johnson's division of Ewell's corps and twenty piecesof artillery. But the resistance was so obstinate that the advantagegained did not prove decisive. The 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, and18th, were consumed in manoeuvring and awaiting the arrival ofreinforcements from Washington. Deeming it impracticable to make anyfurther attack upon the enemy at Spottsylvania Court House, orders wereissued on the 15th with a view to a movement to the North Anna, tocommence at twelve o'clock on the night of the 19th. Late in theafternoon of the 19th, Ewell's corps came out of its works on ourextreme right flank; but the attack was promptly repulsed, with heavyloss. This delayed the movement to the North Anna until the night of the21st, when it was commenced. But the enemy again, having the shorterline, and being in possession of the main roads, was enabled to reachthe North Anna in advance of us, and took position behind it. The fifthcorps reached the North Anna on the afternoon of the 23d, closelyfollowed by the sixth corps. The second and ninth corps got up about thesame time, the second holding the railroad bridge, and the ninth lyingbetween that and Jericho Ford. General Warren effected a crossing thesame afternoon, and got a position without much opposition. Soon aftergetting into position he was violently attacked, but repulsed the enemywith great slaughter. On the 25th, General Sheridan rejoined the Armyof the Potomac from the raid on which he started from Spottsylvania,having destroyed the depots at Beaver Dam and Ashland stations, fourtrains of cars, large supplies of rations, and many miles ofrailroad-track; recaptured about four hundred of our men on their way toRichmond as prisoners of war; met and defeated the enemy's cavalry atYellow Tavern; carried the first line of works around Richmond (butfinding the second line too strong to be carried by assault), recrossedto the north bank of the Chickahominy at Meadow Bridge under heavy fire,and moved by a detour to Haxall's Landing, on the James River, where hecommunicated with General Butler. This raid had the effect of drawingoff the whole of the enemy's cavalry force, making it comparatively easyto guard our trains.

General Butler moved his main force up the James River, in pursuance ofinstructions, on the 4th of May, General Gillmore having joined him withthe tenth corps. At the same time he sent a force of one thousand eighthundred cavalry, by way of West Point, to form a junction with himwherever he might get a foothold, and a force of three thousand cavalry,under General Kautz, from Suffolk, to operate against the road south ofPetersburg and Richmond. On the 5th, he occupied, without opposition,both City Point and Bermuda Hundred, his movement being a completesurprise. On the 6th, he was in position with his main army, andcommenced intrenching. On the 7th he made a reconnoissance against thePetersburg and Richmond Railroad, destroying a portion of it after somefighting. On the 9th he telegraphed as follows:

"HEADQUARTERS, NEAR BERMUDA LANDING, May 9, 1864.

"HON. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

"Our operations may be summed up in a few words. With one thousandseven hundred cavalry we have advanced up the Peninsula, forced theChickahominy, and have safely, brought them to their present position.These were colored cavalry, and are now holding our advance picketstowards Richmond.

"General Kautz, with three thousand cavalry from Suffolk, on the sameday with our movement up James River, forced the Black Water, burned therailroad bridge at Stony Creek, below Petersburg, cutting intoBeauregard's force at that point.

"We have landed here, intrenched ourselves, destroyed many miles ofrailroad, and got a position which, with proper supplies, we can holdout against the whole of Lee's army. I have ordered up the supplies.

"Beauregard, with a large portion of his force, was left south by thecutting of the railroads by Kautz. That portion which reachedPetersburg under Hill I have whipped to-day, killing and wounding many,and taking many prisoners, after a severe and well-contested fight.

"General Grant will not be troubled with any further reinforcements to
Lee from Beauregard's force.

"BENJ. F. BUTLER, Major-General."

On the evening of the 13th and morning of the 14th he carried a portionof the enemy's first line of defences at Drury's Bluff, or Fort Darling,with small loss. The time thus consumed from the 6th lost to us thebenefit of the surprise and capture of Richmond and Petersburg,enabling, as it did, Beauregard to collect his loose forces in North andSouth Carolina, and bring them to the defence of those places. On the16th, the enemy attacked General Butler in his position in front ofDrury's Bluff. He was forced back, or drew back, into his intrenchmentsbetween the forks of the James and Appomattox rivers, the enemyintrenching strongly in his front, thus covering his railroads, thecity, and all that was valuable to him. His army, therefore, though ina position of great security, was as completely shut off from furtheroperations directly against Richmond as if it had been in a bottlestrongly corked. It required but a comparatively small force of theenemy to hold it there.

On the 12th, General Kautz, with his cavalry, was started on a raidagainst the Danville Railroad, which he struck at Coalfield, Powhatan,and Chula Stations, destroying them, the railroad-track, two freighttrains, and one locomotive, together with large quantities of commissaryand other stores; thence, crossing to the South Side Road, struck it atWilson's, Wellsville, and Black's and White's Stations, destroying theroad and station-houses; thence he proceeded to City Point, which hereached on the 18th.

On the 19th of April, and prior to the movement of General Butler, theenemy, with a land force under General Hoke and an iron-clad ram,attacked Plymouth, N. C., commanded by General H. W. Wessells, and ourgunboats there, and, after severe fighting, the place was carried byassault, and the entire garrison and armament captured. The gunboatSmithfield was sunk, and the Miami disabled.

The army sent to operate against Richmond having hermetically sealeditself up at Bermuda Hundred, the enemy was enabled to bring the most,if not all, the reinforcements brought from the south by Beauregardagainst the Army of the Potomac. In addition to this reinforcement, avery considerable one, probably not less than fifteen thousand men, wasobtained by calling in the scattered troops under Breckinridge from thewestern part of Virginia.

The position of Bermuda Hundred was as easy to defend as it wasdifficult to operate from against the enemy. I determined, therefore,to bring from it all available forces, leaving enough only to securewhat had been gained; and accordingly, on the 22d, I directed that theybe sent forward, under command of Major-General W. F. Smith, to join theArmy of the Potomac.

On the 24th of May, the 9th army corps, commanded by Major-General A. E.Burnside, was assigned to the Army of the Potomac, and from this timeforward constituted a portion of Major-General Meade's command.

Finding the enemy's position on the North Anna stronger than either ofhis previous ones, I withdrew on the night of the 26th to the north bankof the North Anna, and moved via Hanover Town to turn the enemy'sposition by his right.

Generals Torbert's and Merritt's divisions of cavalry, under Sheridan,and the 6th corps, led the advance, crossed the Pamunkey River atHanover Town, after considerable fighting, and on the 28th the twodivisions of cavalry had a severe, but successful engagement with theenemy at Hawes's Shop. On the 29th and 30th we advanced, with heavyskirmishing, to the Hanover Court House and Cold Harbor Road, anddeveloped the enemy's position north of the Chickahominy. Late on theevening of the last day the enemy came out and attacked our left, butwas repulsed with very considerable loss. An attack was immediatelyordered by General Meade, along his whole line, which resulted indriving the enemy from a part of his intrenched skirmish line.

On the 31st, General Wilson's division of cavalry destroyed the railroadbridges over the South Anna River, after defeating the enemy's cavalry.General Sheridan, on the same day, reached Cold Harbor, and held ituntil relieved by the 6th corps and General Smith's command, which hadjust arrived, via White House, from General Butler's army.

On the 1st day of June an attack was made at five P.M. by the 6th corpsand the troops under General Smith, the other corps being held inreadiness to advance on the receipt of orders. This resulted in ourcarrying and holding the enemy's first line of works in front of theright of the 6th corps, and in front of General Smith. During theattack the enemy made repeated assaults on each of the corps not engagedin the main attack, but was repulsed with heavy loss in every instance.That night he made several assaults to regain what he had lost in theday, but failed. The 2d was spent in getting troops into position foran attack on the 3d. On the 3d of June we again assaulted the enemy'sworks, in the hope of driving him from his position. In this attemptour loss was heavy, while that of the enemy, I have reason to believe,was comparatively light. It was the only general attack made from theRapidan to the James which did not inflict upon the enemy losses tocompensate for our own losses. I would not be understood as saying thatall previous attacks resulted in victories to our arms, or accomplishedas much as I had hoped from them; but they inflicted upon the enemysevere losses, which tended, in the end, to the complete overthrow ofthe rebellion.

From the proximity of the enemy to his defences around Richmond, it wasimpossible, by any flank movement, to interpose between him and thecity. I was still in a condition to either move by his left flank, andinvest Richmond from the north side, or continue my move by his rightflank to the south side of the James. While the former might have beenbetter as a covering for Washington, yet a full survey of all the groundsatisfied me that it would be impracticable to hold a line north andeast of Richmond that would protect the Fredericksburg Railroad, a long,vulnerable line, which would exhaust much of our strength to guard, andthat would have to be protected to supply the army, and would leave opento the enemy all his lines of communication on the south side of theJames. My idea, from the start, had been to beat Lee's army north ofRichmond, if possible. Then, after destroying his lines ofcommunication north of the James River, to transfer the army to thesouth side, and besiege Lee in Richmond, or follow him south if heshould retreat. After the battle of the Wilderness, it was evident thatthe enemy deemed it of the first importance to run no risks with thearmy he then had. He acted purely on the defensive, behind breastworks,or feebly on the offensive immediately in front of them, and where, incase of repulse, he could easily retire behind them. Without a greatersacrifice of life than I was willing to make, all could not beaccomplished that I had designed north of Richmond. I thereforedetermined to continue to hold substantially the ground we thenoccupied, taking advantage of any favorable circumstances that mightpresent themselves, until the cavalry could be sent to Charlottesvilleand Gordonsville to effectually break up the railroad connection betweenRichmond and the Shenandoah Valley and Lynchburg; and when the cavalrygot well off, to move the army to the south side of the James River, bythe enemy's right flank, where I felt I could cut off all his sources ofsupply, except by the canal.

On the 7th, two divisions of cavalry, under General Sheridan, got off onthe expedition against the Virginia Central Railroad, with instructionsto Hunter, whom I hoped he would meet near Charlottesville, to join hisforces to Sheridan's, and after the work laid out for them wasthoroughly done, to join the Army of the Potomac by the route laid downin Sheridan's instructions.

On the 10th of June, General Butler sent a force of infantry, underGeneral Gillmore, and of cavalry under General Kautz, to capturePetersburg, if possible, and destroy the railroad and common bridgesacross the Appomattox. The cavalry carried the works on the south side,and penetrated well in towards the town, but were forced to retire.General Gillmore, finding the works which he approached very strong, anddeeming an assault impracticable, returned to Bermuda Hundred withoutattempting one.

Attaching great importance to the possession of Petersburg, I sent backto Bermuda Hundred and City Point, General Smith's command by water, viathe White House, to reach there in advance of the Army of the Potomac.This was for the express purpose of securing Petersburg before theenemy, becoming aware of our intention, could reinforce the place.

The movement from Cold Harbor commenced after dark on the evening of the12th. One division of cavalry, under General Wilson, and the 5th corps,crossed the Chickahominy at Long Bridge, and moved out to White OakSwamp, to cover the crossings of the other corps. The advance corpsreached James River, at Wilcox's Landing and Charles City Court House,on the night of the 13th.

During three long years the Armies of the Potomac and Northern Virginiahad been confronting each other. In that time they had fought moredesperate battles than it probably ever before fell to the lot of twoarmies to fight, without materially changing the vantage ground ofeither. The Southern press and people, with more shrewdness than wasdisplayed in the North, finding that they had failed to captureWashington and march on to New York, as they had boasted they would do,assumed that they only defended their Capital and Southern territory.Hence, Antietam, Gettysburg, and all the other battles that had beenfought, were by them set down as failures on our part, and victories forthem. Their army believed this. It produced a morale which could onlybe overcome by desperate and continuous hard fighting. The battles ofthe Wilderness, Spottsylvania, North Anna and Cold Harbor, bloody andterrible as they were on our side, were even more damaging to the enemy,and so crippled him as to make him wary ever after of taking theoffensive. His losses in men were probably not so great, owing to thefact that we were, save in the Wilderness, almost invariably theattacking party; and when he did attack, it was in the open field. Thedetails of these battles, which for endurance and bravery on the part ofthe soldiery, have rarely been surpassed, are given in the report ofMajor-General Meade, and the subordinate reports accompanying it.

During the campaign of forty-three days, from the Rapidan to the JamesRiver, the army had to be supplied from an ever-shifting base, bywagons, over narrow roads, through a densely wooded country, with a lackof wharves at each new base from which to conveniently dischargevessels. Too much credit cannot, therefore, be awarded to thequartermaster and commissary departments for the zeal and efficiencydisplayed by them. Under the general supervision of the chiefquartermaster, Brigadier-General R. Ingalls, the trains were made tooccupy all the available roads between the army and our water-base, andbut little difficulty was experienced in protecting them.

The movement in the Kanawha and Shenandoah valleys, under General Sigel,commenced on the 1st of May. General Crook, who had the immediatecommand of the Kanawha expedition, divided his forces into two columns,giving one, composed of cavalry, to General Averell. They crossed themountains by separate routes. Averell struck the Tennessee and VirginiaRailroad, near Wytheville, on the 10th, and proceeding to New River andChristiansburg, destroyed the road, several important bridges anddepots, including New River Bridge, forming a junction with Crook atUnion on the 15th. General Sigel moved up the Shenandoah Valley, metthe enemy at New Market on the 15th, and, after a severe engagement, wasdefeated with heavy loss, and retired behind Cedar Creek. Not regardingthe operations of General Sigel as satisfactory, I asked his removalfrom command, and Major-General Hunter appointed to supersede him. Hisinstructions were embraced in the following dispatches to Major-GeneralH. W. Halleck, chief of staff of the army:

"NEAR SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE, VA. "May 20, 1864.

* * * * * * * "The enemy areevidently relying for supplies greatly on such as are brought over thebranch road running through Staunton. On the whole, therefore, I thinkit would be better for General Hunter to move in that direction; reachStaunton and Gordonsville or Charlottesville, if he does not meet toomuch opposition. If he can hold at bay a force equal to his own, hewill be doing good service. * *

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL H. W. HALLECK."

"JERICHO FORD, VA., May 25, 1864.

"If Hunter can possibly get to Charlottesville and Lynchburg, he shoulddo so, living on the country. The railroads and canal should bedestroyed beyond possibility of repairs for weeks. Completing this, hecould find his way back to his original base, or from about Gordonsvillejoin this army.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL H. W. HALLECK."

General Hunter immediately took up the offensive, and, moving up theShenandoah Valley, met the enemy on the 5th of June at Piedmont, and,after a battle of ten hours, routed and defeated him, capturing on thefield of battle one thousand five hundred men, three pieces ofartillery, and three hundred stand of small arms. On the 8th of thesame month he formed a junction with Crook and Averell at Staunton, fromwhich place he moved direct on Lynchburg, via Lexington, which place hereached and invested on the 16th day of June. Up to this time he wasvery successful; and but for the difficulty of taking with himsufficient ordnance stores over so long a march, through a hostilecountry, he would, no doubt, have captured that, to the enemy important,point. The destruction of the enemy's supplies and manufactories wasvery great. To meet this movement under General Hunter, General Leesent a force, perhaps equal to a corps, a part of which reachedLynchburg a short time before Hunter. After some skirmishing on the17th and 18th, General Hunter, owing to a want of ammunition to givebattle, retired from before the place. Unfortunately, this want ofammunition left him no choice of route for his return but by way ofKanawha. This lost to us the use of his troops for several weeks fromthe defence of the North.

Had General Hunter moved by way of Charlottesville, instead ofLexington, as his instructions contemplated, he would have been in aposition to have covered the Shenandoah Valley against the enemy, shouldthe force he met have seemed to endanger it. If it did not, he wouldhave been within easy distance of the James River Canal, on the mainline of communication between Lynchburg and the force sent for itsdefence. I have never taken exception to the operations of GeneralHunter, and am not now disposed to find fault with him, for I have nodoubt he acted within what he conceived to be the spirit of hisinstructions and the interests of the service. The promptitude of hismovements and his gallantry should entitle him to the commendation ofhis country.

To return to the Army of the Potomac: The 2d corps commenced crossingthe James River on the morning of the 14th by ferry-boats at Wilcox'sLanding. The laying of the pontoon-bridge was completed about midnightof the 14th, and the crossing of the balance of the army was rapidlypushed forward by both bridge and ferry.

After the crossing had commenced, I proceeded by steamer to Bermuda
Hundred to give the necessary orders for the immediate capture of
Petersburg.

The instructions to General Butler were verbal, and were for him to sendGeneral Smith immediately, that night, with all the troops he could givehim without sacrificing the position he then held. I told him that Iwould return at once to the Army of the Potomac, hasten its crossing andthrow it forward to Petersburg by divisions as rapidly as it could bedone, that we could reinforce our armies more rapidly there than theenemy could bring troops against us. General Smith got off as directed,and confronted the enemy's pickets near Petersburg before daylight nextmorning, but for some reason that I have never been able tosatisfactorily understand, did not get ready to assault his main linesuntil near sundown. Then, with a part of his command only, he made theassault, and carried the lines north-east of Petersburg from theAppomattox River, for a distance of over two and a half miles, capturingfifteen pieces of artillery and three hundred prisoners. This was aboutseven P.M. Between the line thus captured and Petersburg there were noother works, and there was no evidence that the enemy had reinforcedPetersburg with a single brigade from any source. The night was clearthe moon shining brightly and favorable to further operations. GeneralHancock, with two divisions of the 2d corps, reached General Smith justafter dark, and offered the service of these troops as he (Smith) mightwish, waiving rank to the named commander, who he naturally supposedknew best the position of affairs, and what to do with the troops. Butinstead of taking these troops and pushing at once into Petersburg, herequested General Hancock to relieve a part of his line in the capturedworks, which was done before midnight.

By the time I arrived the next morning the enemy was in force. An attackwas ordered to be made at six o'clock that evening by the troops underSmith and the 2d and 9th corps. It required until that time for the 9thcorps to get up and into position. The attack was made as ordered, andthe fighting continued with but little intermission until six o'clockthe next morning, and resulted in our carrying the advance and some ofthe main works of the enemy to the right (our left) of those previouslycaptured by General Smith, several pieces of artillery, and over fourhundred prisoners.

The 5th corps having got up, the attacks were renewed and persisted inwith great vigor on the 17th and 18th, but only resulted in forcing theenemy into an interior line, from which he could not be dislodged. Theadvantages of position gained by us were very great. The army thenproceeded to envelop Petersburg towards the South Side Railroad as faras possible without attacking fortifications.

On the 16th the enemy, to reinforce Petersburg, withdrew from a part ofhis intrenchment in front of Bermuda Hundred, expecting, no doubt, toget troops from north of the James to take the place of those withdrawnbefore we could discover it. General Butler, taking advantage of this,at once moved a force on the railroad between Petersburg and Richmond.As soon as I was apprised of the advantage thus gained, to retain it Iordered two divisions of the 6th corps, General Wright commanding, thatwere embarking at Wilcox's Landing, under orders for City Point, toreport to General Butler at Bermuda Hundred, of which General Butler wasnotified, and the importance of holding a position in advance of hispresent line urged upon him.

About two o'clock in the afternoon General Butler was forced back to theline the enemy had withdrawn from in the morning. General Wright, withhis two divisions, joined General Butler on the forenoon of the 17th,the latter still holding with a strong picket-line the enemy's works.But instead of putting these divisions into the enemy's works to holdthem, he permitted them to halt and rest some distance in the rear ofhis own line. Between four and five o'clock in the afternoon the enemyattacked and drove in his pickets and re-occupied his old line.

On the night of the 20th and morning of the 21st a lodgment was effectedby General Butler, with one brigade of infantry, on the north bank ofthe James, at Deep Bottom, and connected by pontoon-bridge with BermudaHundred.

On the 19th, General Sheridan, on his return from his expedition againstthe Virginia Central Railroad, arrived at the White House just as theenemy's cavalry was about to attack it, and compelled it to retire. Theresult of this expedition was, that General Sheridan met the enemy'scavalry near Trevilian Station, on the morning of the 11th of June, whomhe attacked, and after an obstinate contest drove from the field incomplete rout. He left his dead and nearly all his wounded in ourhands, and about four hundred prisoners and several hundred horses. Onthe 12th he destroyed the railroad from Trevilian Station to LouisaCourt House. This occupied until three o'clock P.M., when he advancedin the direction of Gordonsville. He found the enemy reinforced byinfantry, behind well-constructed rifle-pits, about five miles from thelatter place and too strong to successfully assault. On the extremeright, however, his reserve brigade carried the enemy's works twice, andwas twice driven therefrom by infantry. Night closed the contest. Nothaving sufficient ammunition to continue the engagement, and his animalsbeing without forage (the country furnishing but inferior grazing), andhearing nothing from General Hunter, he withdrew his command to thenorth side of the North Anna, and commenced his return march, reachingWhite House at the time before stated. After breaking up the depot atthat place, he moved to the James River, which he reached safely afterheavy fighting. He commenced crossing on the 25th, near Fort Powhatan,without further molestation, and rejoined the Army of the Potomac.

On the 22d, General Wilson, with his own division of cavalry of the Armyof the Potomac, and General Kautz's division of cavalry of the Army ofthe James moved against the enemy's railroads south of Richmond.Striking the Weldon Railroad at Reams's Station, destroying the depotand several miles of the road, and the South Side road about fifteenmiles from Petersburg, to near Nottoway Station, where he met anddefeated a force of the enemy's cavalry. He reached Burkesville Stationon the afternoon of the 23d, and from there destroyed the DanvilleRailroad to Roanoke Bridge, a distance of twenty-five miles, where hefound the enemy in force, and in a position from which he could notdislodge him. He then commenced his return march, and on the 28th metthe enemy's cavalry in force at the Weldon Railroad crossing of StonyCreek, where he had a severe but not decisive engagement. Thence hemade a detour from his left with a view of reaching Reams's Station(supposing it to be in our possession). At this place he was met by theenemy's cavalry, supported by infantry, and forced to retire, with theloss of his artillery and trains. In this last encounter, GeneralKautz, with a part of his command, became separated, and made his wayinto our lines. General Wilson, with the remainder of his force,succeeded in crossing the Nottoway River and coming in safely on ourleft and rear. The damage to the enemy in this expedition more thancompensated for the losses we sustained. It severed all connection byrailroad with Richmond for several weeks.

With a view of cutting the enemy's railroad from near Richmond to theAnna rivers, and making him wary of the situation of his army in theShenandoah, and, in the event of failure in this, to take advantage ofhis necessary withdrawal of troops from Petersburg, to explode a minethat had been prepared in front of the 9th corps and assault the enemy'slines at that place, on the night of the 26th of July the 2d corps andtwo divisions of the cavalry corps and Kautz's cavalry were crossed tothe north bank of the James River and joined the force General Butlerhad there. On the 27th the enemy was driven from his intrenchedposition, with the loss of four pieces of artillery. On the 28th ourlines were extended from Deep Bottom to New Market Road, but in gettingthis position were attacked by the enemy in heavy force. The fightinglasted for several hours, resulting in considerable loss to both sides.The first object of this move having failed, by reason of the very largeforce thrown there by the enemy, I determined to take advantage of thediversion made, by assaulting Petersburg before he could get his forceback there. One division of the 2d corps was withdrawn on the night ofthe 28th, and moved during the night to the rear of the 18th corps, torelieve that corps in the line, that it might be foot-loose in theassault to be made. The other two divisions of the 2d corps andSheridan's cavalry were crossed over on the night of the 29th and movedin front of Petersburg. On the morning of the 30th, between four andfive o'clock, the mine was sprung, blowing up a battery and most of aregiment, and the advance of the assaulting column, formed of the 9thcorps, immediately took possession of the crater made by the explosion,and the line for some distance to the right and left of it, and adetached line in front of it, but for some cause failed to advancepromptly to the ridge beyond. Had they done this, I have every reasonto believe that Petersburg would have fallen. Other troops wereimmediately pushed forward, but the time consumed in getting them upenabled the enemy to rally from his surprise (which had been complete),and get forces to this point for its defence. The captured line thusheld being untenable, and of no advantage to us, the troops werewithdrawn, but not without heavy loss. Thus terminated in disaster whatpromised to be the most successful assault of the campaign.

Immediately upon the enemy's ascertaining that General Hunter wasretreating from Lynchburg by way of the Kanawha River, thus laying theShenandoah Valley open for raid into Maryland and Pennsylvania, hereturned northward and moved down that valley. As soon as this movementof the enemy was ascertained, General Hunter, who had reached theKanawha River, was directed to move his troops without delay, by riverand railroad, to Harper's Ferry; but owing to the difficulty ofnavigation by reason of low water and breaks in the railroad, greatdelay was experienced in getting there. It became necessary, therefore,to find other troops to check this movement of the enemy. For thispurpose the 6th corps was taken from the armies operating againstRichmond, to which was added the 19th corps, then fortunately beginningto arrive in Hampton Roads from the Gulf Department, under orders issuedimmediately after the ascertainment of the result of the Red Riverexpedition. The garrisons of Baltimore and Washington were at this timemade up of heavy-artillery regiments, hundred days' men, and detachmentsfrom the invalid corps. One division under command of General Ricketts,of the 6th corps, was sent to Baltimore, and the remaining two divisionsof the 6th corps, under General Wright, were subsequently sent toWashington. On the 3d of July the enemy approached Martinsburg.General Sigel, who was in command of our forces there, retreated acrossthe Potomac at Shepherdtown; and General Weber, commanding at Harper'sFerry, crossed the occupied Hagerstown, moving a strong column towardsFrederick City. General Wallace, with Rickett's division and his owncommand, the latter mostly new and undisciplined troops, pushed out fromBaltimore with great promptness, and met the enemy in force on theMonocacy, near the crossing of the railroad bridge. His force was notsufficient to insure success, but he fought the enemy nevertheless, andalthough it resulted in a defeat to our arms, yet it detained the enemy,and thereby served to enable General Wright to reach Washington with twodivision of the 6th corps, and the advance of the 19th corps, beforehim. From Monocacy the enemy moved on Washington, his cavalry advancereaching Rockville on the evening of the 10th. On the 12th areconnoissance was thrown out in front of Fort Stevens, to ascertain theenemy's position and force. A severe skirmish ensued, in which we lostabout two hundred and eighty in killed and wounded. The enemy's losswas probably greater. He commenced retreating during the night.Learning the exact condition of affairs at Washington, I requested bytelegraph, at forty-five minutes past eleven P.M., on the 12th, theassignment of Major-General H. G. Wright to the command of all thetroops that could be made available to operate in the field against theenemy, and directed that he should get outside of the trenches with allthe force he could, and push Early to the last moment. General Wrightcommenced the pursuit on the 13th; on the 18th the enemy was overtakenat Snicker's Ferry, on the Shenandoah, when a sharp skirmish occurred;and on the 20th, General Averell encountered and defeated a portion ofthe rebel army at Winchester, capturing four pieces of artillery andseveral hundred prisoners.

Learning that Early was retreating south towards Lynchburg or Richmond,I directed that the 6th and 19th corps be got back to the armiesoperating against Richmond, so that they might be used in a movementagainst Lee before the return of the troops sent by him into the valley;and that Hunter should remain in the Shenandoah Valley, keeping betweenany force of the enemy and Washington, acting on the defensive as muchas possible. I felt that if the enemy had any notion of returning, thefact would be developed before the 6th and 19th corps could leaveWashington. Subsequently, the 19th corps was excepted form the order toreturn to the James.

About the 25th it became evident that the enemy was again advancing uponMaryland and Pennsylvania, and the 6th corps, then at Washington, wasordered back to the vicinity of Harper's Ferry. The rebel force moveddown the valley, and sent a raiding party into Pennsylvania which on the30th burned Chambersburg, and then retreated, pursued by our cavalry,towards Cumberland. They were met and defeated by General Kelley, andwith diminished numbers escaped into the mountains of West Virginia.From the time of the first raid the telegraph wires were frequently downbetween Washington and City Point, making it necessary to transmitmessages a part of the way by boat. It took from twenty-four tothirty-six hours to get dispatches through and return answers would bereceived showing a different state of facts from those on which theywere based, causing confusion and apparent contradiction of orders thatmust have considerably embarrassed those who had to execute them, andrendered operations against the enemy less effective than they otherwisewould have been. To remedy this evil, it was evident to my mind thatsome person should have the supreme command of all the forces in theDepartment of West Virginia, Washington, Susquehanna, and the MiddleDepartment, and I so recommended.

On the 2d of August, I ordered General Sheridan to report in person toMajor-General Halleck, chief of staff, at Washington, with a view to hisassignment to the command of all the forces against Early. At this timethe enemy was concentrated in the neighborhood of Winchester, while ourforces, under General Hunter, were concentrated on the Monocacy, at thecrossing of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, leaving open to the enemyWestern Maryland and Southern Pennsylvania. From where I was, Ihesitated to give positive orders for the movement of our forces atMonocacy, lest by so doing I should expose Washington. Therefore, on the4th, I left City Point to visit Hunter's command, and determine formyself what was best to be done. On arrival there, and afterconsultation with General Hunter, I issued to him the followinginstructions:

"MONOCACY BRIDGE, MARYLAND, August 5, 1864—8 P.M.

"GENERAL:—Concentrate all your available force without delay in thevicinity of Harper's Ferry, leaving only such railroad guards andgarrisons for public property as may be necessary. Use, in thisconcentrating, the railroad, if by so doing time can be saved. FromHarper's Ferry, if it is found that the enemy has moved north of thePotomac in large force, push north, following him and attacking himwherever found; follow him, if driven south of the Potomac, as long asit is safe to do so. If it is ascertained that the enemy has but asmall force north of the Potomac, then push south with the main force,detaching under a competent commander, a sufficient force to look afterthe raiders, and drive them to their homes. In detaching such a force,the brigade of the cavalry now en route from Washington via Rockvillemay be taken into account.

"There are now on their way to join you three other brigades of the bestcavalry, numbering at least five thousand men and horses. These will beinstructed, in the absence of further orders, to join you by the southside of the Potomac. One brigade will probably start to-morrow. Inpushing up the Shenandoah Valley, where it is expected you will have togo first or last, it is desirable that nothing should be left to invitethe enemy to return. Take all provisions, forage, and stock wanted forthe use of your command; such as cannot be consumed, destroy. It is notdesirable that the buildings should be destroyed—they should rather beprotected; but the people should be informed that, so long as an armycan subsist among them, recurrence of theses raids must be expected, andwe are determined to stop them at all hazards.

"Bear in mind, the object is to drive the enemy south; and to do thisyou want to keep him always in sight. Be guided in your course by thecourse he takes.

"Make your own arrangements for supplies of all kinds, giving regularvouchers for such as may be taken from loyal citizens in the countrythrough which you march.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL D. HUNTER."

The troops were immediately put in motion, and the advance reached
Halltown that night.

General Hunter having, in our conversation, expressed a willingness tobe relieved from command, I telegraphed to have General Sheridan, thenat Washington, sent to Harper's Ferry by the morning train, with ordersto take general command of all the troops in the field, and to call onGeneral Hunter at Monocacy, who would turn over to him my letter ofinstructions. I remained at Monocacy until General Sheridan arrived, onthe morning of the 6th, and, after a conference with him in relation tomilitary affairs in that vicinity, I returned to City Point by way ofWashington.

On the 7th of August, the Middle Department, and the Departments of West
Virginia, Washington, and Susquehanna, were constituted into the "Middle
Military Division," and Major-General Sheridan was assigned to
temporary command of the same.

Two divisions of cavalry, commanded by Generals Torbert and Wilson, weresent to Sheridan from the Army of the Potomac. The first reached him atHarper's Ferry about the 11th of August.

His operations during the month of August and the fore part of Septemberwere both of an offensive and defensive character, resulting in manysevere skirmishes, principally by the cavalry, in which we weregenerally successful, but no general engagement took place. The twoarmies lay in such a position—the enemy on the west bank of the OpequonCreek covering Winchester, and our forces in front of Berryville—thateither could bring on a battle at any time. Defeat to us would lay opento the enemy the States of Maryland and Pennsylvania for long distancesbefore another army could be interposed to check him. Under thesecircumstances I hesitated about allowing the initiative to be taken.Finally, the use of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and the Chesapeakeand Ohio Canal, which were both obstructed by the enemy, became soindispensably necessary to us, and the importance of relievingPennsylvania and Maryland from continuously threatened invasion sogreat, that I determined the risk should be taken. But fearing totelegraph the order for an attack without knowing more than I did ofGeneral Sheridan's feelings as to what would be the probable result, Ileft City Point on the 15th of September to visit him at hisheadquarters, to decide, after conference with him, what should be done.I met him at Charlestown, and he pointed out so distinctly how each armylay; what he could do the moment he was authorized, and expressed suchconfidence of success, that I saw there were but two words ofinstructions necessary—Go in! For the conveniences of forage, theteams for supplying the army were kept at Harper's Ferry. I asked himif he could get out his teams and supplies in time to make an attack onthe ensuing Tuesday morning. His reply was, that he could beforedaylight on Monday. He was off promptly to time, and I may here add,that the result was such that I have never since deemed it necessary tovisit General Sheridan before giving him orders.

Early on the morning of the 19th, General Sheridan attacked GeneralEarly at the crossing on the Opequon Creek, and after a most sanguinaryand bloody battle, lasting until five o'clock in the evening, defeatedhim with heavy loss, carrying his entire position from Opequon Creek toWinchester, capturing several thousand prisoners and five pieces ofartillery. The enemy rallied, and made a stand in a strong position atFisher's Hill, where he was attacked, and again defeated with heavy losson the 20th [22d]. Sheridan pursued him with great energy throughHarrisonburg, Staunton, and the gaps of the Blue Ridge. After strippingthe upper valley of most of the supplies and provisions for the rebelarmy, he returned to Strasburg, and took position on the north side ofCedar Creek.

Having received considerable reinforcements, General Early againreturned to the valley, and, on the 9th of October, his cavalryencountered ours near Strasburg, where the rebels were defeated, withthe loss of eleven pieces of artillery and three hundred and fiftyprisoners. On the night of the 18th, the enemy crossed the mountainswhich separate the branches of the Shenandoah, forded the North Fork,and early on the morning of the 19th, under cover of the darkness andthe fog, surprised and turned our left flank, and captured the batterieswhich enfiladed our whole line. Our troops fell back with heavy lossand in much confusion, but were finally rallied between Middletown andNewtown. At this juncture, General Sheridan, who was at Winchester whenthe battle commenced arrived on the field, arranged his lines just intime to repulse a heavy attack of the enemy, and immediately assumingthe offensive, he attacked in turn with great vigor. The enemy wasdefeated with great slaughter, and the loss of most of his artillery andtrains, and the trophies he had captured in the morning. The wreck ofhis army escaped during the night, and fled in the direction of Stauntonand Lynchburg. Pursuit was made to Mount Jackson. Thus ended this, theenemy's last attempt to invade the North via the Shenandoah Valley. Iwas now enabled to return the 6th corps to the Army of the Potomac, andto send one division from Sheridan's army to the Army of the James, andanother to Savannah, Georgia, to hold Sherman's new acquisitions on thesea-coast, and thus enable him to move without detaching from his forcefor that purpose.

Reports from various sources led me to believe that the enemy haddetached three divisions from Petersburg to reinforce Early in theShenandoah Valley. I therefore sent the 2d corps and Gregg's divisionof cavalry, of the Army of the Potomac, and a force of General Butler'sarmy, on the night of the 13th of August, to threaten Richmond from thenorth side of the James, to prevent him from sending troops away, and,if possible, to draw back those sent. In this move we captured sixpieces of artillery and several hundred prisoners, detained troops thatwere under marching orders, and ascertained that but one division(Kershaw's), of the three reputed detached, had gone.

The enemy having withdrawn heavily from Petersburg to resist thismovement, the 5th corps, General Warren commanding, was moved out on the18th, and took possession of the Weldon Railroad. During the day he hadconsiderable fighting. To regain possession of the road, the enemy maderepeated and desperate assaults, but was each time repulsed with greatloss. On the night of the 20th, the troops on the north side of theJames were withdrawn, and Hancock and Gregg returned to the front atPetersburg. On the 25th, the 2d corps and Gregg's division of cavalry,while at Reams's Station destroying the railroad, were attacked, andafter desperate fighting, a part of our line gave way, and five piecesof artillery fell into the hands of the enemy.

By the 12th of September, a branch railroad was completed from the City
Point and Petersburg Railroad to the Weldon Railroad, enabling us to
supply, without difficulty, in all weather, the army in front of
Petersburg.

The extension of our lines across the Weldon Railroad compelled theenemy to so extend his, that it seemed he could have but few troopsnorth of the James for the defence of Richmond. On the night of the28th, the 10th corps, Major-General Birney, and the 18th corps,Major-General Ord commanding, of General Butler's army, were crossed tothe north side of the James, and advanced on the morning of the 29th,carrying the very strong fortifications and intrenchments belowChaffin's Farm, known as Fort Harrison, capturing fifteen pieces ofartillery, and the New Market Road and intrenchments. This success wasfollowed up by a gallant assault upon Fort Gilmer, immediately in frontof the Chaffin Farm fortifications, in which we were repulsed with heavyloss. Kautz's cavalry was pushed forward on the road to the right ofthis, supported by infantry, and reached the enemy's inner line, but wasunable to get further. The position captured from the enemy was sothreatening to Richmond, that I determined to hold it. The enemy madeseveral desperate attempts to dislodge us, all of which wereunsuccessful, and for which he paid dearly. On the morning of the 30th,General Meade sent out a reconnoissance with a view to attacking theenemy's line, if it was found sufficiently weakened by withdrawal oftroops to the north side. In this reconnoissance we captured and heldthe enemy's works near Poplar Spring Church. In the afternoon, troopsmoving to get to the left of the point gained were attacked by the enemyin heavy force, and compelled to fall back until supported by the forcesholding the captured works. Our cavalry under Gregg was also attacked,but repulsed the enemy with great loss.

On the 7th of October, the enemy attacked Kautz's cavalry north of theJames, and drove it back with heavy loss in killed, wounded, andprisoners, and the loss of all the artillery eight or nine pieces. Thishe followed up by an attack on our intrenched infantry line, but wasrepulsed with severe slaughter. On the 13th, a reconnoissance was sentout by General Butler, with a view to drive the enemy from some newworks he was constructing, which resulted in very heavy loss to us.

On the 27th, the Army of the Potomac, leaving only sufficient men tohold its fortified line, moved by the enemy's right flank. The 2dcorps, followed by two divisions of the 5th corps, with the cavalry inadvance and covering our left flank, forced a passage of Hatcher's Run,and moved up the south side of it towards the South Side Railroad, untilthe 2d corps and part of the cavalry reached the Boydton Plank Roadwhere it crosses Hatcher's Run. At this point we were six miles distantfrom the South Side Railroad, which I had hoped by this movement toreach and hold. But finding that we had not reached the end of theenemy's fortifications, and no place presenting itself for a successfulassault by which he might be doubled up and shortened, I determined towithdraw to within our fortified line. Orders were given accordingly.Immediately upon receiving a report that General Warren had connectedwith General Hancock, I returned to my headquarters. Soon after I leftthe enemy moved out across Hatcher's Run, in the gap between GeneralsHancock and Warren, which was not closed as reported, and made adesperate attack on General Hancock's right and rear. General Hancockimmediately faced his corps to meet it, and after a bloody combat drovethe enemy within his works, and withdrew that night to his old position.

In support of this movement, General Butler made a demonstration on thenorth side of the James, and attacked the enemy on the WilliamsburgRoad, and also on the York River Railroad. In the former he wasunsuccessful; in the latter he succeeded in carrying a work which wasafterwards abandoned, and his forces withdrawn to their formerpositions.

From this time forward the operations in front of Petersburg andRichmond, until the spring campaign of 1865, were confined to thedefence and extension of our lines, and to offensive movements forcrippling the enemy's lines of communication, and to prevent hisdetaching any considerable force to send south. By the 7th of February,our lines were extended to Hatcher's Run, and the Weldon Railroad hadbeen destroyed to Hicksford.

General Sherman moved from Chattanooga on the 6th of May, with theArmies of the Cumberland, Tennessee, and Ohio, commanded, respectively,by Generals Thomas McPherson, and Schofield, upon Johnston's army atDalton; but finding the enemy's position at Buzzard's Roost, coveringDalton, too strong to be assaulted, General McPherson was sent throughSnake Gap to turn it, while Generals Thomas and Schofield threatened itin front and on the north. This movement was successful. Johnston,finding his retreat likely to be cut off, fell back to his fortifiedposition at Resaca, where he was attacked on the afternoon of May 15th.A heavy battle ensued. During the night the enemy retreated south.Late on the 17th, his rear-guard was overtaken near Adairsville, andheavy skirmishing followed. The next morning, however, he had againdisappeared. He was vigorously pursued, and was overtaken at Cassvilleon the 19th, but during the ensuing night retreated across the Etowah.While these operations were going on, General Jefferson C. Davis'sdivision of Thomas's army was sent to Rome, capturing it with its fortsand artillery, and its valuable mills and foundries. General Sherman,having give his army a few days' rest at this point, again put it inmotion on the 23d, for Dallas, with a view of turning the difficult passat Allatoona. On the afternoon of the 25th, the advance, under GeneralHooker, had a severe battle with the enemy, driving him back to New HopeChurch, near Dallas. Several sharp encounters occurred at this point.The most important was on the 28th, when the enemy assaulted GeneralMcPherson at Dallas, but received a terrible and bloody repulse.

On the 4th of June, Johnston abandoned his intrenched position at NewHope Church, and retreated to the strong positions of Kenesaw, Pine, andLost mountains. He was forced to yield the two last-named places, andconcentrate his army on Kenesaw, where, on the 27th, Generals Thomas andMcPherson made a determined but unsuccessful assault. On the night ofthe 2d of July, Sherman commenced moving his army by the right flank,and on the morning of the 3d, found that the enemy, in consequence ofthis movement, had abandoned Kenesaw and retreated across theChattahoochee.

General Sherman remained on the Chattahoochee to give his men rest andget up stores until the 17th of July, when he resumed his operations,crossed the Chattahoochee, destroyed a large portion of the railroad toAugusta, and drove the enemy back to Atlanta. At this place General Hoodsucceeded General Johnston in command of the rebel army, and assumingthe offensive-defensive policy, made several severe attacks upon Shermanin the vicinity of Atlanta, the most desperate and determined of whichwas on the 22d of July. About one P.M. of this day the brave,accomplished, and noble-hearted McPherson was killed. General Logansucceeded him, and commanded the Army of the Tennessee through thisdesperate battle, and until he was superseded by Major-General Howard,on the 26th, with the same success and ability that had characterizedhim in the command of a corps or division.

In all these attacks the enemy was repulsed with great loss. Finding itimpossible to entirely invest the place, General Sherman, after securinghis line of communications across the Chattahoochee, moved his mainforce round by the enemy's left flank upon the Montgomery and Maconroads, to draw the enemy from his fortifications. In this he succeeded,and after defeating the enemy near Rough-and-Ready, Jonesboro, andLovejoy's, forcing him to retreat to the south, on the 2d of Septemberoccupied Atlanta, the objective point of his campaign.

About the time of this move, the rebel cavalry, under Wheeler, attemptedto cut his communications in the rear, but was repulsed at Dalton, anddriven into East Tennessee, whence it proceeded west to McMinnville,Murfreesboro, and Franklin, and was finally driven south of theTennessee. The damage done by this raid was repaired in a few days.

During the partial investment of Atlanta, General Rousseau joinedGeneral Sherman with a force of cavalry from Decatur, having made asuccessful raid upon the Atlanta and Montgomery Railroad, and itsbranches near Opelika. Cavalry raids were also made by Generals McCook,Garrard, and Stoneman, to cut the remaining Railroad communication withAtlanta. The first two were successful the latter, disastrous.

General Sherman's movement from Chattanooga to Atlanta was prompt,skilful, and brilliant. The history of his flank movements and battlesduring that memorable campaign will ever be read with an interestunsurpassed by anything in history.

His own report, and those of his subordinate commanders, accompanyingit, give the details of that most successful campaign.

He was dependent for the supply of his armies upon a single-trackrailroad from Nashville to the point where he was operating. Thispassed the entire distance through a hostile country, and every foot ofit had to be protected by troops. The cavalry force of the enemy underForrest, in Northern Mississippi, was evidently waiting for Sherman toadvance far enough into the mountains of Georgia, to make a retreatdisastrous, to get upon this line and destroy it beyond the possibilityof further use. To guard against this danger, Sherman left what hesupposed to be a sufficient force to operate against Forrest in WestTennessee. He directed General Washburn, who commanded there, to sendBrigadier-General S. D. Sturgis in command of this force to attack him.On the morning of the 10th of June, General Sturgis met the enemy nearGuntown, Mississippi, was badly beaten, and driven back in utter routand confusion to Memphis, a distance of about one hundred miles, hotlypursued by the enemy. By this, however, the enemy was defeated in hisdesigns upon Sherman's line of communications. The persistency withwhich he followed up this success exhausted him, and made a season forrest and repairs necessary. In the meantime, Major-General A. J. Smith,with the troops of the Army of the Tennessee that had been sent byGeneral Sherman to General Banks, arrived at Memphis on their returnfrom Red River, where they had done most excellent service. He wasdirected by General Sherman to immediately take the offensive againstForrest. This he did with the promptness and effect which hascharacterized his whole military career. On the 14th of July, he metthe enemy at Tupelo, Mississippi, and whipped him badly. The fightingcontinued through three days. Our loss was small compared with that ofthe enemy. Having accomplished the object of his expedition, GeneralSmith returned to Memphis.

During the months of March and April this same force under Forrestannoyed us considerably. On the 24th of March it captured Union City,Kentucky, and its garrison, and on the 24th attacked Paducah, commandedby Colonel S. G. Hicks, 40th Illinois Volunteers. Colonel H., havingbut a small force, withdrew to the forts near the river, from where herepulsed the enemy and drove him from the place.

On the 13th of April, part of this force, under the rebel GeneralBuford, summoned the garrison of Columbus, Kentucky, to surrender, butreceived for reply from Colonel Lawrence, 34th New Jersey Volunteers,that being placed there by his Government with adequate force to holdhis post and repel all enemies from it, surrender was out of thequestion.

On the morning of the same day Forrest attacked Fort Pillow, Tennessee,garrisoned by a detachment of Tennessee cavalry and the 1st RegimentAlabama colored troops, commanded by Major Booth. The garrison foughtbravely until about three o'clock in the afternoon, when the enemycarried the works by assault; and, after our men threw down their arms,proceeded to an inhuman and merciless massacre of the garrison.

On the 14th, General Buford, having failed at Columbus, appeared before
Paducah, but was again driven off.

Guerillas and raiders, seemingly emboldened by Forrest's operations,were also very active in Kentucky. The most noted of these was Morgan.With a force of from two to three thousand cavalry, he entered the Statethrough Pound Gap in the latter part of May. On the 11th of June theyattacked and captured Cynthiana, with its entire garrison. On the 12thhe was overtaken by General Burbridge, and completely routed with heavyloss, and was finally driven out of the State. This notorious guerillawas afterwards surprised and killed near Greenville, Tennessee, and hiscommand captured and dispersed by General Gillem.

In the absence of official reports of the commencement of the Red Riverexpedition, except so far as relates to the movements of the troops sentby General Sherman under General A. J. Smith, I am unable to give thedate of its starting. The troops under General Smith, comprising twodivisions of the 16th and a detachment of the 17th army corps, leftVicksburg on the 10th of March, and reached the designated point on RedRiver one day earlier than that appointed by General Banks. The rebelforces at Fort de Russy, thinking to defeat him, left the fort on the14th to give him battle in the open field; but, while occupying theenemy with skirmishing and demonstrations, Smith pushed forward to Fortde Russy, which had been left with a weak garrison, and captured it withits garrison about three hundred and fifty men, eleven pieces ofartillery, and many small-arms. Our loss was but slight. On the 15thhe pushed forward to Alexandria, which place he reached on the 18th. Onthe 21st he had an engagement with the enemy at Henderson's Hill, inwhich he defeated him, capturing two hundred and ten prisoners and fourpieces of artillery.

On the 28th, he again attacked and defeated the enemy under the rebelGeneral Taylor, at Cane River. By the 26th, General Banks had assembledhis whole army at Alexandria, and pushed forward to Grand Ecore. On themorning of April 6th he moved from Grand Ecore. On the afternoon of the7th, he advanced and met the enemy near Pleasant Hill, and drove himfrom the field. On the same afternoon the enemy made a stand eightmiles beyond Pleasant Hill, but was again compelled to retreat. On the8th, at Sabine Cross Roads and Peach Hill, the enemy attacked anddefeated his advance, capturing nineteen pieces of artillery and animmense amount of transportation and stores. During the night, GeneralBanks fell back to Pleasant Hill, where another battle was fought on the9th, and the enemy repulsed with great loss. During the night, GeneralBanks continued his retrograde movement to Grand Ecore, and thence toAlexandria, which he reached on the 27th of April. Here a seriousdifficulty arose in getting Admiral Porter's fleet which accompanied theexpedition, over the rapids, the water having fallen so much since theypassed up as to prevent their return. At the suggestion of Colonel (nowBrigadier-General) Bailey, and under his superintendence, wing-dams wereconstructed, by which the channel was contracted so that the fleetpassed down the rapids in safety.

The army evacuated Alexandria on the 14th of May, after considerableskirmishing with the enemy's advance, and reached Morganzia and PointCoupee near the end of the month. The disastrous termination of thisexpedition, and the lateness of the season, rendered impracticable thecarrying out of my plans of a movement in force sufficient to insure thecapture of Mobile.

On the 23d of March, Major-General Steele left Little Rock with the 7th
army corps, to cooperate with General Banks's expedition on the Red
River, and reached Arkadelphia on the 28th. On the 16th of April, after
driving the enemy before him, he was joined, near Elkin's Ferry, in
Washita County, by General Thayer, who had marched from Fort Smith.
After several severe skirmishes, in which the enemy was defeated,
General Steele reached Camden, which he occupied about the middle of
April.

On learning the defeat and consequent retreat of General Banks on RedRiver, and the loss of one of his own trains at Mark's Mill, in DallasCounty, General Steele determined to fall back to the Arkansas River.He left Camden on the 26th of April, and reached Little Rock on the 2dof May. On the 30th of April, the enemy attacked him while crossingSaline River at Jenkins's Ferry, but was repulsed with considerableloss. Our loss was about six hundred in killed, wounded and prisoners.

Major-General Canby, who had been assigned to the command of the"Military Division of the West Mississippi," was therefore directed tosend the 19th army corps to join the armies operating against Richmond,and to limit the remainder of his command to such operations as might benecessary to hold the positions and lines of communications he thenoccupied.

Before starting General A. J. Smith's troops back to Sherman, GeneralCanby sent a part of it to disperse a force of the enemy that wascollecting near the Mississippi River. General Smith met and defeatedthis force near Lake Chicot on the 5th of June. Our loss was aboutforty killed and seventy wounded.

In the latter part of July, General Canby sent Major-General Gordon
Granger, with such forces as he could collect, to co-operate with
Admiral Farragut against the defences of Mobile Bay. On the 8th of
August, Fort Gaines surrendered to the combined naval and land forces.
Fort Powell was blown up and abandoned.

On the 9th, Fort Morgan was invested, and, after a severe bombardment,surrendered on the 23d. The total captures amounted to one thousandfour hundred and sixty-four prisoners, and one hundred and four piecesof artillery.

About the last of August, it being reported that the rebel GeneralPrice, with a force of about ten thousand men, had reached Jacksonport,on his way to invade Missouri, General A. J. Smith's command, then enroute from Memphis to join Sherman, was ordered to Missouri. A cavalryforce was also, at the same time, sent from Memphis, under command ofColonel Winslow. This made General Rosecrans's forces superior to thoseof Price, and no doubt was entertained he would be able to check Priceand drive him back; while the forces under General Steele, in Arkansas,would cut off his retreat. On the 26th day of September, Price attackedPilot Knob and forced the garrison to retreat, and thence moved north tothe Missouri River, and continued up that river towards Kansas. GeneralCurtis, commanding Department of Kansas, immediately collected suchforces as he could to repel the invasion of Kansas, while GeneralRosecrans's cavalry was operating in his rear.

The enemy was brought to battle on the Big Blue and defeated, with theloss of nearly all his artillery and trains and a large number ofprisoners. He made a precipitate retreat to Northern Arkansas. Theimpunity with which Price was enabled to roam over the State of Missourifor a long time, and the incalculable mischief done by him, show to howlittle purpose a superior force may be used. There is no reason whyGeneral Rosecrans should not have concentrated his forces, and beatenand driven Price before the latter reached Pilot Knob.

September 20th, the enemy's cavalry, under Forrest, crossed theTennessee near Waterloo, Alabama, and on the 23d attacked the garrisonat Athens, consisting of six hundred men, which capitulated on the 24th.Soon after the surrender two regiments of reinforcements arrived, andafter a severe fight were compelled to surrender. Forrest destroyed therailroad westward, captured the garrison at Sulphur Branch trestle,skirmished with the garrison at Pulaski on the 27th, and on the same daycut the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad near Tullahoma and Dechard.On the morning of the 30th, one column of Forrest's command, underBuford, appeared before Huntsville, and summoned the surrender of thegarrison. Receiving an answer in the negative, he remained in thevicinity of the place until next morning, when he again summoned itssurrender, and received the same reply as on the night before. Hewithdrew in the direction of Athens which place had been regarrisoned,and attacked it on the afternoon of the 1st of October, but withoutsuccess. On the morning of the 2d he renewed his attack, but washandsomely repulsed.

Another column under Forrest appeared before Columbia on the morning ofthe 1st, but did not make an attack. On the morning of the 3d he movedtowards Mount Pleasant. While these operations were going on, everyexertion was made by General Thomas to destroy the forces under Forrestbefore he could recross the Tennessee, but was unable to prevent hisescape to Corinth, Mississippi.

In September, an expedition under General Burbridge was sent to destroythe saltworks at Saltville, Virginia. He met the enemy on the 2d ofOctober, about three miles and a half from Saltville, and drove him intohis strongly intrenched position around the salt-works, from which hewas unable to dislodge him. During the night he withdrew his commandand returned to Kentucky.

General Sherman, immediately after the fall of Atlanta, put his armiesin camp in and about the place, and made all preparations for refittingand supplying them for future service. The great length of road fromAtlanta to the Cumberland River, however, which had to be guarded,allowed the troops but little rest.

During this time Jefferson Davis made a speech in Macon, Georgia, whichwas reported in the papers of the South, and soon became known to thewhole country, disclosing the plans of the enemy, thus enabling GeneralSherman to fully meet them. He exhibited the weakness of supposing thatan army that had been beaten and fearfully decimated in a vain attemptat the defensive, could successfully undertake the offensive against thearmy that had so often defeated it.

In execution of this plan, Hood, with this army, was soon reported tothe south-west of Atlanta. Moving far to Sherman's right, he succeededin reaching the railroad about Big Shanty, and moved north on it.

General Sherman, leaving a force to hold Atlanta, with the remainder ofhis army fell upon him and drove him to Gadsden, Alabama. Seeing theconstant annoyance he would have with the roads to his rear if heattempted to hold Atlanta, General Sherman proposed the abandonment anddestruction of that place, with all the railroads leading to it, andtelegraphed me as follows:

"CENTREVILLE, GEORGIA", October 10—noon.

"Dispatch about Wilson just received. Hood is now crossing Coosa River,twelve miles below Rome, bound west. If he passes over the Mobile andOhio road, had I not better execute the plan of my letter sent byColonel Porter, and leave General Thomas with the troops now inTennessee to defend the State? He will have an ample force when thereinforcements ordered reach Nashville.

"W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.
"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GRANT."

For a full understanding of the plan referred to in this dispatch, Iquote from the letter sent by Colonel Porter:

"I will therefore give my opinion, that your army and Canby's should bereinforced to the maximum; that after you get Wilmington, you strike forSavannah and the river; that Canby be instructed to hold the MississippiRiver, and send a force to get Columbus, Georgia, either by the way ofthe Alabama or the Appalachicola, and that I keep Hood employed and putmy army in final order for a march on Augusta, Columbia, and Charleston,to be ready as soon as Wilmington is sealed as to commerce and the cityof Savannah is in our possession." This was in reply to a letter ofmine of date September 12th, in answer to a dispatch of his containingsubstantially the same proposition, and in which I informed him of aproposed movement against Wilmington, and of the situation in Virginia,etc.

"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA,

"October 11, 1864—11 A.M.

"Your dispatch of October 10th received. Does it not look as if Hoodwas going to attempt the invasion of Middle Tennessee, using the Mobileand Ohio and Memphis and Charleston roads to supply his base on theTennessee River, about Florence or Decatur? If he does this, he oughtto be met and prevented from getting north of the Tennessee River. Ifyou were to cut loose, I do not believe you would meet Hood's army, butwould be bushwhacked by all the old men and little boys, and suchrailroad guards as are still left at home. Hood would probably strikefor Nashville, thinking that by going north he could inflict greaterdamage upon us than we could upon the rebels by going south. If thereis any way of getting at Hood's army, I would prefer that, but I musttrust to your own judgment. I find I shall not be able to send a forcefrom here to act with you on Savannah. Your movements, therefore, willbe independent of mine; at least until the fall of Richmond takes place.I am afraid Thomas, with such lines of road as he has to protect, couldnot prevent Hood from going north. With Wilson turned loose, with allyour cavalry, you will find the rebels put much more on the defensivethan heretofore.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN."

"KINGSTON, GEORGIA, "October 11—11 A.M.

"Hood moved his army from Palmetto Station across by Dallas andCedartown, and is now on the Coosa River, south of Rome. He threw onecorps on my road at Acworth, and I was forced to follow. I hold Atlantawith the 20th corps, and have strong detachments along my line. Thisreduces my active force to a comparatively small army. We cannot remainhere on the defensive. With the twenty-five thousand men, and the boldcavalry he has, he can constantly break my roads. I would infinitelyprefer to make a wreck of the road, and of the country from Chattanoogato Atlanta including the latter city send back all my wounded andworthless, and with my effective army, move through Georgia, smashingthings, to the sea. Hood may turn into Tennessee and Kentucky, but Ibelieve he will be forced to follow me. Instead of my being on thedefensive, I would be on the offensive; instead of guessing at what hemeans to do, he would have to guess at my plans. The difference in waris full twenty-five per cent. I can make Savannah, Charleston, or themouth of the Chattahoochee.

"Answer quick, as I know we will not have the telegraph long.

"W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.
"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GRANT."

"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, "October 11,1864—11.30 P.M.

"Your dispatch of to-day received. If you are satisfied the trip to thesea-coast can be made, holding the line of the Tennessee River firmly,you may make it, destroying all the railroad south of Dalton orChattanooga, as you think best.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN."

It was the original design to hold Atlanta, and by getting through tothe coast, with a garrison left on the southern railroads, leading eastand west, through Georgia, to effectually sever the east from the west.In other words, cut the would-be Confederacy in two again, as it hadbeen cut once by our gaining possession of the Mississippi River.General Sherman's plan virtually effected this object.

General Sherman commenced at once his preparations for his proposedmovement, keeping his army in position in the meantime to watch Hood.Becoming satisfied that Hood had moved westward from Gadsden across SandMountain, General Sherman sent the 4th corps, Major-General Stanleycommanding, and the 23d corps, Major-General Schofield commanding, backto Chattanooga to report to Major-General Thomas, at Nashville, whom hehad placed in command of all the troops of his military division, savethe four army corps and cavalry division he designed to move withthrough Georgia. With the troops thus left at his disposal, there waslittle doubt that General Thomas could hold the line of the Tennessee,or, in the event Hood should force it, would be able to concentrate andbeat him in battle. It was therefore readily consented to that Shermanshould start for the sea-coast.

Having concentrated his troops at Atlanta by the 14th of November, hecommenced his march, threatening both Augusta and Macon. His coming-outpoint could not be definitely fixed. Having to gather his subsistence ashe marched through the country, it was not impossible that a forceinferior to his own might compel him to head for such point as he couldreach, instead of such as he might prefer. The blindness of the enemy,however, in ignoring his movement, and sending Hood's army, the onlyconsiderable force he had west of Richmond and east of the MississippiRiver, northward on an offensive campaign, left the whole country open,and Sherman's route to his own choice.

How that campaign was conducted, how little opposition was met with, thecondition of the country through which the armies passed, the capture ofFort McAllister, on the Savannah River, and the occupation of Savannahon the 21st of December, are all clearly set forth in General Sherman'sadmirable report.

Soon after General Sherman commenced his march from Atlanta, twoexpeditions, one from Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and one from Vicksburg,Mississippi, were started by General Canby to cut the enemy's lines ofcommunication with Mobile and detain troops in that field. GeneralFoster, commanding Department of the South, also sent an expedition, viaBroad River, to destroy the railroad between Charleston and Savannah.The expedition from Vicksburg, under command of Brevet Brigadier-GeneralE. D. Osband (colonel 3d United States colored cavalry), captured, onthe 27th of November, and destroyed the Mississippi Central Railroadbridge and trestle-work over Big Black River, near Canton, thirty milesof the road, and two locomotives, besides large amounts of stores. Theexpedition from Baton Rouge was without favorable results. Theexpedition from the Department of the South, under the immediate commandof Brigadier-General John P. Hatch, consisting of about five thousandmen of all arms, including a brigade from the navy, proceeded up BroadRiver and debarked at Boyd's Neck on the 29th of November, from where itmoved to strike the railroad at Grahamsville. At Honey Hill, aboutthree miles from Grahamsville, the enemy was found and attacked in astrongly fortified position, which resulted, after severe fighting, inour repulse with a loss of seven hundred and forty-six in killed,wounded, and missing. During the night General Hatch withdrew. On the6th of December General Foster obtained a position covering theCharleston and Savannah Railroad, between the Coosawhatchie andTulifinny rivers.

Hood, instead of following Sherman, continued his move northward, whichseemed to me to be leading to his certain doom. At all events, had Ihad the power to command both armies, I should not have changed theorders under which he seemed to be acting. On the 26th of October, theadvance of Hood's army attacked the garrison at Decatur, Alabama, butfailing to carry the place, withdrew towards Courtland, and succeeded,in the face of our cavalry, in effecting a lodgment on the north side ofthe Tennessee River, near Florence. On the 28th, Forrest reached theTennessee, at Fort Heiman, and captured a gunboat and three transports.On the 2d of November he planted batteries above and below Johnsonville,on the opposite side of the river, isolating three gunboats and eighttransports. On the 4th the enemy opened his batteries upon the place,and was replied to from the gunboats and the garrison. The gunboatsbecoming disabled were set on fire, as also were the transports, toprevent their falling into the hands of the enemy. About a million anda half dollars' worth of store and property on the levee and instorehouses was consumed by fire. On the 5th the enemy disappeared andcrossed to the north side of the Tennessee River, above Johnsonville,moving towards Clifton, and subsequently joined Hood. On the night ofthe 5th, General Schofield, with the advance of the 23d corps, reachedJohnsonville, but finding the enemy gone, was ordered to Pulaski, andwas put in command of all the troopers there, with instruction to watchthe movements of Hood and retard his advance, but not to risk a generalengagement until the arrival of General A. J. Smith's command fromMissouri, and until General Wilson could get his cavalry remounted.

On the 19th, General Hood continued his advance. General Thomas,retarding him as much as possible, fell back towards Nashville for thepurpose of concentrating his command and gaining time for the arrival ofreinforcements. The enemy coming up with our main force, commanded byGeneral Schofield, at Franklin, on the 30th, assaulted our worksrepeatedly during the afternoon until late at night, but were in everyinstance repulsed. His loss in this battle was one thousand sevenhundred and fifty killed, seven hundred and two prisoners, and threethousand eight hundred wounded. Among his losses were six generalofficers killed, six wounded, and one captured. Our entire loss was twothousand three hundred. This was the first serious opposition the enemymet with, and I am satisfied was the fatal blow to all his expectations.During the night, General Schofield fell back towards Nashville. Thisleft the field to the enemy—not lost by battle, but voluntarilyabandoned—so that General Thomas's whole force might be broughttogether. The enemy followed up and commenced the establishment of hisline in front of Nashville on the 2d of December.

As soon as it was ascertained that Hood was crossing the TennesseeRiver, and that Price was going out of Missouri, General Rosecrans wasordered to send to General Thomas the troops of General A. J. Smith'scommand, and such other troops as he could spare. The advance of thisreinforcement reached Nashville on the 30th of November.

On the morning of the 15th December, General Thomas attacked Hood inposition, and, in a battle lasting two days, defeated and drove him fromthe field in the utmost confusion, leaving in our hand most of hisartillery and many thousand prisoners, including four general officers.

Before the battle of Nashville I grew very impatient over, as itappeared to me, the unnecessary delay. This impatience was increasedupon learning that the enemy had sent a force of cavalry across theCumberland into Kentucky. I feared Hood would cross his whole army andgive us great trouble there. After urging upon General Thomas thenecessity of immediately assuming the offensive, I started West tosuperintend matters there in person. Reaching Washington City, Ireceived General Thomas's dispatch announcing his attack upon the enemy,and the result as far as the battle had progressed. I was delighted.All fears and apprehensions were dispelled. I am not yet satisfied butthat General Thomas, immediately upon the appearance of Hood beforeNashville, and before he had time to fortify, should have moved out withhis whole force and given him battle, instead of waiting to remount hiscavalry, which delayed him until the inclemency of the weather made itimpracticable to attack earlier than he did. But his final defeat ofHood was so complete, that it will be accepted as a vindication of thatdistinguished officer's judgment.

After Hood's defeat at Nashville he retreated, closely pursued bycavalry and infantry, to the Tennessee River, being forced to abandonmany pieces of artillery and most of his transportation. On the 28th ofDecember our advanced forces ascertained that he had made good hisescape to the south side of the river.

About this time, the rains having set in heavily in Tennessee and NorthAlabama, making it difficult to move army transportation and artillery,General Thomas stopped the pursuit by his main force at the TennesseeRiver. A small force of cavalry, under Colonel W. J. Palmer, 15thPennsylvania Volunteers, continued to follow Hood for some distance,capturing considerable transportation and all the enemy'spontoon-bridge. The details of these operations will be foundclearly set forth in General Thomas's report.

A cavalry expedition, under Brevet Major-General Grierson, started fromMemphis on the 21st of December. On the 25th he surprised and capturedForrest's dismounted camp at Verona, Mississippi, on the Mobile and OhioRailroad, destroyed the railroad, sixteen cars loaded with wagons andpontoons for Hood's army, four thousand new English carbines, and largeamounts of public stores. On the morning of the 28th he attacked andcaptured a force of the enemy at Egypt, and destroyed a train offourteen cars; thence turning to the south-west, he struck theMississippi Central Railroad at Winona, destroyed the factories andlarge amounts of stores at Bankston, and the machine-shops and publicproperty at Grenada, arriving at Vicksburg January 5th.

During the operations in Middle Tennessee, the enemy, with a force underGeneral Breckinridge, entered East Tennessee. On the 13th of Novemberhe attacked General Gillem, near Morristown, capturing his artillery andseveral hundred prisoners. Gillem, with what was left of his command,retreated to Knoxville. Following up his success, Breckinridge moved tonear Knoxville, but withdrew on the 18th, followed by General Ammen.Under the directions of General Thomas, General Stoneman concentratedthe commands of Generals Burbridge and Gillem near Bean's Station tooperate against Breckinridge, and destroy or drive him into Virginia—destroy the salt-works at Saltville, and the railroad into Virginiaas far as he could go without endangering his command. On the 12th ofDecember he commenced his movement, capturing and dispersing the enemy'sforces wherever he met them. On the 16th he struck the enemy, underVaughn, at Marion, completely routing and pursuing him to Wytheville,capturing all his artillery, trains, and one hundred and ninety-eightprisoners; and destroyed Wytheville, with its stores and supplies, andthe extensive lead-works near there. Returning to Marion, he met a forceunder Breckinridge, consisting, among other troops, of the garrison ofSaltville, that had started in pursuit. He at once made arrangements toattack it the next morning; but morning found Breckinridge gone. Hethen moved directly to Saltville, and destroyed the extensive salt-worksat that place, a large amount of stores, and captured eight pieces ofartillery. Having thus successfully executed his instructions, hereturned General Burbridge to Lexington and General Gillem to Knoxville.

Wilmington, North Carolina, was the most important sea-coast port leftto the enemy through which to get supplies from abroad, and send cottonand other products out by blockade-runners, besides being a place ofgreat strategic value. The navy had been making strenuous exertions toseal the harbor of Wilmington, but with only partial effect. The natureof the outlet of Cape Fear River was such, that it required watching forso great a distance that, without possession of the land north of NewInlet, or Fort Fisher, it was impossible for the navy to entirely closethe harbor against the entrance of blockade-runners.

To secure the possession of this land required the co-operation of aland force, which I agreed to furnish. Immediately commenced theassemblage in Hampton Roads, under Admiral D. D. Porter, of the mostformidable armada ever collected for concentration upon one given point.This necessarily attracted the attention of the enemy, as well as thatof the loyal North; and through the imprudence of the public press, andvery likely of officers of both branches of service, the exact object ofthe expedition became a subject of common discussion in the newspapersboth North and South. The enemy, thus warned, prepared to meet it.This caused a postponement of the expedition until the later part ofNovember, when, being again called upon by Hon. G. V. Fox, AssistantSecretary of the Navy, I agreed to furnish the men required at once, andwent myself, in company with Major-General Butler, to Hampton Roads,where we had a conference with Admiral Porter as to the force requiredand the time of starting. A force of six thousand five hundred men wasregarded as sufficient. The time of starting was not definitelyarranged, but it was thought all would be ready by the 6th of December,if not before. Learning, on the 30th of November, that Bragg had goneto Georgia, taking with him most of the forces about Wilmington, Ideemed it of the utmost importance that the expedition should reach itsdestination before the return of Bragg, and directed General Butler tomake all arrangements for the departure of Major-General Weitzel, whohad been designated to command the land forces, so that the navy mightnot be detained one moment.

On the 6th of December, the following instructions were given:

"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, December 6, 1864.

"GENERAL: The first object of the expedition under General Weitzel isto close to the enemy the port of Wilmington. If successful in this,the second will be to capture Wilmington itself. There are reasonablegrounds to hope for success, if advantage can be taken of the absence ofthe greater part of the enemy's forces now looking after Sherman inGeorgia. The directions you have given for the numbers and equipment ofthe expedition are all right, except in the unimportant matter of wherethey embark and the amount of intrenching tools to be taken. The objectof the expedition will be gained by effecting a landing on the main landbetween Cape Fear River and the Atlantic, north of the north entrance tothe river. Should such landing be effected while the enemy still holdsFort Fisher and the batteries guarding the entrance to the river, thenthe troops should intrench themselves, and, by co-operating with thenavy, effect the reduction and capture of those places. These in ourhands, the navy could enter the harbor, and the port of Wilmington wouldbe sealed. Should Fort Fisher and the point of land on which it isbuilt fall into the hands of our troops immediately on landing, then itwill be worth the attempt to capture Wilmington by a forced march andsurprise. If time is consumed in gaining the first object of theexpedition, the second will become a matter of after consideration.

"The details for execution are intrusted to you and the officerimmediately in command of the troops.

"Should the troops under General Weitzel fail to effect a landing at ornear Fort Fisher, they will be returned to the armies operating againstRichmond without delay.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL B. F. BUTLER."

General Butler commanding the army from which the troops were taken forthis enterprise, and the territory within which they were to operate,military courtesy required that all orders and instructions should gothrough him. They were so sent, but General Weitzel has sinceofficially informed me that he never received the foregoinginstructions, nor was he aware of their existence, until he read GeneralButler's published official report of the Fort Fisher failure, with myindorsement and papers accompanying it. I had no idea of GeneralButler's accompanying the expedition until the evening before it got offfrom Bermuda Hundred, and then did not dream but that General Weitzelhad received all the instructions, and would be in command. I ratherformed the idea that General Butler was actuated by a desire to witnessthe effect of the explosion of the powder-boat. The expedition wasdetained several days at Hampton Roads, awaiting the loading of thepowder-boat.

The importance of getting the Wilmington expedition off without anydelay, with or without the powder-boat, had been urged upon GeneralButler, and he advised to so notify Admiral Porter.

The expedition finally got off on the 13th of December, and arrived atthe place of rendezvous, off New Inlet, near Fort Fisher, on the eveningof the 15th. Admiral Porter arrived on the evening of the 18th, havingput in at Beaufort to get ammunition for the monitors. The sea becomingrough, making it difficult to land troops, and the supply of water andcoal being about exhausted, the transport fleet put back to Beaufort toreplenish; this, with the state of the weather, delayed the return tothe place of rendezvous until the 24th. The powder-boat was exploded onthe morning of the 24th, before the return of General Butler fromBeaufort; but it would seem, from the notice taken of it in the Southernnewspapers, that the enemy were never enlightened as to the object ofthe explosion until they were informed by the Northern press.

On the 25th a landing was effected without opposition, and areconnoissance, under Brevet Brigadier-General Curtis, pushed up towardsthe fort. But before receiving a full report of the result of thisreconnoissance, General Butler, in direct violation of the instructionsgiven, ordered the re-embarkation of the troops and the return of theexpedition. The re-embarkation was accomplished by the morning of the27th.

On the return of the expedition officers and men among them BrevetMajor-General (then Brevet Brigadier-General) N. M. Curtis,First-Lieutenant G. W. Ross, 117th Regiment New York Volunteers,First-Lieutenant William H. Walling, and Second-Lieutenant GeorgeSimpson, 142d New York Volunteers voluntarily reported to me that whenrecalled they were nearly into the fort, and, in their opinion, it couldhave been taken without much loss.

Soon after the return of the expedition, I received a dispatch from theSecretary of the Navy, and a letter from Admiral Porter, informing methat the fleet was still off Fort Fisher, and expressing the convictionthat, under a proper leader, the place could be taken. The naturalsupposition with me was, that when the troops abandoned the expedition,the navy would do so also. Finding it had not, however, I answered onthe 30th of December, advising Admiral Porter to hold on, and that Iwould send a force and make another attempt to take the place. Thistime I selected Brevet Major-General (now Major-General) A. H. Terry tocommand the expedition. The troops composing it consisted of the samethat composed the former, with the addition of a small brigade,numbering about one thousand five hundred, and a small siege train. Thelatter it was never found necessary to land. I communicated direct tothe commander of the expedition the following instructions:

"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, January 3, 1865.

"GENERAL: The expedition intrusted to your command has been fitted outto renew the attempt to capture Fort Fisher, N. C., and Wilmingtonultimately, if the fort falls. You will then proceed with as littledelay as possible to the naval fleet lying off Cape Fear River, andreport the arrival of yourself and command to Admiral D. D. Porter,commanding North Atlantic Blockading Squadron.

"It is exceedingly desirable that the most complete understanding shouldexist between yourself and the naval commander. I suggest, therefore,that you consult with Admiral Porter freely, and get from him the partto be performed by each branch of the public service, so that there maybe unity of action. It would be well to have the whole programme laiddown in writing. I have served with Admiral Porter, and know that youcan rely on his judgment and his nerve to undertake what he proposes. Iwould, therefore, defer to him as much as is consistent with your ownresponsibilities. The first object to be attained is to get a firmposition on the spit of land on which Fort Fisher is built, from whichyou can operate against that fort. You want to look to thepracticability of receiving your supplies, and to defending yourselfagainst superior forces sent against you by any of the avenues left opento the enemy. If such a position can be obtained, the siege of FortFisher will not be abandoned until its reduction is accomplished, oranother plan of campaign is ordered from these headquarters.

"My own views are, that if you effect a landing, the navy ought to run aportion of their fleet into Cape Fear River, while the balance of itoperates on the outside. Land forces cannot invest Fort Fisher, or cutit off from supplies or reinforcements, while the river is in possessionof the enemy.

"A siege-train will be loaded on vessels and sent to Fort Monroe, inreadiness to be sent to you if required. All other supplies can bedrawn from Beaufort as you need them.

"Keep the fleet of vessels with you until your position is assured.When you find they can be spared, order them back, or such of them asyou can spare, to Fort Monroe, to report for orders.

"In case of failure to effect a landing, bring your command back to
Beaufort, and report to these headquarters for further instructions.
You will not debark at Beaufort until so directed.

"General Sheridan has been ordered to send a division of troops toBaltimore and place them on sea-going vessels. These troops will bebrought to Fort Monroe and kept there on the vessels until you are heardfrom. Should you require them, they will be sent to you.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL A. H. TERRY."

Lieutenant-Colonel C. B. Comstock, aide-de-camp (now brevetbrigadier-general), who accompanied the former expedition,was assigned, in orders, as chief-engineer to this.

It will be seen that these instructions did not differ materially fromthose given for the first expedition, and that in neither instance wasthere an order to assault Fort Fisher. This was a matter left entirelyto the discretion of the commanding officer.

The expedition sailed from Fort Monroe on the morning of the 6th,arriving at the rendezvous, off Beaufort, on the 8th, where, owing tothe difficulties of the weather, it lay until the morning of the 12th,when it got under way and reached its destination that evening. Undercover of the fleet, the disembarkation of the troops commenced on themorning of the 13th, and by three o'clock P.M. was completed withoutloss. On the 14th a reconnoissance was pushed to within five hundredyards of Fort Fisher, and a small advance work taken possession of andturned into a defensive line against any attempt that might be made fromthe fort. This reconnoissance disclosed the fact that the front of thework had been seriously injured by the navy fire. In the afternoon ofthe 15th the fort was assaulted, and after most desperate fighting wascaptured, with its entire garrison and armament. Thus was secured, bythe combined efforts of the navy and army, one of the most importantsuccesses of the war. Our loss was: killed, one hundred and ten;wounded, five hundred and thirty-six. On the 16th and the 17th theenemy abandoned and blew up Fort Caswell and the works on Smith'sIsland, which were immediately occupied by us. This gave us entirecontrol of the mouth of the Cape Fear River.

At my request, Mayor-General B. F. Butler was relieved, and
Major-General E. O. C. Ord assigned to the Department of Virginia and
North Carolina.

The defence of the line of the Tennessee no longer requiring the forcewhich had beaten and nearly destroyed the only army now threatening it,I determined to find other fields of operation for General Thomas'ssurplus troops—fields from which they would co-operate with othermovements. General Thomas was therefore directed to collect all troops,not essential to hold his communications at Eastport, in readiness fororders. On the 7th of January, General Thomas was directed, if he wasassured of the departure of Hood south from Corinth, to send GeneralSchofield with his corps east with as little delay as possible. Thisdirection was promptly complied with, and the advance of the corpsreached Washington on the 23d of the same month, whence it was sent toFort Fisher and New Bern. On the 26th he was directed to send GeneralA. J. Smith's command and a division of cavalry to report to GeneralCanby. By the 7th of February the whole force was en route for itsdestination.

The State of North Carolina was constituted into a military department,and General Schofield assigned to command, and placed under the ordersof Major-General Sherman. The following instructions were given him:

"CITY POINT, VA., January 31, 1865.

"GENERAL:— * * * Your movements are intended as co-operativewith Sherman's through the States of South and North Carolina. Thefirst point to be attained is to secure Wilmington. Goldsboro' willthen be your objective point, moving either from Wilmington or New Bern,or both, as you deem best. Should you not be able to reach Goldsboro',you will advance on the line or lines of railway connecting that placewith the sea-coast—as near to it as you can, building the road behindyou. The enterprise under you has two objects: the first is to giveGeneral Sherman material aid, if needed, in his march north; the second,to open a base of supplies for him on his line of march. As soon,therefore, as you can determine which of the two points, Wilmington orNew Bern, you can best use for throwing supplies from, to the interior,you will commence the accumulation of twenty days' rations and foragefor sixty thousand men and twenty thousand animals. You will get ofthese as many as you can house and protect to such point in the interioras you may be able to occupy. I believe General Palmer has receivedsome instructions direct from General Sherman on the subject of securingsupplies for his army. You will learn what steps he has taken, and begoverned in your requisitions accordingly. A supply of ordnance storeswill also be necessary.

"Make all requisitions upon the chiefs of their respective departmentsin the field with me at City Point. Communicate with me by everyopportunity, and should you deem it necessary at any time, send aspecial boat to Fortress Monroe, from which point you can communicate bytelegraph.

"The supplies referred to in these instructions are exclusive of thoserequired for your own command.

"The movements of the enemy may justify, or even make it your imperativeduty, to cut loose from your base, and strike for the interior to aidSherman. In such case you will act on your own judgment without waitingfor instructions. You will report, however, what you purpose doing.The details for carrying out these instructions are necessarily left toyou. I would urge, however, if I did not know that you are alreadyfully alive to the importance of it, prompt action. Sherman may belooked for in the neighborhood of Goldsboro' any time from the 22d tothe 28th of February; this limits your time very materially.

"If rolling-stock is not secured in the capture of Wilmington, it can besupplied from Washington. A large force of railroad men have alreadybeen sent to Beaufort, and other mechanics will go to Fort Fisher in aday or two. On this point I have informed you by telegraph.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL J. M. SCHOFIELD."

Previous to giving these instructions I had visited Fort Fisher,accompanied by General Schofield, for the purpose of seeing for myselfthe condition of things, and personally conferring with General Terryand Admiral Porter as to what was best to be done.

Anticipating the arrival of General Sherman at Savannah his armyentirely foot-loose, Hood being then before Nashville, Tennessee, theSouthern railroads destroyed, so that it would take several months tore-establish a through line from west to east, and regarding the captureof Lee's army as the most important operation towards closing therebellion—I sent orders to General Sherman on the 6th of December, thatafter establishing a base on the sea-coast, with necessary garrison, toinclude all his artillery and cavalry, to come by water to City Pointwith the balance of his command.

On the 18th of December, having received information of the defeat andutter rout of Hood's army by General Thomas, and that, owing to thegreat difficulty of procuring ocean transportation, it would take overtwo months to transport Sherman's army, and doubting whether he mightnot contribute as much towards the desired result by operating fromwhere he was, I wrote to him to that effect, and asked him for his viewsas to what would be best to do. A few days after this I received acommunication from General Sherman, of date 16th December, acknowledgingthe receipt of my order of the 6th, and informing me of his preparationsto carry it into effect as soon as he could get transportation. Alsothat he had expected, upon reducing Savannah, instantly to march toColumbia, South Carolina, thence to Raleigh, and thence to report to me;but that this would consume about six weeks' time after the fall ofSavannah, whereas by sea he could probably reach me by the middle ofJanuary. The confidence he manifested in this letter of being able tomarch up and join me pleased me, and, without waiting for a reply to myletter of the 18th, I directed him, on the 28th of December, to makepreparations to start as he proposed, without delay, to break up therailroads in North and South Carolina, and join the armies operatingagainst Richmond as soon as he could.

On the 21st of January I informed General Sherman that I had ordered the23d corps, Major-General Schofield commanding, east; that it numberedabout twenty-one thousand men; that we had at Fort Fisher, about eightthousand men; at New Bern, about four thousand; that if Wilmington wascaptured, General Schofield would go there; if not, he would be sent toNew Bern; that, in either event, all the surplus force at both pointswould move to the interior towards Goldsboro', in co-operation with hismovement; that from either point railroad communication could be runout; and that all these troops would be subject to his orders as he cameinto communication with them.

In obedience to his instructions, General Schofield proceeded to reduceWilmington, North Carolina, in co-operation with the navy under AdmiralPorter, moving his forces up both sides of the Cape Fear River. FortAnderson, the enemy's main defence on the west bank of the river, wasoccupied on the morning of the 19th, the enemy having evacuated it afterour appearance before it.

After fighting on 20th and 21st, our troops entered Wilmington on themorning of the 22d, the enemy having retreated towards Goldsboro' duringthe night. Preparations were at once made for a movement on Goldsboro'in two columns—one from Wilmington, and the other from New Bern—and torepair the railroad leading there from each place, as well as to supplyGeneral Sherman by Cape Fear River, towards Fayetteville, if it becamenecessary. The column from New Bern was attacked on the 8th of March,at Wise's Forks, and driven back with the loss of several hundredprisoners. On the 11th the enemy renewed his attack upon our intrenchedposition, but was repulsed with severe loss, and fell back during thenight. On the 14th the Neuse River was crossed and Kinston occupied,and on the 21st Goldsboro' was entered. The column from Wilmingtonreached Cox's Bridge, on the Neuse River, ten miles above Goldsboro', onthe 22d.

By the 1st of February, General Sherman's whole army was in motion fromSavannah. He captured Columbia, South Carolina, on the 17th; thencemoved on Goldsboro', North Carolina, via Fayetteville, reaching thelatter place on the 12th of March, opening up communication with GeneralSchofield by way of Cape Fear River. On the 15th he resumed his marchon Goldsboro'. He met a force of the enemy at Averysboro', and after asevere fight defeated and compelled it to retreat. Our loss in thisengagement was about six hundred. The enemy's loss was much greater.On the 18th the combined forces of the enemy, under Joe Johnston,attacked his advance at Bentonville, capturing three guns and driving itback upon the main body. General Slocum, who was in the advanceascertaining that the whole of Johnston's army was in the front,arranged his troops on the defensive, intrenched himself and awaitedreinforcements, which were pushed forward. On the night of the 21st theenemy retreated to Smithfield, leaving his dead and wounded in ourhands. From there Sherman continued to Goldsboro', which place had beenoccupied by General Schofield on the 21st (crossing the Neuse River tenmiles above there, at Cox's Bridge, where General Terry had gotpossession and thrown a pontoon-bridge on the 22d), thus forming ajunction with the columns from New Bern and Wilmington.

Among the important fruits of this campaign was the fall of Charleston,South Carolina. It was evacuated by the enemy on the night of the 17thof February, and occupied by our forces on the 18th.

On the morning of the 31st of January, General Thomas was directed tosend a cavalry expedition, under General Stoneman, from East Tennessee,to penetrate South Carolina well down towards Columbia, to destroy therailroads and military resources of the country, and return, if he wasable, to East Tennessee by way of Salisbury, North Carolina, releasingour prisoners there, if possible. Of the feasibility of this latter,however, General Stoneman was to judge. Sherman's movements, I had nodoubt, would attract the attention of all the force the enemy couldcollect, and facilitate the execution of this. General Stoneman was solate in making his start on this expedition (and Sherman having passedout of the State of South Carolina), on the 27th of February I directedGeneral Thomas to change his course, and order him to repeat his raid oflast fall, destroying the railroad towards Lynchburg as far as he could.This would keep him between our garrisons in East Tennessee and theenemy. I regarded it not impossible that in the event of the enemybeing driven from Richmond, he might fall back to Lynchburg and attempta raid north through East Tennessee. On the 14th of February thefollowing communication was sent to General Thomas:

"CITY POINT, VA., February 14, 1865.

"General Canby is preparing a movement from Mobile Bay against Mobileand the interior of Alabama. His force will consist of about twentythousand men, besides A. J. Smith's command. The cavalry you have sentto Canby will be debarked at Vicksburg. It, with the available cavalryalready in that section, will move from there eastward, in co-operation.Hood's army has been terribly reduced by the severe punishment you gaveit in Tennessee, by desertion consequent upon their defeat, and now bythe withdrawal of many of them to oppose Sherman. (I take it a largeportion of the infantry has been so withdrawn. It is so asserted in theRichmond papers, and a member of the rebel Congress said a few dayssince in a speech, that one-half of it had been brought to SouthCarolina to oppose Sherman.) This being true, or even if it is nottrue, Canby's movement will attract all the attention of the enemy, andleave the advance from your standpoint easy. I think it advisable,therefore, that you prepare as much of a cavalry force as you can spare,and hold it in readiness to go south. The object would be threefold:first, to attract as much of the enemy's force as possible, to insuresuccess to Canby; second, to destroy the enemy's line of communicationsand military resources; third, to destroy or capture their forcesbrought into the field. Tuscaloosa and Selma would probably be thepoints to direct the expedition against. This, however, would not be soimportant as the mere fact of penetrating deep into Alabama. Discretionshould be left to the officer commanding the expedition to go where,according to the information he may receive, he will best secure theobjects named above.

"Now that your force has been so much depleted, I do not know whatnumber of men you can put into the field. If not more than fivethousand men, however, all cavalry, I think it will be sufficient. Itis not desirable that you should start this expedition until the oneleaving Vicksburg has been three or four days out, or even a week. I donot know when it will start, but will inform you by telegraph as soon asI learn. If you should hear through other sources before hearing fromme, you can act on the information received.

"To insure success your cavalry should go with as little wagon-train aspossible, relying upon the country for supplies. I would also reducethe number of guns to a battery, or the number of batteries, and put theextra teams to the guns taken. No guns or caissons should be taken withless than eight horses.

"Please inform me by telegraph, on receipt of this, what force you thinkyou will be able to send under these directions.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL G. H. THOMAS."

On the 15th, he was directed to start the expedition as soon after the20th as he could get it off.

I deemed it of the utmost importance, before a general movement of thearmies operating against Richmond, that all communications with thecity, north of James River, should be cut off. The enemy havingwithdrawn the bulk of his force from the Shenandoah Valley and sent itsouth, or replaced troops sent from Richmond, and desiring to reinforceSherman, if practicable, whose cavalry was greatly inferior in numbersto that of the enemy, I determined to make a move from the Shenandoah,which, if successful, would accomplish the first at least, and possiblythe latter of the objects. I therefore telegraphed General Sheridan asfollows:

"CITY POINT, VA., February 20, 1865—1 P.M.

"GENERAL:—As soon as it is possible to travel, I think you will have nodifficulty about reaching Lynchburg with a cavalry force alone. Fromthere you could destroy the railroad and canal in every direction, so asto be of no further use to the rebellion. Sufficient cavalry should beleft behind to look after Mosby's gang. From Lynchburg, if informationyou might get there would justify it, you will strike south, heading thestreams in Virgina to the westward of Danville, and push on and joinGeneral Sherman. This additional raid, with one now about starting fromEast Tennessee under Stoneman, numbering four or give thousand cavalry,one from Vicksburg, numbering seven or eight thousand cavalry, one fromEastport, Mississippi, then thousand cavalry, Canby from Mobile Bay,with about thirty-eight thousand mixed troops, these three latterpushing for Tuscaloosa, Selma, and Montgomery, and Sherman with a largearmy eating out the vitals of South Carolina, is all that will be wantedto leave nothing for the rebellion to stand upon. I would advise you toovercome great obstacles to accomplish this. Charleston was evacuatedon Tuesday 1st.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN."

On the 25th I received a dispatch from General Sheridan, inquiring where
Sherman was aiming for, and if I could give him definite information as
to the points he might be expected to move on, this side of Charlotte,
North Carolina. In answer, the following telegram was sent him:

"CITY POINT, VA., February 25, 1865.

"GENERAL:—Sherman's movements will depend on the amount of oppositionhe meets with from the enemy. If strongly opposed, he may possibly haveto fall back to Georgetown, S. C., and fit out for a new start. Ithink, however, all danger for the necessity of going to that point haspassed. I believe he has passed Charlotte. He may take Fayetteville onhis way to Goldsboro'. If you reach Lynchburg, you will have to beguided in your after movements by the information you obtain. Beforeyou could possibly reach Sherman, I think you would find him moving fromGoldsboro' towards Raleigh, or engaging the enemy strongly posted at oneor the other of these places, with railroad communications opened fromhis army to Wilmington or New Bern.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN."

General Sheridan moved from Winchester on the 27th of February, with twodivisions of cavalry, numbering about five thousand each. On the 1st ofMarch he secured the bridge, which the enemy attempted to destroy,across the middle fork of the Shenandoah, at Mount Crawford, and enteredStaunton on the 2d, the enemy having retreated to Waynesboro'. Thencehe pushed on to Waynesboro', where he found the enemy in force in anintrenched position, under General Early. Without stopping to make areconnoissance, an immediate attack was made, the position was carried,and sixteen hundred prisoners, eleven pieces of artillery, with horsesand caissons complete, two hundred wagons and teams loaded withsubsistence, and seventeen battle-flags, were captured. The prisoners,under an escort of fifteen hundred men, were sent back to Winchester.Thence he marched on Charlottesville, destroying effectually therailroad and bridges as he went, which place he reached on the 3d. Herehe remained two days, destroying the railroad towards Richmond andLynchburg, including the large iron bridges over the north and southforks of the Rivanna River and awaited the arrival of his trains. Thisnecessary delay caused him to abandon the idea of capturing Lynchburg.On the morning of the 6th, dividing his force into two columns, he sentone to Scottsville, whence it marched up the James River Canal to NewMarket, destroying every lock, and in many places the bank of the canal.From here a force was pushed out from this column to Duiguidsville, toobtain possession of the bridge across the James River at that place,but failed. The enemy burned it on our approach. The enemy also burnedthe bridge across the river at Hardwicksville. The other column moveddown the railroad towards Lynchburg, destroying it as far as AmherstCourt House, sixteen miles from Lynchburg; thence across the country,uniting with the column at New Market. The river being very high, hispontoons would not reach across it; and the enemy having destroyed thebridges by which he had hoped to cross the river and get on the SouthSide Railroad about Farmville, and destroy it to Appomattox Court House,the only thing left for him was to return to Winchester or strike a baseat the White House. Fortunately, he chose the latter. From New Markethe took up his line of march, following the canal towards Richmond,destroying every lock upon it and cutting the banks whereverpracticable, to a point eight miles east of Goochland, concentrating thewhole force at Columbia on the 10th. Here he rested one day, and sentthrough by scouts information of his whereabouts and purposes, and arequest for supplies to meet him at White House, which reached me on thenight of the 12th. An infantry force was immediately sent to getpossession of White House, and supplies were forwarded. Moving fromColumbia in a direction to threaten Richmond, to near Ashland Station,he crossed the Annas, and after having destroyed all the bridges andmany miles of the railroad, proceeded down the north bank of thePamunkey to White House, which place he reached on the 19th.

Previous to this the following communication was sent to General Thomas:

"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, March 7, 1865—9.30 A.M.

"GENERAL:—I think it will be advisable now for you to repair therailroad in East Tennessee, and throw a good force up to Bull's Gap andfortify there. Supplies at Knoxville could always be got forward asrequired. With Bull's Gap fortified, you can occupy as outposts aboutall of East Tennessee, and be prepared, if it should be required of youin the spring, to make a campaign towards Lynchburg, or into NorthCarolina. I do not think Stoneman should break the road until he getsinto Virginia, unless it should be to cut off rolling-stock that may becaught west of that.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL G. H. THOMAS."

Thus it will be seen that in March, 1865, General Canby was moving anadequate force against Mobile and the army defending it under GeneralDick Taylor; Thomas was pushing out two large and well-appointed cavalryexpeditions—one from Middle Tennessee under Brevet Major-General Wilsonagainst the enemy's vital points in Alabama, the other from EastTennessee, under Major-General Stoneman, towards Lynchburg—andassembling the remainder of his available forces, preparatory tocommence offensive operations from East Tennessee; General Sheridan'scavalry was at White House; the armies of the Potomac and James wereconfronting the enemy, under Lee, in his defences of Richmond andPetersburg; General Sherman with his armies, reinforced by that ofGeneral Schofield, was at Goldsboro'; General Pope was makingpreparations for a spring campaign against the enemy under Kirby Smithand Price, west of the Mississippi; and General Hancock wasconcentrating a force in the vicinity of Winchester, Virginia, to guardagainst invasion or to operate offensively, as might prove necessary.

After the long march by General Sheridan's cavalry over winter roads, itwas necessary to rest and refit at White House. At this time thegreatest source of uneasiness to me was the fear that the enemy wouldleave his strong lines about Petersburg and Richmond for the purpose ofuniting with Johnston, and before he was driven from them by battle, orI was prepared to make an effectual pursuit. On the 24th of March,General Sheridan moved from White House, crossed the James River atJones's Landing, and formed a junction with the Army of the Potomac infront of Petersburg on the 27th. During this move, General Ord sentforces to cover the crossings of the Chickahominy.

On the 24th of March the following instructions for a general movementof the armies operating against Richmond were issued:

"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, March 24, 1865.

"GENERAL: On the 29th instant the armies operating against Richmondwill be moved by our left, for the double purpose of turning the enemyout of his present position around Petersburg, and to insure the successof the cavalry under General Sheridan, which will start at the sametime, in its efforts to reach and destroy the South Side and Danvillerailroads. Two corps of the Army of the Potomac will be moved at firstin two columns, taking the two roads crossing Hatcher's Run, nearestwhere the present line held by us strikes that stream, both movingtowards Dinwiddie Court House.

"The cavalry under General Sheridan, joined by the division now underGeneral Davies, will move at the same time by the Weldon Road and theJerusalem Plank Road, turning west from the latter before crossing theNottoway, and west with the whole column before reaching Stony Creek.General Sheridan will then move independently, under other instructionswhich will be given him. All dismounted cavalry belonging to the Armyof the Potomac, and the dismounted cavalry from the Middle MilitaryDivision not required for guarding property belonging to their arm ofservice, will report to Brigadier-General Benham, to be added to thedefences of City Point. Major-General Parke will be left in command ofall the army left for holding the lines about Petersburg and City Point,subject of course to orders from the commander of the Army of thePotomac. The 9th army corps will be left intact, to hold the presentline of works so long as the whole line now occupied by us is held. If,however, the troops to the left of the 9th corps are withdrawn, then theleft of the corps may be thrown back so as to occupy the position heldby the army prior to the capture of the Weldon Road. All troops to theleft of the 9th corps will be held in readiness to move at the shortestnotice by such route as may be designated when the order is given.

"General Ord will detach three divisions, two white and one colored, orso much of them as he can, and hold his present lines, and march for thepresent left of the Army of the Potomac. In the absence of furtherorders, or until further orders are given, the white divisions willfollow the left column of the Army of the Potomac, and the coloreddivision the right column. During the movement Major-General Weitzelwill be left in command of all the forces remaining behind from the Armyof the James.

"The movement of troops from the Army of the James will commence on thenight of the 27th instant. General Ord will leave behind the minimumnumber of cavalry necessary for picket duty, in the absence of the mainarmy. A cavalry expedition, from General Ord's command, will also bestarted from Suffolk, to leave there on Saturday, the 1st of April,under Colonel Sumner, for the purpose of cutting the railroad aboutHicksford. This, if accomplished, will have to be a surprise, andtherefore from three to five hundred men will be sufficient. Theyshould, however, be supported by all the infantry that can be sparedfrom Norfolk and Portsmouth, as far out as to where the cavalry crossesthe Blackwater. The crossing should probably be at Uniten. ShouldColonel Sumner succeed in reaching the Weldon Road, he will beinstructed to do all the damage possible to the triangle of roadsbetween Hicksford, Weldon, and Gaston. The railroad bridge at Weldonbeing fitted up for the passage of carriages, it might be practicable todestroy any accumulation of supplies the enemy may have collected southof the Roanoke. All the troops will move with four days' rations inhaversacks and eight days' in wagons. To avoid as much hauling aspossible, and to give the Army of the James the same number of days'supplies with the Army of the Potomac, General Ord will direct hiscommissary and quartermaster to have sufficient supplies delivered atthe terminus of the road to fill up in passing. Sixty rounds ofammunition per man will be taken in wagons, and as much grain as thetransportation on hand will carry, after taking the specified amount ofother supplies. The densely wooded country in which the army has tooperate making the use of much artillery impracticable, the amount takenwith the army will be reduced to six or eight guns to each division, atthe option of the army commanders.

"All necessary preparations for carrying these directions into operationmay be commenced at once. The reserves of the 9th corps should bemassed as much as possible. While I would not now order anunconditional attack on the enemy's line by them, they should be readyand should make the attack if the enemy weakens his line in their front,without waiting for orders. In case they carry the line, then the wholeof the 9th corps could follow up so as to join or co-operate with thebalance of the army. To prepare for this, the 9th corps will haverations issued to them, same as the balance of the army. GeneralWeitzel will keep vigilant watch upon his front, and if found at allpracticable to break through at any point, he will do so. A successnorth of the James should be followed up with great promptness. Anattack will not be feasible unless it is found that the enemy hasdetached largely. In that case it may be regarded as evident that theenemy are relying upon their local reserves principally for the defenceof Richmond. Preparations may be made for abandoning all the line northof the James, except inclosed works only to be abandoned, however, aftera break is made in the lines of the enemy.

"By these instructions a large part of the armies operating againstRichmond is left behind. The enemy, knowing this, may, as an onlychance, strip their lines to the merest skeleton, in the hope ofadvantage not being taken of it, while they hurl everything against themoving column, and return. It cannot be impressed too strongly uponcommanders of troops left in the trenches not to allow this to occurwithout taking advantage of it. The very fact of the enemy coming outto attack, if he does so, might be regarded as almost conclusiveevidence of such a weakening of his lines. I would have it particularlyenjoined upon corps commanders that, in case of an attack from theenemy, those not attacked are not to wait for orders from the commandingofficer of the army to which they belong, but that they will movepromptly, and notify the commander of their action. I would also enjointhe same action on the part of division commanders when other parts oftheir corps are engaged. In like manner, I would urge the importance offollowing up a repulse of the enemy.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERALS MEADE, ORD, AND SHERIDAN."

Early on the morning of the 25th the enemy assaulted our lines in frontof the 9th corps (which held from the Appomattox River towards ourleft), and carried Fort Stedman, and a part of the line to the right andleft of it, established themselves and turned the guns of the fortagainst us, but our troops on either flank held their ground until thereserves were brought up, when the enemy was driven back with a heavyloss in killed and wounded, and one thousand nine hundred prisoners.Our loss was sixty-eight killed, three hundred and thirty-seven wounded,and five hundred and six missing. General Meade at once ordered theother corps to advance and feel the enemy in their respective fronts.Pushing forward, they captured and held the enemy's strongly intrenchedpicket-line in front of the 2d and 6th corps, and eight hundred andthirty-four prisoners. The enemy made desperate attempts to retake thisline, but without success. Our loss in front of these was fifty-twokilled, eight hundred and sixty-four wounded, and two hundred and sevenmissing. The enemy's loss in killed and wounded was far greater.

General Sherman having got his troops all quietly in camp aboutGoldsboro', and his preparations for furnishing supplies to themperfected, visited me at City Point on the 27th of March, and statedthat he would be ready to move, as he had previously written me, by the10th of April, fully equipped and rationed for twenty days, if it shouldbecome necessary to bring his command to bear against Lee's army, inco-operation with our forces in front of Richmond and Petersburg.General Sherman proposed in this movement to threaten Raleigh, and then,by turning suddenly to the right, reach the Roanoke at Gaston orthereabouts, whence he could move on to the Richmond and DanvilleRailroad, striking it in the vicinity of Burkesville, or join the armiesoperating against Richmond, as might be deemed best. This plan he wasdirected to carry into execution, if he received no further directionsin the meantime. I explained to him the movement I had ordered tocommence on the 29th of March. That if it should not prove as entirelysuccessful as I hoped, I would cut the cavalry loose to destroy theDanville and South Side railroads, and thus deprive the enemy of furthersupplies, and also to prevent the rapid concentration of Lee's andJohnston's armies.

I had spent days of anxiety lest each morning should bring the reportthat the enemy had retreated the night before. I was firmly convincedthat Sherman's crossing the Roanoke would be the signal for Lee toleave. With Johnston and him combined, a long, tedious, and expensivecampaign, consuming most of the summer, might become necessary. Bymoving out I would put the army in better condition for pursuit, andwould at least, by the destruction of the Danville Road, retard theconcentration of the two armies of Lee and Johnston, and cause the enemyto abandon much material that he might otherwise save. I thereforedetermined not to delay the movement ordered.

On the night of the 27th, Major-General Ord, with two divisions of the24th corps, Major-General Gibbon commanding, and one division of the25th corps, Brigadier-General Birney commanding, and MacKenzie'scavalry, took up his line of march in pursuance of the foregoinginstructions, and reached the position assigned him near Hatcher's Runon the morning of the 29th. On the 28th the following instructions weregiven to General Sheridan:

"CITY POINT, VA., March 28, 1865.

"GENERAL:—The 5th army corps will move by the Vaughn Road at three A.M.to-morrow morning. The 2d moves at about nine A.M., having but aboutthree miles to march to reach the point designated for it to take on theright of the 5th corps, after the latter reaching Dinwiddie Court House.Move your cavalry at as early an hour as you can, and without beingconfined to any particular road or roads. You may go out by the nearestroads in rear of the 5th corps, pass by its left, and passing near to orthrough Dinwiddie, reach the right and rear of the enemy as soon as youcan. It is not the intention to attack the enemy in his intrenchedposition, but to force him out, if possible. Should he come out andattack us, or get himself where he can be attacked, move in with yourentire force in your own way, and with the full reliance that the armywill engage or follow, as circumstances will dictate. I shall be on thefield, and will probably be able to communicate with you. Should I notdo so, and you find that the enemy keeps within his main intrenchedline, you may cut loose and push for the Danville Road. If you find itpracticable, I would like you to cross the South Side Road, betweenPetersburg and Burkesville, and destroy it to some extent. I would notadvise much detention, however, until you reach the Danville Road, whichI would like you to strike as near to the Appomattox as possible. Makeyour destruction on that road as complete as possible. You can thenpass on to the South Side Road, west of Burkesville, and destroy that inlike manner.

"After having accomplished the destruction of the two railroads, whichare now the only avenues of supply to Lee's army, you may return to thisarmy, selecting your road further south, or you may go on into NorthCarolina and join General Sherman. Should you select the latter course,get the information to me as early as possible, so that I may sendorders to meet you at Goldsboro'.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN."

On the morning of the 29th the movement commenced. At night the cavalrywas at Dinwiddie Court House, and the left of our infantry line extendedto the Quaker Road, near its intersection with the Boydton Plank Road.The position of the troops from left to right was as follows: Sheridan,Warren, Humphreys, Ord, Wright, Parke.

Everything looked favorable to the defeat of the enemy and the captureof Petersburg and Richmond, if the proper effort was made. I thereforeaddressed the following communication to General Sheridan, havingpreviously informed him verbally not to cut loose for the raidcontemplated in his orders until he received notice from me to do so:

"GRAVELLY CREEK, March 29, 1865.

"GENERAL:—Our line is now unbroken from the Appomattox to Dinwiddie.We are all ready, however, to give up all, from the Jerusalem Plank Roadto Hatcher's Run, whenever the forces can be used advantageously. Aftergetting into line south of Hatcher's, we pushed forward to find theenemy's position. General Griffin was attacked near where the QuakerRoad intersects the Boydton Road, but repulsed it easily, capturingabout one hundred men. Humphreys reached Dabney's Mill, and was pushingon when last heard from.

"I now feel like ending the matter, if it is possible to do so, beforegoing back. I do not want you, therefore, to cut loose and go after theenemy's roads at present. In the morning push around the enemy, if youcan, and get on to his right rear. The movements of the enemy's cavalrymay, of course, modify your action. We will act all together as onearmy here, until it is seen what can be done with the enemy. Thesignal-officer at Cobb's Hill reported, at half-past eleven A.M., that acavalry column had passed that point from Richmond towards Petersburg,taking forty minutes to pass.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN."

From the night of the 29th to the morning of the 31st the rain fell insuch torrents as to make it impossible to move a wheeled vehicle, exceptas corduroy roads were laid in front of them. During the 30th, Sheridanadvanced from Dinwiddie Court House towards Five Forks, where he foundthe enemy in full force. General Warren advanced and extended his lineacross the Boydton Plank Road to near the White Oak Road, with a view ofgetting across the latter; but, finding the enemy strong in his frontand extending beyond his left, was directed to hold on where he was, andfortify. General Humphreys drove the enemy from his front into his mainline on the Hatcher, near Burgess's Mills. Generals Ord, Wright, andParke made examinations in their fronts to determine the feasibility ofan assault on the enemy's lines. The two latter reported favorably.The enemy confronting us as he did, at every point from Richmond to ourextreme left, I conceived his lines must be weakly held, and could bepenetrated if my estimate of his forces was correct. I determined,therefore, to extend our line no farther, but to reinforce GeneralSheridan with a corps of infantry, and thus enable him to cut loose andturn the enemy's right flank, and with the other corps assault theenemy's lines. The result of the offensive effort of the enemy the weekbefore, when he assaulted Fort Stedman, particularly favored this. Theenemy's intrenched picket-line captured by us at that time threw thelines occupied by the belligerents so close together at some points thatit was but a moment's run from one to the other. Preparations were atonce made to relieve General Humphreys's corps, to report to GeneralSheridan; but the condition of the roads prevented immediate movement.On the morning of the 31st, General Warren reported favorably to gettingpossession of the White Oak Road, and was directed to do so. Toaccomplish this, he moved with one division, instead of his whole corps,which was attacked by the enemy in superior force and driven back on the2d division before it had time to form, and it, in turn, forced backupon the 3d division, when the enemy was checked. A division of the 2dcorps was immediately sent to his support, the enemy driven back withheavy loss, and possession of the White Oak Road gained. Sheridanadvanced, and with a portion of his cavalry got possession of the FiveForks; but the enemy, after the affair with the 5th corps, reinforcedthe rebel cavalry, defending that point with infantry, and forced himback towards Dinwiddie Court House. Here General Sheridan displayedgreat generalship. Instead of retreating with his whole command on themain army, to tell the story of superior forces encountered, he deployedhis cavalry on foot, leaving only mounted men enough to take charge ofthe horses. This compelled the enemy to deploy over a vast extent ofwooded and broken country, and made his progress slow. At this juncturehe dispatched to me what had taken place, and that he was dropping backslowly on Dinwiddie Court House. General Mackenzie's cavalry and onedivision of the 5th corps were immediately ordered to his assistance.Soon after receiving a report from General Meade that Humphreys couldhold our position on the Boydton Road, and that the other two divisionsof the 5th corps could go to Sheridan, they were so ordered at once.Thus the operations of the day necessitated the sending of Warren,because of his accessibility, instead of Humphreys, as was intended, andprecipitated intended movements. On the morning of the 1st of April,General Sheridan, reinforced by General Warren, drove the enemy back onFive Forks, where, late in the evening, he assaulted and carried hisstrongly fortified position, capturing all his artillery and betweenfive and six thousand prisoners.

About the close of this battle, Brevet Major-General Charles Griffinrelieved Major-General Warren in command of the 5th corps. The reportof this reached me after nightfall. Some apprehensions filled my mindlest the enemy might desert his lines during the night, and by fallingupon General Sheridan before assistance could reach him, drive him fromhis position and open the way for retreat. To guard against this,General Miles's division of Humphreys's corps was sent to reinforce him,and a bombardment was commenced and kept up until four o'clock in themorning (April 2), when an assault was ordered on the enemy's lines.General Wright penetrated the lines with his whole corps, sweepingeverything before him, and to his left towards Hatcher's Run, capturingmany guns and several thousand prisoners. He was closely followed bytwo divisions of General Ord's command, until he met the other divisionof General Ord's that had succeeded in forcing the enemy's lines nearHatcher's Run. Generals Wright and Ord immediately swung to the right,and closed all of the enemy on that side of them in Petersburg, whileGeneral Humphreys pushed forward with two divisions and joined GeneralWright on the left. General Parke succeeded in carrying the enemy'smain line, capturing guns and prisoners, but was unable to carry hisinner line. General Sheridan being advised of the condition of affairs,returned General Miles to his proper command. On reaching the enemy'slines immediately surrounding Petersburg, a portion of General Gibbon'scorps, by a most gallant charge, captured two strong inclosed works—themost salient and commanding south of Petersburg—thus materiallyshortening the line of investment necessary for taking in the city. Theenemy south of Hatcher's Run retreated westward to Sutherland's Station,where they were overtaken by Miles's division. A severe engagementensued, and lasted until both his right and left flanks were threatenedby the approach of General Sheridan, who was moving from Ford's Stationtowards Petersburg, and a division sent by General Meade from the frontof Petersburg, when he broke in the utmost confusion, leaving in ourhands his guns and many prisoners. This force retreated by the mainroad along the Appomattox River. During the night of the 2d the enemyevacuated Petersburg and Richmond, and retreated towards Danville. Onthe morning of the 3d pursuit was commenced. General Sheridan pushedfor the Danville Road, keeping near the Appomattox, followed by GeneralMeade with the 2d and 6th corps, while General Ord moved forBurkesville, along the South Side Road; the 9th corps stretched alongthat road behind him. On the 4th, General Sheridan struck the DanvilleRoad near Jetersville, where he learned that Lee was at Amelia CourtHouse. He immediately intrenched himself and awaited the arrival ofGeneral Meade, who reached there the next day. General Ord reachedBurkesville on the evening of the 5th.

On the morning of the 5th, I addressed Major-General Sherman thefollowing communication:

"WILSON'S STATION, April 5, 1865.

"GENERAL: All indications now are that Lee will attempt to reachDanville with the remnant of his force. Sheridan, who was up with himlast night, reports all that is left, horse, foot, and dragoons, attwenty thousand, much demoralized. We hope to reduce this numberone-half. I shall push on to Burkesville, and if a stand is made atDanville, will in a very few days go there. If you can possibly do so,push on from where you are, and let us see if we cannot finish the jobwith Lee's and Johnston's armies. Whether it will be better for you tostrike for Greensboro', or nearer to Danville, you will be better ableto judge when you receive this. Rebel armies now are the only strategicpoints to strike at.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN."

On the morning of the 6th, it was found that General Lee was moving westof Jetersville, towards Danville. General Sheridan moved with hiscavalry (the 5th corps having been returned to General Meade on hisreaching Jetersville) to strike his flank, followed by the 6th corps,while the 2d and 5th corps pressed hard after, forcing him to abandonseveral hundred wagons and several pieces of artillery. General Ordadvanced from Burkesville towards Farmville, sending two regiments ofinfantry and a squadron of cavalry, under Brevet Brigadier-GeneralTheodore Read, to reach and destroy the bridges. This advance met thehead of Lee's column near Farmville, which it heroically attacked anddetained until General Read was killed and his small force overpowered.This caused a delay in the enemy's movements, and enabled General Ord toget well up with the remainder of his force, on meeting which, the enemyimmediately intrenched himself. In the afternoon, General Sheridanstruck the enemy south of Sailors' Creek, captured sixteen pieces ofartillery and about four hundred wagons, and detained him until the 6thcorps got up, when a general attack of infantry and cavalry was made,which resulted in the capture of six or seven thousand prisoners, amongwhom were many general officers. The movements of the 2d corps andGeneral Ord's command contributed greatly to the day's success.

On the morning of the 7th the pursuit was renewed, the cavalry, exceptone division, and the 5th corps moving by Prince Edward's Court House;the 6th corps, General Ord's command, and one division of cavalry, onFarmville; and the 2d corps by the High Bridge Road. It was soon foundthat the enemy had crossed to the north side of the Appomattox; but soclose was the pursuit, that the 2d corps got possession of the commonbridge at High Bridge before the enemy could destroy it, and immediatelycrossed over. The 6th corps and a division of cavalry crossed atFarmville to its support.

Feeling now that General Lee's chance of escape was utterly hopeless, Iaddressed him the following communication from Farmville:

"April 7, 1865.

"GENERAL—The result of the last week must convince you of thehopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of NorthernVirginia in this struggle. I feel that it is so, and regard it as myduty to shift from myself the responsibility of any further effusion ofblood, by asking of you the surrender of that portion of the ConfederateStates army known as the Army of Northern Virginia.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"GENERAL R. E. LEE."

Early on the morning of the 8th, before leaving, I received at Farmvillethe following:

"April 7, 1865.

"GENERAL: I have received your note of this date. Though notentertaining the opinion you express on the hopelessness of furtherresistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia, I reciprocateyour desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and therefore, beforeconsidering your proposition, ask the terms you will offer on conditionof its surrender.

"R. E. LEE, General.
"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT."

To this I immediately replied:

"April 8, 1865.

"GENERAL:—Your note of last evening, in reply to mine of same date,asking the condition on which I will accept the surrender of the Army ofNorthern Virginia, is just received. In reply, I would say, that peacebeing my great desire, there is but one condition I would insist upon—namely, That the men and officers surrendered shall be disqualified fortaking up arms again against the Government of the United States untilproperly exchanged. I will meet you, or will designate officers to meetany officers you may name for the same purpose, at any point agreeableto you, for the purpose of arranging definitely the terms upon which thesurrender of the Army of the Northern Virginia will be received.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"GENERAL R. E. LEE."

Early on the morning of the 8th the pursuit was resumed. General Meadefollowed north of the Appomattox, and General Sheridan, with all thecavalry, pushed straight ahead for Appomattox Station, followed byGeneral Ord's command and the 5th corps. During the day General Meade'sadvance had considerable fighting with the enemy's rear-guard, but wasunable to bring on a general engagement. Late in the evening GeneralSheridan struck the railroad at Appomattox Station, drove the enemy fromthere, and captured twenty-five pieces of artillery, a hospital train,and four trains of cars loaded with supplies for Lee's army. Duringthis day I accompanied General Meade's column, and about midnightreceived the following communication from General Lee:

April 8, 1865.

"GENERAL:—I received, at a late hour, your note of to-day. In mine ofyesterday I did not intend to propose the surrender of the Army ofNorthern Virginia, but to ask the terms of your proposition. To befrank, I do not think the emergency has arisen to call for the surrenderof this army; but as the restoration of peace should be the sole objectof all, I desired to know whether your proposals would lead to that end.I cannot, therefore, meet you with a view to the surrender of the Armyof Northern Virginia; but as far as your proposal may affect theConfederate States forces under my command, and tend to the restorationof peace, I should be pleased to meet you at ten A.M. to-morrow on theold stage-road to Richmond, between the picket-lines of the two armies.

"R. E. LEE, General.
"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT."

Early on the morning of the 9th I returned him an answer as follows, andimmediately started to join the column south of the Appomattox:

"April 9, 1865.

"GENERAL:—Your note of yesterday is received. I have no authority totreat on the subject of peace; the meeting proposed for ten A.M. to-daycould lead to no good. I will state, however, general, that I amequally anxious for peace with yourself, and the whole North entertainsthe same feeling. The terms upon which peace can be had are wellunderstood. By the South laying down their arms they will hasten thatmost desirable event, save thousands of human lives, and hundreds ofmillions of property not yet destroyed. Seriously hoping that all ourdifficulties may be settled without the loss of another life, Isubscribe myself, etc.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"GENERAL R. E. LEE."

On this morning of the 9th, General Ord's command and the 5th corpsreached Appomattox Station just as the enemy was making a desperateeffort to break through our cavalry. The infantry was at once thrownin. Soon after a white flag was received, requesting a suspension ofhostilities pending negotiations for a surrender.

Before reaching General Sheridan's headquarters, I received thefollowing from General Lee:

"April 9, 1865.

"GENERAL:—I received your note of this morning on the picket-line,whither I had come to meet you, and ascertain definitely what terms wereembraced in your proposal of yesterday with reference to the surrenderof this army. I now ask an interview, in accordance with the offercontained in your letter of yesterday, for that purpose.

"R. E. LEE, General.
"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT."

The interview was held at Appomattox Court-House, the result of which isset forth in the following correspondence:

APPOMATTOX COURT-HOUSE, Virginia, April 9, 1865.

"GENERAL: In accordance with the substance of my letter to you of the8th instant, I propose to receive the surrender of the Army of NorthernVirginia on the following terms, to wit: Rolls of all the officers andmen to be made in duplicate, one copy to be given to an officer to bedesignated by me, the other to be retained by such officer or officersas you may designate. The officers to give their individual paroles notto take up arms against the Government of the United States untilproperly exchanged; and each company or regimental commander sign a likeparole for the men of their commands. The arms, artillery, and publicproperty to be parked and stacked, and turned over to the officersappointed by me to receive them. This will not embrace the side-arms ofthe officers, nor their private horses or baggage. This done, eachofficer and man will be allowed to return to his home, not to bedisturbed by United States authority so long as they observe theirparoles and the laws in force where they may reside.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"GENERAL R. E. LEE."

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, April 9, 1865.

"GENERAL: I have received your letter of this date containing the termsof surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia as proposed by you. Asthey are substantially the same as those expressed in your letter of the8th instant, they are accepted. I will proceed to designate the properofficers to carry the stipulations into effect.

"R. E. LEE, General.
"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT."

The command of Major-General Gibbon, the 5th army corps under Griffin,and Mackenzie's cavalry, were designated to remain at AppomattoxCourt-House until the paroling of the surrendered army was completed,and to take charge of the public property. The remainder of the armyimmediately returned to the vicinity of Burkesville.

General Lee's great influence throughout the whole South caused hisexample to be followed, and to-day the result is that the armies latelyunder his leadership are at their homes, desiring peace and quiet, andtheir arms are in the hands of our ordnance officers.

On the receipt of my letter of the 5th, General Sherman moved directlyagainst Joe Johnston, who retreated rapidly on and through Raleigh,which place General Sherman occupied on the morning of the 13th. Theday preceding, news of the surrender of General Lee reached him atSmithfield.

On the 14th a correspondence was opened between General Sherman andGeneral Johnston, which resulted on the 18th in an agreement for asuspension of hostilities, and a memorandum or basis for peace, subjectto the approval of the President. This agreement was disapproved by thePresident on the 21st, which disapproval, together with yourinstructions, was communicated to General Sherman by me in person on themorning of the 24th, at Raleigh, North Carolina, in obedience to yourorders. Notice was at once given by him to General Johnston for thetermination of the truce that had been entered into. On the 25thanother meeting between them was agreed upon, to take place on the 26th,which terminated in the surrender and disbandment of Johnston's armyupon substantially the same terms as were given to General Lee.

The expedition under General Stoneman from East Tennessee got off on the20th of March, moving by way of Boone, North Carolina, and struck therailroad at Wytheville, Chambersburg, and Big Lick. The force strikingit at Big Lick pushed on to within a few miles of Lynchburg, destroyingthe important bridges, while with the main force he effectuallydestroyed it between New River and Big Lick, and then turned forGreensboro', on the North Carolina Railroad; struck that road anddestroyed the bridges between Danville and Greensboro', and betweenGreensboro' and the Yadkin, together with the depots of supplies alongit, and captured four hundred prisoners. At Salisbury he attacked anddefeated a force of the enemy under General Gardiner, capturing fourteenpieces of artillery and one thousand three hundred and sixty-fourprisoners, and destroyed large amounts of army stores. At this place hedestroyed fifteen miles of railroad and the bridges towards Charlotte.Thence he moved to Slatersville.

General Canby, who had been directed in January to make preparations fora movement from Mobile Bay against Mobile and the interior of Alabama,commenced his movement on the 20th of March. The 16th corps,Major-General A. J. Smith commanding, moved from Fort Gaines by water toFish River; the 13th corps, under Major-General Gordon Granger, movedfrom Fort Morgan and joined the 16th corps on Fish River, both movingthence on Spanish Fort and investing it on the 27th; while Major-GeneralSteele's command moved from Pensacola, cut the railroad leading fromTensas to Montgomery, effected a junction with them, and partiallyinvested Fort Blakely. After a severe bombardment of Spanish Fort, apart of its line was carried on the 8th of April. During the night theenemy evacuated the fort. Fort Blakely was carried by assault on the9th, and many prisoners captured; our loss was considerable. Thesesuccesses practically opened to us the Alabama River, and enabled us toapproach Mobile from the north. On the night of the 11th the city wasevacuated, and was taken possession of by our forces on the morning ofthe 12th.

The expedition under command of Brevet Major-General Wilson, consistingof twelve thousand five hundred mounted men, was delayed by rains untilMarch 22d, when it moved from Chickasaw, Alabama. On the 1st of April,General Wilson encountered the enemy in force under Forrest nearEbenezer Church, drove him in confusion, captured three hundredprisoners and three guns, and destroyed the central bridge over theCahawba River. On the 2d he attacked and captured the fortified city ofSelma, defended by Forrest, with seven thousand men and thirty-two guns,destroyed the arsenal, armory, naval foundry, machine-shops, vastquantities of stores, and captured three thousand prisoners. On the 4thhe captured and destroyed Tuscaloosa. On the 10th he crossed theAlabama River, and after sending information of his operations toGeneral Canby, marched on Montgomery, which place he occupied on the14th, the enemy having abandoned it. At this place many stores and fivesteamboats fell into our hands. Thence a force marched direct onColumbus, and another on West Point, both of which places were assaultedand captured on the 16th. At the former place we got one thousand fivehundred prisoners and fifty-two field-guns, destroyed two gunboats, thenavy yard, foundries, arsenal, many factories, and much other publicproperty. At the latter place we got three hundred prisoners, fourguns, and destroyed nineteen locomotives and three hundred cars. On the20th he took possession of Macon, Georgia, with sixty field-guns, onethousand two hundred militia, and five generals, surrendered by GeneralHowell Cobb. General Wilson, hearing that Jeff. Davis was trying tomake his escape, sent forces in pursuit and succeeded in capturing himon the morning of May 11th.

On the 4th day of May, General Dick Taylor surrendered to General Canbyall the remaining rebel forces east of the Mississippi.

A force sufficient to insure an easy triumph over the enemy under KirbySmith, west of the Mississippi, was immediately put in motion for Texas,and Major-General Sheridan designated for its immediate command; but onthe 26th day of May, and before they reached their destination, GeneralKirby Smith surrendered his entire command to Major-General Canby. Thissurrender did not take place, however, until after the capture of therebel President and Vice-President; and the bad faith was exhibited offirst disbanding most of his army and permitting an indiscriminateplunder of public property.

Owing to the report that many of those lately in arms against thegovernment had taken refuge upon the soil of Mexico, carrying with themarms rightfully belonging to the United States, which had beensurrendered to us by agreement among them some of the leaders who hadsurrendered in person and the disturbed condition of affairs on the RioGrande, the orders for troops to proceed to Texas were not changed.

There have been severe combats, raids, expeditions, and movements todefeat the designs and purposes of the enemy, most of them reflectinggreat credit on our arms, and which contributed greatly to our finaltriumph, that I have not mentioned. Many of these will be found clearlyset forth in the reports herewith submitted; some in the telegrams andbrief dispatches announcing them, and others, I regret to say, have notas yet been officially reported.

For information touching our Indian difficulties, I would respectfullyrefer to the reports of the commanders of departments in which they haveoccurred.

It has been my fortune to see the armies of both the West and the Eastfight battles, and from what I have seen I know there is no differencein their fighting qualities. All that it was possible for men to do inbattle they have done. The Western armies commenced their battles inthe Mississippi Valley, and received the final surrender of the remnantof the principal army opposed to them in North Carolina. The armies ofthe East commenced their battles on the river from which the Army of thePotomac derived its name, and received the final surrender of their oldantagonists at Appomattox Court House, Virginia. The splendidachievements of each have nationalized our victories removed allsectional jealousies (of which we have unfortunately experienced toomuch), and the cause of crimination and recrimination that might havefollowed had either section failed in its duty. All have a proudrecord, and all sections can well congratulate themselves and each otherfor having done their full share in restoring the supremacy of law overevery foot of territory belonging to the United States. Let them hopefor perpetual peace and harmony with that enemy, whose manhood, howevermistaken the cause, drew forth such herculean deeds of valor.

I have the honor to be, Very respectfully, your obedient servant, U. S.
GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

THE END

__________FOOTNOTES

(*1) Afterwards General Gardner, C.S.A.

(*2) General Garland expressed a wish to get a message back toGeneral Twiggs, his division commander, or General Taylor, tothe effect that he was nearly out of ammunition and must havemore sent to him, or otherwise be reinforced. Deeming thereturn dangerous he did not like to order any one to carry it,so he called for a volunteer. Lieutenant Grant offered hisservices, which were accepted.—PUBLISHERS.

(*3) Mentioned in the reports of Major Lee, Colonel Garland andGeneral Worth.—PUBLISHERS.

(*4) NOTE.—It had been a favorite idea with General Scott for agreat many years before the Mexican war to have established inthe United States a soldiers' home, patterned after something ofthe kind abroad, particularly, I believe, in France. Herecommended this uniformly, or at least frequently, in hisannual reports to the Secretary of War, but never got anyhearing. Now, as he had conquered the state, he madeassessments upon the different large towns and cities occupiedby our troops, in proportion to their capacity to pay, andappointed officers to receive the money. In addition to the sumthus realized he had derived, through capture at Cerro Gordo,sales of captured government tobacco, etc., sums which swelledthe fund to a total of about $220,000. Portions of this fundwere distributed among the rank and file, given to the woundedin hospital, or applied in other ways, leaving a balance of some$118,000 remaining unapplied at the close of the war. After thewar was over and the troops all home, General Scott applied tohave this money, which had never been turned into the Treasuryof the United States, expended in establishing such homes as hehad previously recommended. This fund was the foundation of theSoldiers' Home at Washington City, and also one at Harrodsburgh,Kentucky.

The latter went into disuse many years ago. In fact it neverhad many soldiers in it, and was, I believe, finally sold.

(*5) The Mexican war made three presidential candidates, Scott,Taylor and Pierce—and any number of aspirants for that highoffice. It made also governors of States, members of thecabinet, foreign ministers and other officers of high rank bothin state and nation. The rebellion, which contained more war ina single day, at some critical periods, than the whole Mexicanwar in two years, has not been so fruitful of political resultsto those engaged on the Union side. On the other side, the sideof the South, nearly every man who holds office of any sortwhatever, either in the state or in the nation, was aConfederate soldier, but this is easily accounted for from thefact that the South was a military camp, and there were very fewpeople of a suitable age to be in the army who were not in it.

(*6) C. B. Lagow, the others not yet having joined me.

(*7) NOTE.—Since writing this chapter I have received from Mrs.W. H. L. Wallace, widow of the gallant general who was killed inthe first day's fight on the field of Shiloh, a letter fromGeneral Lew. Wallace to him dated the morning of the 5th. Atthe date of this letter it was well known that the Confederateshad troops out along the Mobile & Ohio railroad west of Crump'slanding and Pittsburg landing, and were also collecting nearShiloh. This letter shows that at that time General Lew.Wallace was making preparations for the emergency that mighthappen for the passing of reinforcements between Shiloh and hisposition, extending from Crump's landing westward, and he sendsit over the road running from Adamsville to the Pittsburglanding and Purdy road. These two roads intersect nearly a milewest of the crossing of the latter over Owl Creek, where ourright rested. In this letter General Lew. Wallace advisesGeneral W. H. L. Wallace that he will send "to-morrow" (and hisletter also says "April 5th," which is the same day the letterwas dated and which, therefore, must have been written on the4th) some cavalry to report to him at his headquarters, andsuggesting the propriety of General W. H. L. Wallace's sending acompany back with them for the purpose of having the cavalry atthe two landings familiarize themselves with the road so thatthey could "act promptly in case of emergency as guides to andfrom the different camps."

This modifies very materially what I have said, and what hasbeen said by others, of the conduct of General Lew. Wallace atthe battle of Shiloh. It shows that he naturally, with no moreexperience than he had at the time in the profession of arms,would take the particular road that he did start upon in theabsence of orders to move by a different road.

The mistake he made, and which probably caused his apparentdilatoriness, was that of advancing some distance after he foundthat the firing, which would be at first directly to his frontand then off to the left, had fallen back until it had got verymuch in rear of the position of his advance. This falling backhad taken place before I sent General Wallace orders to move upto Pittsburg landing and, naturally, my order was to follow theroad nearest the river. But my order was verbal, and to a staffofficer who was to deliver it to General Wallace, so that I amnot competent to say just what order the General actuallyreceived.

General Wallace's division was stationed, the First brigade atCrump's landing, the Second out two miles, and the Third two anda half miles out. Hearing the sounds of battle General Wallaceearly ordered his First and Third brigades to concentrate on theSecond. If the position of our front had not changed, the roadwhich Wallace took would have been somewhat shorter to our rightthan the River road.

U. S. GRANT.

MOUNT MACGREGOR, NEW YORK, June 21, 1885.

(*8) NOTE: In an article on the battle of Shiloh which I wrotefor the Century Magazine, I stated that General A. McD. McCook,who commanded a division of Buell's army, expressed someunwillingness to pursue the enemy on Monday, April 7th, becauseof the condition of his troops. General Badeau, in his history,also makes the same statement, on my authority. Out of justiceto General McCook and his command, I must say that they left apoint twenty-two miles east of Savannah on the morning of the6th. From the heavy rains of a few days previous and thepassage of trains and artillery, the roads were necessarily deepin mud, which made marching slow. The division had not onlymarched through this mud the day before, but it had been in therain all night without rest. It was engaged in the battle ofthe second day and did as good service as its positionallowed. In fact an opportunity occurred for it to perform aconspicuous act of gallantry which elicited the highestcommendation from division commanders in the Army of theTennessee. General Sherman both in his memoirs and report makesmention of this fact. General McCook himself belongs to a familywhich furnished many volunteers to the army. I refer to thesecircumstances with minuteness because I did General McCookinjustice in my article in the Century, though not to the extentone would suppose from the public press. I am not willing to doany one an injustice, and if convinced that I have done one, Iam always willing to make the fullest admission.

(*9) NOTE.—For gallantry in the various engagements, from thetime I was left in command down to 26th of October and on myrecommendation, Generals McPherson and C. S. Hamilton werepromoted to be Major-Generals, and Colonels C. C. Marsh, 20thIllinois, M. M. Crocker, 13th Iowa J. A. Mower, 11th Missouri,M. D. Leggett, 78th Ohio, J. D. Stevenson, 7th Missouri, andJohn E. Smith, 45th Illinois, to be Brigadiers.

(*10) Colonel Ellet reported having attacked a Confederatebattery on the Red River two days before with one of his boats,the De Soto. Running aground, he was obliged to abandon hisvessel. However, he reported that he set fire to her and blewher up. Twenty of his men fell into the hands of the enemy.With the balance he escaped on the small captured steamer, theNew Era, and succeeded in passing the batteries at Grand Gulfand reaching the vicinity of Vicksburg.

(*11) One of Colonel Ellet's vessels which had run the blockadeon February the 2d and been sunk in the Red River.

(*12) NOTE.—On this occasion Governor Richard Yates, ofIllinois, happened to be on a visit to the army and accompaniedme to Carthage. I furnished an ambulance for his use and thatof some of the State officers who accompanied him.

(*13) NOTE.—When General Sherman first learned of the move Iproposed to make, he called to see me about it. I recollectthat I had transferred my headquarters from a boat in the riverto a house a short distance back from the levee. I was seatedon the piazza engaged in conversation with my staff when Shermancame up. After a few moments' conversation he said that he wouldlike to see me alone. We passed into the house together and shutthe door after us. Sherman then expressed his alarm at the moveI had ordered, saying that I was putting myself in a positionvoluntarily which an enemy would be glad to manoeuvre a year—ora long time—to get me in. I was going into the enemy's country,with a large river behind me and the enemy holding pointsstrongly fortified above and below. He said that it was anaxiom in war that when any great body of troops moved against anenemy they should do so from a base of supplies, which they wouldguard as they would the apple of the eye, etc. He pointed outall the difficulties that might be encountered in the campaignproposed, and stated in turn what would be the true campaign tomake. This was, in substance, to go back until high groundcould be reached on the east bank of the river; fortify thereand establish a depot of supplies, and move from there, beingalways prepared to fall back upon it in case of disaster. Isaid this would take us back to Memphis. Sherman then said thatwas the very place he would go to, and would move by railroadfrom Memphis to Grenada, repairing the road as we advanced. Tothis I replied, the country is already disheartened over thelack of success on the part of our armies; the last electionwent against the vigorous prosecution of the war, voluntaryenlistments had ceased throughout most of the North andconscription was already resorted to, and if we went back so faras Memphis it would discourage the people so much that bases ofsupplies would be of no use: neither men to hold them norsupplies to put in them would be furnished. The problem for uswas to move forward to a decisive victory, or our cause waslost. No progress was being made in any other field, and we hadto go on.

Sherman wrote to my adjutant general, Colonel J. A. Rawlins,embodying his views of the campaign that should be made, andasking him to advise me to at least get the views of my generalsupon the subject. Colonel Rawlins showed me the letter, but Idid not see any reason for changing my plans. The letter wasnot answered and the subject was not subsequently mentionedbetween Sherman and myself to the end of the war, that Iremember of. I did not regard the letter as official, andconsequently did not preserve it. General Sherman furnished acopy himself to General Badeau, who printed it in his history ofmy campaigns. I did not regard either the conversation betweenus or the letter to my adjutant-general as protests, but simplyfriendly advice which the relations between us fullyjustified. Sherman gave the same energy to make the campaign asuccess that he would or could have done if it had been orderedby himself. I make this statement here to correct an impressionwhich was circulated at the close of the war to Sherman'sprejudice, and for which there was no fair foundation.

(*14) Meant Edward's Station.

(*15) CHATTANOOGA, November 18, 1863.

MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN:

Enclosed herewith I send you copy of instructions toMajor-General Thomas. You having been over the ground inperson, and having heard the whole matter discussed, furtherinstructions will not be necessary for you. It is particularlydesirable that a force should be got through to the railroadbetween Cleveland and Dalton, and Longstreet thus cut off fromcommunication with the South, but being confronted by a largeforce here, strongly located, it is not easy to tell how this isto be effected until the result of our first effort is known.

I will add, however, what is not shown in my instructions toThomas, that a brigade of cavalry has been ordered here which,if it arrives in time, will be thrown across the Tennessee aboveChickamauga, and may be able to make the trip to Cleveland orthereabouts.

U. S. GRANT
Maj.-Gen'l.

CHATTANOOGA, November 18, 1863.

MAJOR-GENERAL GEO. H. THOMAS,
Chattanooga:

All preparations should be made for attacking the enemy'sposition on Missionary Ridge by Saturday at daylight. Not beingprovided with a map giving names of roads, spurs of themountains, and other places, such definite instructions cannotbe given as might be desirable. However, the general plan, youunderstand, is for Sherman, with the force brought with himstrengthened by a division from your command, to effect acrossing of the Tennessee River just below the mouth ofChickamauga; his crossing to be protected by artillery from theheights on the north bank of the river (to be located by yourchief of artillery), and to secure the heights on the northernextremity to about the railroad tunnel before the enemy canconcentrate against him. You will co-operate with Sherman. Thetroops in Chattanooga Valley should be well concentrated on yourleft flank, leaving only the necessary force to defendfortifications on the right and centre, and a movable column ofone division in readiness to move wherever ordered. Thisdivision should show itself as threateningly as possible on themost practicable line for making an attack up the valley. Youreffort then will be to form a junction with Sherman, making youradvance well towards the northern end of Missionary Ridge, andmoving as near simultaneously with him as possible. Thejunction once formed and the ridge carried, communications willbe at once established between the two armies by roads on thesouth bank of the river. Further movements will then depend onthose of the enemy. Lookout Valley, I think, will be easilyheld by Geary's division and what troops you may still havethere belonging to the old Army of the Cumberland. Howard'scorps can then be held in readiness to act either with you atChattanooga or with Sherman. It should be marched on Fridaynight to a position on the north side of the river, not lowerdown than the first pontoon-bridge, and there held in readinessfor such orders as may become necessary. All these troops willbe provided with two days' cooked rations in haversacks, and onehundred rounds of ammunition on the person of each infantrysoldier. Special care should be taken by all officers to seethat ammunition is not wasted or unnecessarily fired away. Youwill call on the engineer department for such preparations asyou may deem necessary for carrying your infantry and artilleryover the creek.

U. S. GRANT,
Major-General.

(*16) In this order authority was given for the troops to reformafter taking the first line of rifle-pits preparatory to carryingthe ridge.

(*17) CHATTANOOGA, November 24,1863.

MAJOR-GENERAL. CEO. H. THOMAS,
Chattanooga

General Sherman carried Missionary Ridge as far as the tunnelwith only slight skirmishing. His right now rests at the tunneland on top of the hill, his left at Chickamauga Creek. I haveinstructed General Sherman to advance as soon as it is light inthe morning, and your attack, which will be simultaneous, willbe in cooperation. Your command will either carry therifle-pits and ridge directly in front of them, or move to theleft, as the presence of the enemy may require. If Hooker'sposition on the mountain [cannot be maintained] with a smallforce, and it is found impracticable to carry the top from wherehe is, it would be advisable for him to move up the valley withall the force he can spare, and ascend by the first practicableroad.

U. S. GRANT,

Major-General.

(*18) WASHINGTON, D. C.,December 8, 1863, 10.2 A.M.

MAJ.-GENERAL U. S. GRANT:

Understanding that your lodgment at Knoxville and at Chattanoogais now secure, I wish to tender you, and all under your command,my more than thanks, my profoundest gratitude for the skill,courage, and perseverance with which you and they, over so greatdifficulties, have effected that important object. God bless youall,

A. LINCOLN,

President U. S.

(*19) General John G. Foster.

(*20) During this winter the citizens of Jo Davies County, Ill.,subscribed for and had a diamond-hilled sword made for GeneralGrant, which was always known as the Chattanooga sword. Thescabbard was of gold, and was ornamented with a scroll runningnearly its entire length, displaying in engraved letters thenames of the battles in which General Grant had participated.

Congress also gave him a vote of thanks for the victories at
Chattanooga, and voted him a gold medal for Vicksburg and
Chattanooga. All such things are now in the possession of the
government at Washington.

(*21) WASHINGTON, D. C.December 29, 1863.

MAJ.-GENERAL U. S. GRANT:

General Foster has asked to be relieved from his command onaccount of disability from old wounds. Should his request begranted, who would you like as his successor? It is possiblethat Schofield will be sent to your command.

H. W. HALLECK
General-in-Chief.
(OFFICIAL.)

(*22) See letter to Banks, in General Grant's report, Appendix.

(*23) [PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, WASHINGTON, D. C.,
April 4, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN,
Commanding Military Division of the Mississippi.

GENERAL:—It is my design, if the enemy keep quiet and allow meto take the initiative in the spring campaign, to work all partsof the army together, and somewhat towards a common centre. Foryour information I now write you my programme, as at presentdetermined upon.

I have sent orders to Banks, by private messenger, to finish uphis present expedition against Shreveport with all dispatch; toturn over the defence of Red River to General Steele and thenavy and to return your troops to you and his own to NewOrleans; to abandon all of Texas, except the Rio Grande, and tohold that with not to exceed four thousand men; to reduce thenumber of troops on the Mississippi to the lowest numbernecessary to hold it, and to collect from his command not lessthan twenty-five thousand men. To this I will add five thousandmen from Missouri. With this force he is to commence operationsagainst Mobile as soon as he can. It will be impossible for himto commence too early.

Gillmore joins Butler with ten thousand men, and the two operateagainst Richmond from the south side of the James River. Thiswill give Butler thirty-three thousand men to operate with, W.F. Smith commanding the right wing of his forces and Gillmorethe left wing. I will stay with the Army of the Potomac,increased by Burnside's corps of not less than twenty-fivethousand effective men, and operate directly against Lee's army,wherever it may be found.

Sigel collects all his available force in two columns, one,under Ord and Averell, to start from Beverly, Virginia, and theother, under Crook, to start from Charleston on the Kanawha, tomove against the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad.

Crook will have all cavalry, and will endeavor to get in aboutSaltville, and move east from there to join Ord. His force willbe all cavalry, while Ord will have from ten to twelve thousandmen of all arms.

You I propose to move against Johnston's army, to break it upand to get into the interior of the enemy's country as far asyou can, inflicting all the damage you can against their warresources.

I do not propose to lay down for you a plan of campaign, butsimply lay down the work it is desirable to have done and leaveyou free to execute it in your own way. Submit to me, however,as early as you can, your plan of operations.

As stated, Banks is ordered to commence operations as soon as hecan. Gillmore is ordered to report at Fortress Monroe by the18th inst., or as soon thereafter as practicable. Sigel isconcentrating now. None will move from their places ofrendezvous until I direct, except Banks. I want to be ready tomove by the 25th inst., if possible. But all I can now directis that you get ready as soon as possible. I know you will havedifficulties to encounter in getting through the mountains towhere supplies are abundant, but I believe you will accomplishit.

From the expedition from the Department of West Virginia I donot calculate on very great results; but it is the only way Ican take troops from there. With the long line of railroadSigel has to protect, he can spare no troops except to movedirectly to his front. In this way he must get through toinflict great damage on the enemy, or the enemy must detach fromone of his armies a large force to prevent it. In other words,if Sigel can't skin himself he can hold a leg while some oneelse skins.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.

(*24) See instructions to Butler, in General Grant's report,Appendix.

(*25) IN FIELD, CULPEPER C. H., VA.,April 9, 1864.

MAJ.-GENERAL GEO. G. MEADE
Com'd'g Army of the Potomac.

For information and as instruction to govern your preparationsfor the coming campaign, the following is communicatedconfidentially for your own perusal alone.

So far as practicable all the armies are to move together, andtowards one common centre. Banks has been instructed to turnover the guarding of the Red River to General Steele and thenavy, to abandon Texas with the exception of the Rio Grande, andto concentrate all the force he can, not less than 25,000 men, tomove on Mobile. This he is to do without reference to othermovements. From the scattered condition of his command,however, he cannot possibly get it together to leave New Orleansbefore the 1st of May, if so soon. Sherman will move at the sametime you do, or two or three days in advance, Jo. Johnston's armybeing his objective point, and the heart of Georgia his ultimateaim. If successful he will secure the line from Chattanooga toMobile with the aid of Banks.

Sigel cannot spare troops from his army to reinforce either ofthe great armies, but he can aid them by moving directly to hisfront. This he has been directed to do, and is now makingpreparations for it. Two columns of his command will make southat the same time with the general move; one from Beverly, fromten to twelve thousand strong, under Major-General Ord; theother from Charleston, Va., principally cavalry, underBrig.-General Crook. The former of these will endeavor to reachthe Tennessee and Virginia Railroad, about south of Covington,and if found practicable will work eastward to Lynchburg andreturn to its base by way of the Shenandoah Valley, or joinyou. The other will strike at Saltville, Va., and come eastwardto join Ord. The cavalry from Ord's command will try tributarieswould furnish us an easy line over which to bring all supplies towithin easy hauling distance of every position the army couldoccupy from the Rapidan to the James River. But Lee could, ifhe chose, detach or move his whole army north on a line ratherinterior to the one I would have to take in following. Amovement by his left—our right—would obviate this; but allthat was done would have to be done with the supplies andammunition we started with. All idea of adopting this latterplan was abandoned when the limited quantity of suppliespossible to take with us was considered. The country over whichwe would have to pass was so exhausted of all food or forage thatwe would be obliged to carry everything with us.

While these preparations were going on the enemy was notentirely idle. In the West Forrest made a raid in WestTennessee up to the northern border, capturing the garrison offour or five hundred men at Union City, and followed it up by anattack on Paducah, Kentucky, on the banks of the Ohio. While hewas able to enter the city he failed to capture the forts or anypart of the garrison. On the first intelligence of Forrest'sraid I telegraphed Sherman to send all his cavalry against him,and not to let him get out of the trap he had put himselfinto. Sherman had anticipated me by sending troops against himbefore he got my order.

Forrest, however, fell back rapidly, and attacked the troops atFort Pillow, a station for the protection of the navigation ofthe Mississippi River. The garrison to force a passagesouthward, if they are successful in reaching the Virginia andTennessee Railroad, to cut the main lines of the road connectingRichmond with all the South and South-west.

Gillmore will join Butler with about 10,000 men from SouthCarolina. Butler can reduce his garrison so as to take 23,000men into the field directly to his front. The force will becommanded by Maj.-General W. F. Smith. With Smith and Gillmore,Butler will seize City Point, and operate against Richmond fromthe south side of the river. His movement will be simultaneouswith yours.

Lee's army will be your objective point. Wherever Lee goes,there you will go also. The only point upon which I am now indoubt is, whether it will be better to cross the Rapidan aboveor below him. Each plan presents great advantages over theother with corresponding objections. By crossing above, Lee iscut off from all chance of ignoring Richmond and going north ona raid. But if we take this route, all we do must be donewhilst the rations we start with hold out. We separate fromButler so that he cannot be directed how to co-operate. By theother route Brandy Station can be used as a base of suppliesuntil another is secured on the York or James rivers.

These advantages and objections I will talk over with you morefully than I can write them.

Burnside with a force of probably 25,000 men will reinforceyou. Immediately upon his arrival, which will be shortly afterthe 20th inst., I will give him the defence of the road fromBull Run as far south as we wish to hold it. This will enableyou to collect all your strength about Brandy Station and to thefront.

There will be naval co-operation on the James River, andtransports and ferries will be provided so that should Lee fallback into his intrenchments at Richmond, Butler's force andyours will be a unit, or at least can be made to act as such.What I would direct then, is that you commence at once reducingbaggage to the very lowest possible standard. Two wagons to aregiment of five hundred men is the greatest number that shouldbe allowed, for all baggage, exclusive of subsistence stores andordnance stores. One wagon to brigade and one to divisionheadquarters is sufficient and about two to corps headquarters.

Should by Lee's right flank be our route, you will want to makearrangements for having supplies of all sorts promptly forwardedto White House on the Pamunkey. Your estimates for thiscontingency should be made at once. If not wanted there, thereis every probability they will be wanted on the James River orelsewhere.

If Lee's left is turned, large provision will have to be madefor ordnance stores. I would say not much short of five hundredrounds of infantry ammunition would do. By the other, half theamount would be sufficient.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-General.

(*26) General John A. Logan, upon whom devolved the command ofthe Army of the Tennessee during this battle, in his report gaveour total loss in killed, wounded and missing at 3,521; andestimated that of the enemy to be not less than 10,000: andGeneral G. M. Dodge, graphically describing to General Shermanthe enemy's attack, the full weight of which fell first upon andwas broken by his depleted command, remarks: "The disparity offorces can be seen from the fact that in the charge made by mytwo brigades under Fuller and Mersy they took 351 prisoners,representing forty-nine different regiments, eight brigades andthree divisions; and brought back eight battle flags from theenemy."

(*27)UNION ARMY ON THE RAPIDAN, MAY 5, 1864.

[COMPILED.]

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, Commander-in-Chief.

MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE G. MEADE, Commanding Army of the Potomac.

MAJ.-GEN. W. S. HANCOCK, commanding Second Army Corps.

     First Division, Brig.-Gen. Francis C. Barlow.
          First Brigade, Col. Nelson A. Miles.
          Second Brigade, Col. Thomas A. Smyth.
          Third Brigade, Col. Paul Frank.
          Fourth Brigade, Col. John R. Brooke.

     Second Division, Brig.-Gen. John Gibbon.
          First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Alex. S. Webb.
          Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Joshua T. Owen.
          Third Brigade, Col. Samuel S. Carroll.

     Third Division, Maj.-Gen. David B. Birney.
          First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. J. H. H. Ward.
          Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Alexander Hays.

     Fourth Divisin, Brig.-Gen. Gershom Mott.
          First Brigade, Col. Robert McAllister.
          Second Brigade, Col. Wm. R. Brewster.

Artillery Brigade, Col. John C. Tidball.

MAJ.-GEN. G. K. WARREN, commanding Fifth Army Corps.

     First Division, Brig.-Gen. Charles Griffin.
          First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Romeyn B. Ayres.
          Second Brigade, Col. Jacob B. Sweitzer.
          Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. J. J. Bartlett.

     Second Division, Brig.-Gen. John C. Robinson.
          First Brigade, Col. Samuel H. Leonard.
          Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Henry Baxter.
          Third Brigade, Col. Andrew W. Denison.

     Third Division, Brig.-Gen. Samuel W. Crawford.
          First Brigade, Col. Wm McCandless.
          Third Brigade, Col. Joseph W. Fisher.

     Fourth Division, Brig.-Gen. James S. Wadsworth.
          First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Lysander Cutler.
          Second Brigade Brig.-Gen. James C. Rice.
          Third Brigade, Col. Roy Stone

Artillery Brigade, Col. S. S. Wainwright.

MAJ.-GEN. JOHN SEDGWICK, commanding Sixth Army Corps.

     First Division, Brig.-Gen. H. G. Wright.
          First Brigade, Col. Henry W. Brown.
          Second Brigade, Col. Emory Upton.
          Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. D. A. Russell.
          Fourth Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Alexander Shaler.

     Second Division, Brig.-Gen. George W. Getty.
          First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Frank Wheaton.
          Second Brigade, Col. Lewis A. Grant.
          Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Thos. H. Neill.
          Fourth Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Henry L. Eustis.

     Third Division, Brig.-Gen. James Ricketts.
          First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Wm. H. Morris.
          Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. T. Seymour.

Artillery Brigade, Col. C. H. Tompkins

MAJ.-GEN. P. H. SHERIDAN, commanding Cavalry Corps.

     First Division, Brig.-Gen. A. T. A. Torbert.
          First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. G. A. Custer.
          Second Brigade, Col. Thos. C. Devin.
          Reserve Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Wesley Merritt

     Second Division, Brig.-Gen. D. McM. Gregg.
          First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Henry E. Davies, Jr.
          Second Brigade, Col. J. Irvin Gregg.

     Third Division, Brig.-Gen. J. H. Wilson.
          First Brigade, Col. T. M. Bryan, Jr.
          Second Brigade, Col. Geo. H. Chapman.

MAJ.-GEN. A. E. BURNSIDE, commanding Ninth Army Corps.

     First Division, Brig.-Gen. T. G. Stevenson.
          First Brigade, Col. Sumner Carruth.
          Second Brigade, Col. Daniel Leasure.

     Second Division, Brig.-Gen. Robert B. Potter.
          First Brigade, Col. Zenas R. Bliss.
          Second Brigade, Col. Simon G. Griffin.

     Third Division, Brig.-Gen. Orlando Willcox.
          First Brigade, Col. John F. Hartranft.
          Second Brigade, Col. Benj. C. Christ.

     Fourth Division, Brig.-Gen. Edward Ferrero.
          First Brigade, Col. Joshua K. Sigfried.
          Second Brigade, Col. Henry G. Thomas.

Provisional Brigade, Col. Elisha G. Marshall.

BRIG.-GEN. HENRY J. HUNT, commanding Artillery.

     Reserve, Col. H. S. Burton.
          First Brigade, Col. J. H. Kitching.
          Second Brigade, Maj. J. A. Tompkins.
          First Brig. Horse Art., Capt. J. M. Robertson.
          Second Brigade, Horse Art., Capt. D. R. Ransom.
          Third Brigade, Maj. R. H. Fitzhugh.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS…….
          Provost Guard, Brig.-Gen. M. R. Patrick.
          Volunteer Engineers, Brig.-Gen. H. W. Benham.

CONFEDERATE ARMY.

Organization of the Army of Northern Virginia, Commanded by
GENERAL ROBERT E. LEE, August 31st, 1834.

First Army Corps: LIEUT.-GEN. R. H. ANDERSON, Commanding.

MAJ.-GEN. GEO. E. PICKETT'S Division.
     Brig.-Gen. Seth M. Barton's Brigade. (a)
     Brig.-Gen. M. D. Corse's "
          " Eppa Hunton's "
          " Wm. R. Terry's "

MAJ.-GEN. C. W. FIELD'S Division. (b)
     Brig.-Gen. G. T. Anderson's Brigade
           " E. M. Law's (c) "
           " John Bratton's "

MAJ.-GEN. J. B. KERSHAW'S Division. (d)
     Brig.-Gen. W. T. Wofford's Brigade
           " B. G. Humphreys' "
           " Goode Bryan's "
           " Kershaw's (Old) "

Second Army Corps: MAJOR-GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY, Commanding

MAJ.-GEN. JOHN B. GORDON'S Division.
     Brig.-Gen. H. T. Hays' Brigade. (e)
         " John Pegram 's " (f)
         " Gordon's " (g)
     Brig.-Gen. R. F. Hoke's "

MAJ.-GEN. EDWARD JOHNSON'S Division.
     Stonewall Brig. (Brig.-Gen. J. A. Walker). (h)
     Brig.-Gen. J M Jones' Brigade. (h)
         " Geo H. Stewart's " (h)
         " L. A. Stafford's " (e)

MAJ.-GEN. R. E. RODES' Division.
     Brig.-Gen. J. Daniel's Brigade. (i)
         " Geo. Dole's " (k)
         " S. D. Ramseur's Brigade.
         " C. A. Battle's "
         " R. D. Johnston's " (f)

Third Army Corps: LIEUT.-GEN. A. P. HILL, Commanding.

MAJ.-GEN. WM. MAHONE'S Division. (l)
     Brig.-Gen. J. C. C. Sanders' Brigade.
                Mahone's "
     Brig.-Gen. N. H. Harris's " (m)
        " A. R. Wright's "
        " Joseph Finegan's "

MAJ.-GEN. C. M. WILCOX'S Division.
     Brig.-Gen. E. L. Thomas's Brigade (n)
        " James H. Lane's "
        " Sam'l McCowan's "
        " Alfred M. Scale's "

MAJ.-GEN. H. HETH'S Division. (o)
     Brig.-Gen. J. R. Davis's Brigade.
        " John R. Cooke's "
        " D. McRae's "
        " J. J. Archer's "
        " H. H. Walker's "

unattached: 5th Alabama Battalion.

Cavalry Corps: LIEUTENANT-GENERAL WADE HAMPTON, Commanding.(p)

MAJ.-GEN. FITZHUGH LEE'S Division
     Brig.-Gen. W. C. Wickham's Brigade
        " L. L. Lomax's "

MAJ.-GEN. M. C. BUTLER'S Division.
     Brig.-Gen. John Dunovant's Brigade.
        " P. M. B. Young's "
        " Thomas L. Rosser's "

MAJ.-GEN. W. H. F. LEE'S Division.
     Brig.-Gen. Rufus Barringer's Brigade.
        " J. R. Chambliss's "

Artillery Reserve: BRIG.-GEN. W. N. PENDLETON, Commanding.

BRIG.-GEN. E. P. ALEXANDER'S DIVISION.*
     Cabell's Battalion.
          Manly's Battery.
          1st Co. Richmond Howitzers.
          Carleton's Battery.
          Calloway's Battery.

     Haskell's Battalion.
          Branch's Battery.
          Nelson's "
          Garden's "
          Rowan "

     Huger's Battalion.
          Smith's Battery.
          Moody "
          Woolfolk "
          Parker's "
          Taylor's "
          Fickling's "
          Martin's "

     Gibb's Battalion.
          Davidson's Battery.
          Dickenson's "
          Otey's "

BRIG.-GEN. A. L. LONG'S DIVISION.

     Braxton's Battalion.
          Lee Battery.
          1st Md. Artillery.
          Stafford "
          Alleghany "

     Cutshaw's Battalion.
          Charlotteville Artillery.
          Staunton "
          Courtney "

     Carter's Battalion.
          Morris Artillery.
          Orange "
          King William Artillery.
          Jeff Davis "

    Nelson's Battalion.
          Amherst Artillery.
          Milledge "
          Fluvauna "

Brown's Battalion. Powhatan Artillery. 2d Richmond Howitzers. 3d " " Rockbridge Artillery. Salem Flying Artillery.

COL R. L.WALKER'S DIVISION.

     Cutt's Battalion.
          Ross's Battery.
          Patterson's Battery.
          Irwin Artillery.

     Richardson's Battalion.
          Lewis Artillery.
          Donaldsonville Artillery.
          Norfolk Light "
          Huger "

     Mclntosh 's Battalion.
          Johnson's Battery.
          Hardaway Artillery.
          Danville "
          2d Rockbridge Artillery.

     Pegram's Battalion.
          Peedee Artillery.
          Fredericksburg Artillery.
          Letcher "
          Purcell Battery.
          Crenshaw's Battery.

     Poague's Battalion.
          Madison Artillery.
          Albemarle "
          Brooke "
          Charlotte "

NOTE.(a) COL. W. R. Aylett was in command Aug. 29th, and probably atabove date.(b) Inspection report of this division shows that it alsocontained Benning's and Gregg's Brigades. (c) Commanded byColonel P. D. Bowles.(d) Only two brigadier-generals reported for duty; names notindicated.

Organization of the Army of the Valley District.(e) Constituting York's Brigade.(f) In Ramseur's Division.(g) Evan's Brigade, Colonel E. N. Atkinson commanding, andcontaining 12th Georgia Battalion.(h) The Virginia regiments constituted Terry's Brigade, Gordon'sDivision.(i) Grimes' Brigade.(k) Cook's "

(l) Returns report but one general officer present for duty;name not indicated.(m) Colonel Joseph M. Jayne, commanding.(n) Colonel Thomas J. Simmons, commanding. (o) Fourbrigadier-generals reported present for duty; names notindicated.(p) On face of returns appears to have consisted of Hampton's,Fitz-Lee's, and W. H. F. Lee's Division, and Dearing's Brigade.

*But one general officer reported present for duty in theartillery, and Alexander's name not on the original.

(*28) HEADQUARTERS ARMIES U. S.,May II, 1864.—3 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE,
Commanding Army of the Potomac.

Move three divisions of the 2d corps by the rear of the 5th and6th corps, under cover of night, so as to join the 9th corps ina vigorous assault on the enemy at four o'clock A.M. to-morrow.will send one or two staff officers over to-night to stay withBurnside, and impress him with the importance of a prompt andvigorous attack. Warren and Wright should hold their corps asclose to the enemy as possible, to take advantage of anydiversion caused by this attack, and to push in if anyopportunity presents itself. There is but little doubt in mymind that the assault last evening would have proved entirelysuccessful if it had commenced one hour earlier and had beenheartily entered into by Mott's division and the 9th corps.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieut.-General.

(*29) HEADQUARTERS, ARMIES U. S.,May 11, 1864.-4 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL A. E. BURNSIDE,
Commanding 9th Army Corps.

Major-General Hancock has been ordered to move his corps undercover of night to join you in a vigorous attack against theenemy at 4 o'clock A.M. to-morrow. You will move against theenemy with your entire force promptly and with all possiblevigor at precisely 4 o'clock A.M. to-morrow the 12th inst. Letyour preparations for this attack be conducted with the utmostsecrecy and veiled entirely from the enemy.

I send two of my staff officers, Colonels Comstock and Babcock,in whom I have great confidence and who are acquainted with thedirection the attack is to be made from here, to remain with youand General Hancock with instructions to render you everyassistance in their power. Generals Warren and Wright will holdtheir corps as close to the enemy as possible, to take advantageof any diversion caused by yours and Hancock's attack, and willpush in their whole force if any opportunity presents itself.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieut.-General.

(*30) HEADQUARTERS ARMIES U. S.,May 12, 1864, 6.30 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK,
Washington, D. C.

The eighth day of the battle closes, leaving between three andfour thousand prisoners in our hands for the day's work,including two general officers, and over thirty pieces ofartillery. The enemy are obstinate, and seem to have found thelast ditch. We have lost no organizations, not even that of acompany, whilst we have destroyed and captured one division(Johnson's), one brigade (Doles'), and one regiment entire fromthe enemy.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieut.-General.

(*31) SPOTTSYLVANIA C. H., May 13, 1864.

HON E. M. STANTON, SECRETARY OF WAR,
Washington, D. C.

I beg leave to recommend the following promotions be made forgallant and distinguished services in the last eight days'battles, to wit: Brigadier-General H. G. Wright andBrigadier-General John Gibbon to be Major-Generals; Colonel S.S. Carroll, 8th Ohio Volunteers Colonel E. Upton, 121st New YorkVolunteers; Colonel William McCandless, 2d Pennsylvania Reserves,to be Brigadier-Generals. I would also recommend Major-General W.S. Hancock for Brigadier-General in the regular army. Hisservices and qualifications are eminently deserving of thisrecognition. In making these recommendations I do not wish theclaims of General G. M. Dodge for promotion forgotten, butrecommend his name to be sent in at the same time. I would alsoask to have General Wright assigned to the command of the SixthArmy Corps. I would further ask the confirmation of GeneralHumphreys to the rank of Major-General.

General Meade has more than met my most sanguine expectations.He and Sherman are the fittest officers for large commands Ihave come in contact with. If their services can be rewarded bypromotion to the rank of Major-Generals in the regular army thehonor would be worthily bestowed, and I would feel personallygratified. I would not like to see one of these promotions atthis time without seeing both.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieut.-General.

(*32) QUARLES' MILLS, VA., May 26, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK,
Washington, D. C.

The relative position of the two armies is now as follows: Lee'sright rests on a swamp east of the Richmond and Fredericksburgroad and south of the North Anna, his centre on the river at OxFord, and his left at Little River with the crossings of LittleRiver guarded as far up as we have gone. Hancock with his corpsand one division of the 9th corps crossed at Chesterfield Fordand covers the right wing of Lee's army. One division of the 9thcorps is on the north bank of the Anna at Ox Ford, with bridgesabove and below at points nearest to it where both banks areheld by us, so that it could reinforce either wing of our armywith equal facility. The 5th and 6th corps with one division ofthe 9th corps run from the south bank of the Anna from a shortdistance above Ox Ford to Little River, and parallel with andnear to the enemy.

To make a direct attack from either wing would cause a slaughterof our men that even success would not justify. To turn theenemy by his right, between the two Annas is impossible onaccount of the swamp upon which his right rests. To turn him bythe left leaves Little River, New Found River and South AnnaRiver, all of them streams presenting considerable obstacles tothe movement of our army, to be crossed. I have determinedtherefore to turn the enemy's right by crossing at or nearHanover Town. This crosses all three streams at once, andleaves us still where we can draw supplies.

During the last night the teams and artillery not in position,belonging to the right wing of our army, and one division ofthat wing were quietly withdrawn to the north bank of the riverand moved down to the rear of the left. As soon as it is darkthis division with most of the cavalry will commence a forcedmarch for Hanover Town to seize and hold the crossings. Thebalance of the right wing will withdraw at the same hour, andfollow as rapidly as possible. The left wing will also withdrawfrom the south bank of the river to-night and follow in rear ofthe right wing. Lee's army is really whipped. The prisoners wenow take show it, and the action of his army shows itunmistakably. A battle with them outside of intrenchmentscannot be had. Our men feel that they have gained the MORALEover the enemy, and attack him with confidence. I may bemistaken, but I feel that our success over Lee's army is alreadyassured. The promptness and rapidity with which you haveforwarded reinforcements has contributed largely to the feelingof confidence inspired in our men, and to break down that of theenemy.

We are destroying all the rails we can on the Central andFredericksburg roads. I want to leave a gap on the roads northof Richmond so big that to get a single track they will have toimport rail from elsewhere. Even if a crossing is not effectedat Hanover Town it will probably be necessary for us to move ondown the Pamunkey until a crossing is effected. I think itadvisable therefore to change our base of supplies from PortRoyal to the White House. I wish you would direct this changeat once, and also direct Smith to put the railroad bridge therein condition for crossing troops and artillery and leave men tohold it.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieut.-General.

(*33) NEAR COLD HARBOR, June 3, 1864, 7 A.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE,
Commanding A. P.

The moment it becomes certain that an assault cannot succeed,suspend the offensive; but when one does succeed, push itvigorously and if necessary pile in troops at the successfulpoint from wherever they can be taken. I shall go to where youare in the course of an hour.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieut.-General.

(*34) COLD HARBOR, June 5,1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Chief of Staff of the Army, Washington,
D. C.

A full survey of all the ground satisfies me that it would beimpracticable to hold a line north-east of Richmond that wouldprotect the Fredericksburg Railroad to enable us to use thatroad for supplying the army. To do so would give us a longvulnerable line of road to protect, exhausting much of ourstrength to guard it, and would leave open to the enemy all ofhis lines of communication on the south side of the James. Myidea from the start has been to beat Lee's army if possiblenorth of Richmond; then after destroying his lines ofcommunication on the north side of the James River to transferthe army to the south side and besiege Lee in Richmond, orfollow him south if he should retreat.

I now find, after over thirty days of trial, the enemy deems itof the first importance to run no risks with the armies they nowhave. They act purely on the defensive behind breastworks, orfeebly on the offensive immediately in front of them, and wherein case of repulse they can instantly retire behind them.Without a greater sacrifice of human life than I am willing tomake all cannot be accomplished that I had designed outside ofthe city. I have therefore resolved upon the following plan:

I will continue to hold substantially the ground now occupied bythe Army of the Potomac, taking advantage of any favorablecircumstance that may present itself until the cavalry can besent west to destroy the Virginia Central Railroad from aboutBeaver Dam for some twenty-five or thirty miles west. When thisis effected I will move the army to the south side of the JamesRiver, either by crossing the Chickahominy and marching near toCity Point, or by going to the mouth of the Chickahominy onnorth side and crossing there. To provide for this last andmost possible contingency, several ferry-boats of the largestclass ought to be immediately provided.

Once on the south side of the James River, I can cut off allsources of supply to the enemy except what is furnished by thecanal. If Hunter succeeds in reaching Lynchburg, that will belost to him also. Should Hunter not succeed, I will still makethe effort to destroy the canal by sending cavalry up the southside of the river with a pontoon train to cross wherever theycan.

The feeling of the two armies now seems to be that the rebelscan protect themselves only by strong intrenchments, whilst ourarmy is not only confident of protecting itself withoutintrenchments, but that it can beat and drive the enemy whereverand whenever he can be found without this protection.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.

(*35) COLD HARBOR, VA., June 6, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL D. HUNTER

Commanding Dept. W. Va.

General Sheridan leaves here to-morrow morning, withinstructions to proceed to Charlottesville, Va., and to commencethere the destruction of the Va. Cen. R. R., destroying this wayas much as possible. The complete destruction of this road andof the canal on James River is of great importance to us.According to the instructions I sent to General Halleck for yourguidance, you were to proceed to Lynchburg and commence there. Itwould be of great value to us to get possession of Lynchburg fora single day. But that point is of so much importance to theenemy, that in attempting to get it such resistance may be metas to defeat your getting onto the road or canal at all. I see,in looking over the letter to General Halleck on the subject ofyour instructions, that it rather indicates that your routeshould be from Staunton via Charlottesville. If you have sounderstood it, you will be doing just what I want. Thedirection I would now give is, that if this letter reaches youin the valley between Staunton and Lynchburg, you immediatelyturn east by the most practicable road. From thence moveeastward along the line of the road, destroying it completelyand thoroughly, until you join General Sheridan. After the worklaid out for General Sheridan and yourself is thoroughly done,proceed to join the Army of the Potomac by the route laid out inGeneral Sheridan's instructions.

If any portion of your force, especially your cavalry, is neededback in your Department, you are authorized to send it back.

If on receipt of this you should be near to Lynchburg and deemit practicable to detach a cavalry force to destroy the canal.Lose no opportunity to destroy the canal.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieut.-General.

(*36) FROM A STATEMENT OF LOSSES COMPILED IN THEADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE.

FIELD OF ACTION AND DATE. | KILLED. | WOUNDED. | MISSING. |AGGREGATE. |

Wilderness, May 5th to 7th | 2,261 | 8,785 | 2,902 |13,948 |
Spottsylvania, May 8th to 21st | 2,271 | 9,360 | 1,970 | 13,601|
North Anna, May 23d to 27th | 186 | 792 | 165 | 1,143 |
Totopotomoy, May 27th to 31st | 99 | 358 | 52 | 509 | Cold
Harbor, May 31st to June 12th | 1,769 | 6,752 | 1,537 |10,058 |
Total ……………. | 6,586 | 26,047 | 6,626 | 39,259 |

(*37) CITY POINT, VA., June 17, 1864. 11 A.M.

MAJOR-GEN. HALLECK,
Washington, D. C.

* * * * * *

The enemy in their endeavor to reinforce Petersburg abandonedtheir intrenchments in front of Bermuda Hundred. They no doubtexpected troops from north of the James River to take theirplace before we discovered it. General Butler took advantage ofthis and moved a force at once upon the railroad and plank roadbetween Richmond and Petersburg, which I hope to retainpossession of.

Too much credit cannot be given to the troops and theircommanders for the energy and fortitude displayed during thelast five days. Day and night has been all the same, no delaysbeing allowed on any account.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieut.-General.

(*38) CITY POINT, VA., July 24, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE,
Commanding, etc.

The engineer officers who made a survey of the front fromBermuda Hundred report against the probability of success froman attack there. The chances they think will be better onBurnside's front. If this is attempted it will be necessary toconcentrate all the force possible at the point in the enemy'sline we expect to penetrate. All officers should be fullyimpressed with the absolute necessity of pushing entirely beyondthe enemy's present line, if they should succeed in penetratingit, and of getting back to their present line promptly if theyshould not succeed in breaking through.

To the right and left of the point of assault all the artillerypossible should be brought to play upon the enemy in frontduring the assault. Their lines would be sufficient for thesupport of the artillery, and all the reserves could be broughton the flanks of their commands nearest to the point of assault,ready to follow in if successful. The field artillery andinfantry held in the lines during the first assault should be inreadiness to move at a moment's notice either to their front orto follow the main assault, as they should receive orders. Onething, however, should be impressed on corps commanders. Ifthey see the enemy giving away on their front or moving from itto reinforce a heavily assaulted portion of their line, theyshould take advantage of such knowledge and act promptly withoutwaiting for orders from army commanders. General Ord canco-operate with his corps in this movement, and about fivethousand troops from Bermuda Hundred can be sent to reinforceyou or can be used to threaten an assault between the Appomattoxand James rivers, as may be deemed best.

This should be done by Tuesday morning, if done at all. If notattempted, we will then start at the date indicated to destroythe railroad as far as Hicksford at least, and to Weldon ifpossible.

* * * * * *

Whether we send an expedition on the road or assault at
Petersburg, Burnside's mine will be blown up….

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.

(*39) See letter, August 5th, Appendix.

(*40) See Appendix, letters of Oct. 11th.

(*41) CITY POINT, VA., December 2,1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,
Nashville Tenn.

If Hood is permitted to remain quietly about Nashville, you willlose all the road back to Chattanooga and possibly have toabandon the line of the Tennessee. Should he attack you it isall well, but if he does not you should attack him before hefortifies. Arm and put in the trenches your quartermasteremployees, citizens, etc.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.

CITY POINT, VA., December 2, 1864.—1.30 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,
Nashville, Tenn.

With your citizen employees armed, you can move out of Nashvillewith all your army and force the enemy to retire or fight uponground of your own choosing. After the repulse of Hood atFranklin, it looks to me that instead of falling back toNashville we should have taken the offensive against the enemywhere he was. At this distance, however, I may err as to thebest method of dealing with the enemy. You will now sufferincalculable injury upon your railroads if Hood is not speedilydisposed of. Put forth therefore every possible exertion toattain this end. Should you get him to retreating give him nopeace.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.

CITY POINT, VA., December 5, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,
Nashville, Tenn.

Is there not danger of Forrest moving down the Cumberland towhere he can cross it? It seems to me whilst you should begetting up your cavalry as rapidly as possible to look afterForrest, Hood should be attacked where he is. Time strengthenshim in all possibility as much as it does you.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.

CITY POINT, VA., December 6, 1864—4 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,
Nashville, Tenn.

Attack Hood at once and wait no longer for a remnant of yourcavalry. There is great danger of delay resulting in a campaignback to the Ohio River.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.

CITY POINT, VA., December 8, 1864.—8.30 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,
Nashville, Tenn.

Your dispatch of yesterday received. It looks to me evident theenemy are trying to cross the Cumberland River, and arescattered. Why not attack at once? By all means avoid thecontingency of a foot race to see which, you or Hood, can beatto the Ohio. If you think necessary call on the governors ofStates to send a force into Louisville to meet the enemy if heshould cross the river. You clearly never should cross exceptin rear of the enemy. Now is one of the finest opportunitiesever presented of destroying one of the three armies of theenemy. If destroyed he never can replace it. Use the means atyour command, and you can do this and cause a rejoicing thatwill resound from one end of the land to the other.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.

CITY POINT, VA., December 11, 1864.—4 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,
Nashville, Tenn.

If you delay attack longer the mortifying spectacle will bewitnessed of a rebel army moving for the Ohio River, and youwill be forced to act, accepting such weather as you find. Letthere be no further delay. Hood cannot even stand a drawnbattle so far from his supplies of ordnance stores. If heretreats and you follow, he must lose his material and much ofhis army. I am in hopes of receiving a dispatch from you to-dayannouncing that you have moved. Delay no longer for weather orreinforcements.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.

WASHINGTON, D. C., December 15, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,
Nashville, Tenn.

I was just on my way to Nashville, but receiving a dispatch fromVan Duzer detailing your splendid success of to-day, I shall gono further. Push the enemy now and give him no rest until he isentirely destroyed. Your army will cheerfully suffer manyprivations to break up Hood's army and render it useless forfuture operations. Do not stop for trains or supplies, but takethem from the country as the enemy have done. Much is nowexpected.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.

(*42) See orders to Major-General Meade, Ord, and Sheridan,March 24th, Appendix.

(*43) See Appendix.

(*44) NOTE.—The fac-simile of the terms of Lee's surrenderinserted at this place, was copied from the original documentfurnished the publishers through the courtesy of General Ely S.Parker, Military Secretary on General Grant's staff at the timeof the surrender.

Three pages of paper were prepared in General Grant's manifold
order book on which he wrote the terms, and the interlineations
and erasures were added by General Parker at the suggestion of
General Grant. After such alteration it was handed to General
Lee, who put on his glasses, read it, and handed it back to
General Grant. The original was then transcribed by General
Parker upon official headed paper and a copy furnished General
Lee.

The fac-simile herewith shows the color of the paper of theoriginal document and all interlineations and erasures.

There is a popular error to the effect that Generals Grant andLee each signed the articles of surrender. The document in theform of a letter was signed only by General Grant, in the parlorof McLean's house while General Lee was sitting in the room, andGeneral Lee immediately wrote a letter accepting the terms andhanded it to General Grant.

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